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Abstract 
The growing evidence that humanity has entered the Anthropocene raises significant 
concerns over the existential survival of individuals, states, and of life on Earth itself. In 
response to the increasingly global nature of environmental problems, international 
environmental law (IEL) has emerged to facilitate collective efforts by states to mitigate 
ecological harm. In more recent times, the role of IEL has centred on addressing the balance 
between development, economic growth, and the need to protect the environment for future 
generations. In light of mounting evidence over the role of environmental degradation and 
the negative impact of humanity’s activities on the Earth, concerns over how such 
destruction can exacerbate conflict and undermine security, development, and economic 
growth have been raised by the United Nations Security Council and other international 
forums. The increasing associations between environment and security in international 
circles and by states poses the questions of how states perceive the ‘environment’ and for 
what reasons do they protect it? This thesis examines the extent to which this convergence 
between environment and security alters the way in which the international community seek 
to protect the environment, and in turn, what this suggests about their perception of the 
environment. Drawing on ecofeminist theory to develop an analytical framework, it 
examines the preparatory reports and outcome texts from eight environmental regimes in 
relation to three areas of international environmental law-making. It examines who 
participates in the development of IEL in order to reveal any tensions between the principle 
of participation included in sustainable development, and the exclusionary practices in some 
environmental areas that are closely connected to the environment and national interests.  It 
then considers the justifications for the integration of other non-environmental 
considerations, such as development, economic, security, and technology into IEL, and their 
influence on states’ perception of the environment. The thesis concludes that despite the 
broader participation by NSAs in the development of IEL, changes in states’ priorities over 
time, and the growing convergence between security and environment, the western 
anthropomorphic perception of the environment prevails in  law-making at an international 
level. 
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1. Introduction 
This study will explore the conjunction of two powerful and ontologically divergent 
words – ‘environmental security’ – as this occurs in international environmental law (IEL) 
and the implications of this for the assumptions and perspectives about the environment in 
this body of law. The conjunction of these words carries significant emotive connotations 
because they both concern the existential survival of humanity, states and the Earth itself.1 
The United Nations, states, governments, intergovernmental organisations, non-
governmental organisations, corporate global actors, civil society, communities, and 
individual human beings have responded to the degradation of the environment through 
policy-making and legislation, while also including environmental themes in security 
considerations. This inclusion reflects the widening and deepening of the meaning of 
‘security’ in the post-Cold War period where concerns such as drugs, disease, environment, 
the economy, terrorism, and organised crime have been labelled as security issues.2 Some 
member states of the United Nations have gone so far as to identify connections between 
poverty and environmental degradation as a cause of insecurity, and propose that the 
solution to these interconnected problems, and attaining peace, is through the process of 
sustainable development, economic growth, and trade and economic liberalisation.3 
However, such solutions are informed by assumptions about and perceptions of the 
environment and its role in international geopolitics.  
Underlying any international response to the interrelated concerns of environment and 
security is the question of what states and non-state actors (NSAs) in the international 
community mean when they refer to the environment. Ecofeminists argue that different 
responses to security and environmental degradation are informed by beliefs, attitudes, and 
values that shape the way we view our world and other people.4 Therefore, an examination 
of the beliefs, attitudes, and values that inform states’ perception of the environment is 
                                                          
1 Jon Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era (Zed 
Books 2001), 1; UNSC Verbatim Record (17 April 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5663, 23 (Maldives), 27 (Papua New 
Guinea); UNSC Verbatim Record (20 July 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1), 36 (Fiji). 
2 UNSC Verbatim Record (31 January 1992) UN Doc S/PV.3046, 143;  Note by the President of the Security 
Council  (31 January 1992) UN Doc UN Doc S/23500, 3;  Note by the President of the Security Council  (30 April 
1993) UN Doc UN Doc S/25696; UNSC Verbatim Record (20 July 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1), 2-
3; see also, UNSC Presidential Statement 22 Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Natural Resources 
and Conflict (25 June 2007) UN Doc S/PRST/2007/22 (concerning climate change and natural resources in 
international peace and security); UNSC  Resolution 1817 ((11 June 2008)) UN Doc S/RES/1817 (concerning 
drug trafficking and organised crime in international peace and security); UNSC Presidential Statement 32 
(Peace and security in Africa) (8 December 2009) UN Doc S/PRST/2009/32;  Presidential Statement 15 
(Maintenance of International Peace and Security) (20 July 2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/15*; UNSC Resolution 
2177 (18 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2177 (Ebola); UNSC Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc 
S/RES/1373; and UNSC Resolution 2195 (19 December 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2195 (terrorism). 
3  Presidential Statement 4 (Maintenance of International Peace and Security: The Interdependence between 
Security and Development) (11 February 2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/4. 
4 Karen J. Warren and Duane L Cady, ‘Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections’ (1994) 9(2) Hypatia 4. 
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particularly important in order to understand precisely what states seek to protect through 
IEL, and the way in which any associations between ‘security’ and the ‘environment’ may 
alter such perceptions. Given that the general consensus is that the environmental crisis is 
only going to deepen and potentially exacerbate both traditional and non-traditional 
security concerns, such an enquiry contributes to the wider debates about the role of IEL, 
and the justifications for linking environment and security in wider discourse. 
1. SETTING THE SCENE: ENVIRONMENT/SECURITY CONNECTIONS AND THE REASONS 
FOR RESEARCH 
The environment and international peace and security have historically been considered 
as separate concerns, and treated as such by the international community. However, with 
globalisation, climate change, and concerns about food, energy, and climate security, the 
environment has been increasingly seen as a threat to individual, national, and international 
peace and security. The emergence of the environment as an international concern is the 
focus of Chapter 2. Therefore, the following discussion intends to give an overview of these 
issues in order to set the scene and identify the research questions addressed in this thesis. 
1.1 Environment and Security Connections 
International law and international relations traditionally conceptualise the world 
divided into two types of regions: Those regions falling under territorial sovereignty, and 
those lying outside the political reach of state. The interrelated principles of res communis 
(belonging to all) or res nullius (belonging to none) affected the regulation of regions outside 
of the exclusive control of a sovereign state by permitting freedom of access, exploitation, 
and exploration by all states able to do so.5 This dichotomy informs the early development 
of international responses to peace, security, and the environment, because the principle of 
non-intervention in the domestic activities of states was central to any international 
response.6 
                                                          
5 Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Revised edition, Macmillan Co. 1954), 111-112; R. 
Y. Jennings, ‘A Changing International Law of the Sea ’ (1972) 31(1) CLJ 32, 32; Yong-On Park, ‘Res Communis 
versus Res Nullius’ (1976) 5(1) J East West Stud 77, 81; Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2003), 24, 453-454; see also FS Ruddy, ‘Res Nullius and Occupation in Roman and International 
Law’ (1968) 36(2) UMKC LRev 274. 
6 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury (Béla  
Kapossy and Richard Whitmore eds, Thomas Nugent tr, First published 1797, Liberty Fund: Indianapolis 2008), 
289-291, especially ¶54; Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International 
Conference of American States (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) (1936) 165 
LNTS 19; 28 Am J Int'l L Sup 75 (1934) , art 8; P. H. Winfield, ‘The History of Intervention in International Law’ 
(1922) 3 BYBIL 130, 133-134. 
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Early attempts to respond to environmental problems sought to regulate action in line 
with the principle of non-interference in a state’s territory.7 Principles such as the 
responsibility not to cause environmental damage in areas outside a state’s jurisdiction,8 and 
the polluter pays principle, both impose obligations on states to ensure that their activities 
do not cause harm to other states or areas beyond national control.9 Other principles, such 
as the principle of preventative action10 and the principle of ‘good-neighbourliness’11 
similarly obligate states to respect the sovereignty of other states and cooperate to protect 
transboundary resources.12 These early responses to transboundary environmental problems 
connect state obligations with the concept of sovereignty. In doing so, they indicate that 
these responses regulated the environment along a public (global commons)/private (state) 
dichotomy.  
Decolonisation, the growing interdependence between states through globalisation, and 
the ongoing Cold War affected state relations, meaning that international responses to 
environmental problems required a more nuanced approach by the mid-20th century. The 
global commons/state dichotomy continued to inform international responses to 
transboundary environmental concerns. Newly-independent developing countries sought to 
reassert their sovereignty over their natural resources in response to the attempts by former 
colonial powers to retain favourable concessions and access to resources granted prior to 
independence.13 At the same time, they also sought to ensure that the regimes being 
developed to manage the global commons took into account the unequal technological and 
economic power that precluded them from participating in their exploitation.14 The 
                                                          
7 Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices, and 
Prospects (Oxford University Press 2004), 80. 
8 Island of Palmas Case (United States of America v Netherlands) (Award) (4 April 1928) II RIAA 829, 839; Trail 
Smelter Case (United States v Canada)  (1938/1941) III RIAA 1905-1982, 1965. 
9 Trail Smelter Case, 1965; Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (1974) ICJ Reports 253 (Judgement, 20 December 
1974),389; Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ 
Rep 226, ¶29; Cordonier Segger and Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law, 80-84; see also International Law 
Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm From Hazardous Activities with 
Commentaries  (2001) UN Doc A/56/10.  
10 E.g. Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State (London) (adopted 8 
November 1933, entered into force 14 January 1936) 172 LNTS 241 (1953), art 12(2), protocol ¶1.  
11 E.g. Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (Judgement) (16 November 1957) XII RIAA 281; 24 ILR 101; 
Philippe Sands and others, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 
2012), 504. 
12 Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, ¶29; The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Order) (3 
December 2001) ITLOS Case No 10 (2001), ¶82; See generally, Philippe Sands, Principles of International 
Environmental Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2003), 237-246, 249-251; Sands and others, Principles 
(3rd edn), 198-199 and 204-205. 
13 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2005), 212-213; Margot E Salomon, ‘From NIEO to Now and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice’ (2013) 
62(1) ICLQ 31, 39. 
14 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, 213; Scott J Shackelford, ‘The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ 
(2009) 28(1) Stan Envtl LJ 109 116; Karin Mickelson, ‘The Maps of International Law: Perceptions of Nature in 
the Classification of Territory’ (2014) 27(03) LJIL 621, 633-634. 
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principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the common heritage 
concept reflect these two approaches.  
Developing countries used forums such as the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) and environmental negotiations to ensure that their development needs were taken 
into account. The principles contained in the 1962 United Nations Declaration on the 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources enabled developing countries to gain control 
over their resources and promote economic and social development.15 The reaffirmation of 
sovereignty over natural resources suggests that it was considered to be the natural wealth 
for developing countries. Therefore, the assertion of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources reaffirmed the global commons/state dichotomy in the management of 
environmental resources.16 
The common heritage concept, introduced during the same period, reaffirmed this 
dichotomy. The concept incorporates two interrelated aims. It seeks to manage the global 
commons for future generations,17 and to develop an equitable approach to the sharing of 
resources and benefits of these commons.18 The concept was included in many of the 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) adopted during the mid-20th century, such 
as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS).19 The two aims of the common heritage concept incorporate elements 
of equity in the way in which states manage shared resources. This may be seen as 
recognition of the granulation of the international community, whereby states may have the 
same interests, but differentiated capabilities and needs that affect their ability to act on their 
interests in an equal way with other states.20  
                                                          
15 UNGA Resolution 1803 (XVII) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (14 December 1962) UN Doc 
A/RES/1803(XVII); Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, 211-212; Salomon, 'From NIEO to Now', 40. 
16 Salomon, 'From NIEO to Now', 40.  
17 Shaw, International Law 454. 
18 Christopher C. Joyner, ‘Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind’ (1986) 35(1) 
ICLQ 190, 191; Shackelford, 'Common Heritage of Mankind', 115; Stephen Stec, ‘Humanitarian Limits to 
Sovereignty: Common Concern and Common Heritage Approaches to Natural Resources and Environment’ 
(2010) 12(3) IntCLRev 361, 366.  
19 Antarctic Treaty (Washington) (adopted 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961) 402 UNTS 71 
(1961); 19 ILM 860 (1980), preamble; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (London, Moscow, Washington) (adopted 
27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 206 (1967), preamble, art II; The Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (New York) (adopted 5 December 1979, 
entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3 (1992); 18 ILM 1434 (1979), art 11; United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay) (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 
UNTS 3 (1998); 21 ILM 1261 (1982), art 136; see also, Alexandre Kiss, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: 
Utopia or Reality?’ (1985) 40(3) IJ 423, 430; UNGA General Debate (1 November 1967) UN Doc A/C.1/PV.15, 
12; cited in Mickelson, 'The Maps of International Law', 633.  
20 Kiss, 'Common Heritage of Mankind', 431-432. 
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Therefore, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the 
common heritage concept indicate a more nuanced approach to the management of the 
environment. They maintain the global commons/state dichotomy, while also recognising 
the growing interdependence between states because of the emerging globalisation and 
growth of capitalism during this period. In doing so, they also recognised the significant 
interrelationships between natural resources, technological and scientific capabilities, and 
economic development.   
The relationship between transboundary harm, technology, scientific capabilities, 
economic growth, and development was recognised during the preparations for the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference). 
Developing countries used the opportunity to question the legitimacy of the global agenda as 
it was then conceived.21 They sought to frame discussions about environmental problems in 
a way that took into account the integral interrelationship between development, the 
environment, and the structural and system bias within the international system as a 
whole.22 
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) 
tries to balance these differences. In doing so, it reflects growing comprehension by the 
international community that the environment was increasingly interrelated with other 
international concerns, such as development, global economics, and trade issues, which had 
significant importance for developing states.23 In particular, the declaration acknowledged 
the essential need for economic and social development,24 that ‘environmental deficiencies’ 
were caused by underdevelopment,25 and that ‘states have…the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies…’26 These principles 
helped shape the future of IEL based on a recognition of the interrelationship between 
development and the environment. 
The tensions between developing countries and primarily western states, concerning 
access to natural resources fed into the dominant security discourse. During the mid-20th 
century, connections between security and the environment primarily focused on the need 
                                                          
21 Adil Najam, ‘Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to 
Participation to Engagement’ (2005) 5(3) Int Environ Agreements 303, 308; also, Sundhya. Pahuja, Decolonising 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2011), 37-40 and Chapters 3-4. 
22 Najam, 'Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance', 307-309; Susanna Hecht and 
Alexander Cockburn, ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Rio’ (1992) 254(24) Nation 848. 
23 Louis B Sohn, ‘The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment’ (1973) 14(3) Harv Int'l LJ 423, 432. 
24 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (16 June 1972) UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/14/REV.1 (1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972) , Principle 8.  
25 Ibid, Principle 9. 
26 Ibid, Principle 21. 
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to secure raw materials that private entities would need to retain economic power.27 The oil 
crisis of 1973 highlighted the interdependence between security and other international 
systems, such as global trade and the economic interests of dominant states. The crisis 
revealed that natural resources, such as oil, could be used as political leverage and therefore 
become a strategic threat to the interests of powerful nations such as the United States.28 The 
emerging discussion concerning the relationship between access to environmental 
resources, and the economic security of states, highlighted the growing interdependence 
between countries, which may affect the security of states.29   
Similarly, the expansion of the international community through decolonisation raised 
concerns about underdevelopment, conflict, and the access to natural resources. Concerns 
surrounding ‘underdevelopment,’30 the provision of western assistance through scientific 
and industrial support to colonised and newly-decolonised territories, fed into the discourse 
surrounding international peace and security.31 In this context, non-western peoples and 
places were defined by their lack, and ‘underdevelopment’ became a ‘synonym for 
‘economically backward’ areas’32 that needed to undertake significant societal 
transformation through socio-economic change, supported by the western (civilised) 
states.33 Therefore, ‘development’ was framed in objective measures of economic growth 
instead of the culture of peoples and place.34 These arguments informed the future policies 
and responses to the inequalities between states in the international communities and later 
debates concerning the connections between ‘underdevelopment’, food and energy security, 
overpopulation, environmental degradation, and peace and security.  
                                                          
27 Lester R. Brown, Redefining National Security (Washington: World Watch Institute 1977), 5-6; Norman Myers, 
‘The Environmental Dimension to Security Issues’ (1986) 6(4) The Environmentalist 251, 252; Marc A Levy, ‘Is 
National Security an Environment Issue?’ (1995) 20(2) Int Security 35, 48. 
28 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge University Press 
2009), 86. 
29 Ibid, 85. 
30 However, both 'underdevelopment' and ‘development’ are contested concepts. See, Anne Phillips, ‘The 
Concept of 'Development'’ (1977) 4(8) Rev Afr Polit Econ 7, 8; Ilan Kapoor, ‘Hyper-Self-Reflexive Development? 
Spivak on Representing the Third World 'Other'’ (2004) 25(4) Third World Quarterly 627, 628-629; Farzana Naz, 
‘Arturo Escobar and the Development Discourse: An Overview’ (2006) 28(3) Asian Affairs 64, 65; for a detailed 
discussion, see Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical 
Introduction to Third World Politics (Macmillan 1985); Wolfgang Sachs (ed) The Development Dictionary: A 
Guide to Knowledge as Power (2nd edn, Zed 2010).  
31 Pahuja, Decolonising International Law, 61.  
32 Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (Patrick Camiller tr, 2nd edn, 
Zed Books 2002), 72; Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, 207.  
33 Phillips, 'The Concept of 'Development'', 9; Ray Kiely, ‘The Last Refuge of the Noble Savage? A Critical 
Assessment of Post-Development Theory’ (1999) 11(1) EJDR 30, 32; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: 
The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (New edn, Princeton University Press 2012), 4; see also Charles 
Gore, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries’ (2000) 28(5) 
World Dev 789, 794-795. 
34 Pahuja, Decolonising International Law, 65. 
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Therefore, by the early 1980s, there were significant debates surrounding non-traditional 
sources of insecurity in the broader security discourse. State actors and policy-makers 
identified threats such as overpopulation, transboundary environmental degradation, 
natural resource scarcity, food and energy security, and underdevelopment, as potential 
security threats to powerful, western states. These narratives fed into the more general 
concerns surrounding the potential for population growth, resource scarcity, and 
environmental degradation to escalate conflict.35   
The narrative connecting underdevelopment and environmental degradation with 
conflict and insecurity was reinforced in the World Commission on Environment and 
Development Report published in 1987. This report (also known as the Brundtland Report) 
stated that economics, environment, and security were interdependent, and that security 
should be widened to take account of these interactions.36 The report proposed that 
‘sustainable development’ could be a solution to the drivers of insecurity because it would 
enable countries to develop sustainably, within the carrying capacities of Earth’s ecological 
systems. Therefore, the environment became part of wider discussions over the relationship 
between development, economy, and the environment in developing states, as well as the 
need to develop a solution to global environmental problems that took into account the 
legitimate interest of developing countries in pursuing economic and social development.  
Sustainable development explicitly connects finding solutions to environmental concerns 
with achieving development. Because of this, the concept has had significant influence in the 
evolution of IEL, and caught the attention of liberal security discourses in the post-Cold War 
period. There are many conceptualisations of ‘sustainable development’.37 The Brundtland 
Report published the most popular definition. It defined sustainable development as 
meeting ‘the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.’38 The report further elaborated this definition and includes two 
important concepts: 
‘the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to 
which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the 
state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet 
present and future needs. Thus the goals of economic and social development must 
                                                          
35 Simon Dalby, Security and Environmental Change (Polity 2009), 16. 
36 WCED, Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment and Development; Oxford University 
Press 1987), 301 
37 Desta Mebratu, ‘Sustainability and Sustainable Development: Historical and Conceptual Review’ (1998) 18(6) 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 493, 503-512; Iris Borowy, Defining Sustainable Development for our 
Common Future: A History of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland 
Commission) (Routledge 2014), 3.  
38 WCED, Our Common Future, 43. 
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be defined in terms of sustainability in all countries – developed or developing, 
market oriented or centrally planned.’ 39 
The concept of sustainable development was not invented by the Brundtland 
Commission. Earlier documents produced by the World Bank, the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in collaboration with the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the International Institute 
for Environment and Development (IIED), each referred to ‘sustainable development’ and 
adopted other definitions of the concept.40 For example, the IUCN’s World Conservation 
Strategy argued that for 
‘development to be sustainable, it must take account of social and ecological 
factors, as well as economic ones; of the living and non-living resource base; and of 
the long term as well as the short term advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
actions.’41  
These two definitions highlight the inherent tensions in the concept. Sustainable 
development seeks to reconcile the often paradoxical relationship between consistent 
economic growth,42 the need for development,43 and the physical limitations of the Earth’s 
ecological functions. Because sustainable development tries to reconcile these tensions, it 
was seen as a solution to the drivers of underdevelopment and the stressors that could lead 
to conflict and insecurity, while also having significant influence on the evolution of IEL  
The substantive and procedural elements of sustainable development strongly influenced 
the evolution of IEL after 1992.44 This influence reflects an institutionalisation of collective 
responses to environmental problems that also take into account the need to balance the 
different interests of states. Because of this, sustainable development can be considered as an 
                                                          
39 Ibid, 43. Emphasis added.  
40 Borowy, Defining Sustainable Development, 3; see e.g. International Union for Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources, World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development 
(International Union for Conservation of Nature and Nature Resources (Currently World Conservation Union), 
United Nations Environment Programme, World Wildlife Fund. Gland, Switzerland, IUCN-UNEP-WWF 1980); 
Kirchner, JW and Others, ‘Carrying Capacity, Population Growth, and Sustainable Development’ in Kirchner, J. 
W, and others. “Two Essays on Population and Carrying Capacity.” Cited by The World Bank, World 
Development Report 1984 (Oxford University Press 1984).  
41 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, World Conservation Strategy, ¶3. 
42 See e.g. Herman E. Daly, ‘Toward Some Operational Principles of Sustainable Development’ (1990) 2(1) 
Ecolog Econ 1; Sharachchandra M. Lélé, ‘Sustainable development: A Critical Review’ (1991) 19(6) World Dev 
607; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ‘Wasn't the Future Wonderful? Resources, Environment, and the Emerging Myth of 
Global Sustaining Development’ (1991) 2(1) Colo J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y 35; Herman E. Daly, Beyond Growth: The 
Economics of Sustainable Development (Beacon Press 1996); Herman E. Daly, ‘Reconciling the Economics of 
Social Equity and Environmental Sustainability’ (2002) 24(1) Popul Environ 47; John Robinson, ‘Squaring the 
Circle? ‘Some Thoughts on the Idea of Sustainable Development’ (2004) 48(4) Ecolog Econ 369; Micheal Redclift, 
‘Sustainable Development (1987–2005): An Oxymoron Comes of Age’ (2005) 13 Sustainable Development 212. 
43 Mark R. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (Zed Books 
2001), 114-115. 
44 Sands and others, Principles (3rd edn), 206-209.  
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‘integrationist principle’45 that seeks to balance the competing economic, environmental and 
social interests of states.46 This balance is manifested in the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Development and Environment (Rio Declaration), adopted at the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Conference). 
In particular, the procedural elements of sustainable development have been 
incorporated into MEAs and soft law after the Rio Conference. These elements include the 
principle of participation, the right to information, and the right to effective remedies.47 
Similarly, the substantive elements of the concept, such as differential treatment, have 
become integral to the climate change and biodiversity regimes, amongst others.48 These 
principles have shaped the evolution of IEL and have guided the way in which states balance 
the needs of individuals and communities with the limitations of the Earth’s ecosystems, and 
the different capabilities of states to respond to environmental problems.  
Further, sustainable development had a significant influence on the international 
community’s responses to conflict and security in the post-Cold War period. Supporters of 
the concept claim that sustainable development can provide both a framework and solution 
to addressing the underlying drivers of underdevelopment (environmental degradation, 
socio-economic inequality) and as a means of addressing threats to individuals from 
livelihood insecurity, food insecurity, and an unliveable environment.49 These arguments 
reveal the emerging connections between environment and security, as well as the adoption 
of sustainable development as a potential solution to the drivers of insecurity.  
                                                          
45 Dominic McGoldrick, ‘Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated Conception’ (1996) 45(04) 
ICLQ 796, 818.  
46 Sumudu Atapattu, ‘Sustainable Development, Myth or Reality? A Survey of Sustainable Development Under 
International Law and Sri Lankan Law’ (2001) 14 Geo Int'l Envtl L Rev 265, 277. 
47 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (13 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I); 31 ILM 874 
(1992), principle 10; see e.g. Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro) (adopted 5 June 1992, entered in 
force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992), art 8(j); Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus) (adopted 25 
June 1998, entered into force 30 October 2001 ) 2161 UNTS 447 (2003); 38 ILM 517 (1999), art 1. 
48 Stockholm Declaration 1972, principle 23; UNCLOS 1982, art 61(3) and 69(4); Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal) (adopted 16 September 1987, entered into force 1 January 1989) 1522 UNTS 
3; 26 ILM 1550 (1987), preamble; Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer (London) (adopted 29 June 1990, entered into force 10 August 1992) 30 ILM 537 (1991); 1598 UNTS 469 
(1991), art 10; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York) (adopted 9 May 1992, 
entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (2000); 31 ILM 849 (1992), art 3(1).  
49 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security 
(UN Development Programme; Oxford University Press 1994) 24-25; United Nations, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change  (2 December 2004) 
UN Doc A/59/565 26; Ban Ki-Moon, ‘A Green Future: The Right War’ Time (April 17 2008) 
<http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1730759_1731383_1731345,00.html> accessed 28 
January 2014; UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment 
(UNEP's Disasters and Conflicts Programme, Nairobi, Kenya: 2009), 6. 
10 
 
Therefore, the environment, development, peace, and security have increasingly been 
linked together after the Cold War. The connections between these areas have been 
examined from three different stances. The first approach examines the role of the 
environment as a long-term stressor on societies. In this approach, researchers examine the 
ways in which environmental scarcity, caused by overpopulation, physical depletion, and 
unequal resource allocation, increases the risk of conflict and insecurity in primarily 
developing countries. 50 This research influenced the development of collective security 
strategies and foreign policy by states and regional organisations.51 Their policies connect 
environment and security and propose that social and economic development can reduce 
these risks by addressing the drivers of underdevelopment and pressures on the local 
environment. In this way, the environment is seen as a threat to the security of the 
international community by acting as a societal stressor. 
The second approach makes humans the referent object of security. In this context, 
environment/security connects are framed as part of the attempt to protect and empower 
individuals in order to maintain security.52 This approach views peace, security, and 
development as indivisible and essential to maintain international peace and security.53 
Therefore, the environment is considered antecedent to achieving development, and 
essential to the attainment of human security. Examples of this approach can be seen in the 
growing concerns over energy, food, and livelihood security in light of global environmental 
                                                          
50 Robert Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are 
Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet’ The Atlantic (Washington, DC, 1 February 1994) 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/4670/> accessed 11 July 2011; Val 
Percival and Thomas F Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of South Africa’ 
(1998) 35(3) J Peace Res 279 280; Ayalneh Bogale and Benedikt Korf, ‘To Share or Not to Share? (Non)-Violence, 
Scarcity and Resources in Somali Region, Ethiopia’ (2007) 43(4) J Dev Stud 743, 743; Dalby, Security and 
Environmental Change, 16; see also, Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, ‘Population Growth and 
Environmental Security’ (1991) 45(2) GaR 223. 
51 E.g. United States, 'Quadrennial Defense Review Report' (United States Department of Defense, 15 April 2011)  
<http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf> accessed 19 June 2015; Cabinet Office, 
'Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review' (Cabinet Office, 2010) 
Cm 7948 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-
defence-security-review.pdf> 19 June 2015, 4.B.1 43; Council of the European Union, 'Main Aspects And Basic 
Choices of the CFSP (Part II, point E, paragraph 25 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013)' 
(High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament, 
23 July 2014) Doc 12094/14  <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12094-2014-INIT/en/pdf> 
accessed 19 June 2015, 159-160 
52 Human Security Unit, ‘Human Security Approach’ (Human Security Unit, UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA))  <http://unocha.org/humansecurity/human-security-unit/human-security-
approach> accessed 13 March 2014; Lloyd Axworthy, ‘Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People 
First’ (2001) 7(1) Global Governance 19 20; Ryerson Christie, ‘Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, 
to Engage or to Critique?’ (2010) 41(2) Secur Dialog 169 173; Nik Hynek and David Chandler, ‘No Emancipatory 
Alternative, No Critical Security Studies’ (2013) 1(1) Critical Studies on Security 46, 47-48.  
53  Presidential Statement 8 (Women and Peace and Security) (27 April 2010) UN Doc S/PRST/2010/8 , 2.  
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degradation.54 Once again, environmental degradation and poverty are seen as the by-
products of underdevelopment and sustainable development is the solution. In this 
approach, the connection between development, environment, and security is made explicit.  
The final approach focuses specifically on the threat of climate change to state and 
human well-being through the exacerbation of existing vulnerabilities. This approach 
focuses on the potential losses of economic and livelihood security, as well as the erosion of 
social safety nets in vulnerable developing countries because of climate change.55 Other 
research has examined the implications of inaction on climate change for economic, energy, 
and water security.56 This suggests that such inaction may destabilise already volatile 
regions, and thus have a significant impact on the overall security of the international 
community.57 States and NSAs highlight the potential economic, energy, food, and 
livelihood security implications of climate change, and the potential instability of regions 
because of poor access to water.58 These debates recognise the increased interdependence of 
states because of globalisation, the global economy, and through transboundary ecosystems. 
They recognise climate change as a potential threat to the collective security of the 
international community and therefore connect security and the environment by examining 
how climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and may therefore increase 
incidences of conflict.59   
These different approaches to environment/security linkages indicate that there is an 
assumption that peace, security, and sustainable development are mutually supportive. This 
                                                          
54 Emmy Simmons, Harvesting Peace: Food Security, Conflict, and Cooperation (Environmental Change and 
Security Report, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre for International Scholars, 2013), 20; Saswati Bora 
and others, 'Food Security and Conflict' (Background Paper, World Development Report 2011 Agriculture and 
Rural Development Department, World Bank 22 October 2010) 
<http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/pdf/wdr%20background%20paper_bora%20et%20al4dbd
.pdf?keepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=600&width=800> accessed 14 April 2016, 4, 6-7; see also Henk-
Jan Brinkman and Cullen S Hendrix, 'Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and 
Addressing the Challenges' (Occasional Paper Number 24 World Food Programme,  July 2011) 
<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp238358.pdf> 09 December 2015; 
Clemens Breisinger and others, How to Build Resilience to Conflict: The Role of Food Security (International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2014). 
55 Joshua W. Busby and others, ‘Climate Change and Insecurity: Mapping Vulnerability in Africa’ (2013) 37(4) 
Int Security 132, 142; IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policy Makers. Contribution of 
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (R. 
K. Pachauri and Leo Meyer eds, Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014), 13; 
56 Jon Barnett, ‘Security and Climate Change’ (2003) 13(1) Global Environmental Change 7, 9; Commission for 
Africa, Still Our Common Interest (Commission for Africa, 2010), 22; Matt McDonald, ‘Discourses of Climate 
Security’ (2013) 33(0) Polit Geogr 42, 47; IPCC, Climate Change 2014. Summary for Policy Makers, 16; see also, 
Oli Brown, Anne Hammill and Robert McLeman, ‘Climate Change as the 'New' Security Threat: Implications for 
Africa’ (2007) 83(6) Int Aff 1141, 1141; Jon Barnett and W Neil Adger, ‘Climate Change, Human Security and 
Violent Conflict’ (2001) 26 Polit Geogr 639, 640. 
57 Commission for Africa, Still Our Common Interest  (2010), 22 
58 McDonald, 'Discourses of Climate Security', 47. 
59 Commission for Africa, Still Our Common Interest  (2010), 22 
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assumption is inherent in the different explanations of the environment/security linkages 
outlined above. It is also reflected in the consistent affirmation of the role of sustainable 
development as a pathway to achieve peace and security, and environmental 
protection.60However, this appropriation of sustainable development by security discourses 
may be problematic for the development of IEL. This is because the references to the 
environment in the security discourse portray it as a commodity, resource, or utility to be 
used to achieve different security goals and as part of the sustainable development process.  
Ecofeminists challenge this representation of the environment because it universalises an 
anthropocentric worldview which may not take into ontological differences between 
communities and societies.61 Therefore, the securitisation of the environment may have 
implications for the subsequent evolution of IEL, the way in which it represents the 
environment, and the perception of the environment itself. 
1.2 Identifying the Problem 
The securitisation of the environment and the convergence with security concerns raises 
the question of the influence these changes have on the way states view the environment in 
IEL and the basis on which the states and NSAs seek to protect the environment. Such a 
convergence may well lead to conflict between the different understandings held by states 
and NSAs about the environment, or lead to exacerbations of existing differences.  
Differences in perceptions of the environment in international law-making may affect 
states’ motivations to protect the environment, with huge consequences for the future 
development of IEL. Thus, revealing the values, attitudes, and understandings about the 
environment, which constitutes states’ perceptions of it, is crucial to understanding the 
development of IEL. There is as yet, however, little critical examination of these issues by the 
academy. 
States’ perceptions of the environment may influence many factors that shape IEL. For 
instance, how far do states’ and NSAs’ perceptions about the environment encompass an 
ecologically integrated/holistic view? Do states in their international policy and law-making 
                                                          
60 E.g. Georgi Gotev, ‘Mimica: 'There cannot be a sustainable foreign and security policy without a clear 
development contribution'’ EurActivcom (7 January 2015 [updated 8 January 2015]) 
<http://www.euractiv.com/sections/development-policy/mimica-there-cannot-be-sustainable-foreign-and-
security-policy-without> accessed 29 January 2015; Lamberto Zannier, ‘Fostering Peace and Sustainable 
Development: A Genuine Commitment of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’ UN 
Chronicle (April 2016) <http://unchronicle.un.org/article/fostering-peace-and-sustainable-development/> 
accessed 17 May 2016. 
61  Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (Zed 1988), 224; Val Plumwood, 
Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (Routledge 2002), 51-52; Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen, 
‘Introduction’ in Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen (eds), Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with other Animals 
and the Earth (Bloomsbury Academic 2014), 1; see also Karen J. Warren and Jim Cheney, ‘Ecological Feminism 
and Ecosystem Ecology’ (1991) 6(1) Hypatia 179. 
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mainly view the environment in terms of its material contributions for human betterment? 
How far do states, through soft law and hard law instruments, acknowledge the differences 
between cultures, communities, and locations and how does this influence their perception 
of the environment and, consequently, IEL? Has the environment’s utility for securing 
sustainable development become a central justification for protecting the environment? 
Building on this, has the introduction of new paradigms, such as sustainable development 
and the green economy, affected the way in which states view the environment, with 
concomitant effects on IEL?  
In light of the above, this thesis examines the extent to which the association between 
environment and security has altered the basis on which states and NSAs that make up the 
international community seek to protect the environment, and in turn, what this suggests 
about their perception of the environment.  
2. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION, METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND 
DOCUMENTARY CONSIDERATIONS 
While a full account of the theoretical basis, research questions, and methods are 
provided for in Chapter 3 and 4, by way of an introduction to the research, the theoretical 
foundation, documentary considerations, and the approach taken to answer the research 
question, are outlined here.  
2.1 Theory 
This thesis draws on ecofeminist theory to develop an analytical framework through 
which a number of international legal documents and associated preparatory reports will be 
read. Ecofeminist theories critique the dominant social paradigms upon which western 
culture and the international community are built.62 These paradigms are made up of 
institutions, habits, and values that together provide social lenses through which groups and 
individuals interpret the social world. Ecofeminists argue that in western society, the 
dominant social paradigm includes the belief that the primary goal for governments, after 
national defence, is to create conditions that increase commodity production and satisfy the 
materialist needs of citizens.63 Ecofeminists argue that inherent in this goal is the belief that 
society’s ills can be solved by technology and that ‘economic growth’ is a measure of 
                                                          
62 Dennis C Pirages and Paul R. Ehrlich, Ark II: Social Response to Environmental Imperatives (WH Freeman & 
Co 1974), 43 and 69; Bill Devall, ‘The Deep Ecology Movement’ (1980) 20(2) Nat Resources J 299, 300; Lester W 
Milbrath, ‘Culture and the Environment in the United States’ (1985) 9(2) Environmental Management 161, 163; 
Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism (Kali for Women; London: Zed Books 1993), 251; Shiva, Staying 
Alive, xv; World Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet, 'Womens Action Agenda 21' (Miami, 1991); Annie 
Rochette, ‘Stop the Rape of the World: An Ecofeminist Critique of Sustainable Development’ (2002) 51 
UNBrunswick LJ 145, 152. 
63 Annie Rochette, ‘Rape of the World: An Ecofeminist Critique of International Environmental Law’ (Master of 
Laws (LLM), University of British Columbia 1998), 22.  
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progress.64 These paradigms shape the ways in which states, international institutions, and 
NSAs respond to global concerns, such as environment and security. 
Ecofeminism offers an approach that recognises the intersecting oppressions, silences, 
and exclusions felt by some states and NSAs in the creation, development, and 
implementation of IEL. This is because it starts from the position that the domination of 
nonhuman nature and other marginalised communities is mutually supportive.65 Therefore, 
incorporating ecofeminism as the theoretical framework used in this research means that 
the project can make visible the beliefs, values, and assumptions that inform a state’s 
perceptions of the environment and how these may have altered with the convergence of 
environment/security discourse and IEL.  
Drawing from values which ecofeminism considers integral to an ecofeminist 
environmental ethic, this thesis develops an analytical framework through which the texts of 
the preparatory reports and adopted instruments will be read. In doing so, the thesis 
examines the extent to which a state’s perception of the environment may have altered in line 
with the associations between environment and security. The value and benefits of drawing 
on ecofeminist theory in this thesis will be developed in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Methodology 
The project uses a reflexive version of content analysis that is informed by ecofeminist 
theory. Ecofeminists start from the basis that the social location of the knower is central to 
understanding epistemological claims.66 Consequently, drawing on ecofeminist theory 
enables this research to develop a methodology that interrogates the beliefs, values, and 
attitudes of the international community in relation to the environment that recognises 
community-based experiences, as well as the situations in which those experiences are 
created.67  
This research draws on the ecofeminist ethic articulated by ecofeminist philosopher 
Karen Warren to develop the ecofeminist analytical framework. I argue that these boundary 
conditions are suited to creating an analytical framework in order to examine the beliefs, 
values and attitudes that inform the justifications for environmental protection and the 
perception of the environment itself. In particular, I draw on Warren’s ‘inclusive’ and 
‘contextual’ boundary conditions because they have relevance in examining who participates 
                                                          
64 Devall, 'The Deep Ecology Movement', 300. 
65 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Routledge 1993), 1-2; Karen J. Warren, Ecofeminist 
Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What it is and Why it Matters (Rowman & Littlefield 2000), 62. 
66 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 105-119; Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 148; Josephine 
Donovan, ‘Participatory Epistemology, Sympathy, and Animal Ethics’ in Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen (eds), 
Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with other Animals and the Earth (Bloomsbury Academic 2014), 75. 
67 Lori Gruen, ‘Toward an Ecofeminist Moral Epistemology’ in Karen J. Warren and Barbara Wells-Howe (eds), 
Ecological Feminism (Routledge 1994), 126. 
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in the creation of IEL, and the types of knowledge and experiences valued. Her ‘structurally 
plural’ boundary condition is relevant when examining the types of interests, voices, and 
views of the environment portrayed in the preparatory documents and adopted outcome 
texts, and the justifications for environmental protection. Finally, I include the ‘open’ 
condition, which although not part of her ethic, recognises that ecofeminism is a political 
and activist movement.68  
These four boundary conditions can be used as interconnecting lenses through which to 
examine IEL. I describe how the boundary conditions are used to guide my critical analysis 
of the texts in Chapter 4. By using these interconnected lenses, I connect the aspirations of 
an ecofeminist ethic to an examination of the beliefs, values and attitudes of the 
international community in relation to the environment. Therefore, the analytical 
framework enables an original examination of the extent to which the securitisation of the 
environment may have altered the perceptions of the environment and the justifications 
used to protect it in international law.  
2.3 Method and Terminology  
Preparatory reports and outcome texts from eight different environmental regimes 
negotiated and agreed under the auspices of the United Nations are examined. I decided to 
analyse such a breadth of documents in order to draw out interrelationships and 
commonalities that may exist in IEL. Chapter 4 explains the rationale for data selection, 
strategy of inquiry, method choice, procedure, and analysis.69 Therefore, the following 
paragraphs give a brief overview of the method and introduce common terms used to refer 
to the different types of documents examined in this research. 
‘Outcome texts’ or ‘outcome documents’ refer to the document adopted by states at the 
culmination of the negotiation period. I use the term ‘environmental regime’ to refer to a 
collection of hard or soft documents that are associated with a specific environmental 
agreement. I justify my decision to analyse both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law documents in section 3 
of this chapter. For example, the climate change regime encompasses the negotiating 
documents for both the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC,70 as well as the reports produced 
in later working groups and their related COP decisions. The regimes considered in this 
thesis include biological diversity, tropical timber, fisheries, desertification, climate change, 
ozone layer, transboundary watercourses, and sustainable development.  
                                                          
68 Catriona Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy (University of 
Minnesota Press 1999), 144. 
69 Below, Chapter 4, Section 3. 
70 Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto) (adopted 11 December 
1997, entered into force 6 February 2005) 37 ILM 32 (1998). 
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I use the term ‘environmental area’ to refer to the broad issue that the environmental 
regime seeks to address. For example, the 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement 
(1983 ITTA)71 and the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention)72 both 
concern the broader environmental area of ‘natural resources.’ This thesis draws 
environmental regimes from four different areas: Natural resources, climate change, ozone 
depletion, desertification, and the guiding principles of IEL that seek to recognise the 
balance between development and international responses to environmental problems. I 
introduce these regimes below, and in more detail in Chapter 4. Therefore, this thesis 
examines regimes that seek to protect the environment (such as biodiversity) and also seek 
to respond to broad environmental problems (such as climate change). Analysing a cross-
sector of environmental concerns means that the project addresses the criticism that IEL 
scholarship ‘siloes’ different topics.73 
This research groups the development of IEL into four time periods: Those documents 
developed prior to the Rio Conference (1980-1987), documents developed during the 1992 
Rio Conference (1987-1992), those developed between the end of the conference and 2000, 
and those documents developed after 2001 and before 2012. Owing to the importance of the 
Stockholm Declaration on the subsequent development of IEL, I have included it in the 
analysis.74 Furthermore, some environmental regimes cross between different periods, and 
in those cases, I use the date in which the outcome document was developed to determine 
which time period that regime should be associated with. A notable example of this is the 
development of the 1992 Biological Diversity Convention (Biodiversity Convention), whose 
development spans both the pre-Rio and Rio period. While not all documents or time-
periods will fit my hypothesis, I hope to provide an explanatory framework that can identify 
the representation of the environment and basis for which the international community 
focuses upon the environmental protection at different points in time during the evolution 
of IEL.  
I undertake a content analysis of the preparatory documents and adopted outcome texts. 
This offers a flexible method in order to better understand the way in which 
environment/security connections may alter the justifications for environmental protection 
                                                          
71 International Tropical Timber Agreement (Geneva) (adopted 18 November 1983, entered into force 1 April 
1985) 1393 UNTS 119 (1985). 
72 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (New York) (adopted 21 
May 1997, entered into force 17 August 2014) 36 ILM 703 (1997). 
73 Elizabeth Fisher and others, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate About Environmental Law’ (2009) 
21(2) JEL 213, 241.  
74 Karin Mickelson, ‘South, North, International Environmental Law, and International Environmental Lawyers’ 
(2000) 11 YbInt'l EnvL 52, 62; also, Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Stockholm Declaration and the Structure and Processes 
of International Environmental Law’ in Aldo Chircop and Ted McDorman (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime 
Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M Johnston (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437707, Kluwer 
Law 2008). 
17 
 
and the perception of the environment itself. Examining the preparatory documents as well 
as the adopted outcome texts means that I can examine the beliefs, values and attitudes of 
the international community through an ecofeminist lens and therefore gain a more holistic 
understanding of the extent to which connections with other international concerns, such as 
the economy, development, and security may affect the perceptions of the environment.  
I adopt an iterative process to analysing the documents through the ecofeminist 
framework. This approach allowed the data to be coded conceptually. I read the documents 
several times over, which meant I could identify specific categories that emerged in the 
content of the data. In doing so, I identified common categories such as participation, the 
incorporation of non-environmental considerations, and the perception of the environment 
itself emerging from the data. My initial analysis suggested that these three categories could 
enable me to examine the ways in which the securitisation of the environment may have 
altered IEL while also engaging with different elements within the documents themselves. 
Therefore, they have become the foci of the three analytical chapters included in this 
research project. 
This section has given an overview to the theoretical foundations, methodology, and 
method developed in this project. I argue that ecofeminism offers the best theoretical 
framework through which to examine the underlying beliefs, values, and attitudes that 
inform the justifications for protecting the environment and the perception of the 
environment itself, and the extent to which these may be altered by the securitisation of the 
environment. The methodology of adopting a reflexive and iterative content analysis to 
examine the texts of preparatory and adopted outcome documents offers a number of 
benefits because it allows the categorisations of analysis to emerge from the analysis itself, 
while also allowing the interconnections between issue areas, regimes, and areas to be 
revealed during the analysis. In the following section, I defend my choice to include both 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sources of law.  
2.4 Documentary Considerations: The use of ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Sources of IEL 
IEL is made up from both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sources of law. ‘Hard’ sources of law are 
conventionally derived from the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and, in the 
context of IEL, usually take the form of Conventions and Protocols.75 ‘Soft’ sources of law 
usually take the form of non-legally binding documents that exert some normative effect on 
the actions of states and other international actors, such as intergovernmental organisations, 
institutions, and non-governmental organisations.76 The term ‘soft law’ is often used as a 
                                                          
75 Patricia W Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2002), 13-15. 
76 See, Christine M Chinkin, ‘Normative Development in the International Legal System’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), 
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University Press 2000), 25-31; Jürgen Friedrich, International Environmental "Soft Law": The Functions and 
18 
 
synonym for normative statements that are included in non-legally binding instruments.77 
While there are many different interpretations and debates concerning the meaning of soft 
law, it is generally agreed that soft law ‘begins once legal arrangements are weakened along 
one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation’.78 In the context of 
IEL, the boundaries between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law are becoming increasingly permeable, and 
the reliance on ‘soft’ instruments has acted as a catalyst for significant academic debate.79  
The debates concerning the role of ‘soft law’ or normative statements in international law 
generally fall into two distinct camps. Some writers evaluate hard and soft law in binary 
terms depending on their binding or non-binding nature.80 In particular, writers starting 
from a positivist epistemological stance dismiss soft law because they argue that law is ‘either 
hard or not law at all’.81 For example, Klabbers argues that law cannot be ‘more or less 
binding’, and therefore, the concept of ‘soft law’ is logically flawed.82 Raustiala argues that 
‘there is no such thing as ‘soft law’.’ The concept of soft law purports to identify something 
between ‘binding law and no law.’83 Writing earlier, Weil argues that the use of nonbinding 
normative statements may ‘destabilise the international normative system and turn it into an 
instrument that can no longer serve its purpose’.84 They argue that the traditional 
conception of law as binary is capable of performing many of the functions ascribed to soft 
law. These criticisms of soft law have been challenged for proposing crude distinctions that 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Limits of Nonbinding Instruments in International Environmental Governance and Law (Springer Berlin 2013), 
chapter 1.  
77 Dinah Shelton, ‘Soft Law’ in David J Armstrong and Jutta Brunnée (eds), Routledge Handbook of International 
Law (Routledge 2009), 69. 
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Organ 421, 422; Oscar Schachter, ‘The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’ (1977) 71(2) 
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do not reflect the ‘complex social reality of soft law’ nor do justice to the spectrum of soft law 
instruments.85 
However, other writers evaluate the role of soft law based upon characteristics that vary 
along a continuum.86 In particular, from an ex ante negotiation perspective, states have 
choices which can make agreements more or less binding along the dimensions outlined by 
Abbott and Snidal, while also recognising that such agreements have normative content.87 
Writers such as Lichtenstein, Brunnée, and Toope propose that soft law offers an 
opportunity to achieve ‘functional cooperation amongst states to reach international goals’.88 
In doing so, soft law can be understood as a manifestation of, and mechanism for various 
forms of socialisation between states that include persuasion, norm diffusion, and 
acculturation.89 Thus, soft law can informally establish acceptable norms of behaviour based 
on shared understandings that may emerge as legal norms as they influence the actions of 
states and NSAs.90 In the context of IEL, this understanding of the role of soft law is 
appropriate because it reflects the evidence of the formation of customary law, authorises 
action by international organisations, and guides the interpretation of treaties.91  
Therefore, in IEL, soft law often performs a powerful functional role.92 It can act as a 
half-way house to facilitate compromise between parties and develop ‘mutually beneficial 
cooperation, between actors with different interests and values’.93 It can allow flexibility for 
states to adapt commitments to their circumstances.94 It may allow compromise between 
more powerful states and those with less power.95 It can facilitate consensus between states 
by reducing contracting costs and limiting sovereignty costs.96 It can respond to uncertainty 
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and adapt to the changing situation.97 It can offer an effective approach to address 
uncertainty in environmental concerns.98 In most cases, the statutes of intergovernmental 
organisations may not invest organs of their institutions with the right to adopt legally 
binding decisions.99 Finally, it enables the participation by NSAs, both in the creation and 
subsequent evolution of norms, and in the implementation of any commitments contained 
within the soft-law instrument.100  
Soft law in IEL can be categorised as primary and secondary instruments.101 Shelton 
describes ‘primary soft law’ as normative texts that are not adopted in treaty form and are 
‘addressed to the international community as a whole’.102 These instruments may declare 
new norms, are often adopted as a precursor to the adoption of a later binding agreement, or 
may reaffirm and further elaborate norms set forth in earlier binding or non-binding 
texts.103 In IEL, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, 1992 Rio Declaration, and UNGA 
Resolution 55/2 Millennium Declaration (2000) (Millennium Declaration)104 may be 
considered as examples of primary declarative texts. They include norms and principles that 
have exerted influence on the interpretation, application and development of other rules of 
law.105 
Specific environmental regimes also rely on the use of ‘secondary’ soft law instruments to 
engage in normative and institutional development.106 This approach is prevalent in the 
climate change regime, biodiversity regime, and the earlier ozone layer regimes, whose 
framework conventions may be seen as a ‘living’ treaty that can generate secondary soft law 
in the form of decisions.107 The institutions established by these framework conventions 
derive jurisdiction and mandate from the convention to create secondary soft law to guide 
the elaboration, interpretation, and application of the principles and obligations contained 
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in the convention.108 Subsequent decisions by the COP engage in normative and 
institutional development of the regimes, and often have significant operational impact.109 
These decisions contain many characteristics that make norms binding through precise 
language and by influencing and conditioning state behaviour.110 The use of these forms of 
soft law reflect the interplay between traditionally ‘hard’ instruments, such as framework 
conventions, and the use of more flexible and ‘softer’ instruments to evolve these regimes.111  
Because soft law has played an important role in the development of legal norms in IEL, 
this thesis examines examples of both primary and secondary soft law instruments. While 
recognising ‘fuzziness’ of soft law and the need for legal certainty,112 to exclude such 
instruments from the analysis would mean omitting instruments that can reveal the 
underlying assumptions that inform the perception of the environment by different actors in 
the international sphere. As states consciously choose to use soft law to progress certain 
environmental regimes and develop environmental norms, analysing these documents can 
give a broader insight into the different values, beliefs, and assumptions that inform states’ 
and NSAs’ perception of the environment during different periods of the evolution of IEL. 
The important role that ‘soft’ law plays in the protection of the environment has informed 
the selection and reading of the environmental law documents investigated in this thesis. 
2.5 Introducing the Environmental Regimes 
I analysed the preparatory documents and outcome texts from eight environmental 
regimes. The breadth of this body of documentation furnishes this research with a unique 
insight into the evolution of IEL. It meant I could identify similarities and differences in 
states’ and NSAs’ perceptions of the environment, and the extent to which the securitisation 
of the environment may have altered these perceptions, and the justifications used for 
environmental protection.  
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The ozone layer regime, comprising the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer (Ozone Layer Convention)113 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol), is included in this thesis 
because it provides one of the most effective and sophisticated models of international 
regulation and supervision of an environmental concern.114 It represents an early example of 
a global response to the destruction of the global commons, and, as such, may give insight 
into early representations of the environment by the international community and the basis 
for which it is protected. It acknowledges the different needs and interests between 
developed and developing states in order to ensure universal participation.115 It recognises 
the close association between the environment, economy, and development concerns, and 
includes novel ways to reduce the production of ozone-depleting substances supporting 
these other goals. Finally, the Ozone Layer Convention and the Montreal Protocol represent 
the only United Nations environmental regime that has achieved universal ratification.  
The climate change regime comprises the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, as well as 
subsequent COP decisions that have developed the regime.116 Climate change has been 
characterised as a ‘common concern of mankind’117 and continues to be one of the most 
complex and intractable matters facing the world to date. The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
seek to regulate emissions of substances that contribute to global warming. In doing so, 
these two agreements touch upon a number of intersecting areas, such as economic and 
social development, science and technology, and national security. As discussed previously, 
the use of COP decisions in pursuit of environmental regulation reflects the enmeshing of 
soft and hard laws which is a distinctive characteristic of IEL.118 They have significant 
operational effect and legal influence on the evolution of the regime.119 For these reasons, the 
inclusion of the climate change regime is necessary to reflect contemporary IEL making. 
The desertification regime comprises the 1994 United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, 
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particularly in Africa (Desertification Convention)120 and its four regional annexes. The 
convention integrates a holistic, bottom-up approach to preventing desertification at the 
local, national, and regional levels. It bases many of its objectives on attaining sustainable 
development, while also establishing differing obligations for affected developing country 
parties and developed country parties.121 By doing so, the convention takes into account the 
social and economic development needs of developing countries while also addressing the 
serious environmental problem of desertification. This convention has been included in this 
project because it adopts an integrated response to desertification that takes into account 
both sustainable development and desertification. 
The biodiversity regime encompasses all aspects of biodiversity, including biotechnology, 
biological resources and the role of biodiversity in development.122 It includes the 
Biodiversity Convention, 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol), and 
the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing (Nagoya Protocol).123 These three 
legally binding MEAs are particularly relevant for this research because they address the 
interrelated issues of conservation of transboundary public goods in the form of 
biodiversity. They further aim to address and regulate the economic value of the nonhuman 
environment in the form of biotechnology and access to genetic resources. As this research 
examines the purpose for which the international community seeks to protect the 
environment, and the extent to which this has evolved over the course of the last 40 years or 
so, having an environmental system of law that has adopted legally binding documents at 
different stages of this time can give a certain insight into the representations of the 
environment and the ways in which other topics of international consideration have been 
included. 
The International Tropical Timber Agreements (1983, 1994, 2006 ITTA)124 were 
developed and adopted under the purview of UNCTAD. They are the first commodity 
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agreements to integrate the conservation and sustainable usage of natural resources.125 
Therefore, the negotiations and adopted texts of the three ITTAs can give insight into the 
representation of ‘high value’ natural resources by the international community. They 
indicate the extent to which environmental considerations have been diffused across other 
sectors of the UN system. 
The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, formally known as the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stock,126 has relevance for this thesis because it addresses 
the way in which ‘high value’ transboundary natural resources are to be conserved. These 
resources are found in the high seas, which have traditionally been regarded as the global 
commons, and therefore open to all.127 This agreement and its applicability to both the high 
seas and the exclusive economic zones of coastal states not only reflects a further 
qualification of the freedom to fish on the high seas, but also an obligation for the 
international community to cooperate in order to undertake conservation and sustainable 
management of these resources.  
Unlike previous environmental law, the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention was drafted 
through the International Law Commission. It reflects a codification of customary 
international law governing this area of jurisprudence.128 Therefore, this convention has 
relevance because it is an example of a legally binding outcome text developed through the 
evolution of customary international law. Like many other environmental outcome texts, it 
is a framework convention that provides states with a structure of rules and principles that 
may be adjusted to suit particular watercourses.129 
The final group of environmental documents contains those relating to the elaboration of 
sustainable development in IEL. While soft law in nature, these documents contain the 
principles and concepts that have guided the development and evolution of IEL.130 They 
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trace the evolution of the concept of sustainable development and its central position in the 
growth of IEL in the era following the 1992 Rio Conference. They also trace the evolution of 
principles such as inter-generational equity and common, but differentiated, responsibilities 
as the basis for the international community’s response to environmental concerns. While 
these principles are found in some ‘hard law’ outcome texts, they inform a number of non-
legally binding documents developed by the international community to guide its response 
to environmental concerns and development considerations.  
Analysing this range of environmental regulation ensures that this research can identify 
similarities and differences in states’ and NSAs’ perception of the environment, and the 
extent to which this may have altered with the securitisation of the environment. Further, it 
can reveal underlying beliefs, values, and attitudes that inform the justifications for the 
inclusion of non-environmental considerations, such as the economy, development, science, 
technology, and security, and if these have also been altered with the securitisation of the 
environment. The breadth of the documentation will furnish this study with a unique 
insight into the development of IEL, and the extent to which the basis upon which the 
international community seeks to protect the environment may have altered. 
3. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
The thesis comprises an introductory chapter, one critical review of the literature, a 
chapter describing the research’s theoretical foundation, a methodology chapter, three 
chapters conducting an ecofeminist reading of the preparatory texts and outcome 
documents, and a concluding chapter. In the following section, I will give a brief overview of 
each chapter, including its purpose and its relevance to the thesis and the questions it seeks 
to answer. 
Chapter 2 critiques the development of IEL, and the evolving associations between the 
environment and international peace and security. It reviews the co-evolution of IEL and 
international security and examines the collective responses to environmental degradation 
by the international community and their conceptual underpinnings. It also maps the 
evolution of the international peace and security discourse from the post-Cold War period. 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the widening and deepening of the security 
discourse and to show that this evolution has similarities to the evolution of IEL. It reveals 
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that over the course of the time-period in question, a link has been established between the 
environment and security. 
Chapters 3 and 4 introduce ecofeminist theory as the critical theory through which I read 
the preparatory documents and outcome texts and describes the methodology and research 
method used in this project. The purpose of Chapter 3 is twofold. It first introduces three 
alternative theoretical approaches that could also examine the securitisation of the 
environment and the evolving perceptions of the environment and explains why they are 
less suited to this research agenda. These approaches include international feminisms 
(feminist critiques of international law, international relations, and security studies), deep 
ecology, and social ecology. Second, it introduces ecofeminism and explains why it is the 
most relevant theory for this research agenda. Chapter 4 explains how the analytical 
framework developed for this project fits within, and is inspired by, ecofeminist literature. It 
describes the strategy of enquiry and method of analysis that draws on, and is inspired by, 
ecofeminist methods.  
Chapter 5 examines who participates in the development of IEL and where the 
participation by NSAs is supported. In doing so, it seeks to reveal any tensions between the 
principle of participation included in sustainable development, and the exclusionary 
practices in some environmental areas that are closely connected to the environment and 
national interests.  To guide this analysis, the chapter seeks to answer two interrelated 
questions: (1) Who participates in the creation, development, and subsequent 
implementation of IEL? (2) To what extent has the participation by NSAs expanded in the 
creation and development of IEL in the international sphere?  
The purpose for answering these questions is threefold. First, knowing who shapes IEL, 
and the types of issues where NSA participation is valued is the first step in examining the 
extent to which the securitisation of the environment may have altered the basis on which 
the international community seeks to protect the environment. Second, knowing who 
shapes the content of IEL can help reveal the assumptions, values, and beliefs that inform 
the justifications for the protection of the environment. Third, examining where 
participation is excluded can identify those environmental areas and non-environmental 
considerations that may be closely associated with national interests. The conclusions from 
this final point inform the direction and analysis of the following two chapters.  
Chapter 6 examines the extent to which the consolidation of sustainable development as 
the dominant paradigm in IEL, and its integration of non-environmental considerations and 
the justifications for their integration, has altered the basis on which the international 
community protects the environment. Building on the previous chapter, these non-
environmental considerations include economic, trade, development, scientific and 
technological, and security considerations. The analysis is guided by two interrelated 
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questions: (1) What other interests have been included in IEL? (2) What justifications for 
their inclusion are contained in the preparatory documents and adopted outcome texts? 
Identifying the prioritisation of these considerations and the justification for their 
prioritisation through the analytical framework makes it possible to identify the underlying 
beliefs, values, and assumptions that have informed the integration of non-environmental 
considerations in IEL. In doing so, this chapter will examine the extent to which the 
securitisation of the environment has altered the basis for protecting the environment.  
Chapter 7 examines the different representations of the environment included in the 
environmental documents. It considers the extent to which the prioritisation of the non-
environmental considerations through the paradigm of sustainable development has altered 
the perception of the environment. To guide this examination, this chapter asks two 
interrelated questions: To guide this examination, this chapter asks two interrelated 
questions: (1) To what extent the international community’s references to the environment 
have altered over the time-period in question? And (2) what does this change, if found, 
indicate about States’ evolving perception of the environment? By answering these 
questions, the chapter seeks to reveal if there are any shared assumptions, values, and beliefs 
between the different representations of the environment contained in the documents and 
those contained in the environment/security literature. Should similarities arise, this may 
indicate that the appropriation of sustainable development by the security discourse and its 
prioritisation in IEL may alter the perception of the environment.  
In the final chapter, I summarise the key findings from the research and consider their 
implications for future development of IEL. Since an integral aspect of this thesis is the 
development of the critical analytical framework, I will explore the benefits and drawbacks 
of using this framework as a method, and its potential use in other areas of international law. 
Finally, I conclude with a section that considers future directions for research based on the 
findings from this thesis.  
4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced the background and context in which I have placed my 
research. It posits that there is an increasing link between environment and security, and 
convergence in responses to these concerns. I have suggested that there is little critical 
examination of the consequences of the convergence of these two seemingly disparate 
discourses. This thesis aims to respond to this gap by examining the extent to which the 
association between environment and security has altered the basis upon which the 
international community seeks to protect the environment, and in turn, has affected the 
perception of the environment itself. In doing so, this research hopes to contribute to 
existing knowledge by providing greater contextualisation of why IEL may be considered 
ineffective and fragmented. Furthermore, by integrating an ecofeminist analytical 
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framework, this thesis can also contribute a novel and insightful critique through which to 
read IEL.  
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2. The Emergence of the Environment as an International 
Concern 
This chapter traces the emergence of the environment as an international legal and 
security concern. I argue that in the post-Cold War period, environment/security 
connections have emerged at the same time that collective and cooperative responses to 
environmental problems have been adopted through international law. Throughout this 
chapter, I identify the different theoretical perspectives that inform the arguments linking 
the environment and global security, and those that support the development of collective 
responses in IEL.  
The first section of this chapter introduces ‘traditional’ responses to environment and 
security concerns that occurred prior to the Second World War. Section 1 considers both 
liberal and realist theoretical perspectives and examines how these informed the responses 
to environment concerns in international law and the security domain. Section 2 introduces 
cooperative and institutional mechanisms developed to manage the environment during the 
mid-20th century. This section discusses the implications of decolonisation, the growing 
interdependence between states through globalisation, and the increased understanding of 
transboundary environmental degradation on the way in which states and other members of 
the international community responded to environment and security concerns. Section 3 
traces the consolidation of sustainable development as the dominant paradigm in post-Cold 
War responses to environmental concerns, and increasingly, security considerations. In this 
section, I argue that the prominence of liberal internationalism and neoliberalism in the 
shaping of global governance means that ‘security’ as a concept has widened and deepened 
to encompass environmental considerations. In the conclusion, I argue that these are 
inherently ‘messy’ issues that have many intersections, contradictions, and alternative 
interpretations. However, it is possible to assert that the environment is securitised, and that 
such securitisation may alter the justifications for which international community protects 
protect the environment, and in turn perceives the environment in IEL. 
1. ‘TRADITIONAL’ RESPONSES TO SECURITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Traditional responses to the environment and security concerns have predominately 
been framed in either the realist or liberal traditions of international relations. In the 19th 
and early 20th century, the liberal manifestos by Immanuel Kant and Jeremey Bentham had a 
profound influence on the development of international law and international relations.1 
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During the inter-war period, Kant’s arguments for perpetual peace were particularly 
influential. Kant argued that peace required the transformation of individual consciousness, 
republican constitutionalism, and cosmopolitan law for states to attain peace along with the 
Pacific union.2 Building on these three components, other liberals argued that free trade 
would create a more peaceful world order, while others believed in the power of law to solve 
the problem of war.3 These beliefs informed state responses to the environment and security 
in the inter-war period.  
Liberal thought during the inter-war period recognised that international peace and 
prosperity must be constructed.4 US President Woodrow Wilson argued that peace could 
only be secured by creating an international organisation to regulate international anarchy.5 
He argued that the international sphere should have a system of regulation to cope with 
disputes, as well as an international force that could be mobilised when peaceful dispute 
resolution failed. Wilson’s vision of liberal internationalism can be described as a ‘one-
world’ vision of nation-states that trade and interact in a multilateral system of laws creating 
an orderly international community.’6 It supported a universal membership to the League of 
Nations, through which collective security would be implemented. The sovereign state 
remained the central actor and affirmed state independence and non-intervention.7 
International law would be central to and enforced through global public opinion. Further, 
liberal states would have a narrow policy domain, mainly restricted to trade and collective 
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security.8 Therefore, liberal theory on a global scale may be understood as applying an 
analogy from the character of a political actor to its international conduct.9 
Elements of these central claims of liberalism and liberal internationalism are reflected in 
the early development of responses to environmental concerns found in international law. 
One of the main foundations of the international legal system, and by extension, IEL is the 
primacy of the state and the sovereign control over activities undertaken within the state’s 
borders.10 A useful analogy to describe this inside/outside or public/private distinction is by 
describing the state as a ‘person.’ In this analogy, the state’s territory is akin to the body, and 
states have autonomy over this territory/body.11 Louis Henkin used the analogy of the state 
as essentially identical to the individual to describe states, like individuals, as being equal in 
rights and status. He suggests that states and (some) individuals share other similarities, 
including the right to liberty and internal autonomy and the ‘right to property, including its 
territory, which implies territorial integrity’.12 This construction of the state as a ‘person’ 
with a ‘body’ in the form of territory has normative consequence in maintaining the 
jurisdictional divide between the internal and external activities of states.13 The traditional 
construction of states in international law thus has consequences for the way in which states 
regulated their action in relation to the environment during the early 20th century. As 
classical international law conceives the state as a ‘person’ with autonomy over its territory, 
this reflects a public/private dichotomy where states’ activities over their ‘body’ are not 
subject to the interference of other states.14  
This construction of the state is reflected in early responses to environment concerns. 
The principle of non-interference in the domestic interests of states meant that the 
environment under the sovereign control of a state could not be subject to the inference by 
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another state.15 Conversely, those areas of the planet deemed the ‘global commons,’ such as 
the high seas, were considered res communis, meaning that all states had access to them and 
none could impose ‘a particular approach to their use or protection.’16 This dichotomy 
reflects the early emphasis on non-intervention in the domestic sphere of a state that 
maintained the distinction between the environment outside the control of a state and the 
environment inside the territorial boundaries of a state. 
The early regulation of the global commons contained a similar understanding of the 
privilege of sovereign states to exercise their right of access and exploitation in areas such as 
the high seas. The Bering Sea Arbitration (1893) between the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom concerned the harvesting of seals in the Bering Sea.17 In this case, the 
United States argued that it had a right of property and protection over fur seals residing in 
waters of the Bering Sea that extended to a right to take steps outside of its territory to 
conserve them for the benefit of humankind.18 This argument is an early example of 
sustainable management and conservation of natural resources in the global commons.19 
However, the arbitral tribunal rejected the argument and ruled that states had sovereign 
rights to exercise freedom of access, exploitation, and exploration of areas outside their 
exclusive control.20 In doing so, it reaffirmed the state-centric and sovereign-based 
regulation of the global commons, and maintained the public/private dichotomy contained 
in liberalism, a decision criticised by some writers at the time.21  
Similarly, four widely accepted principles of IEL, developed during this period, 
connected state obligations to the concept of sovereignty.22 The first principle required states 
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to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respected the environment of 
other states or areas beyond national control.23 The second principle involves a duty to 
prevent pollution.24 The third principle implies that the polluter should bear the cost of 
undertaken pollution prevention measures or pay for any damaged caused.25 The fourth 
principle concerns a general obligation for states to cooperate to identify and avoid 
transboundary harms.26 These principles, while maintaining the public/private dichotomy of 
liberal internationalism, have informed the subsequent development of IEL and reflect an 
early response to environmental concerns.27  
These principles indicate that the state, and its territorial integrity, remain central in the 
development of early IEL. For example, the ‘no harm’ principle is a negative obligation that 
seeks to regulate the activities of states in their territory so they do not cause harm above 
acceptable levels to another state or to the global commons. Therefore, traditional responses 
to environmental concerns during the inter-war period regulate state actions along the lines 
of the public/private dichotomy between those areas deemed res communis and those under 
the sovereign control of state.28 In this way, they reflect liberal internationalism by using 
international law to maintain cooperation and friendly relations.29 Further, they suggest that 
states maintained the view of the environment as property, the use of which may support the 
friendly relations between states through free trade and economic interdependence.  
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However, liberal internationalism and the ideal of collective security through an 
international institution, such as the League of Nations, was undermined by the events 
preceding the Second World War.30 Towards the end of the 1930s, ‘classical’ realism 
resurfaced as a way to explain international concerns relating to security.31 For classical 
realists, the most important element of international politics is to pursue power to ensure 
the security of the state. Therefore, they consider the core elements of international relations 
to be statism, survival, and self-help as they are directly related to state concerns.32  
Classical realists assume that politics is governed by laws created by human nature. 
Realists such as Morgenthau, argued that to understand international politics, we must use 
the concept of interests, defined in terms of power.33 Therefore, classical realism focuses on 
the logic of power politics driven by the essentially aggressive impulse of human nature.34 
These classical doctrines of realism became highly influential after the end of the Second 
World War, and shaped international security for much of the 20th century. 
This survey of the early development of IEL and international peace and security suggests 
that the environment featured to the extent that it had relevance to economic or sovereign 
interests of states. Classical international law and international relations predominantly 
viewed states as the primary actor in the international sphere, and maintained a strict 
public/private divide in relation to the regulation of state actions. Therefore, responses to 
environmental problems were governed primarily in relation to the interests of states whose 
territory or interests in the global commons were affected by the actions by other states. 
Where states engaged in multilateral responses to environmental problems, these too, were 
framed in terms of negative obligations on the actions of states. While realist security 
purported not to have an interest in the environment, this reveals an inherent assumption 
whereby the environment is considered as a tool, resource, or commodity that could 
legitimately be exploited for state gain. 
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2. AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR: MID-CENTURY RESPONSES TO THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
With the start of the Cold War, realist approaches to international relations and security 
dominated state foreign policy and the policy-making elite. States remained the central 
actors for realist theory and the logic of power politics explained their actions. However, 
unlike earlier realist approaches, which attributed the struggle for power to human nature, 
realists writing toward the end of this period ascribed inter-state conflict and security 
competitions to the lack of an overarching authority above states.35 This ‘structural realist’ 
theory still argued that security was the ultimate concern for states and that no other states 
could be relied upon to guarantee the survival of one’s state.36 They assumed that because of 
the anarchic political system, states provided their own means of protecting themselves from 
others.37 For structural realists, the fundamental variable in understanding international 
outcomes is the relative distribution of power between states.38 Therefore, they understood 
international relations as a politics of power and security, in which international law had 
little influence.39 
This understanding of security remained in place for much of the mid-part of the 20th 
century.40 However, critics argued that it was unable to offer a nuanced explanation of the 
emerging international order, or of international responses to the growing concerns such as 
environmental degradation, economic interdependence, and decolonisation.41 In the early 
post-war period, liberals argued that transnational cooperation was essential in order to 
resolve common problems. David Mitrany argued that cooperation in one area, such as the 
environment or development, would lead states to extent collaboration in other areas.42 As 
states became more embedded in this integrative process, the cost of withdrawing would 
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increase.43 This argument concerning the positive benefits of transnational cooperation 
informed subsequent approaches to international governance.  
In particular, liberal institutionalism offered an explanation of international relations as a 
‘cobweb’ in which states and other transnational actors were linked different interactions.44 
Liberal institutionalists argued that the expansion of the international community, 
emergence of a global culture and the growth of capitalism increased the interdependence 
between states and other NSAs, thus offering the opportunity for enhanced cooperation. 
This approach paid more attention to the complex interdependence between states, 
societies, and NSAs.45  
In this account, the interdependence of states through membership of international 
institutions created incentives for cooperation in areas outside of international peace and 
security.46 While these writers acknowledged the role of power, they emphasise the 
interdependence through international institutions and the identification of common 
interests, which bind states together and mutually constrain each other’s actions.47 For 
example, some writers identified economic and social security as interests that could 
promote states’ cooperation at the international level.48 They argued that states were 
becoming less concerned about military security,49 and with the growing interdependence, 
states viewed one another as partners needed to ensure the greater comfort and well-being 
for their citizens.50 In this approach, environmental concerns were seen as a second-level 
issue and one that could be addressed through international institutions and to gain 
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international cooperation.51 As will be discussed below, and in Section 3, this assumption 
has informed many arguments in which the environment and international security are 
connected. 
Two elements of liberal institutionalism had a profound influence on the development of 
international responses to environment and security concerns. First, their argument that the 
actions and interests of NSAs should be taken into consideration has influenced the 
development of international responses to environmental concerns.52 Second, and related to 
the first element, the growing interdependence between states and NSAs through 
international institutions and organisations brought shared responsibilities to address 
common concerns as well as restraining state autonomy. Therefore, not only were the 
institutions in the international sphere becoming more interconnected and interrelated, but 
the actors involved in them were no longer solely states. As a result, states turned to 
international institutions that would carry out functions of the state, such as security, which 
they could not perform alone. 
During the same period, scientists became increasingly concerned over the impact of 
human activities on the Earth’s environment, particularly in light of the increasing 
population and unsustainable exploitation of the global commons.53 These concerns tied 
with the environmentalist movement in mainstream culture and the decolonisation period 
of the 1960s and 1970s. Concerns over the growing population, population, resource 
scarcity, and the potential for conflict, gave impetus to states to use ‘low political issues’, 
such as the environment and development to build a sense of a global community, 
familiarity and confidence to prevent a further devastating world war.54 Conversely, newly-
independent, developing countries sought to use ‘low political issues’, such as environmental 
management to challenge the existing international system in the areas of the global 
economy, development assistance and the environment because they considered the current 
approach inequitable and unfair.55  
The emergence of the common heritage concept and the affirmation of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources may be seen as part of a broader change to the 
international community where newly-independent countries used international 
institutions, such as the UNGA, to challenge the inequality of existing economic and trade 
institutions. They used soft law instruments to effect changes in the international legal 
framework in an attempt to redress the inequalities of these institutions. At the same time, 
these two concepts can be understood as part of the international community’s attempt to 
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collectively manage the global commons in response to broader economic and 
environmental concerns. Therefore, these two principles reflect the growing 
interconnections between broader areas of international concern, such as development, the 
environment, and economic inequality. They also indicate an increased use in international 
institutions to effect change cooperatively in second tier political issues, such as the 
environment, thus instigating interdependence between states. 
Developing countries supported the introduction of the common heritage principle 
because they believed the existing regime, and the unequal technological capabilities and 
economic power between developed and developing countries prevented them from 
exploiting the resources in the global commons.56 The common heritage concept tied in 
with the broader calls for greater technology transfer, economic support and assistance from 
developed states to developing countries.57 This, developing countries argued, would 
promote economic growth in the developing world. Therefore, the introduction of a 
normative concept, such as the common heritage concept, sought to redress the balance 
between developed and developing countries in the use and conservation of the global 
commons, thus signifying a more cooperative and collaborative response to environmental 
concerns. 
Many of the MEAs that governed the global commons developed during the 1960s 
incorporated elements of the common heritage concept. The inclusion of this concept in 
these agreements embodies ‘liberal sovereignty’ which attempts to redistribute resources 
based on the rights of individuals.58 In doing so, they reveal the growing links between 
economic development, peace, and security that shaped future environmental agreements. 
These links are historically present in liberal thought and relate back to the commercial 
liberalism advocated by Cobden.59 For example, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty, and the 1979 Moon Treaty each associate the use of the global commons and 
their natural resources for the benefit of mankind, peaceful purposes, and not subject to 
appropriation claims of sovereignty through use or occupation.60 These statements reiterate 
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the importance of international cooperation to collectively manage these resources for the 
benefit of all mankind, and may be seen as a challenge by developing states to the liberalism 
articulated in the res communis which privileged the powerful, developed states and their 
private corporations.61  
These arguments supporting inclusion of the common heritage concept are also found in 
the negotiations of the 1982 UNCLOS. The Ambassador of Malta argued that the deep 
seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be declared the 
common heritage for humankind. He identified two central concerns over the current 
regulation of these areas of global commons. First, that current international law encourages 
the appropriation of this area by those who have the technological capability to do so, and 
second, that environmental problems such as marine pollution, or the dumping of nuclear 
waste, risk destroying an ecosystem just when understanding of the Earth was expanding.62 
He argued that the common heritage concept takes into account the inequalities between 
members of the international community and sought to address some of the issues affecting 
the economies of developing countries.  
The common heritage concept was given legal content in UNCLOS.63 It proclaims that 
the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and are the 
common heritage of mankind.64 States may not exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over 
the area or its tangible resources and all ‘rights in the resources of the Area are vested in 
mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act’.65 This means that the activities 
undertaken in this area must be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole and take 
into consideration the interests and needs of developing states.66 This articulation of the 
concept reflects an institutionalisation of international cooperation in the management and 
exploitation of the global commons. It has been designed to benefit people who may 
otherwise be excluded from the profits accrued from the exploitation of the seabed. It 
therefore challenged the liberal free trade economics evident in the earlier use of res 
communis in the global commons with the notion of ‘redistributive multilateralism’ for all 
states to share the benefits of those resources in the global commons.67 Further, it also 
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recognised that the vulnerability of the environment required international cooperation to 
manage for future generations.68 
During the same period, newly-independent developing countries sought to reassert their 
sovereign control over natural resources contained within their jurisdiction.69 They 
challenged the structural biases of the existing international system and their development 
problems through the creation of a new international economic order, part of which 
included reasserting the exclusive control over natural resources for economic 
development.70 This was in response to the attempts by former colonial powers to retain 
favourable concessions and access to resources granted prior to independence.71 The 1962 
United Nations Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources affirmed the 
‘right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources’ for the interests of ‘national development and wellbeing of the people.’72 This 
declaration aimed to balance the priorities of developing and developed states by conferring 
control over their natural wealth to developing countries with the interests of developed 
states and protection for their corporations investing abroad.73 This declaration can be seen 
as part of the growing association between the environment and development, where the 
natural resources of developing states were to be used for their economic betterment and to 
secure the well-being of their citizens. 74 It may also be seen as a challenge by developing 
states to the growing economic interdependence between states, which they argued enabled 
hegemonic power to be accumulated in the developed, western states.75 
Taken together, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the 
common heritage concept can also be seen as a reaffirmation of the public/private divide. 
The two concepts maintain the view of natural resources as raw material to be exploited for 
the economic development of developing countries.76 However, the introduction of the 
common heritage concept also ensures that the activities of states in the global commons are 
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to be managed for the benefit of future generations of mankind. This reflects the 
increasingly cooperative approach towards responding to the interrelated concerns of 
environmental management and addressing the development needs of developing states.  
At the same time, key events during the Cold War highlighted the linkages between ‘non-
traditional’ issues and international peace and security. Non-traditional issues, such as the 
increasing interdependence between states through globalisation, access to natural 
resources, and underdevelopment were increasingly referred to as strategic threats to the 
security of the international community, particularly that of the United States. In particular, 
the 1973 Middle Eastern oil crisis highlighted the interdependence between security and 
other international institutions.77 This crisis revealed that natural resources, such as oil, may 
be used as political leverage by cartels and thus be considered as a strategic threat to the 
interests of great powers (such as the United States).78 Therefore, this crisis introduced the 
notion of interdependence and the issue of economic security on the realist international 
security agenda.79 Similarly, the intra-state conflicts in the developing world were discussed 
within international security studies to the extent that they related to the ongoing 
superpowers’ global rivalry.80 The discussion of these conflicts mainly focused on the 
concerns of economic security and the possibility that supplier cartels could disrupt the 
western economy through raising prices or restricting supply.81 
Therefore, toward the end of the 1970s, different issues were raised as a security concern 
for states.82 Structural realist security scholars argued that issues such as access to raw 
materials were relevant in the process of accumulating power that is based on the material 
capabilities that a state controls.83 As the socio-economic power of states also informed their 
material capabilities, economic and technological considerations were increasingly included 
in realist security studies as strategic objectives to ensure states’ security. Similarly, issues 
such as international trade, disease, the global economy, and access to raw materials, were 
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included in the discussion of security. This challenged the classical understanding of 
international security as purely the threat of external military attack.84  
For example, Lester Brown proposed that the concept of a ‘threat’ should be expanded to 
take into account the change in the international community and the activities that may 
threaten states. He argued that events such as natural disasters, raw material shortages, 
rebellions, and blockades could be considered threats to security.85 Richard Ullman argued 
that activities that inhibited the opportunity for cultural, scientific and intellectual exchange 
should be considered as a threat to security.86 Each of these arguments widen the meaning of 
security to include activities and concerns not traditionally considered as a security issue.  
One reason why these scholars argued that such issues should be considered a security 
issue was the increase in size of the international community through decolonisation. This 
raised concerns over unstable socio-economic and politically ‘weak’ states and the stability 
of different regions across the globe.87 These anxieties coincided with the diversification of 
the global economy and significant price shocks on some raw materials, as well as growing 
unease over the effect of resource scarcity on the ability for newly-independent countries to 
pursue development goals.88 Realist security scholars were concerned that such instability 
may affect the balance of power in the international community, while liberals argued that 
the transformation of such countries into democracies and assimilating them into the global 
economic institutions, can ensure the security of the international community.89 These 
concerns informed the international security debate and the role of development and 
environment within it. 
Concerns about over-population, resource scarcity, and weak governments were closely 
associated with growing debates over the security of newly-independent countries and the 
potential of regional destabilisation.90 During the 1960s and 1970s, neo-Malthusians 
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persuasively argued that conflict over resources would occur because of overpopulation.91 
These arguments draw on Thomas Malthus’ theory that overpopulation is positively 
constrained by periods of war.92 Neo-Malthusian’s warned that population growth, and 
specifically, population growth in the Global South, would destroy civilisation ‘as we know 
it’ and lead to an abrupt collapse of industrial society.93 These arguments informed the 
narrative that underdevelopment, poor environmental management, and resource 
degradation was a threat to the current world order and global security.94  
These arguments continued to inform debates surrounding development, conflict, and 
environmental degradation during the 1980s. There was ongoing concern about the 
possibility of regional destabilisation in the Global South because of its underdevelopment, 
and the exacerbation of conflict by natural disasters such as drought.95 Whilst realists 
continued to frame these interconnected concerns in terms of altering the balance of power 
between the United States and the Soviet Union,96 others looked beyond the state to the 
well-being of individuals. An example of this can be found in the highly influential 1987 
Brundtland Report, published by the United Nations World Commission on Environment 
and Development. This report revealed a growing focus on the well-being of individuals and 
the potential destabilising effect of underdevelopment, overpopulation and environmental 
degradation on international peace and security.   
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The Brundtland Report expressly linked development, the environment, and security 
together. It introduced the concept of sustainable development into the political mainstream 
as a solution the underdevelopment of the Global South as well as a goal for all states in 
general. The report can be understood as adopting a liberal perspective on the causes of 
insecurity by proposing a solution that focused on protecting individual rights and security 
through the supporting the economic development of states, and increasing the number of 
liberal democracies in the international community. As will be discussed in later in this 
chapter, the Brundtland Report, and its definition of sustainable development, has had an 
extraordinary influence on the evolution of international responses to environmental 
concerns and questions of global security in the post-Cold War period.  
Towards the end of the Cold War, other critical theories challenged the dominant 
paradigms of international relations, law, and security. Feminist security studies and post-
colonial security studies challenged the ‘traditional’ (realist) perspective of international 
security.97 Part of this early research mirrored the wider feminist debates and examined 
whether women’s role as nurturers gave them a different perspective on peace and security.98 
Other researchers challenged this biological and cultural ‘peace-proneness’99 of early 
research and argued that women should be considered as a separate referent object for 
security.100 These post-positivist examinations of security laid the foundations for 
developing multilevel and multidimensional interrogations of ‘security’ that were based on 
the experiences of women. These were significantly expanded in the post-Cold War, and as 
will be discussed below, engaged in examining the link between security and the 
environment to some degree. 
While the security in the Cold War period has generally been viewed through the realist 
security paradigm, other approaches have produced different understandings of security and 
how to achieve it. Liberalism generally focused on increasing interdependence through 
economic and institutional means. However, both of these perspectives have framed the 
environment as ancillary to the end goal: Security. During this period, the environment was 
linked to security as a way to increase the economic security of a state (realist perspective) or 
as something to support economic interdependence between states through commercial 
activity (liberal perspective) as a way to ensure peace. 
The latter perspective was reaffirmed in the emerging narrative, informed by liberalism, 
which linked developmental and environmental issues together as a way to attain security. 
This link is particularly evident in the Brundtland Report, and the subsequent introduction 
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of sustainable development into mainstream international discourse. As will be examined 
below, the environment was once again considered in terms of the economic security of the 
state and international community, and as security for the individual terms of food and 
health. Finally, it was also considered as integral for states’ ability to maintain security 
through resource control.  
3. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE POST-COLD WAR RESPONSES TO THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
The end of the Cold War was heralded as the ‘end of history’ by some commentators who 
noted the triumph of the west, and the ‘unabashed victory of economic and political 
liberalism.’101 The immediate post-Cold War period created an opportunity for development 
and environment issues to be heard by the international community. There was a new 
optimism that states would be able cooperatively to solve global problems that previously 
were unable to compete for attention on the diplomatic agenda. Bernstein suggests that the 
combination of environment and development ‘epitomised the alternative international 
agenda so long buried under the preoccupation with superpower conflict’.102 In particular, 
the 1992 Rio Conference represented an opportunity to show the new face of global 
cooperation and signalled that a peaceful, multilateral political system and open, market 
friendly international economic system were to be the cornerstones of the post-Cold War 
international order.  
The organisers of the Rio Conference took the opportunity to make a statement on how 
planetary affairs should be managed. They promoted the concept of sustainable 
development, as articulated in the Brundtland Report, which linked these two areas.103 They 
suggested that sustainable development should be seen as a goal and solution for the issues 
which undermine international peace and security. Maurice Strong made this argument 
when he linked the security of the planet and the security of individuals and nations.104 The 
concept has had a profound effect on the subsequent evolution of IEL and international 
responses to peace and security. Many attribute this influence to its ability to reconcile the 
paradoxical relationship between consistent economic growth, and the limitations of the 
Earth’s ecological functions.105 Therefore, the concept was seen as a solution to the drivers of 
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underdevelopment and the social stressors that can lead to conflict and insecurity, as well as 
a guiding principle for the subsequent development of IEL.  
3.1 What is sustainable development? 
The origins of sustainable development can be traced to earlier state practice and to 
reports and proposals by intergovernmental organisations such as the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature.106 However, the concept of sustainable development introduced 
in the Brundtland Report has had significant influence on the development of IEL in 
subsequent soft and hard law instruments and in international responses to (in)security. The 
report refers to sustainable development as a way to meet the ‘needs of the present without 
compromising the needs of future generations.’107 This approach is a normative one that 
integrates elements of inter- and intra-generational equity,108 economic and social 
development, as well as the importance of maintaining a healthy environment.109 The latter 
three elements have become known as the ‘three pillars of sustainable development’.110  
These elements of sustainable development are reflected in the two underlying concepts 
that inform sustainable development: ‘The concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential 
needs of the world’s poor; and the idea of limitations imposed, by the state of technology 
and social organisation.’111 Therefore, sustainable development incorporates many of the 
central values of liberalism. It makes people the central focus of the concept. It incorporates 
liberalism’s technological innovation and social progress, while also recognising the current 
technological and social limitations of society. It also incorporates the argument that 
economic growth, development, and interdependence act as a way to maintain peace and 
security. For these reasons, sustainable development aims to support the continuation of 
(economic) development which states, international institutions, programmes, and 
organisations, deemed necessary for developing countries, while also taking into 
consideration the limitations of Earth’s ecological functions. 
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The content of the sustainable development concept has shaped the evolution of 
international responses to environmental problems through IEL. Principles such as the 
principle of integration, equity, precaution, and good governance have been incorporated 
into international regimes responding to environmental and developmental concerns.112 
This is indicative of an institutionalisation of collective responses to environmental concerns 
at different levels of governance and with the participation of both NSAs and states. In this 
way, sustainable development may be considered a manifestation of liberalism in the 
international sphere, and specifically, in the evolution of international responses to the 
environment.  
3.2 Sustainable Development in International Environmental Law 
The legal content of sustainable development is generally found in the conventions and 
soft law documents adopted during the Rio Conference process. There are two distinct 
elements to the concept: Those principles that reflect substantive elements of the concept 
and those that reflect procedural elements of the concept. Together, these elements indicate 
a growing institutionalisation of collective responses to transboundary environmental 
problems, while also taking into account the need to balance the differing interests of 
members of the international community.113 In this way, sustainable development can be 
thought of as an ‘integrationist principle’114 whose components seek to balance the 
competing economic, social and environmental interests of the international community.115 
Sustainable development includes both substantive and procedural principles. One 
procedural principle that has been widely supported in the development of IEL and 
governance is participation, including the right by individuals to participate in 
environmental decision-making processes, the right to effective remedies and the right to 
information.116 These principles encapsulate ‘norms of liberal environmentalism’ in which 
‘liberal democracy, capitalism, ‘good governance’ is regarded as the most viable political 
framework for tackling sustainable development challenges.’117 They have been included in 
both hard and soft IEL as a response to the perceived ‘democratic gap’ in the development of 
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such law. Chambers and Elliot suggest that the support for the participation of marginalised 
groups such as youth, women, and indigenous people is seen as a way to respond to the 
participation gap and strengthen the democratic basis of environmental governance.118  
The support for the participation by NSAs, including individuals, civil society, NGOs, 
and private actors, demonstrates the growing pluralism of the international sphere described 
by liberal institutionalists. Many of the international environmental agreements adopted at 
the Rio Conference and afterwards include the principles of participation in their texts.119 
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration recognises the principle of public participation.120 
Similarly, the 1992 Biodiversity Convention requires the participation and interests of the 
individual or communities affected.121 One of the most comprehensive articulations of the 
participation principle is included in the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention). This convention requires states to ‘guarantee 
the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to 
justice in environmental matters’.122 These principles have also been incorporated into 
national and regional institutional frameworks for environmental matters.123 
The consequence of this broad support for procedural participation is that individuals at 
the local, national and international levels have been able to challenge the responses to 
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environmental concerns through local, national and international institutions.124 The 
broadening of NSA participation at all levels of governance has challenged the state-centric 
conceptualisation of the international community as envisaged in realist paradigms.125 It 
further reveals the consolidation of liberal institutionalist approaches to the global order 
which support the participation by NSAs as a way to increase the democratic legitimacy of 
state action and also to improve the democratic governance of states. This, liberalism 
assures, will help empower individuals and increase the number of liberal states in the 
international community, therefore creating peace.  
The other notable procedural principle included in sustainable development is the 
precautionary approach. This principle builds on existing legal principles, such as the ‘no 
harm’ principle discussed above.126 This is both an element of the substantive principle of 
sustainable usage and a procedural principle that requires states to undertake a duty to 
adopt precautionary measures where there is scientific uncertainty over effects of their 
activities on the environment.127 In this way it reflects the recognition of the limitations of 
current technology and science, as articulated within the concept of sustainable 
development.  
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The precautionary approach may be seen as a guiding principle to encourage decision-
makers to consider the potentially harmful effects of their activities on the environment.128 
Some references to the approach in IEL are more qualified than others. For example, the 
2000 Cartagena Protocol and Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration calls for states to apply a 
precautionary approach where there is lack of full scientific certainty and ‘threats of serious 
or irreversible damage’ exist.129 It requires states to balance different interests, such as the 
economy and environment, in a cost-effective manner.130 However, the earlier 1995 Fish 
Stocks Agreement contains a less qualified reference to precaution which does not refer to 
the balance between the threat to the environment and economic considerations.131 This 
reflects the inclusion of a broader precautionary approach in the earlier agreement.  
The inclusion of an explicit economic element in the manifestation of the precautionary 
approach in the later Cartagena Protocol suggests that the relationship between the 
environment, economy, and science has become increasingly complex in recent times. It 
may also indicate the increasing treatment of tensions between environmental conservation 
and the need to develop as an economic problem, and one that can be solved by subjecting it 
to objective, dispassionate cost benefit analysis. This may reveal a prioritisation of economic 
considerations in the context of these paradoxical issues. Finally, it may also identify the 
increasing influence of neoliberalism in the evolution of IEL and the dominance of the 
market in international development.  
A number of international courts, including the WTO Appellate Body, ITLOS, and the 
ICJ, have been asked to pronounce on the legal status of the precautionary approach, but 
have eschewed answering this question.132 The WTO Appellate Body has stated that it is 
unwilling to pronounce whether the precautionary approach has become a principle of 
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Hawke, ‘Sustainable Development', 361; Wiener, ‘Precaution', 601, 604. 
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130 International Law Association, International Law on Sustainable Development  (2012), 20; see also Rio 
Declaration 1992, Principle 15; Kyoto Protocol 1997; Cartagena Protocol 2000, preamble;. This has been 
criticised as a weaker version of the precautionary approach. See, Linda Cameron, 'Environmental Risk 
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customary or general international law.133 A similar tension is included in the ICJ’s 
treatment of the principle. New Zealand relied on the precautionary principle in its 
submissions to the court in the Nuclear Test Case (1995).134 While the court dismissed New 
Zealand’s request in this case, judges Weeramantry and Palmer used the opportunity to 
argue that the precautionary approach had joined the growing corpus of international 
environmental principles.135 The court, once again, chose not to record its view on the legal 
status of the approach in the later Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay Case (2010). This was 
criticised by Judge Cançado Trindade who argued that the principle was a principle of 
IEL.136  
However, international courts have been more open to noting the relevance of the 
precautionary approach in the interpretation and application of international law. During 
the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay Case (2010), the court did note that the approach may 
have relevance in the interpretation and application of provisions of law.137 Similarly, the 
Seabed Dispute Chamber in the Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to 
Activities in the Area (2011) suggested that the precautionary approach is a rule of custom 
for the purposes of treaty interpretation.138 While not a declaratory statement of the law, the 
chamber goes beyond the statements made by previous tribunals and courts.139 These 
decisions indicate that courts have been unwilling to rule on the legal status on the 
approach’s substantive elements. However, they are more willing to recognise the 
procedural content of the principle. This indicates that states may be more willing to be 
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subject to a decision-making exercise than a more substantive obligation concerning an 
unmeasurable uncertainty.  
Philippe Sands notes that the substantive elements of sustainable development, such as 
the precautionary approach, differential treatment, and inter-generational equity comprise 
the inherent legal elements of sustainable development.140 These substantive elements point 
to the limitations that must be placed on the use of natural resources.141 One example of this 
differential treatment between the substantive and procedural elements of sustainable 
development is the treatment of the principle of inter-generational equity by international 
courts and tribunals.142 
This tension is further revealed in the contested legality of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility (CBDR). This principle links the performance of developing 
states’ obligations with financial assistance, technology transfer, and capacity-building.143 As 
this principle explicitly connects international responses to environmental problems with 
development support, many states are reluctant to accord this principle legal content.144 
Others, particularly developing countries, argue it is a principle of international law.145 This 
tension is noticeable in the negotiations of the climate change regime where environment 
and economic development considerations are intimately connected.146  
Recent adopted decisions from the climate change regime point to an erosion of 
differentiation between developing and developed states. However, they contain 
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Differentiated Responsibility’ (2006) 21(3) AmUInt'l LRev 461; International Law Association, International Law 
on Sustainable Development  (2012), 18.  
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commitments to technology transfer147 and preferential access to assistance by developing 
states, particularly the least developed countries, African countries, and Small Island 
Developing States (SIDs).148 The retention of these commitments reflects some 
acknowledgement of equity between states.149 However, the Durban Platform on Enhanced 
Action makes no reference to ‘equity’ or CBDR.150 These tensions are ongoing and revealed 
in the negotiations of the Paris Agreement at the 21st COP to the 1992 UNFCCC.151 These 
tensions highlight the problems in the recent development of climate change law and 
difficulties in reconciling the substantive elements of sustainable development, with 
economic and political realities.152 Therefore, they suggest that tensions between equity and 
differentiation remain at the forefront of climate negotiations.  
The principle of sustainable use explicitly links the substantive elements of sustainable 
development. References to the ‘sustainable utilisation’ of resources, or words to similar 
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effect, have been included in many MEAs and other international agreements.153 This 
principle has been recognised by international tribunals and courts who note the existence 
of an obligation to conserve living natural resources. In the Icelandic Fisheries Case (1974), 
the ICJ stated that states have a duty to give due regard to the needs of conservation for the 
benefit of all.154 In cases decided after the introduction of sustainable development, the ICJ 
noted need for states to take into consideration the new norms and standards relating to 
sustainable development, including the sustainable usage of natural resources.155 They 
recognised the need to balance states’ rights and needs and the obligation to protect the 
environment from any damage that may be caused by activities.156 These rulings uphold the 
substantive elements of the sustainable development concept that seek to ensure the 
management of environmental resources for future generations.  
Sustainable development and the principle of integration recognises that there are 
interconnections between different areas of international law.157 These interconnections 
have been noted by the ICJ and the WTO Appellate Body, both of whom have used the 
principle of sustainable development to acknowledge the interrelationships between the 
different areas of international law and balance these interests.158 These pronouncements on 
the principle of integration indicate that not only is it a substantial principle of sustainable 
development, but it has practical usage to synthesise sustainable development. 
The central importance of sustainable development is the ability for it to integrate laws, 
principles, and norms from across the international legal system.159 Its value as a normative 
concept means that it continues to be central to the ongoing negotiations in environmental 
regimes, as well as in the wider international community.160 Some of the central principles 
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have been integrated into national and international law,161 and into primary and secondary 
soft law instruments such as regulations, declarations, and codes of practice.162 These 
represent a ‘strengthening and broadening of the concept’163 in the wider international 
sphere. These developments highlight the collective and cooperative response to the 
interrelated issues of environmental sustainability and development incorporated within the 
international community.  
However, some commentators contend that sustainable development serves the interests 
of the industrial elite.164 These criticisms relate to the tension between integrating the three 
pillars of sustainable development and the arguments that economic development has been 
prioritised in implementation of the concept. This issue has become particularly relevant in 
response to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the resulting ‘great recession.’165 
Natural resource accounting has been a widely used and integral part of sustainable 
development where the ‘value’ of nature is included in economic considerations to provide a 
more comprehensive overview of the sustainability of development and growth.166 
Proponents of this approach argue that ascribing ‘value’ to the environment enables 
policymakers to inform decisions over the benefits and potential costs of any project over 
time. Critics of this approach question the ability of the methodology to ‘accurately assign 
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economic values to the social and environmental impacts of a project.’167 As many of the 
‘values’ of nature are non-monetary or non-quantifiable, critics of the use of economic 
methodologies in environmental decision-making argue that this approach frames the 
environment as a commodity that silences and ignores those non-monetary and 
unquantifiable values of nature.168  
In response to the recent global economic crisis, the concept of a ‘green economy’ has 
been integrated into the paradigm of sustainable development as a way to ensure sustained 
economic growth while also protecting the environment.169 The ‘green economy’ is defined 
as ‘new economic paradigm’ that ‘that reduces environmental risks and ecological scarcities 
at the same time as improving human well-being and social equity.’170 It is meant to 
complement sustainable development by establishing an economic foundation to support 
sustainable development activities.171 Both the climate change and biodiversity regimes 
include green economy by introducing ‘payment for ecosystem services’ schemes in the 
context of nationally defined development policies. These schemes ‘sell’ ecosystem functions 
on the global market, thus incentivising those communities who own the ecosystems to 
provide a reason not to use them in an exploitative manner.172  
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Some NSAs criticise the inclusion of the green economy into sustainable development 
because it commoditises the environment and therefore may alter the balance between the 
three pillars of sustainable development. They argue that it reaffirms the anthropocentric 
content of the concept.173 They argue that the continued support for ‘sustained and inclusive 
growth’ will lead to resource depletion and very little benefit for women.174 The green 
economy’s commitment to sustained economic growth and the integration of more 
sophisticated accounting approaches reflect the complexity of contemporary responses to 
environmental degradation, environmental management, economic development and 
international trade. Critics argue that these responses manifest neoliberalism’s commitment 
to free-trade and free markets as a response to environmental problems which has resulted 
in highly complex and interconnected linkages between environment, economic, trade and 
development issues in the international sphere.  
Critics of sustainable development argue that it has moved away from a holistic and 
integrated approach to the integrated pillars, simply towards another way of viewing the 
neoliberal, capitalist developmental approach. They argue that it is the ‘final destination’ for 
a neoliberal version on environmental protection and criticise this direction of international 
environmental governance.175 Others argue that it maintains an ‘objective’ measurement of 
the value of nature that excludes those elements, which are unquantifiable. Despite these 
criticisms, sustainable development remains an environmental norm with a significant 
normative and legal concept. Therefore, the way that the environment is presented in the 
context of this concept has a profound influence on the subsequent evolution of IEL.  
The integration of sustainable development into IEL reflects the social, political, and 
economic context of the past 20 years. From the discussion and treatment of sustainable 
development, as well as its constituent principles in international law, we can see that the 
international community has widened and deepened responses to environmental concerns 
in a way that sought to balance development interests and environmental concerns. In this 
way, the development of the concept reflects liberal ideals that support the increasing 
interdependence between different communities, individuals, and states through economic 
and social interdependence.  
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Therefore, sustainable development responds to the emerging multipolar, plural, and 
interconnected world in which different communities in the international order seek to 
reconcile the interrelated, but often contradictory, goals of environmental protection and 
development. It reveals the assumptions held by some states and international institutions 
that certain types of governance, economic practices, and participatory approaches will 
enable the peaceful and secure coexistence of states in the international community. This is 
particularly noteworthy in the justifications for the securitisation of the environment, 
discussed below, where the environment, development, and security are explicitly linked 
together as a reason for why sustainable development should remain the overriding goal for 
the international community and strategy for responding to environment concerns.  
3.3 Post-Cold War Environment/Security links  
During the post-Cold War period, security scholars and other interested actors began to 
examine the links between the environment and security in more detail. The way in which 
the environment has been linked with security in the post-Cold War period consolidates 
liberal approaches towards security by widening and deepening security to prioritise the 
security of individuals rather than states. This rests on the assumption that the protection 
and betterment of the world’s poor and marginalised peoples through sustainable 
development can ensure the collective security of the international community.176  
However, critics of the links are uncomfortable with the evocation of ‘security’ as a 
primary means to improve the human condition and strengthen international society in the 
post-Cold War period.177 They question the dangerous and unforeseen consequences of the 
securitisation of issues, such as the environment, for group or institutional advantage. 
Further, they suggest that the securitisation of issues such as underdevelopment and the 
environment foster fear while also favouring policies of containment and marginalises the 
places in which these issues occur.178  
With these criticisms in mind, the following discussion focuses on three approaches that 
have linked the environment with security in the post-Cold War period. The first examined 
the environment as a societal stressor and sought to identify where issues such as resource 
scarcity, overpopulation and environmental degradation may increase the incidences of 
insecurity. The second focused on the security of individuals and incorporated the 
environment to the extent that it enabled states and individuals to secure access to food, 
                                                          
176 Mark R. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples (Polity 2007), 3; 
Endre Begby and J Peter Burgess, ‘Human Security and Liberal Peace’ (2009) 1(1) Public Reason 91, 91; Mark R. 
Duffield, ‘The Liberal Way of Development and the Development—Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-
Chance Divide’ (2010) 41(1) Secur Dialog 53, 55. 
177 E.g. Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 
1998); Jef Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’ (2000) 38(5) JCMS 751.  
178 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 3-4; see also Rita Abrahamsen, ‘Blair's Africa: The Politics 
of Securitization and Fear’ (2005) 30(1) Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 55, 61, 70. 
59 
 
energy, and livelihood for development and economic productivity. The third approach 
focuses specifically on the threat of climate change to state and human well-being. Each of 
these approaches invokes ‘security’ as a primary means to improve the human condition and 
strengthen international society. 
3.3.1 Environmental Security 
The first wave of environment/security linkages that emerged in the post-Cold War 
period argued that scarcity, overpopulation, and unequal resource allocation could be a 
powerful long-term stressor on societies.179 Proponents of this approach suggested that 
environmental scarcity could occur in one of three ways: Supply induced, structural 
induced, and demand induced. The causes of such scarcity were attributed to the physical 
depletion of the environment, population induced consumption, and unequal resource 
allocation within a society.180  
This research had a significant influence on the foreign policy and collective security 
strategies of some states. Countries such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, and regional organisations such as the European Union, explicitly identified links 
between environmental scarcity and the increased risk of intra-state conflict in their 
international development, security, and humanitarian policies.181 For example, the United 
Kingdom’s Cabinet Office Report argues that ‘a lack of effective government, weak security 
and poverty can all cause instability and will be exacerbated in the future by competition for 
resources, growing populations and climate change.’182 This link between environment and 
security reveals the dominant assumption that ‘development’, which reduces poverty, 
improves well-being and generates hope, could reduce the alienation of individuals, and 
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thus lessen the risk of social tension and conflict.183 In this context, the environment was 
seen as a potential threat to the security of the international community by undermining the 
development and security of individuals and communities. Commentators have identified 
this argument as embodying the outlook of post-Cold War liberal internationalism with its 
focus on democratic institutions, human rights, and economic liberalism.184  
States, NSAs, and global institutions have responded to these concerns by creating 
development strategies to address the perceived causes of environmental scarcity. Many of 
the responses propose addressing the drivers of poverty, developing technological 
capabilities and improving land tenure.185 These proposals continue to frame the global 
south and environmental insecurity as problems of underdevelopment that requires states, 
NSAs, and institutions from the global north to intervene to ensure the development of the 
global south and therefore prevent conflict.186 These arguments reaffirm the representation 
of the global south as ‘other’, backward, in need of ‘improving’ and assimilating into the 
liberal international order.187 Barnett criticises this ‘selective interpretation’ because it 
maintains security as ‘business-as-usual’ and continues the interpretation of the south by the 
north.188 It has silenced the wider debate over historical, structural, and wider contributors 
to environmental degradation.189 
More recent natural resource/conflict literature has sought to explain the causes of 
conflict in a way that takes into account the socio-economic context. The 2009 United 
Nations Environment Programme Report, From Conflict to Peacebuilding, argued that 
economic inequality and poverty create incentives for groups to capture resources by taking 
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control of the resource rich territories.190 These assumptions are evident in the text of recent 
UNSC resolutions concerning the exploitation of natural resources. In resolutions 
concerning the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and the Central 
African Republic, the UNSC reiterates that the exploitation of natural resources should be 
used to aid the socio-economic development of these countries.191 These resolutions also 
refer to the need to ensure ‘sustainable’ peace and development for these countries through 
the legitimate exploitation of natural resources.192 They emphasise that the ‘transparent and 
effective management’ of natural resources is critical for sustainable peace and security.193 
These statements by the Security Council repeat the arguments put forward by the UN 
Secretary General and UNEP that peace and security are anchored in sustainable 
development, which in turn is based upon the (sustainable) exploitation of natural 
resources. Therefore, they reaffirm liberal assumptions that the process of economic and 
social development, use of natural resources for economic growth, and the transference to 
liberal democratic governance, will address the drivers of underdevelopment and insecurity 
and thus increase the security of the international community.  
Similar arguments concerning the role of democratic governance, economic 
liberalisation, and human rights are revealed in the body of literature examining the links 
between natural resources, conflict, and development. The effect of having an abundance of 
natural resources has been described as the ‘resource curse’ where it has had a detrimental 
effect on the security of states.194 Both academic and institutional literature seeking to 
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explain the connection between natural resources and insecurity have attributed the 
insecurity to poor governance and institutional incapacity, where the institutional capacity 
of the state can be weakened because corruption, neglect of the military, and policy decisions 
by the state.195 This understanding has been adopted by the UN in its work surrounding the 
link between resources, security, and peace.196 In UNSC resolutions, statements, and debates 
concerning the post-conflict reconstruction of conflict rich areas, there are significant 
references to the importance of Governments gaining control over those regions where 
natural resources are prevalent, as well as ensuring the good governance and transparency of 
extractive industries.197  
For example, the more recent resolutions concerning the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Liberia emphasise the importance both of transparency and of implementing 
sustainable natural resource exploitation.198 In this context, natural resources are referred to 
as a benefit for the well-being of citizens and countries, and for their sustainable 
development. These associations highlight the integration of sustainable development 
practices in the UNSC practice surrounding environment/security links. They further repeat 
the assumption that economic and social development, democracy, good governance, and 
the recognition of human rights can help create and maintain peace.  
Therefore, the solution put forward by western states and international institutions is to 
incorporate ‘others’ (the global south, women, marginalised communities, and the 
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environment) into the global economic and security communities through a variety of 
development strategies.199 This approach mirrors the approach taken in the security and 
development strategies of some states who also frame the value of the environment in terms 
of its usefulness for sustainable development and security. In this way, environment/security 
links are incorporated into the strategy of economic liberalisation, human rights, the rule of 
law, and neoliberal development.200 Therefore, it features within development activities to 
the extent that it provides humanity’s basic survival needs, resources for livelihood security, 
subsistence agriculture, and economic development. 201 
Neo-Malthusian arguments have resurfaced in more recent research examining 
environment/security links.202 They are present in the discussions surrounding food 
security, climate change, and population growth. For example, the United Nations World 
Food Programme identifies food insecurity as a cause of violence, while the Wilson Centre 
proposes that population growth and resource scarcity can escalate conflict.203 These 
assumptions inform broader discussions concerning population growth, development, and 
conflict.204 Further, they inform sustainable development objectives as they view sustainable 
development as a solution to such insecurity and potential conflict.  
Therefore, the environmental scarcity/conflict linkages portrayed in this body of research 
have been refined and continue to be analysed in the context of food security, climate 
change, and insecurity. While such links have been criticised for ignoring socio-economic 
considerations of insecurity,205 they have had significant influence on the policy responses 
by NSAs, states, and international institutions in developing countries. Delving underneath 
these responses by such actors, it is possible to identify the argument that liberal 
governmentality and ‘values’ can contribute towards achieving security. Further, they 
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indicate a growth interconnection between different areas of international interest, such as 
the economy, trade, development, and the environment, particularly in the context of 
natural resources and conflict. Therefore, environment/security links manifest themselves in 
debates concerning access to resources for food security as well as more traditional 
considerations of economic production and control.   
3.3.2 Human Security 
Another approach that connects the environment and security is the concept of ‘human 
security’. This concept proposed to make humans the referent object of security as a 
response to the incidences of civil war, underdevelopment, and intra-state conflicts that 
occurred in the immediate post-Cold War period.206 In doing so, it transformed ‘security’ 
from securing the territory of states to securing people, irrespective of any axes of 
difference.207 The concept sought to encourage policymakers and scholars to reconceive 
international security as ‘something more than the military defence of state interests and 
territory.’208 Therefore, the concept is both explanatory and normative. Where 
environment/security connections are present, they are framed as part of its attempt to 
protect and empower individuals in order to promote and maintain international peace and 
security.209 
There is no one, single unified paradigm of human security. Roland Paris describes the 
concept as ambiguous, contested, and permutated through many different interpretations.210 
However, the 1994 Report by the United Nations Development Programme, Human 
Development Report and the 2003 Report by the Commission on Human Security, Human 
Security Now have been fundamental to creating a vision of human security as a basis for 
international action and for action by international institutions.211 These two reports framed 
human security as ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’.212 As part of this broad 
understanding, these reports outline that the aim of human security is to create ‘political, 
social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the 
building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity’.213 Therefore, the concept of human 
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security originates in the liberal humanist tradition and is part of the strategy of liberal 
internationalism which seeks to reduce conflict through preventative development 
predicated on the liberal values of ‘life, liberty and property’.214 
Some commentators suggest that human security embodies liberal internationalism 
because the fate of individual humans becomes the legitimate concern of the international 
community.215 Therefore, responses by the international community, through international 
institutions and NSAs, are guided by ideals that reflect liberal values of democracy, human 
rights, and economic liberalisation. The indivisibility between peace, security, and 
development for the maintenance of international peace and security has been included in a 
number of UNSC Presidential Statements. They have reaffirmed that ‘development, peace 
and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing’.216 They encourage 
governments in post-conflict situations to manage their resources lawfully, transparently 
and sustainably.’217 They condemn the use of natural resources in fuelling conflicts and 
called for their use in promoting development in post-conflict situations.218Therefore, these 
statements embody liberal internationalism in which values of democracy, economic 
liberalisation, and human rights are viewed as integral to achieving international peace and 
security, and that ‘development’ is seen as the primary way of achieving these values. In this 
context, the environment is seen as antecedent to achieving development, and integral to the 
attainment of human security.  
This connection between the environment, development, and security is further 
contained in the reports by international organisations, such as the United Nations. The 
2004 report published by the United Nations’ High-Level Panel on Threats and Challenges, 
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility described the indivisibility between 
freedom, economic development and security and linked the achievement of development 
with ensuring human security.219 They identified environmental degradation, poverty, and 
infectious disease as the by-product of underdevelopment and argued that development is 
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the first line of defence against these issues which undermine human security. They argued 
that sustainable development was integral to achieving international peace and security. The 
UN Secretary-General reiterated this linkage and argued that  
‘the basic building blocks of peace and security for all peoples are economic and 
social security, anchored in sustainable development, [because they] allow us to 
address all the great issues – poverty, climate, environment and political stability as 
parts to a whole.’220  
The 2010 United Nations Secretary-General report on human security reaffirmed this 
link and made the connection between the security of individuals, the environment, and 
development explicit.221  
These references identify a fundamental relationship between environment, security, and 
social and economic development in the pursuit of global peace in the 21st century.222 In this 
approach, the environment features within development activities to the extent that it 
provides humanity’s basic survival needs, resources for livelihood security, subsistence 
agriculture, and economic development.223 Therefore, human security may be considered as 
part of a strategy of liberal internationalism, with its emphasis on supporting economic 
liberalism, neoliberal development, human rights, and the rule of law.224  
However, some critics  argue that the liberal heritage of the concept means that it is 
inherently androcentric and exclusionary.225 Feminists, such as Heidi Hudson and Natasha 
Marhia, criticise the concept for using the word ‘human’ because it collapses femininity and 
masculinity into the term ‘human’ which can ‘conceal the gendered underpinnings of 
security practices’.226 Hudson argues that the liberal empiricist paradigm of mainstream 
security discourse universalises and reproduces existing meanings of what constitutes 
humankind.227 This means that where security is conceived as ‘human’ security, it maintains 
the hegemonic universalisation of what it means to be ‘human’ – which some feminists 
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argue is problematic as it does not fully account for how ‘the conditions through which 
individuals are recognised as ‘human’ in particular contexts can function in exclusionary 
ways’.228 Finally, the discourse of ‘human’ security does not fully account for the fact that a 
person’s security and well-being are a function of their social situation and location in a web 
of social and interpersonal relationships and power relations, all of which are inherently 
gendered.229  
Other critics argue that the concept may not acknowledge the gendered assumptions that 
inform both ‘development’ and ‘security’ itself. They argue that the convergence of 
development and security agendas in the concept of human security can be deployed as a 
‘pretext for hegemonic and interventionist…policies’.230 Similarly, others argue that the 
concept incorporates a universalised version of security containing western values of liberal 
democracy, free trade, human rights, and the rule of law.231 Therefore, they are concerned 
that human security frameworks may be appropriated or co-opted into dominant, statist 
conceptualisations of risk, resulting in the dilution of the emancipatory potential of the 
concept.232  
Others question the promotion of neoliberal globalisation and economic development as 
the primary mechanism to achieve human security. Greaves argues that such an approach is 
contestable because it discounts the risks in the neoliberal market place that 
disproportionally affect the most vulnerable people globally and within particular 
societies.233 These criticisms are related and highlight how human security can be used to 
legitimise intervention to transform the ‘savage’ south, and others into ‘proper’ members of 
the international community.234 As a result, many commentators are wary of this 
‘radicalisation of development’, its intimate connection with NSAs, and the human security 
concept.235 Duffield argues that the link between development and security has altered the 
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meaning of development and the justifications for practices. The representation of 
underdevelopment as a danger to the international community has created an ‘urgency and 
belief’ that ensures the process is closely managed and not left to chance.236 
Building on these criticisms, some propose that ‘human’ security has the potential to be 
emancipatory and a critical project that can interrogate the sources of people’s insecurity.237 
Some propose that an ethics of care as the ontological and normative base for ‘human’ 
theory can enable a more nuanced understanding of the sources of insecurity.238 Robinson 
argues that such an approach would encourage academics and policy-makers to critically 
and seriously consider the politics of race, gender, and class and their interactions with 
security. Other commentators similarly argue that the concept has potential to be 
emancipatory and can be used to make a case for an alternative concept of human security 
that addresses the interrelated, multiple, and essential foundations and sources of human 
security.239 In particular, many emphasise the potential for the concept to identify and 
respond to the structural (in)security faced by women and girls.240 Therefore, they suggest 
that for the concept to be viable, it must privilege other forms of violence, including 
physical, structural, ecological, and economic rather than military security.241 
Therefore, human security reaffirms the assumption that underdevelopment is a threat to 
the security of individuals and a threat to the security of the international community. As 
part of its emancipatory and normative content, the concept incorporates 
environment/security linkages by stressing that human well-being is reliant on access to 
natural resources for food, and economic and livelihood security. It also incorporates a more 
holistic understanding of security/environment links by recognising that human well-being 
and security is also reliant on the availability of a healthy environment for health and general 
well-being. However, as discussed in this section, human security also embodies liberal 
internationalism in which development, and specifically, sustainable development, is seen as 
the primary way of achieving peace and security. In this context, I noted that the 
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environment is seen as antecedent to development and therefore integral in the discussion of 
human security.  
3.3.3 Climate Security 
In recent debates, environment/security links have been increasingly framed as 
exacerbating human ‘vulnerabilities’ in the face of climate change.242 This shift in focus is 
particularly notable in the post-2001 period, and in the recent negotiations concerning 
global security and climate change. Many of the debates surrounding climate change and 
security centre on potential losses of economic livelihood and the exacerbation of poverty, as 
well as the loss of social safety nets in vulnerable developing countries.243 These 
vulnerabilities have been attributed to the loss of economic revenue from degraded natural 
resources, or loss of productivity because of environmental changes.244  
The emerging debate and its focus on human vulnerability maintains the 
anthropocentric nature of the environment/security connections that emerged in the post-
Cold War period. The continued emphasis on the importance of addressing 
underdevelopment by states, NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, and international 
institutions highlights the enduring belief that liberal development promotes environmental 
conservation and international security by addressing the factors that make humans 
vulnerable and therefore more likely to engage in conflict-related activities. In this context, 
human vulnerability is discussed in conjunction with resource conflict or state instability.245   
In the emerging debate, intergovernmental organisations, institutions, and actors are 
explicitly linking the impacts of climate change to the security of the international 
community of a whole.246 Drawing on the language of ‘common interests,’ they associate 
inaction with economic and energy insecurity, as well as the likely instability of regions 
because of water insecurity.247 They frame these concerns in economic terms and highlight 
the likely economic cost of inaction for future economic and energy security.248 These recent 
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connections between environment/security links acknowledge the interrelationships 
between different issue areas in the international sphere, and especially those relating to the 
international political economy, security, and the environment.249 In this way, they take into 
consideration globalisation and the increased interdependence of states through the global 
economy, as well as the movement of people and shared ecosystems.  
In the post-2001 period, climate change/security links have been addressed by the UNSC 
in two official debates.250 During the speeches, these links were framed in two distinct ways: 
Climate change’s impact on the Earth’s functions were portrayed as a threat to the survival 
of states themselves, as well as their citizens.251 Second, climate change’s effect on societal 
stresses, humanitarian crises, and creating greater natural resource scarcities.252 Each of 
these debates linked security and climate change and human security by emphasising the 
potential for humanitarian crises and current conflicts to be exacerbated by the effects of 
climate change.253 Therefore, these debates connect environment and security by identifying 
how the environment exacerbates existing vulnerabilities.254 
In both of the UNSC debates, states reaffirmed the interrelationship between security, 
development, and the environment, and also the threat of the environment to the make-up 
of the international community. In each of these understandings of the environment, states 
have emphasised the interrelationship between themselves, and other NSAs, and the need 
for collective responses, but also that the effect of such environmental degradation creates 
insecurity to the collective of states through migration and the externalisation of internal 
vulnerabilities. This emphasis on both the interdependence and collective responses to 
security issues, as well as the continued debates in the UNSC and in other security contexts, 
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highlight the normative case put forward for the inclusion of ‘environmental security’ into 
both national and international debates on peace and security. 
These debates and policy responses that connect security, the environment and 
development indicate a convergence between sustainable development and security.255 As 
the components of sustainable development include the environment, economic 
development, and, more recently, social development, this colonisation or co-option by the 
global security agenda has significant implications for future international responses to these 
interrelated and interdependent areas. As securitising something legitimises the use of 
exceptional measures, or, in the case of ‘non-traditional’ or antecedent concerns, such as 
poverty, hunger, and natural disasters, it legitimises the penetration of the states where these 
problems happen by more powerful, and dominant global actors. The implications of such 
exceptionalism have been examined by Duffield who argues that this legitimises global 
actors to penetrate the ‘world of peoples, ignoring existing laws, conventions or restraint’ 
while promoting a particular form of ‘development’ that is predicated on liberal values.256 In 
less emergent contexts, the co-option of sustainable development by security still occurs in 
softer forms. It is reflected in the responses by international actors that prioritise 
preventative activities, primarily focused on economic and social development, under the 
liberal model. However, it is clear that the environment has been linked explicitly and 
implicitly with security.  
4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has traced the evolution of international responses to environmental 
concerns, with a specific focus on the connection between the environment and security. It 
found that over the 20th century, environment/security connections have become more 
explicit and prevalent – particularly after the Cold War and into the 21st century. It further 
noted that the activities by states in IEL by the end of the Cold War reflected the growing 
interdependence between states and informed collective and cooperative international 
responses to transboundary environmental concerns, such as climate change, biodiversity 
loss, and the conservation of natural resources. 
At the same time, international pluralism, the proliferation of environmental principles, 
the emerging interrelationships between development, the global economy, and the 
normative concept of ‘sustainable development,’ means that responses to these connected 
issues have become increasingly complicated and messy. The chapter concluded that not 
only have the different areas of the international legal system become muddled, but the 
‘reach’ of the international community has widened and deepened as a result. Therefore, the 
                                                          
255 This is not a new thing. See Arthur H. Westing, ‘International Cooperation for Sustainable Development and 
Peace’ (1986) 13(2) Environmental Conservation 97 
256 See Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Duffield, The New Wars.  
72 
 
introduction of the concept of ‘sustainable development’ reflected a move from responding 
to environmental and security concerns at the state level towards focusing at the level of the 
individual. This chapter concluded that these developments were related to the resurgence 
of liberal internationalism and neoliberalism as the dominant approaches towards global 
security and international order. From this overview, three key conclusions relating to 
environment/security connections and international responses to the environment can be 
made. 
First, sustainable development has had a profound influence on the development of 
international responses to environmental degradation in international law. In particular, it 
has had a notable influence on the development of procedural elements, such as public 
participation and the use of the precautionary approach. It has introduced a number of 
substantive principles that guide and support the collective and cooperative responses by 
individuals, states and other members of the international community to shape legal 
responses to environmental problems. The concept of CBDR and inter-generational 
principle are two notable examples of this collective response which have informed the 
development of many environmental regimes. In this way, sustainable development as 
included within IEL seeks to balance the needs of individuals against the needs of the 
community, and the limitations of the Earth’s ecosystems.  
Second, sustainable development has been co-opted by the international community as 
both a goal and solution to insecurity. This is particularly notable in the post-Cold War 
period where non-traditional security threats, such as underdevelopment and the 
environment, were increasingly addressed by security forums and policymakers. It became 
clear that the post-Cold War period has consolidated action by the state and NSAs in both 
areas on the assumption that peace, security, and (sustainable) development are mutually 
supportive. The chapter argued that the assumption inherent in these links has been 
informed by concerns over the causal relationship between conflict, natural resources, and 
direct/indirect effect of climate change on vulnerable communities and individuals. In 
response to these concerns, states and non-state members of the international community 
have consistently reaffirmed the role of sustainable development as a way to achieve 
sustainable security and environmental protection.  
Third, the appropriation of sustainable development is concerning for the subsequent 
development of international law relating to the environment. This is because neoliberal 
responses to insecurity, in the form of human, environmental, climate or even ‘sustainable’ 
security, are inherently anthropocentric and place the individual as the referent object for 
security. Further, the proposed responses to insecurity focus on addressing the drivers of 
underdevelopment, in the form of economic and social development, with the environment 
presented as either the foundation for such development to occur, or as a potential threat or 
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barrier to these objectives. These concerns have been raised by ecofeminists and other 
feminists and will be discussed in the following chapter.  
Following from the above, the environment has been portrayed as a utility or commodity 
to be used to achieve different types of security such as food, energy, livelihood and 
economic security as part of the process of sustainable development. In this way, the 
environment is seen as a tool to be used to ensure the well-being and security of individuals, 
and by extension, states. This universalises the dominant development paradigm, in which 
the environment is seen as a utility and commodity to be used to achieve security and may 
not take into account differences between communities and their interactions with the 
environment.  
For these reasons, I suggest that securitisation of the environment has occurred. Further, 
the co-option of the sustainable development agenda by global security actors may have 
implications for the justifications used to protect the environment, as well as the basis on 
which states seek to protect the environment and the evolving perceptions of the 
environment in IEL by the international community. Should this be the case, this 
securitisation could have a profound effect on the future direction of international responses 
to the environment, as well as shaping the way in which the environment is seen and valued 
by the international community as a whole. This issue is the focus of my research for the rest 
of this thesis.  

75 
 
3. Ecofeminism and International Law  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. It first discusses alternative theoretical 
perspectives which could also critique the securitisation of the environment and the evolving 
perception of the environment by the international community, and explains why they are 
less suited to the research agenda of this thesis than ecofeminism Second, it introduces 
ecofeminist theory and justifies why it is the most relevant theory through which to examine 
the international environmental law (IEL) regimes used in this thesis. In doing so, it 
establishes the foundations for the next chapter (Chapter 4) in which I explain how 
ecofeminism, and specifically, an ecofeminist ethic, informs my methodological perspective 
and the research method (feminist content analysis) deployed in this thesis.  
This chapter first identifies and critiques alternative theoretical perspectives that could 
offer critiques of environment/security connections and IEL. It identifies the similarities 
between these approaches and ecofeminism before explaining why ecofeminism offers a 
more grounded and encompassing perspective. It introduces the different strands of 
ecofeminism and outlines the ways in which ecofeminists critique the subordination of 
women, other nonhuman ‘others’ and the environment in western thought. It explains how 
ecofeminism links such subordination to the lived realities of women, through social 
institutions in fields such as the economy, development, security, and trade. It identifies two 
strengths of ecofeminism: Its critique of value dualisms and its critique of language that are 
particularly useful in the analysis of IEL. It discusses the charges of essentialism and 
universalism that have been levelled at ecofeminists before arguing that these are no longer 
relevant in recent developments of ecofeminist theory.  
1. THEORETICAL CHOICES: CONTRASTING ECOFEMINISM WITH OTHER FEMINIST AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL THEORIES 
Other critical approaches also question the dominant social paradigms upon which 
western culture and the international community are built. To recap, ‘dominant social 
paradigms’ are descriptions of a world view: ‘A collection of values, beliefs, habits and norms 
that form the frame of reference of a collectivity of people.’1 This world view includes the 
belief that economic growth (measured by gross national product) is the measure of 
progress, the belief that the primary goal of states is national defence (security), and the 
secondary goal should be satisfying the material well-being of citizens through production 
and consumption, and the belief that technology will solve all of humanity’s problems.2 In 
this worldview, ‘security’ in the dominant social paradigm represents a realist, state-centric 
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view.3 Further, the dominant social paradigm is consistent with the main social institutions, 
and expresses the values and beliefs of the ruling elites.4  
This link between social institutions, elites, and their beliefs, values, and attitudes is the 
focus for criticism by both feminist and ecological approaches. Feminist international law, 
international relations, and security scholars (hereinafter referred to as feminist 
international scholars) offer a theoretical perspective which challenges the concepts, 
ideologies, and structures of the international system that are based on the dominant social 
paradigm. In ecological approaches, such as social and deep ecology, scholars criticise 
western anthropocentrism, and the function of social hierarchy as the stabilising principle in 
nature and society. These scholars view western anthropocentrism and social hierarchy as 
inherently harmful to both human societal well-being and nonhuman nature.5 However, for 
reasons that I outline below, ecofeminism, while drawing on similar arguments to feminist 
and ecological theories more generally, has crucial differences that offer a more rounded and 
interconnected critique of IEL than other theories are able to support.  
1.1 Feminist Criticisms of the International System  
Feminist criticisms of the international system include feminists engaged in international 
relations, international law, and security studies. I refer to writers who engage in the work as 
‘feminist international scholars.’ Like ecofeminists, they challenge the concepts, ideology 
and structures of the international system. Both J Ann Tickner and Hilary Charlesworth 
have used the analogy of an archaeological dig to describe their critical approach.6 They 
suggest that feminist critique is akin to dissecting different layers of the international system 
and often requires different methodological tools to uncover its gendered nature and bias. 
Using this analogy, I will briefly outline the ‘layers’ of feminist critiques of the international 
system.   
The first layer of a feminist critique examines who participates in the international 
sphere. In feminist legal studies and international relations, scholars examine the way that 
the absence of women in UN structures and work results in compartmentalisation, gendered 
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analysis and in the law that states create.7 Charlesworth argues that institutional practices 
prevent women’s participation by relying on norms that are based upon male life patterns as 
markers of success or eligibility.8 In international relations, Gillian Youngs and Natasha 
Walter note the absence of women in diplomacy, the military, and foreign policy-making.9 
In both fields, feminists argue that exclusion and inhibition of women’s participation in 
international relations is part of the reason for the resistance and limited response to the 
concerns of women in the international sphere.10  
This view is promoted by feminist security scholars as noted in the previous chapter. 
These scholars problematise security theory and who is allowed to ‘speak’ and define 
‘security.’11 Feminist security scholars, such as Lene Hansen, argue that who is able to speak 
of and define security centres on those who are privileged to speak and thus excludes 
traditionally marginalised groups from the role of security actor.12 Hansen argues that there 
are blank spots in the study and understanding of security that may prevent the inclusion of 
gender. These criticisms concern both theoretical and epistemological foundations of 
‘security’ and the institutional structures that inhibit and exclude the participation of 
marginalised groups and their contributions to norms, policies, and activities that will have a 
direct impact.13  
Like other feminist studies, feminist security studies analyse the different institutions and 
structural power relations that shape international responses to security, within the wider 
international context.14 As noted in the previous chapter, those interested in ‘human’ and 
‘environmental’ security argue that these omit both the gendered impacts and dynamics of 
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such broad approaches to security.15 They suggest that current responses to human or 
environmental security, couched in ‘sustainable’ development, remain ‘entrenched in 
current (gender-subordinating) social and political structures… [and] maintain[s] the state-
centric and top-down foci of the … conflict approach, masking it under a broader definition 
of who merits security.’16 Similarly to broader criticisms of international relations, these 
criticisms relate to the exclusion of marginalised communities, and those who experience 
‘non-traditional’ security concerns from the institutions and structures that shape security 
discussions.17 They argue that the exclusion of marginalised communities and their 
experiences means that the organisational structures, in which international law and politics 
are negotiated, developed, and created by male élites reflect those interests while ignoring 
the voices and interests of marginalised groups, such as women.18   
In response to these criticisms, some feminists argue that attaining equality of 
representation and participation by women in international institutions will end the 
subordination of women and other marginalised communities.19 They suggest that having 
more women as state leaders, and having women and representatives from other 
marginalised communities, will ensure that international institutions and structures take 
into account their perspectives.20 These proposals share similarities with liberal 
ecofeminism. This perspective focuses on making existing institutions equal through 
participation. Therefore, they examine who is able to participate in the creation of new 
policy, laws, and other methods to support gender equality in state and international 
institutions. As a result, they promote the equality of legal rights, commit to major economic 
re-organisation and redistribution of wealth, equality of opportunity, and both public and 
private recognition of women’s rights.21 This contribution to the critique of the international 
sphere by liberal feminists is valuable in examining the creation and development of 
international responses to environmental degradation, development and economic growth.  
However, this approach of ‘uncritical’22 equality has been subject to significant criticism 
by some. Catherine MacKinnon argues that liberal feminism sees ‘sexism primarily as an 
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illusion or myth to be dispelled, an inaccuracy to be corrected.’23 In this way, liberal 
feminism may suffer by universalising a category of ‘women’ and thus essentialise the 
multitude of different experiences, knowledge, and contexts which gendered identities are 
created.24 One of the main criticisms of liberal feminism is that it does not examine the way 
in which discourses, institutions, and structures incorporate masculine biases and deeply 
gendered assumptions.25 Therefore, while dominant institutions increasingly support 
participation by women and marginalised communities, the underlying normative 
constructs that inform the language and structures of the international system still 
incorporate gendered beliefs, values, and attitudes that silence and render women and 
marginalised communities invisible. This is an important criticism that has been raised by 
some ecofeminists in their critique of international responses to environmental concerns 
and is discussed in more detail below.26   
Other feminists look to the silences included in the responses to international concerns 
undertaken by the international community. They do this by examining the language and 
content of international law, and the activities undertaken by states, NSAs, and international 
institutions in response to international concerns and in the implementation of 
international law and policy. For example, feminists analysing international law examine the 
purported objectivity and neutrality contained within it.27 They suggest that terms and 
language signifying ‘male’ characteristics are valued more than those terms and concepts 
signifying ‘female’ characteristics.28 In a similar approach, feminist analysis of international 
relations reveal that ‘certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings, and meanings 
are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and are devalued.’29 Carol Cohn and 
Hilary Charlesworth suggest that characteristics, language, and concepts characterised as 
‘feminine’ are ‘difficult to say and difficult to hear. They seem illegitimate, embarrassing and 
irrelevant.’30 Charlesworth suggests that international law, as a symbolic system and culture, 
is permeated with such gendered values and these reinforce general stereotypes of women 
and men.31 
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Furthermore, feminist international lawyers examine the purportedly neutral principles 
and rules contained in international law that are seen to work differently for men and 
women.32 This is because ‘law’ is treated as ‘the mind of society: Disembodied reason in 
liberal theory, reflection of material interest in left theory.’33 Therefore, the way in which the 
law is framed and the type of language it uses are important in understanding the ways in 
which the law treats women and men differently. Feminists argue that the key factor of legal 
language is its claim to rationality, power, culture, and objectivity. These are terms that are 
associated with the public or male sphere.34 Therefore, to label these terms as ‘neutral’ does 
not engage with the dominant assumptions that the women’s sphere and work are different, 
and inferior to men’s.35 Feminist international lawyers argue that these assumptions are 
evident in the supposedly neutral language of development and economic provisions in 
international legal agreements, as well as analysis of nuclear weapons in the maintenance of 
national and international security. 
Similar analysis in international relations and security studies interrogates gender as part 
of a matrix of power intersecting with markers such as class, race nation, religion, and 
sexuality, among others.36 As Annick Wibben notes, feminist security scholars bring identity 
into the political arena and therefore challenge the notion of an abstract, universal citizen.37 
In doing so, they reveal the silences, marginalisation, and exclusions within traditional 
security studies.38 Feminist critiques of international relations similarly challenge the core 
assumptions of the discipline and reveal the ways in which international relations scholars 
use abstraction, distancing, and other language to discuss concepts and constructs in the 
academy.39  
Ecofeminism shares these criticisms of the gendered values which permeate the symbolic 
system and culture of western society. Like feminist critiques of international law, 
international relations, and security, ecofeminists examine the use of language in relation to 
women and the environment and argue that such examination can make visible the implied 
or subliminal perceptions concerning the environment and our relationship with it.40 They 
argue that such perceptions are informed by various dichotomies that are used in the 
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structure of western thought. As will be discussed below, and in the following chapter, such 
analysis is central to ecofeminism and to the methodological perspective that informs the 
analysis in this research.  
The final layer of analysis examines the underlying concepts that inform international 
law, international relations, and international security. Feminist international scholars argue 
that concepts forming the basis of international law and relations have gendered meaning.41 
They argue that claims to rationality, objectivity, and abstraction continue to maintain and 
perpetuate oppressive structures that, in turn, maintain and perpetuate the subordination 
and devaluation of women in western thought.42 These criticisms are shared by ecofeminists 
who critique western rationalism. Both approaches question the Enlightenment’s 
development of conceptual dichotomies which they argue have formed the basis of 
contemporary western thought.43 Examples of these dichotomies include: Objectivity vs 
subjectivity, culture vs nature, reason vs emotion, and economic vs social value.44  
Feminist international scholars argue that these dichotomies are evident in the structural 
and conceptual bases of international law, international relations, and security. Using the 
nation-state as an example, it is possible to identify that the state is defined as rational, self-
interested, autonomous, and separate from others.45 This informs the way in which states 
interact in the realm of law and international relations. It also informs the way in which 
security has been constructed. Therefore, interrogations of the gendered nature of 
fundamental concepts of international law and relations can make visible the invisible 
gendered bias and the extent to which the language of each discipline is gendered. 
In sum, feminist critiques of the international system challenge the gendered structure of 
the concepts, language, and institutional structure of international law, international 
relations, and security. In each of these areas, feminist critiques focus on the intersecting 
ways in which biases in the international system maintain the devaluation, marginalisation, 
and exclusion of women and other marginalised communities’ experiences and lived 
realities. As will be discussed below, ecofeminism also undertakes similar critiques of the 
international system and the exclusion and devaluation of the experiences of women and 
other marginalised communities. However, unlike feminist critiques of the international 
system, ecofeminists explicitly include the way in which the environment is treated in these 
disciplines as the fourth category of analysis. This is because ecofeminists argue that without 
including the way in which society treats the environment, feminism offers an incomplete 
analysis of the interconnections between the ‘isms’ of domination. Ecofeminism builds on 
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and complements the analysis undertaken by liberal feminist international law, international 
relations, and security scholars, but offers a different and more complete analysis.  
The alternative ecological approaches discussed below generally take a very different 
approach towards critiquing the international community’s response to environmental 
degradation. Both deep and social ecology place the human relationship with the 
environment as central in their analysis. This examines the relationship between human and 
nonhuman nature from a different perspective than that undertaken in feminism.  
1.2 Ecological Critiques: Deep Ecology and Social Ecology 
Deep ecology and social ecology examine humanity’s position vis-à-vis the environment. 
Deep ecology questions the assumption that humans are separate and above nature while 
social ecology considers human societal hierarchy and domination as the basis for 
environmental destruction.46 Both of these approaches share similarities with ecofeminism 
in their critique of western culture’s anthropocentrism, commitment to value dualisms, and 
the revision of structures of domination. I will briefly outline the main thesis of each critical 
approach. 
1.2.1 Deep Ecology 
Deep ecology theorists question the assumption that humans are separate and above 
nature.47 They discredit the ‘shallow ecology movement’ which refers to the fight against 
pollution and resource depletion because its central objective is the affluence and health of 
people in developed countries.48 Instead, deep ecologists enumerate a movement that 
encompasses seven important concepts, including ‘biospherical egalitarianism,’ principles of 
diversity and symbiosis, complexity and not complication, and local autonomy and 
decentralisation.49 Inherent in these concepts is the critique of western culture’s 
anthropocentrism, and the societal, class, and other hierarchies that are premised on the 
same dichotomies that ecofeminists reject.  
In this way, deep ecology shares similarities with ecofeminism in its critique of the 
situation of humanity over nature as embodied in value dualisms.50 Deep ecologists consider 
humans as part of ‘creation ongoing’51 and therefore not above or separate from nature.52 
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Like ecofeminism, and feminism more broadly, deep ecologists explore themes such as the 
rejection of mind/body, nature/culture, and subject/object dualisms.53 Like some 
ecofeminists, they reject technology as an end in itself54 and critique atomistic and 
hierarchical constructions in science.55 Similar to some ecofeminists, deep ecologists argue 
that diversity is desirable and that decentralisation, and local autonomy is important.56 
Therefore, some elements of the deep ecology movement and ecofeminism share conceptual 
similarities and criticisms of the contemporary responses to environmental degradation 
based in technological innovation, commodification of nature and development predicated 
on economic growth.  
However, ecofeminists and social ecologists, amongst others, have raised significant 
criticisms of deep ecology. Murray Bookchin, a social ecologist, considers deep ecology as 
‘vague, formless, often self-contradictory and invertebrate…’57 He criticises deep ecology 
because it does not acknowledge that ecological problems rest in societal problems and 
universalises the experience of all humans rather than acknowledging the differences of lived 
experience between women and men, poor and wealthy, and the exploited with their 
exploiters.58  
Similarly, ecofeminists challenge its conceptualisation of human/nature relationships for 
being ‘shockingly sexist’59 because they fail to acknowledge that the ‘new consciousness’ that 
deep ecology puts forward, is in fact integrating ‘traditional ‘female’ values of caring, 
relatedness and wholeness without connecting these values with women’s struggles.’60 This 
exclusion of the gendered nature of the environmental crisis is evident in Warwick Fox’s 
contention that the critiques of other forms of discrimination are irrelevant, and feminism, 
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for example, ‘has nothing to add to the conception of environmental ethics.’61 In this way, 
deep ecology considers the hierarchy in human society as irrelevant to explanations of 
environmental degradation and destruction. It is for these reasons that the theory is not used 
in this research project. 
1.2.2 Social Ecology 
Social ecology challenges the function of hierarchy as a ‘stabilising principle’ in nature 
and society.62 Social ecologists believe that the root of the ecological crisis is in the 
interrelated dominations of humanity and nature.63 They aim to uncover structures of 
domination in order to replace the current model of society with one that is based on 
recognising the ‘co-evolution of nature and humanity along the principles of equity, 
mutuality, and unity in diversity.’64 Therefore, social ecology argues for radical changes to 
present society towards one which adopts community-sized social arrangements, 
participatory democracy, and decentralisation. Such an approach ensures that authority 
remains at the community level, which is the level of ‘lived experience.’65 This 
conceptualisation of an ecological society has similar characteristics of an ecofeminist 
description of a non-aggressive and interdependent society.  
Ecofeminism criticises social ecology for creating another hierarchy of oppressions by 
assuming that ending the dominations of humans within society will end the domination of 
nature.66 They argue that social ecology is limited to intra-human oppressions and ignores 
the intersecting politics of human/nature relations.67 Ecofeminists argue that social ecology 
may reproduce the human/nonhuman nature relationships that are integrated in the 
dominant social paradigm.68 Therefore, ecofeminists argue social ecology is incomplete 
without integrating feminist critiques.69  
Each of these theories critique western culture’s conceptual and structural foundations, 
and argue that these have a profound effect on the wellbeing of subordinated groups and the 
environment. Feminist international scholars criticise the gendered nature of western 
rational thought and the philosophical foundations of international law, international 
relations, and security. Deep and social ecology theories critique western culture’s treatment 
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of the environment and offer solutions that aim to end this oppression. However, 
ecofeminism offers a more nuanced and rounded critical position through which to analyse 
the international community’s perception of the environment because it recognises the 
interdependent nature of all oppressions, and that gender is linked to all of them.70  
Therefore, ecofeminism shares similarities with the foundations of feminist and 
ecological theory. These two broad approaches critique to a greater and lesser degree, the 
broad western canonical philosophical position. However, beyond that, ecofeminism offers a 
different perspective which emerges from its foundations in both the environmental and 
feminist movements. Unlike feminist critiques of international law, international relations, 
and security, ecofeminism explores the connections between the unjustified domination of 
women and nature.71 Unlike deep and social ecology, ecofeminism argues that the gendered 
nature of the logic of domination in western thought should be central in any environmental 
philosophy because to ignore this connection would give ‘an incomplete, inaccurate, and 
partial account of what is required of a conceptually adequate environmental ethic.’72 
Therefore, ecofeminism argues that a feminist perspective can help to clarify how the 
liberation and domination of nature are ‘conceptually linked to patriarchy and its demise.’73 
These differences enable ecofeminism to undertake a nuanced and interrelated critique of 
the underlying beliefs, values, and attitudes that inform the development of IEL and the 
extent to which the securitisation of the environment may have altered these. 
However, ecofeminism does have synergies with different feminist perspectives. As will 
be discussed below, ecofeminism includes Marxist-informed perspectives, socioeconomic 
perspectives, historical perspectives, epistemological perspectives, and political perspectives 
which have emerged in the academy and movement.74 Nevertheless, unlike feminist 
critiques of international law, international relations, and security studies, ecofeminism 
builds on these perspectives by making the connection between the exploitation of the 
environment and the subordination of women central in its analysis.75  
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Finally, ecofeminism has evolved into a philosophy, social activism and an intellectual 
commitment. This enables ecofeminism to question the theoretical and ideological basis of 
the domination of women and nonhuman nature, and also to question the practical 
implications for this continued domination in social systems and institutions such as the 
global market economy, international environmental governance, and international 
organisations on the local level. As a result, ecofeminism has the power to contribute to the 
debate about the ‘rise and consequence of science, capitalism, and warfare’76 and also the 
ability to unite ‘different strands of feminism.’77 In doing so, ecofeminism has the ‘power 
and promise’78 to develop a more complete critique of the assumptions underlying the 
securitisation of the environment and the extent to which this securitisation has altered the 
basis for which the international community seeks to protect the environment, and the 
perception of the environment itself.  
2. ECOFEMINISM: THEORIES, CRITICISMS AND STRENGTHS 
Francoise D’Eaubonne first coined the term ‘ecofeminism’ and argued that it offers a 
theoretical approach that is able to identify the connections between the dominations of 
women and nature.79 Ecofeminist activism and theory uses a range of tools and techniques 
to uncover the linked subordination of women and the environment.80 In the following 
section, I introduce the historical antecedents, and various strands of ecofeminism. In doing 
so, I highlight the commonalities in the different ecofeminist positions and where they 
differ. Following from this overview, I discuss important strengths of ecofeminist theory and 
why they are relevant for the analysis of IEL. Finally, I acknowledge that ecofeminism has 
been subject to significant criticism as an essentialising and universalising theory. I respond 
to these criticisms and argue that they are not relevant for contemporary ecofeminist theory 
and perspectives. 
                                                          
76 Charis Thompson, ‘Back to Nature? Resurrecting Ecofeminism after Poststructuralist and Third-Wave 
Feminisms’ (2006) 97(3) Isis 505, 507. 
77 Ibid, 507. 
78 Cuomo CJ, ‘On Ecofeminist Philosophy’ (2002) 7(2) Ethics and the Environment 1, 6-7;  Warren, 'Power and 
Promise'.  
79 Francoise D'Eaubonne, ‘Le Feminisme ou la Mort [Feminism or Death]’ in Elaine Marks and Isabelle De 
Courtivron (eds), New French Feminisms: An Anthology (The University of Massachusetts Press 1980); Karen J. 
Warren, ‘Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections’ (1987) 9(1) Environ Ethics 3. 
80 Braidotti and others, Women, the Environment, 161; Noe ̈l Sturgeon, Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, 
Feminist Theory, and Political Action (Routledge 1997), 23Grace Y Kao, ‘The Universal Versus the Particular in 
Ecofeminist Ethics’ (2010) 38(4) Journal of Religious Ethics 616, 617. 
87 
 
2.1 Ecofeminist Theories  
As with many feminist perspectives, there is more than one type of ecofeminism. It is not 
a homogenous theory and involves 'several different strands of discourse.’81 While 
ecofeminists can make generalised statements seemingly referring to all men and women, 
their main focus is the ‘pattern of dominance that arose in European society associated with 
the historical development of science, technology, industrialism, and capitalism.’82 However, 
the way in which ecofeminists examine this pattern identifies various sources for the 
women/nature connection. Some of these are mutually complementary and supportive. 
Others give competing analyses of the dominations of women and nature.83 In the following 
paragraphs, I introduce the main strands of ecofeminism. 
In line with liberal feminism, liberal ecofeminism focuses on improving state regulation 
and ensuring equal opportunities for women in existing democratic, scientific, and 
economic institutions relating to the environment.84 Liberal ecofeminists argue that 
environmental degradation is the result of overly rapid development and the failure to 
control and regulate environmental pollutants.85 This approach reflects the political 
commitments of liberal feminism which focuses on the end of de facto discrimination on the 
basis of sex, education, a greater recognition of women as individuals, and equality of 
opportunity.86  
Liberal ecofeminism receives significant criticism because it does not question the 
structures of the dominant social model and its underlying ideological and conceptual 
apparatus.87 Rather, it considers the sole solution for environmental problems is to develop 
more stringent regulations in dominant institutions.88 This does not acknowledge the 
masculine bias in the dominant model of the human as opposite to nature in human 
culture.89 Other ecofeminists criticise this approach for articulating a path of ‘uncritical 
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equality’90 where women overcome the stigma of their sex and work with men in projects of 
environmental conservation.91 Others argue that it advocates a ‘cheap unity’ … with men 
ignoring patriarchal culture.’92 Still others criticise it because it calls for equal opportunities 
in a socio-economic system that ecofeminists argue is ‘killing us all.’93 Therefore, it may 
endorse a model which incorporates assumptions of class, race and the supremacy of the 
human species.94  
Radical/cultural ecofeminist theory responds to the perceived associations between 
women and nature, and their devaluation in western culture.95 Radical/cultural ecofeminists 
argue that women and nature’s liberation can be achieved by dismantling patriarchal 
systems embedded within human society.96 Patriarchy can be understood as a ‘system of 
social structures, and practices in which men dominate, oppress, and exploit women.’97 
Radical/cultural ecofeminists extend this understanding and argue that these systems 
oppress both women and nature.98 They argue that there is a historical connection between 
the devaluation of women and nature, and that these are causal connections and the 
liberation of both can occur by embracing that which has been devalued.99 Therefore, it is 
often seen as the rival of liberal feminism because it rejects the masculine ideals which liberal 
feminism supports.100 
This perspective has been criticised for ‘naturalising’ the women/nature connection.101 It 
considers women to have an epistemologically privileged understanding of ‘nature’ through, 
for example, their reliance on the local environment for subsistence living.102 Therefore, 
radical/cultural ecofeminism argues for a form of reversal which would allocate positive 
values to that which has been devalued and devalue that which has been valued in 
patriarchal masculinity based in reason.103 This form of ‘uncritical reversal’ can be 
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problematic because it may stereotype ecological feminism.104 Radical/cultural ecofeminism 
does not address how hierarchical structures position and exploit women’s apparent natural 
and care-giving qualities.105 As a result, it is limited in its ability to examine the ideological 
and societal apparatus that informs the association between environment/security links and 
the development of IEL. This is because it does not engage in a critique of the various 
structural and hierarchical positions that work together to maintain the inferiority of 
women and nature.   
Social/ist106 ecofeminist theory considers that environmental problems are based in the 
growth of ‘capitalist patriarchy’ and ideology in which nature is exploited for human 
progress.107 ‘Social/ist’ ecofeminist theory describes an ecofeminist position that considers 
‘masculine/patriarchal values’ as damaging and destructive.108 Mellor argues that the core 
belief in social/ist ecofeminism is that ‘all human beings are rooted in nature, they are 
embodied beings;’109 however, women have been materially associated with human 
embodiment through largely unpaid or underpaid work.110 In this way, ‘social/ist 
ecofeminists argue that ‘women are not more rooted [in nature] essentially than men, it is 
just that men are less rooted in practice.’111 They argue that nature is the basis of human life, 
a social construct, and the result of historical and social forces. Humanity has attempted to 
separate itself from nature through productive systems.112 Therefore, men dominate the 
sphere of monetised production and women are relegated to the domestic sphere which is 
run on women’s unpaid labour.113 Following from this, nature is transformed into profit 
through processes that erode and pollute it.114 Therefore, social/ist ecofeminists argue that 
there needs to be a revaluation of the historical, social and conceptual connections between 
the domination of nature and marginalised groups in order to end environmental 
degradation.  
Building on this analysis, materialist ecofeminist theory argues that western society has 
used the sex/gender division as one vehicle in which to create itself against nature. Mellor 
argues that ‘power is defined by the ability of certain individuals and groups to (temporarily) 
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free themselves from embodiedness and embeddedness, from ecological time and biological 
time.’115 Materialist ecofeminists argue that this pattern has occurred throughout history, 
and women have been responsible for carrying the ‘burden of biological time.’116 They 
suggest that in western social and economic structures, this burden still occurs and in order 
to take their place in western society, women must present themselves as ‘autonomous 
individuals…avoiding domestic obligations, undertaking them in their ‘free’ time, or paying 
someone else to carry out that work.’117 Therefore, materialist ecofeminists develop the 
critiques of social/ist ecofeminists by examining the way in which social and economic 
structures maintain patriarchal domination of women and nonhuman nature.  
Development ecofeminists draw on critiques of the domination of non-western cultures 
by western culture.118 This form of ecofeminist theory refers to women in developing 
countries fighting for their environment. It includes feminist responses from the global 
south concerning the impact of development strategies and has been referred to as the 
women, environment, and development debate.119 They integrate anti-colonial critiques and 
analysis of the causes of environmental destruction.120  
Development ecofeminists critique the interconnected concepts of ‘maldevelopment’ and 
‘underdevelopment.’121 This criticism concerns the notion of ‘development’ as industrialism 
and the commodification of provisioning, first conceived by the United States President 
Harry Truman in his inaugural speech in 1949.122 They argue that behind this approach is 
the assumption that western ways of life were superior to the ‘backward’ and subsistence 
ways of non-western societies.123 Therefore, development ecofeminists challenge this 
because it renders non-western people, nature and women as deficient and thus in need of 
western, male-oriented forms of development.124  
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Development ecofeminists also critique the notion of sustainable development because 
this tacitly approves the overall aim of development.125 They criticise the continued 
affirmation of economic development and the perpetuation of maldevelopment, which they 
argue marginalises, excludes, and devalues rural women and marginalised communities’ 
ecological knowledge and experience.126 Examples of these criticisms are found in the work 
of ecofeminists examining the impact of sustainable development policies surrounding 
reforestation, fuel wood, and access to local resources on women and rural communities.127 
In this research, development ecofeminists argue that future analysis and policy responses 
must take into account the gendered way in which women are excluded from market 
systems and that access to natural resources occurs along gendered lines which can be 
destabilised through development policies framed in western, market-based approaches.128  
Development ecofeminists have extended their critique to the wider issue of globalisation 
and how the inclusion of systems, such as the global economy, maintains the subordination 
and devaluation of women and nonhuman nature.129 Others argue that the interrelated 
responses to global environmental problems represent tools for ‘colonialist projects of 
northern exploitation of southern peoples and lands.’130 These criticisms of the 
‘globalisation’ of development and environmentalism highlight that international responses 
to these interrelated issues converge the technological and moral responses to 
environmental degradation and underdevelopment. In doing so, they propose a ‘unitary 
human concern’ that omits any consideration of the varied political and material sources of 
environmental problems.131 Critics argue that these universalising responses attempt to 
‘bypass the political terrain in which different groups experience problems differently and 
act accordingly.’132 In doing so, technical solutions to environmental problems and 
underdevelopment may not take into account the interrelated ‘isms of domination’ 
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including class and gender effects of the ‘processes of degradation, statization [sic] and 
privatization of nature’s resources.’133  
The critique of development ecofeminists is particularly relevant for this research project 
because it questions the assumptions and conceptual framework that informs sustainable 
development based on extractive and exploitative productivity.134 Because sustainable 
development is central to IEL and security discourses on the environment, identifying the 
assumptions and conceptual frameworks that inform the concept is relevant for this 
research project. This is because assumptions and frameworks may affect states and NSAs, 
perceptions of the environment and the basis on which they protect it.  
The strands of ecofeminist theory reviewed here argue that there are multiple 
oppressions of women, nonhuman nature, people of colour, class, and geographical 
situation, and these are mutually reinforcing. Any theory developed from these different 
strands of ecofeminism can draw on their individual strengths and critical insight.135 I 
suggest that ecofeminism can offer the most complete theoretical framework in which to do 
this because it can highlight the multiple intersections of environment/security discourse 
that may have altered the international community’s perception of the environment. For 
these reasons, ecofeminist theory is a strong theoretical perspective through which to 
examine the interrelated associations between environment/security and the extent to which 
this may alter the perception of the environment and the basis on which the international 
community seek to protect the environment. 
2.2 The Critical Strength of Ecofeminist Theory 
Ecofeminist theory contains many strengths that can contribute towards a nuanced and 
rigorous critique of IEL because it offers a distinct methodological perspective to analyse 
IEL. This is because it critiques western canonical philosophical views and their male-bias, 
and explores the nature of the connections between the domination of women and nature. 
Particular strengths of the theory are its critique of oppressive conceptual frameworks and 
use of language. These, Warren and others argue, function as a ‘socially constructed lens 
through which one perceives reality.’136 I will discuss these two strengths in preparation for 
following chapter where I introduce the methodological perspective and research approach 
used in this thesis. 
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2.2.1 Revealing Value Dualisms in IEL 
Ecofeminism offers a strong critique of the exploitative and gendered conceptual 
frameworks which underpin the dominant and rational discourses in western society.137 
These are formed by a set of values, attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions that shape and mirror 
how an entity views itself and the world around it, and a number of different factors such as 
class, religion, nationality, gender, and race/ethnicity can alter mirror in which an entity 
views itself.  
Ecofeminists argue that these frameworks, and the logical structures integrated within 
them, continue to exclude, devalue, and subordinate human others, and nonhuman 
nature.138 This is because they are based on the concept of dualism which privileges certain 
forms of knowledge and thinking that valorise rationalist faculty as superior to other 
characteristics of the human condition. These dualisms are part of logical structures that 
institutionalise power and normalise this by attaching it to existing types of difference.139  
For example, dualisms such as male/female, mind/body (nature), reason/matter, and 
human/nature naturalise the oppression and subordination of gender, nature, and human 
‘others’.140 These dualisms are integrated into the foundation of these conceptual 
frameworks and have affirmed male-oriented values, beliefs, and assumptions as the 
standard in modern rationalist culture.141 These logical structures are used to valorise 
‘masculine’, abstract, disembedded, and dispassionate characteristics while simultaneously 
devaluing and embedding ‘feminine’ or subordinate characteristics within the body and the 
natural world.142 These structures have acquired significant cultural dominance and 
currency, and are evident in the structure of IEL, economic systems that govern the global 
economy, and security discourses.143 This ecofeminist analysis of the underlying concepts 
and logical structures of rational discourses in western thinking is a useful critique for 
examining the evolving perception of the environment in IEL.  
The strength of ecofeminism is that it can offer a ‘spotlight’ on some of the ‘shared 
conceptual roots of the unjustified dominations of women, nonhuman animals, and 
nature.’144 This critique is used by many of the ecofeminist perspectives discussed in the 
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previous section to explore the interconnecting ways in which these shared conceptual roots 
function in real life to maintain institutions and practices of oppression and domination. An 
examination of dominant conceptual frameworks and the dualisms that inform them can 
offer a useful tool in my research for examining the evolving perception of the environment 
by the international community. 
2.2.2 Critiquing the Language of IEL 
Feminists have argued that language acts as a mirror and reflects our conceptualisation of 
the world and how we view ourselves in it. As such it can be used as a political instrument.145 
An important strength in ecofeminism is its linguistic perspective on the way that language 
plays an important role in the justifications for the domination of women and nonhuman 
nature.  
Some ecofeminists argue that the English language ‘animalises and naturalises’ women in 
contexts where women and animals are already viewed as inferior to men.146 They suggest 
that the use of such language in a patriarchal culture reinforces the inferiorisation of women 
and nature in relation to men. Karen Warren argues that this legitimises the exploitation of 
animals by feminising nature, while also justifying the exploitation of women and 
animalising and naturalising women.147 She suggests that the use of such language 
perpetuates the domination of women and nonhuman nature because it fails to consider the 
extent to which these interrelated dominations are culturally analogous and sanctioned. 
Similarly, Carol Adams’ examination of the language used to defend experimentation on 
animals reveals that it can be used to maintain and legitimise the distance between 
humanity/environment and subject/object.148 Lincoln Houde and Connie Bullis have 
examined the use of language in communication that maintains narratives authorising and 
sanctioning the continued separation between human/nonhuman nature. They argue that 
ecofeminist critiques of language recognise the normative consequence of the symbols 
inherent in language and communication and acknowledge that ‘language and the body are 
interconnected and interrelated within the ecosystem, embedded within culture and nature 
together.’149 Through interrogating language and the assumptions within it, ecofeminists can 
respect other differences and distinctions, and in doing so embrace a ‘contextualist ethic, 
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celebrate a politics of difference, and embody intersubjective interrelationships as 
differences that make a difference together.’150 
Language can also communicate sexist and exploitative assumptions while purporting to 
be neutral.151 Carolyn Merchant argues that the use of sexual imagery and its associated 
language legitimises exploitation and control over nonhuman nature.152 This use of language 
is similar to the way in which military scientists use language to divorce themselves from the 
reality of speaking about nuclear weapons.153 A similar critique is used by Adams who 
argues that animals are ‘made absent through language that ‘that renames dead bodies 
before consumers participate in eating them’ therefore permitting their consumption.’154 In 
these contexts, language is used to render the subject ‘other’ and thus to legitimise 
exploitative or destructive action.155 Analysing the use of language in IEL may make visible 
the implied or subliminal perceptions concerning the environment and our relationship 
with it. This concept is integrated into my analysis in this project.156  
These examples highlight the strengths of an ecofeminist linguistic perspective in 
examining IEL and revealing the underlying conceptual frameworks that may maintain the 
domination of women and nonhuman nature. My research requires a close analysis of the 
language used to refer to the environment as it examines the way in which the securitisation 
of the environment may have altered the justifications for which the international 
community seeks to protect the environment, and in turn, the perception of the 
environment itself. Therefore, one of the main strengths of using ecofeminism is its 
linguistic perspective and the way in which language can be analysed to reveal the 
underlying conceptual frameworks. 
2.3 Criticisms of Ecofeminism  
Ecofeminist theory has been criticised on the grounds of essentialism and universalising 
the experiences of women. Some critics have gone even further and charged ecofeminism 
with being essentialist, biologist, lacking political efficacy, intellectually regressive, and 
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inconsistent.157 Many of these criticisms have been subject to significant debate in 
ecofeminist writing, and, I would argue, addressed in the most rigorous of this.158 However, 
because these criticisms have endured for much of the eighties and nineties, I will outline the 
main charges and the responses to them by ecofeminists, stating why ecofeminism is still 
relevant for examining the perception of the environment by the international community. 
In my conclusion, I suggest that these critiques are no longer valid and reflect an 
evolutionary deadend in the development of ecofeminism. 
2.3.1 Charges of Essentialism 
Essentialism refers to claims that some form of universal nature exists for members of a 
certain group.159 It identifies a connecting trait that all members of the group have,160 and 
therefore does not take into account social and historical differences among women from 
different cultures.161 It has been criticised for being ahistorical and confusing enduring 
attributes with social relations.162 Therefore, to charge ecofeminism with essentialism is akin 
to accusing an ecofeminist of not being a ‘proper’ feminist.’163 As a result, the diversity of 
contributions by ecofeminists to the academy has been discredited.164 
The main targets for charges of essentialism are cultural and spiritual ecofeminism. 
These positions accept and embrace women’s sexuality and biology as being close to nature, 
or in some cases, being nature itself.165 These positions argue that women and nature can be 
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liberated through political action and by revaluing what patriarchy devalues: Nature and the 
feminine elements of human nature.166 Furthermore, spiritual ecofeminism claims that 
prehistoric cultures believed in the ‘aliveness’ of the Earth or of ‘nature’ as a whole.’167 They 
argue that politics lack spirituality which would recognise the interconnectedness of issues 
facing the planet and society.168  
This position has been criticised for celebrating the traditional notion of women as 
nurturers and embracing of male stereotypes that other feminists have tried to challenge.169 
Janet Biehl argues that this approach retains ‘the patriarchal stereotypes of what men expect 
women to be’ and maintains women as mothers and carers instead of women’s potentialities 
and abilities.170 Not only does spiritualist ecofeminism universalise the category of ‘women’, 
but it also indicates an epistemological privilege of one understanding of ‘nature.’171 This 
approach has been challenged because it is a form of uncritical reversal that maintains the 
dichotomy between nature/culture without addressing multiple intersectional hierarchies.172 
Plumwood argues that the very idea of a ‘feminine connection’ is insulting and summons up 
‘women as earth mothers, as passive, reproductive animals, contented cows immersed in the 
body and in the unreflective experiencing of life.’173 Therefore, cultural/spiritual 
ecofeminisms do not acknowledge that one set of values may not benefit all women 
equally.174 As a result, they have been labelled as biologist, lacking political efficacy, 
intellectually regressive, and inconsistent.175  
Ecofeminist responses to these criticisms argue that they homogenise ecofeminism by 
failing to distinguish cultural/spiritual ecofeminism from those who examine the structural 
oppressions of women and nature. They argue that the rejection of ecofeminism paid little 
attention to the internal critiques of their work by feminist environmentalists and ignored 
criticisms of cultural/spiritual ecofeminism by ecofeminists themselves. For example, 
Plumwood and Davion examine the different manifestations of essentialism in ecofeminism. 
They explore the conflation of sex and gender in some forms of ecofeminist thought as well 
as the homogenisation of women’s experiences that is present in some ecofeminist 
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literature.176 They challenge those thinkers who identify as ecofeminists, yet uncritically 
examine femininity and who argue that a ‘feminine’ perspective of the environment will 
solve the ecological crises.177 Plumwood considers this position as being untenable and open 
to serious criticism.178  
Similarly, Victoria Davion labels this approach as ‘ecofeminine’ because these views 
uncritically embrace a unified view of the feminine side of gender dualisms.179 She 
challenges this position because it does not recognise that feminism is a ‘movement for the 
liberation of all women.’180 She argues that ‘ecofeminine’ views fail to critically examine the 
possible negative aspects of the perspective, recognise that the concept of ‘femininity’ may be 
a by-product of patriarchy, and that the concept uncritically embraces a unified perspective 
of what the ‘feminine’ is.181These interrogations of certain forms of ecofeminism reflect the 
critical practice within the movement that looks both inward and outward when engaging 
with activism and academia.  
Essentialism is a significant issue in feminist debates; however, it is also used to obfuscate 
the contributions by ecofeminism to wider feminist theory. Ecofeminists, such as Greta 
Gaard, Val Plumwood, Karen Warren, Noel Sturgeon, Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands, and 
Niamh Moore have undertaken significant critical insight and interrogation of their 
discipline. As a result, ecofeminist analysis and theory has become much more sophisticated 
in its fundamental approach. Therefore, I maintain that the critiques of this theoretical 
approach are insufficient to delegitimise the approach as a basis for a project like mine.  
2.3.2 Charges of Universalism 
One issue that both ecofeminism and feminist critiques of the international system face is 
a question of universalism, and how to address the diversity of women’s voices in the 
international sphere. Ecofeminism has been criticised as a western, white and middle class 
theory that has limited consideration of the diversity of women’s experiences across race, 
class, religion, and national boundaries.182 This criticism is often directed at cultural or 
‘spiritual’ ecofeminists who emphasise global unity and ‘oneness’ without acknowledging the 
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potential implications for some human communities and the universalising effect that this 
has on women’s voices.183 Non-western women, women of colour, and indigenous women 
have criticised ecofeminism for ignoring the multifaceted forms of oppression and the 
complex ways in which these oppressions affect their lived, material, reality.184 They criticise 
the idealisation of ‘indigenous’ and non-western lifestyles that are dehistoricised and 
stereotypical and can serve to obscure specific problems related to cultural survival.185 
International feminists have been criticised for similarly failing to consider the diversity of 
women’s experiences across class, race, and national boundaries.186 While this is a significant 
issue, both ecofeminism and international feminism have acknowledged this critique and set 
forth different perspectives for addressing the criticisms.  
Both Val Plumwood and Karen Warren articulate a theory which acknowledges 
difference and the multiple intersections of different oppressions. They explicitly 
incorporate nature as an additional category of analysis in a feminist framework that 
integrates gender, race and class analysis.187 Warren emphasises the importance of pluralist 
ecofeminism which ensures that the diversity of women’s voices is given significance.188 The 
examination of cross-cultural difference suggests that later forms of ecofeminist analysis 
have become more sophisticated and attuned to the multiple oppressions within movements 
and cultures of which feminists and ecofeminists are part.189 
Feminist international scholars similarly engaged with criticisms of universalism.190 They 
argue that depending on circumstances, it may be appropriate to use the category of 
‘women’, while in other circumstances, a more contextualised category may be 
appropriate.191 They argue that the category of ‘women’ is a powerful theoretical and 
political force and therefore feminist analysis negotiates a difficult path between theoretical 
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and political purity.192 In a similar way to ecofeminism, feminist international scholars 
maintain awareness of differences between women, while also recognising commonalities.193 
These responses to the critique of universalism in feminist analysis mean that international 
feminists can acknowledge tensions between universal theories and local experience.194  
However, ecofeminism and feminist critiques of international law have been criticised by 
non-western feminists for throwing away a theoretical purity.195 Non-western feminists 
assert that women are not a coherent group constituted on the basis of a particular policy or 
system. They argue that women are constituted through the ‘interaction between class, 
culture, religion and other ideological institutions and frameworks.’196 Chandra Mohanty 
argues that feminists should engage in ‘grounded, particularized analyses linked with larger, 
even global, economic and political frameworks.’197 Post-colonial and transnational 
feminism challenge western international feminist scholars to resolve the pitfalls of 
homogenisation and universalism and celebrate the diversity of women’s experiences while 
also interrogating global issues.198 
In spite of these criticisms, ecofeminism can offer a nuanced and interconnecting critical 
perspective through which to analyse IEL. It draws on a diverse ‘political and social milieu’ 
which gives it a strength of critical insight that is derived from both the feminist and 
ecological movements.199 In a similar vein to drawing on feminist international law, 
ecofeminism can adopt a strategy of ‘situated perspectives’ that encourage the awareness of 
difference between women while recognising commonalities.200 This allows for ‘cultural 
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diversity to be respected without falling into cheap relativism’201 and acknowledges the 
global diversity of women’s experiences by using different styles, languages, and disciplinary 
angles.202 Therefore, ecofeminism can offer a ‘range of different but related lenses through 
which to view environmental issues’.203 The fluidity and dynamic nature of ecofeminism is 
one of its strengths, as is its ability to draw on social, political, philosophical, and economic 
foundations, as well as activism and practice in its form and content.204  
Finally, I suggest that the strong rebuttals of the charges of essentialism and universalism 
by ecofeminists such as Plumwood, Gaard, Warren, and others indicate that ecofeminist 
theory has evolved from the ecofeminist approaches subject to such criticisms. In particular, 
the elucidation of ecofeminist philosophy by Warren and Plumwood reflects a more mature 
and grounded theory than the earlier, less coherent, theories, such as those put forward by 
Starkhawk and Charlene Spretnek. Further, more recent ecofeminists have moved in a very 
different direction from that of Starkhawk and Spretnak and have developed theoretical 
perspectives including ecofeminism as embodied materialism, queer ecofeminism, and 
ecofeminism phenomenology.205 Similarly, the range of topics examined through an 
ecofeminist philosophical perspective include environmental jurisprudence, globalisation, 
sustainability and ecology.206 These new directions in ecofeminism indicate that challenges 
of essentialism and universalism are no longer valid and may be seen to reflect an 
evolutionary deadend in the development of ecofeminist theory. For this reason, I believe 
that ecofeminism is an appropriate and useful critical theory through which to examine IEL. 
3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced ecofeminism as a philosophical position, movement, and 
intellection commitment that calls to attention the connection between the oppression of 
women and the unjustified domination of nonhuman nature. I argued that ecofeminism, 
unlike other feminist and ecology approaches, has the capacity to develop a more complete 
critique of the beliefs, attitudes, and values that inform the international community’s 
perception of the environment and how these may have changed with the securitisation of 
the environment. I introduced and discussed the main strands of ecofeminism before 
discussing the two main strengths that inform the analysis undertaken in these different 
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strands which are relevant to this research: Ecofeminist linguistic perspectives and the 
examination of oppressive conceptual frameworks. Finally, I acknowledged the charges of 
essentialism and universalism in older ecofeminism and argued that such criticisms relate to 
ecofeminism approaches that have generally been abandoned and may be considered as 
evolutionary deadends.  
With this in mind, I suggest that ecofeminism can offer a theoretical perspective that 
questions the intersecting oppressions, silences, and exclusions felt by members of the 
international community in the development and furtherance of international law and 
policy concerning environment/security links and the environment. This is because there 
are excluded and marginalised members of all communities – not just those at the local 
level. By extrapolating the critiques and perspectives developed within ecofeminism, it is 
possible to identify those groups within the international community who may also be 
marginalised by those members who are more powerful. The benefit of using ecofeminism is 
that it can examine the spaces where such silences and marginalisation may occur.  
In the following chapter I introduce the methodology and research method used in this 
project. I will discuss the methodological perspective and how this is informed by 
ecofeminist philosophy, and particularly, Karen Warren’s articulation of an ‘ecofeminist 
ethic.’ In this discussion, I will explain how the analytical framework used in this research is 
an outcome of the methodological perspective and the way in which feminist content 
analysis is used as a research method to examine the text of IEL. 
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4. Methodology  
This chapter further elaborates the methodology and research method used in this 
project. It explores the research strategy and design. It shows how the analytical framework 
developed for this project fits within and is inspired by the broader ecofeminist literature. 
The analytical framework constitutes four lenses through which the texts of international 
environmental law are read in this project: Inclusivity, structural pluralism, contextualism 
and openness. The texts of international environmental law (IEL) at issue, fall into four 
broad areas (natural resources, climate change, ozone depletion, and the guiding principles 
of international environmental law), covering eight specific regimes (biological diversity, 
tropical timber, fisheries, desertification, climate change, ozone layer, transboundary 
watercourses, and sustainable development). These were selected as they encompass a 
sufficiently broad range of areas and regimes of international environmental law to counter 
claims of ‘selectivism.’ The strategy of enquiry and method of analysis is an iterative process 
which draws on and is inspired by ecofeminist methods. 
1. RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH  
This thesis used a reflexive version of content analysis that is informed by ecofeminist 
epistemology. This approach to research enabled me to reveal underlying links between the 
securitisation of the environment, changes in the justifications for environmental 
protection, and the perception of the environment itself. It also offered the opportunity to 
draw out such links and evolutions in the justifications or perceptions of the environment 
inter-temporally, as I examined a range of environmental regimes and their documents from 
the pre-Cold War period to 2012. 
My research reflects the postpositivist methodological approaches used in international 
relations, and by feminist legal scholars in the post-Cold War period. These approaches 
challenge the positivist position which holds that empirical sources of knowledge can only 
be validated and proved ‘true’ through tests.1 Instead, I share the view of feminists such as 
Hilary Charlesworth, Shulamit Reinharz, and J. Ann Tickner who consider knowledge 
building as an ongoing process, which emerges through ‘conversation with texts.’2 As noted 
in Chapter 3, many feminists view research as a journey or archaeological dig, and part of an 
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ongoing process which seeks to challenge and reconceptualise what is claimed to be 
‘knowledge’ from the perspective of the other.3 
Ecofeminism similarly challenges the positivist paradigm of social research, and 
specifically that contained in legal studies.4 They argue that law is underpinned by 
positivism, which privileges empiricism and its emphasis on objective observation and 
origins in the scientific revolution.5 Instead, ecofeminism is generally interpretivist and 
seeks to revise or challenge the ideals of masculine and human character.6 It criticises 
Cartesian epistemology as implicitly masculine because it privileges the mind over the body, 
and believes that ‘objectivity is … interpreted as freedom from the body and its deceptions, 
weaknesses and hindrances, its personal and emotional ties.’7 Ecofeminists argue that 
positivist epistemologies may be construed as dualisms because they involve 
hyperseparations which construe sharing and connections between the knower and known 
as a hindrance to knowledge.8 They posit that the connections, links, and relationships 
between subject/object should be recognised in the temporal, social, and specific contexts in 
which they are found.9 As Lori Gruen stresses, this relationship between temporal, social 
and specific contexts in the shaping of ecofeminist enquiry when she argues that the central 
feature of an ecofeminist epistemology is to recognise actual community-based experiences, 
and the situation in which these experiences are created.10 Therefore, ecofeminists start from 
the basis that the social location of the knower is central to understanding and assessing 
epistemological claims.11  
These epistemological considerations are alluded to in Karen Warren’s ecofeminist ethic, 
which is discussed in Section 2 of this chapter. For now, it is enough to state that the 
epistemological perspective of this research critiques androcentric ways of knowing that 
‘account for the antagonistic, dualistic and hierarchical conceptions of self, society and 
cosmos, are perceived to be at the roots of oppression.’12And hence provide a methodology 
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for interrogating the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the international community in relation 
to the environment.  
With this in mind, I considered the different ways in which I could examine the 
international community’s prevalent attitudes towards the environment. I decided to 
examine the texts of international environmental law through an ecofeminist analytical 
framework. This approach is not only original, but also contributes a rounded and informed 
critique through which I could identify and discuss different values, attitudes, and beliefs of 
the international community in relation to different international concerns, such as the 
environment, economy, and development.  
My initial reading of environment/security literature, as well as the texts of the eight 
environmental regimes studied here, guided the broad focus of my research. I refined this 
through my reading of ecofeminism and the creation of the analytical framework, as well as 
through the broad topics that I identified during my reading of the documents. I came to 
develop my research question, outlined in Chapter 1, through this iterative process: 
To what extent has the association between environment and security has altered 
the basis on which states and NSAs that make up the international community seek 
to protect the environment, and in turn, what this suggests about their perception of 
the environment? 
This process encapsulates a reflexive approach to research in which the process of research 
and analysis informed the creation of topics and other variables that emerged throughout 
the study.13  
To recap on some points made in previous chapters, it is worthwhile addressing this 
question for a number of reasons. One reason is that the securitisation of the environment is 
occurring in many different forums, and by many different actors on the international and 
national stages (see Chapters 1 and 2). Second, there are many criticisms of the ways in 
which states protect the environment, and particularly with the growing commercialisation 
or commoditisation of the environment as a proposed response (see Chapter 2). Therefore, 
examining the relationship between the securitisation of the environment and the emerging 
justifications for environmental protection offers an original lens to examine underlying 
beliefs, values, and attitudes that may inform the development of future environmental law 
and policy (see Chapters 1 and 2). Third, the methodology developed in this research can 
offer an interesting and original approach to examine the interconnections between other 
areas of international or national discourse. Finally, as discussed in the previous chapters, it 
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is very important to understand the underlying perceptions of the environment because we 
need to interrogate these views in order to reconceive our relationship with the world and 
with each other (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). 
2. CREATING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON ECOFEMINIST ETHICS 
I drew on the ecofeminist ethic articulated by philosopher Karen Warren to create my 
analytical framework. This ethic can be seen as both a reform and radical strategy because it 
makes critical gendered analysis central while also relying on concepts and positions found 
in reformist theories, such as justice, respect, autonomy, and liberty.14 Warren describes her 
ethic as comprising eight ‘boundary conditions’, and in the following paragraphs I briefly 
outline these conditions and highlight the ways in which they contribute to the analysis of 
international law 
The first two boundary conditions of Warren’s ethic take into account the relationship 
between knowledge, history, and concepts which inform the beliefs, values, and attitudes 
about the world. She conceives her ethic as ‘theory-in-process’ which will develop from 
patterns of voices emerging from alternative descriptions of ethical situations.15 These 
conditions can therefore take into account relationships between history and knowledge and 
that these relationships can inform the beliefs, values, and attitudes of those who shape and 
create international responses to security and environmental degradation.  
Third, Warren proposes that her ethic is ‘contextualist.’ She explains this as an ethic 
which sees ‘ethical discourse and practice as emerging from the ‘voices’ of entities located in 
different historical circumstances.’16 This condition has two dimensions: The individual with 
their own identity, history and emotions, and relationships with their own identity and 
history.17 This focus has significance for my research because it takes into account the 
network of relationships between individuals rather than simply concentrating on the rights, 
rules, and duties that apply to ‘others.’18 Further, it can also reveal the way in which 
knowledge is formed and critique the dualistic structures that western knowledge is built on, 
thus building a contextual understanding of knowledge. 
Fourth, Warren describes an inclusivist ecofeminist ethic as one that emerges and reflects 
the diversity of perspectives of marginalised peoples and women.19 As ecofeminism opposes 
the nature/culture dualism, it also acknowledges that humans are ‘both members of an 
ecological community (in some respects) and different from other members of that 
                                                          
14 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 98. 
15 Ibid, 98-99. 
16 Ibid, 99. 
17 Ibid, 99; Margaret Urban Walker, ‘Moral Understandings: Alternative "Epistemology" for a Feminist Ethics’ 
(1989) 4(2) Hypatia 15, 17-18. 
18 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 99. 
19 Ibid, 99. 
107 
 
community (in other respects).’20 Therefore, it can recognise the differences and 
commonalities in human and nonhuman nature and humanity.21 Furthermore, this 
condition ensures that the voices of marginalised or oppressed communities are given 
‘central legitimacy in ethical theory building.’22  
Fifth and sixth, an ecofeminist ethic does not attempt to provide an objective point of 
view, and also provides a central place for values that are unnoticed, mispresented, or 
underplayed in traditional ethics.23 She argues these values recognise ‘that our relationships 
to others are central to an understanding of who we are’ and can therefore acknowledge the 
diversity amongst and between humans by focusing on relationships, and the values 
celebrating relationships.24 Drawing on these conditions, ecofeminism can recognise the 
various interconnections between the local and the global in an increasingly interconnected 
global society, while also acknowledging the differences.25 In her previous writing, Karen 
Warren described this as ‘structurally plural.’26  
Seventh and eighth, an ecofeminist ethic rejects ‘abstract individualism’ and reconceives 
western conceptualisations of reasons, which are informed by such individualism.27 It 
refuses to accept that it is possible to identify a human essence or nature that ‘exists 
independently of any particular historical context.’28 This emphasises historical and 
relationship contexts of humans and has relevance in the examination of IEL because it 
recognises the multitude of connections of historical relationships that form human, and by 
extension, state conduct. Further, it can challenge the rationalist tradition by making visible 
the underlying strands of reason that interconnect with each other to form a network of 
barriers, which through their relationship to each other, reinforce and maintain the 
subordination and devaluation of marginalised communities and nonhuman nature.29 
Therefore, such a critique into my analysis can help reveal where such structures have been 
incorporated into the text of IEL. 
However, Warren’s ecofeminist ethic does not engage with ecofeminism as activism and 
political movement. A key condition omitted from her ethic is that of ‘openness.’ Openness 
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recognises that ecofeminism is not just a theoretical position, but also a social movement.30 
It challenges the decision-making and discussions concerning the environment which 
occurs behind closed doors and the gendered effect of such actions. This feature reflects 
ecofeminist politics by bringing ‘thinking, speaking, and acting in public in order to 
formulate new beginnings for ourselves and for the world.’31 Therefore, it can ‘open up 
‘nature’ to public, democratic discussion.’32 Including such a feature can take into account 
that ecofeminism is a movement that challenges the dominant social paradigm, and in doing 
so seeks to make public the assumptions, beliefs, and values that inform IEL.  
Many of these boundary conditions are suited to creating an analytical framework 
through which to examine the justifications for environmental protection, and the 
perception of the environment itself. In particular, Warren’s ‘inclusive’ and ‘contextual’ 
boundary conditions have relevance in the examination of who participates in the creation 
of IEL, and what types of knowledge or experience are valued. Her ‘structurally plural’ 
boundary condition (which may be considered an umbrella condition) has relevance in the 
examination of the types of interests, voices, and views of the environment that are 
portrayed in the documents because this feature recognises diversity amongst humans. The 
‘open’ condition, while not part of Warren’s ecofeminist ethic, recognises that ecofeminism 
is political, and emerges from activism as well as the academy. It has relevance in examining 
the way in which interests are balanced in relation to the environment. These boundary 
conditions can also absorb the other conditions of an ecofeminist ethic and thus reinforce 
the analysis undertaken through them.  
In the following section, I outline the specific ways in which I use these boundary 
conditions, to create my analytical framework. In doing so, I explain why I think they are 
relevant to the analysis of international environmental law, and how they relate to the 
separate analytic chapters in this research.  
2.1 Creating the Four Ecofeminist Lenses: Inclusive, Structurally Plural, 
Contextual, and Open 
Through the eyes of a lawyer, I view the eight boundary conditions of Warren’s ethic 
more akin to ‘goals’ than ‘values.’ This is because they reflect an overall ambition and guide 
to creating a new ethic and way of thinking. These goals reflect the normative and 
transformative aspirations of ecofeminist critiques. However, they contain specific values 
                                                          
30 Braidotti and others, Women, the Environment, 161; Rochette, ‘Rape of the World’, 32; see further, Carolyn 
Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World (Routledge 1992). 
31 Catriona Sandilands, ‘Raising Your Hand in the Council of all Beings: Ecofeminism and Citizenship’ (1999) 
4(2) Ethics and the Environment 219, 220. 
32 Ibid, 222; for examples, see, Lahar, 'Ecofeminist Theory and Grassroots Politics'; Birkeland, ‘Linking Theory 
and Practice'; Moore, 'Eco/Feminism'. 
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that can be used as interconnecting lenses through which to examine IEL.33 For example, the 
value for the inclusive goal is ‘inclusivity’; the value of structural plurality is ‘structural 
pluralism’; the value ‘contextual’ is ‘contextualism’ (or ‘contextual understanding’) and the 
value for open is ‘openness.’ These goals and their associated values, drawn from an 
ecofeminist ethic, guide my critical analysis of the texts. In doing so, I connect the normative 
and transformative aspirations of an ecofeminist ethic to the examination of the beliefs, 
attitudes and values of the international community in relation to the environment.  
2.1.1 Inclusivity 
As stated above, the first lens of my analytical framework is informed by the value of 
‘inclusivity.’ This value relates to the goals and aspirations of inclusiveness by enabling the 
voices and experiences of traditionally marginalised and excluded communities, and 
recognising humanity’s membership in the ecological community. It is particularly relevant 
for the analysis of who participates in the creation of IEL, who is excluded, which voices are 
‘heard’ and in what law-making forums. Therefore, it provides an interconnecting lens 
through which to examine the tension between securitising an environmental issue, as such 
a process excludes certain participants and removes the issue from the broader international 
community.  
In this regard, the goal of inclusiveness shares similarities with feminist writers critiquing 
the participation by traditionally marginalised communities in the creation of law. It draws 
on feminist criticisms of ‘privileged white men’ who shape law with their own view which 
‘has come to be seen as universal, neutral, objective, inevitable and complete.’34 The goal of 
inclusiveness builds on the arguments of liberal feminists who maintain that enabling the 
participation by those excluded communities during the creation of law can go in some way 
of enabling equality of opportunity.35 However, an ecofeminist goal of inclusiveness moves 
beyond this and claim that the experiences and voices of those communities that directly 
experience the environment should have more ‘value’ or weight than others.  
Inclusivity can also relate to the ways in which IEL recognises humanity as interrelated 
and integrated into an ecological community.36 The goal of inclusiveness may be revealed in 
the analytical chapters in responses to environmental problems that are balanced, inclusive, 
and not based in a hierarchy between different international domains, such as economic, 
                                                          
33 Joanne Conaghan, ‘Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law’ (2000) 27(3) Journal of Law and 
Society 351, 375.  
34 Rosemary Hunter, ‘Contesting the Dominant Paradigm: Feminist Critiques of Liberal Legalism’ in Margaret 
Davies and Vanessa Munro (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Ashgate 2013), 13; 
Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, 'Feminist Approaches', 614-615. 
35 Wendell, 'A (Qualified) Defense', 66; Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, 'Feminist Approaches', 615-616; 
Christopher C Joyner and George E Little, ‘It's Not Nice to Fool Mother Nature! The Mystique of Feminist 
Approaches to International Environmental Law’ (1996) 14 BU Int'l LJ 223, 871. 
36 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 100. 
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cultural, development, and trade. It may also reveal where certain issues are being elevated 
or securitised by their prioritisation or by the smaller group of states discussing them.  
Similarly, inclusiveness is also revealed in texts that recognise humans as integrated and 
part of an ecological system, and not separate. In this way inclusiveness seeks to move 
beyond framing human/nonhuman relationships as a binary, by referring to the 
environment as separate, subordinate and other. Examining features such as the inclusivity 
of participation, the integration of other areas of international concern, and the different 
representations of nonhuman nature provides an opportunity to reveal these different 
perceptions of the environment and also whose voices contribute to the development of 
international environmental law regimes. In doing so, this lens can reveal the extent to 
which the provisions take into account not only the voices of those marginalised, but also 
humanity’s place in an ecological community. 
2.1.2 Structural Pluralism 
The second lens of my analytical framework is informed by the value of ‘structural 
pluralism’. This value relates to the structurally plural goal and is significant for the analysis 
of IEL. This is because structural pluralism relates to multi-level governance of 
environmental issues. It recognises the various interconnections between the local and the 
global in an increasingly interconnected global society.37 It acknowledges multiple 
communities that make up the local, national, and international spheres, each of which 
contain diverse experiences, culture, and historical contexts.38 Therefore, it draws on 
criticisms by some writers and activists that there should be a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the 
creation and implementation of international environmental law that takes into account 
diversity, location, and difference.39  
Structural pluralism takes into account location, the ways in which different 
communities use and experience their local environment, and that such experiences may be 
affected by their class, race, gender, ethnicity, and social or cultural contexts. This is highly 
relevant in the analysis of the tensions of securitising the environment and in the creation of 
IEL. As noted in Chapter 2, securitising an issue moves it from the broader community to 
one in which only states, and often, select states have power to guide the issue. Therefore, 
any responses may homogenise and universalise a dominant response which does not reflect 
                                                          
37 Moore, 'Eco/Feminism', 11. 
38 Ibid, 10-11. 
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the different features of the multiple communities at the local, national, and international, 
each with their different experiences, history, and cultures. 
Structural pluralism focuses on bridging participation from the local level to the 
international level, while also taking into account differences between communities. It takes 
into account that such participation should occur at multiple levels and between multiple 
communities.40 For these reasons, structural pluralism will be relevant in the analysis of IEL, 
particularly in the analysis of where participation occurs and how states take into account 
difference. It will also be relevant for the analysis of the documents because it enables a 
nuanced analysis of the ways in which the international community seeks to balance the 
different interests that relate to the environment in international environmental law. In this 
analysis, I will be able to consider what this might mean about the diversity of views of the 
environment at the international level, in light of the convergence of security and the 
environment in international discourse. 
2.1.3 Contextualism 
The third lens of my analytical framework will be informed by the value of 
‘contextualism’. This value relates to the goal of contextuality, that give significance to the 
emergence of voices from humans and other entities located in different historical 
circumstances. This has relevance for the analysis of IEL because it seeks to move beyond 
giving significance to different entities – such as nonhuman nature – on the basis of their 
similarity with humanity or ideas about preconceived rights. Instead, it seeks to give 
significance over how a moral agent relates to another. Therefore, it is particularly relevant 
in the analysis of who participates and the different types of knowledge, experience, and 
understandings of the environment that contribute to the creation of law. In this regard this 
goal shares similarities with the work of feminists who examine the prioritisation of certain 
types of knowledge and the exclusion or devaluation of more relational and experiential 
knowledge in the creation of law and responses to environmental degradation.41 It draws 
from similar arguments suggesting that enabling the participation by those excluded 
communities, and valuing their traditional knowledge and experiences, can go some way to 
developing responses to environmental problems that take into account the historical 
circumstances of human/nonhuman interactions.  
Contextualism is also relevant because it examines the ways in which the international 
community develops an integrated approach to knowledge of the environment. Therefore, it 
can critique the ways in which knowledge is used to justify the prioritisation of certain 
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interests in IEL, the commodification of knowledge as a response to environmental 
degradation, and also the types of knowledge that are privileged in relation to environmental 
problems. This is because contextualism seeks to take into account history, identity, and 
how these shape the ways in which different interests are balanced in IEL, and the way in 
which the international community may perceive the environment itself. It also has a 
bearing on the responses put forth by certain members of the international community in 
light of the growing associations between security and the environment as it may reveal the 
dominant values, principles, and knowledge that inform the basis for which the 
international community protects the environment. Furthermore, it may give greater 
understanding of the reasons for the approach adopted by the international community to 
respond to environmental concerns. 
2.1.4 Openness 
The fourth lens of my analytical framework will be informed by the ‘open’ value. This 
value relates to the goals of openness, transparency, public engagement, and the politics of 
feminism, and environmental justice. It is important to remember that ecofeminism is both 
an academic theory and a social movement and therefore seeks to bring discussions 
concerning the environment into the public sphere. This enables those traditionally 
excluded to contribute and engage in debates concerning values, beliefs, and attitudes 
informing the creation of international environmental law. This is particularly relevant for 
each of the three analytic chapters in this thesis.  
In the analysis of the documents, openness is relevant to understanding who participates, 
how ‘open’ or transparent the process is, and the extent to which such practices have been 
subverted by the securitisation of environmental issues. It is also relevant in the analysis of 
the spaces where NSAs are able to attend, and in some contexts, which states are able to 
attend. This, once again, relates to the growing tension between the creation of IEL on the 
basis that it is a global problem that requires community wide responses, and the 
securitisation of the environment with corresponding exclusionary practices. Therefore, 
using this lens can examine this tension within the texts.  
Similarly, openness is relevant because it can reveal how institutional transparency and 
openness may not translate into the direct, democratic, and public openness called for by an 
ecofeminist ethic. This is because openness relies on other boundary conditions of an 
ecofeminist ethic, such as inclusivity and contextuality. Therefore, where documents 
purport to support transparent and open institutional processes, examining them through 
the open lens can offer the opportunity of a rigorous critique of what type of transparency 
and the assumptions, values and beliefs that have informed the insertion of such processes 
into the environmental regime. It may also reveal tensions between securitising 
environmental concerns and engaging in open, transparent, and public debate of the 
underlying justifications for such action.  
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The four analytical lenses introduced above each have stronger synergies with certain 
analytical topics than others. For example, the inclusivity lens has stronger synergies in 
relation to participation, whereas structural pluralism and contextualism may be more 
relevant in the examination undertaken for the integration of non-environmental 
considerations and representation of the environment categories. However, by using all four 
lenses for each topic I believe that I am able to develop an understanding of the ‘messiness’ 
of IEL where different categories, such as participation, integration of non-environmental 
considerations, and representation of the environment bleed into each other, have their own 
intersections, and cannot be analysed independently from each other. To recognise this 
‘messiness’, I portray this framework in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 1 
To conclude, the four lenses that form the analytical framework enable an original 
examination of the extent to which the securitisation of the environment may have altered 
the perception of the environment and the justifications to protect it in international law. 
Through the inclusivity lens, I can interrogate the extent to which responses to 
environmental concerns by the international community recognise, respect, and include the 
voices of traditionally marginalised, excluded, and undermined peoples in dominant 
discourses. Though the structural pluralism lens, I can examine the extent to which the 
international community recognises and respects difference between humans, and humans 
Inclusivity 
Structural 
Pluralism 
Contextualism 
Openness 
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and nonhuman nature, and takes into account difference between communities in responses 
to such concerns. Through the contextualism lens, I can examine the ways in which the 
international community’s responses acknowledge how social construction of conceptions 
of gender, race, class, race, ethnicity, and geographical location are formed by historical and 
social interactions and therefore inform the perception of the environment and knowledge 
concerning the environment itself. Finally, through the openness lens, I can take into 
account that anxieties about the environment necessitate an open, democratic discussion in 
which the previous values are able to be discussed. In the following section, I explain how I 
use this framework as a research method to undertake a feminist content analysis of the 
environmental documents. 
3. METHOD 
3.1 Rationale for Data Selection 
As noted in Chapter 1, I analyse documents from eight environmental regimes that 
contribute to the regulation of four different environmental areas: Natural resources, climate 
change, ozone depletion and sustainable development.42 The decision to analyse such 
breadth of documents is informed by criticisms that environmental lawyers focus on one 
environmental area leading to clustering of scholarship in certain areas and themes.43 This 
research attempts to respond to this criticism by drawing out interrelationships and 
commonalities that may exist in international environmental law.44 The full details of the 
documents analysed in this thesis are displayed in Appendix 2 of this thesis. In the following 
discussion I explain why these eight regimes were selected.  
I selected four main areas of climate change, natural resources, ozone depletion, and 
sustainable development because they encompass the broad range of environmental issues 
that states seek to regulate in the international sphere. As noted in the literature review, 
climate change is one of the most problematic areas of international environmental law. The 
1992 UNFCCC and the 1994 Desertification Convention each address two different aspects 
of climate change. These two regimes are very interesting because they were negotiated and 
adopted just before and just after the 1992 Rio Conference. They also reflect very different 
approaches towards the creation and development of international environmental law, 
which makes them interesting to compare in this research project. 
For example, the UNFCCC is a framework convention whose objective is to stabilise 
greenhouse gas emissions at a level that prevents dangerous ‘anthropogenic interference 
                                                          
42 Above, Chapter 1, 22-26. 
43 Fisher and others, 'Maturity and Methodology', 230. 
44 Ibid, 241. 
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with the climate system.’45 It includes general principles to guide the parties’ efforts in 
achieving stabilisation of the climate, including the precautionary approach, inter-
generational equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities, among others.46 The 
principles included in the UNFCCC reflect a more ‘top-down’ institutional approach 
towards achieving the objective of the convention. The subsequent negotiations of the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol and the softer COP Decisions similarly reflect a consolidation of a ‘top-
down’ regime in which states set internationally-defined, legally-binding emission reduction 
targets, in line with the guiding principles of the UNFCCC.47 This top-down approach has 
been subject to criticisms in terms of effectiveness and also in terms of the differentiation 
between developed and developing countries within the regime.48 
The negotiations and content of the Desertification Convention reflect a very different 
approach. It was negotiated with the participation of communities directly affected by 
desertification and thus demonstrated a more ‘bottom-up’ approach towards developing the 
text. It seeks to respond to desertification in a holistic, bottom-up approach to prevent 
desertification at the local, regional, and national levels. It bases many of its objectives on 
attaining sustainable development, while also incorporating differing obligations for affected 
developing country parties and developed country parties.49 Therefore, it takes into account 
the social and economic contexts in which the international community, and local 
communities seek to respond to environmental problems. Furthermore, the convention may 
arguably be considered as one of the regimes that the international community has forgot, 
even though it has a number of intersections with the biodiversity and climate change 
regimes. At the time of negotiation, desertification was seen as a problem primarily for the 
global south, which may not now be the case.  
Furthermore, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, climate change has been increasingly referred 
to as a security concern. Concerns over desertification as a threat to food and water security 
have been discussed in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and in the UNGA, as 
well as in the academy and civil society. Therefore, including these two regimes means I can 
examine the differences in the creation of international law, the principles guiding states’ 
                                                          
45 UNFCCC 1992, art 2. 
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responses to climate change and the tensions in balancing interests such as security, 
development, and economic well-being.  
Similarly, natural resources are one of the primary sources of economic development for 
many countries in the international community. Many people consider biodiversity (which 
encompasses all natural resources) as the foundation of life on Earth, and as a result, the 
biodiversity regime has many intersections with other areas of environmental law. These 
intersections offer the opportunity to examine the justifications used to protect natural 
resources and the extent to which these justifications alter the perception of the 
environment itself. The 1992 Biodiversity Convention and its two protocols, the 2000 
Cartagena Protocol and the 2010 Nagoya Protocol also created a framework approach 
towards biodiversity. The framework convention contains very few obligations but defines 
three key objectives of the future biodiversity regime. It also includes principles of 
sustainable use, and provisions relating to technology and financial transfers. 50  
This regime is interesting in the context of this project for a number of reasons. First, 
because it has negotiated three legally binding environmental documents during the time-
period under analysis. Second, it seeks to regulate and protect all types of biodiversity, while 
taking into account the needs of developing countries. Third, it explicitly refers to the 
interests of traditionally marginalised and excluded communities such as indigenous 
peoples and women within the context of the regime. For these reasons it offers the 
opportunity to analyse the development of a regime over time and how the interests of 
marginalised communities may have been taken into account in the context of biodiversity 
conservation.  
The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement has been included in this research project because it 
seeks to conserve and protect marine resources that straddle the high seas and areas under 
the national jurisdiction of a state. This is a novel approach because it applies to areas 
beyond the national jurisdiction of states and has introduced the precautionary principle 
into the management and conservation of such stocks.51 Furthermore, it was negotiated and 
adopted after the Rio Conference, during which the international community noted the 
concerns of unregulated fishing, excessive fleet sizes, lack of cooperation between states, and 
unreliable databases over the state of the world fisheries.52 Therefore, it includes guiding 
principles that reflect the concept of sustainable development. This approach to natural 
resource regulation may reveal interesting responses to development, the participation by 
NSAs, and the perception of the environment itself.  
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The 1983, 1994, and 2006 ITTAs53 are included in this research because they offer a very 
different perspective on the regulation of natural resources. These three agreements were 
developed to prove an effective framework for international cooperation, policy 
development, and consultation among members concerning all ‘relevant aspects of the 
world timber economy.’54 In this way, the ITTAs can be seen as an international trade 
agreement that focuses on the regulation of a natural resource primarily concentrated in 
developing countries.55 However, with the scientific and political concern over deforestation 
and environmental degradation, some NSAs sought to include more environmentally-
minded principles into the renegotiated agreement.56 Therefore, the agreements offer an 
opportunity to analyse the way in which trade, environment, and development are balanced, 
particularly in light of mounting evidence of the link between climate change and 
deforestation. As the agreements were developed over the time-period under analysis, it is 
possible to examine the way in which these interests were balanced at different points in 
time over the period analysed in this research.  
The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention has been included in this research because it 
developed through a very different style of law-making. As noted in the introduction, the 
UNGA requested the International Law Commission to examine the issue of non-
navigational watercourses with a view to its codification.57 The ILC adopted a set of draft 
articles on the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses in 1994 which 
were then submitted to the UNGA who adopted the framework convention in 1997.  
This convention is relevant to this research as it emerges through the work of the 
International Law Commission and is an example of a legally binding outcome text 
developed through the evolution of customary international law. This is because very few 
states have the patience to wait for custom to develop. Therefore, this convention may the 
only one to occur, and as such is an interesting and potentially unique example of IEL. In 
addition, it is the only treaty governing freshwater resources shared between states, 58 and is 
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a framework convention that provides states with a framework of rules and principles that 
may be adjusted to suit particular watercourses.59 
The ozone layer regime has been included in this project because its negotiations 
commenced at the start of the time-period and continued during the final stages of the Cold 
War. Therefore, it offers an opportunity to compare the way in which different interests 
such as trade, development, economy, and security were addressed within the negotiations 
and adopted outcome text. Furthermore, the 1985 Ozone Layer Convention and the later 
1987 Montreal Protocol has been labelled as one of the most effective and sophisticated 
models of international regulation and supervision of an environmental concern.60  
Finally, the law relating to sustainable development has been included as it has shaped 
the international response to environmental problems since the mid-20th century. As noted 
in Chapter 2, sustainable development can be seen as a ‘bridging’ concept that brings 
together the promise of community development and people-centred development.61 
Therefore, it has influenced and informed the development of IEL, particularly in the post-
Cold War era. 
Sustainable development has given states and NSAs a means to respond to the 
interrelated concerns of development, environmental degradation, peace and security, as 
well as a solution for a collective response to the destruction of the global commons that 
recognises the legitimate needs of developing countries to develop.62 Such is the strength of 
this concept that it has been considered a ‘principle with normative value’63 and is an 
integral element in state and NSAs’ responses to environmental concerns while also helping 
to shape the foreign and security policy of many countries.64  
The principles that inform the concept of sustainable development have helped shape 
recent international responses to environmental degradation, involve local communities, 
and support the participation by NSAs in the creation and development of environmental 
law. Therefore, to exclude sustainable development would limit the ability of this research to 
understand the context in which states create IEL. This is because sustainable development 
is intractably linked with IEL, development, and more recently, security, and thus offers the 
opportunity to examine the tensions concerning securitisation of the environment on the 
evolution of IEL, and the perception of the environment itself. 
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Overall, each of these environmental regimes has some connection to the different 
themes that I examine in this thesis. The breadth of these regimes means that they 
encompass a broad range of participatory practices in the creation and subsequent content 
of the adopted outcome texts. Each of the regimes seeks to balance the different interests and 
needs of states in relation to a global environmental problem. Some of these regimes seek to 
regulate elements of the environment which have been increasingly securitised in 
international discourse, such as the climate, biodiversity, and water. Other regimes inform 
the development of international responses to security, environmental degradation, or 
development. Finally, the breadth of these regimes across the time-period in question means 
that it should be possible to examine the evolution of the international community’s 
perception of the environment, in light of the growing securitisation of the environment, 
and different interests that are balanced in relation to the environment. 
3.2 Strategy of Inquiry and Method Choice 
Undertaking a content analysis of the preparatory documents and adopted outcome texts 
offers a flexible method to better understand the ways in which the securitisation of the 
environment may have altered the justifications for which states seek to protect the 
environment and the perception of the environment itself.65 Reinharz argues that 
documents may be seen as types of cultural artefacts informed by social organisations, 
cultural patterns, and individual activity.66 Therefore, examining the documents produced 
during the negotiations of environmental regimes as well as the adopted legal instruments 
themselves, means I can examine the beliefs, values, and attitudes by the international 
community during the negotiations and preparations of environmental regimes by reading 
these documents through ecofeminist lenses.67 This gives a more holistic understanding of 
the different ways in which the international community mediates its experiences of the 
environment and its connections with other international domains such as economy, 
development, and security.68 
There are other reasons for using content analysis as the primary research method. One 
benefit of undertaking content analysis on written documents as a form of data is that 
documents are pre-existing and therefore are naturalistic and non-interactive.69 This means 
that the data has a ‘built-in level of authority’ and I can identify social and cultural norms 
without the use of interactive methods that might affect those norms.70 This confers validity 
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to the research, something that has been seen as ‘lacking’ in feminist research methods.71 
Therefore, even though I undertake a more reflexive and iterative approach towards 
analysing the data, the data itself remains pre-existing and naturalistic.72  
Further, content analysis enables me to discern topics, themes, patterns, and meanings 
used to describe the interconnections between international domains, such as development, 
economy, security, as well as the ways in which states refer to the environment itself.73 This 
more ‘open’ method enabled concepts to emerge from the data as well as approaching it 
with some expectations of what I may find. This allowed me to examine both ‘manifest and 
latent’ meanings74 associated with the representation of the environment, justifications for 
its protection, and the extent to which these have been altered with the securitisation of the 
environment. 
Finally, undertaking content analysis through an ecofeminist analytical framework 
enables me to examine the texts of the documents in the context and situations in which 
they are created. This benefit of content analysis is important because ecofeminism 
recognises that ‘claims to knowledge are … influenced by the values of the culture in which 
they are generated.’75 Therefore, I wanted to use a research method that could take into 
account the context of the findings rather than looking at them as isolated structures.76 This 
recognises that views, beliefs, and attitudes towards the environment and related issues are 
formed in ‘particular places at particular moments in time’ and are shaped by the culture, 
society, and history in which they emerge.77  
These three reasons indicate that feminist content analysis is an interesting and original 
method to use in this thesis. Incorporating a more reflexive and iterative approach to the 
analysis enables me identify different categorisations, variables, and themes that emerge 
from the data when examined through the ecofeminist framework. It offers ‘validity’ to the 
research outcomes as documents are ‘non-interactive’, while also enabling me to examine 
the texts in the context in which they were created. These benefits of content analysis 
support the methodological perspective undertaken in this research. Finally, this research 
method has not been used before in the analysis of international environmental law, and 
therefore is part of the original contribution of this thesis.  
                                                          
71 See the discussion in Reinharz, Feminist Methods in Social Research; Caroline Ramazanoğlu and Janet Holland 
(eds), Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices (SAGE Publications Ltd 2002).  
72 Altheide, 'Ethnographic Content Analysis', 65;  
73 E.g. Elza Ibroscheva, ‘The First Ladies and the Arab Spring: A Textual Analysis of the Media Coverage of the 
Female Counterparts of Authoritarian Oppression in the Middle East’ (2013) 13(5) Feminist Media Studies 871, 
874.  
74 Ibid, 874. 
75 Gruen, ‘Toward an Ecofeminist Moral Epistemology', 124. 
76 Ibid, 124. 
77 Ibid, 124. 
121 
 
3.3 Procedure and Data Analysis 
Given the breadth of documents created during the negotiations and development of 
IEL, I limited my document selection to the preparatory reports and adopted outcome texts 
of eight environmental regimes.78 I collected these documents through specialist online 
databases, such as UNBISnet (the United Nations Bibliographic Information System), 
websites of environmental secretariats (such as the Ozone Secretariat, the UNFCCC, and the 
Biodiversity Secretariat), the Ecolex database (operated by the FAO, IUCN and UNEP), and 
the United Nations Treaty Collection. I analysed the complete document, excluding those 
annexes or appendices that were lists of documents or numerical in content. Each document 
was broken into individual paragraphs or articles and sub-articles. These were each given a 
separate row in Microsoft Excel. 
In order to analyse these documents through an ecofeminist framework, I adopted an 
iterative approach. In doing so, I aimed to reflexively engage with the data in a way that was 
systematic but not rigid.79 I fully expected to be guided by topics, categories or variables 
throughout the study, but also allowed others to emerge through the study. This approach to 
content analysis allows data to be coded conceptually, meaning it can be relevant for several 
purposes.  
Therefore, I first read the documents without any predefined or rigid categories that 
defined what was relevant.80 However, my wider reading and feminist theoretical perspective 
gave me tools to use in my observation and analysis of the topics and themes that were 
raised in the documents. This repeated and extensive engagement with the texts and a 
holistic overview of the content itself meant that I could identify specific categories 
emerging in the content of the data. In particular, categories such as participation, the need 
to integrate non-environmental considerations into environmental documents, and the 
representation of the environment itself became emerging categories. I would then re-
examine several previous documents from the same environmental regime and other 
environmental regimes to examine and compare how these categories are treated in the 
previous documents. Moving reflexively between data collection, analysis, and 
reconceptualisation of the categories, themes, and concepts increased my understanding of 
the relevance of formats, sources, and emphasis within the texts.81  
With this in mind, I undertook the following steps in my analysis of the documents. I 
first read the documents many times over. This gave me a repeated and extensive 
                                                          
78 See Appendix 2. 
79 Altheide, 'Ethnographic Content Analysis', 68; Colleen Connolly-Ahern and Antoni Castells i Talens, ‘The Role 
of Indigenous Peoples in Guatemalan Political Advertisements: An Ethnographic Content Analysis’ (2010) 3(3) 
Communication, Culture & Critique 310, 321. 
80 This approach is adapted from the method used by Altheide, 'Ethnographic Content Analysis' and Connolly-
Ahern and Castells i Talens, 'The Role of Indigenous Peoples'.  
81 Altheide, 'Ethnographic Content Analysis', 73.  
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engagement with the text, as well as a holistic overview of the content in each regime and in 
each environmental area. This meant I could recognise a number of different categories, 
themes, and ways in which the international community establishes connections between 
environment and other domains, such as economy, community, and science. While reading 
the documents repeatedly, I made notes on the topic, choice of words, tone used, and the 
omissions or silences within the text. I would then look back to previous regimes and 
compare and contrast the focus, topic, tone, words, and silences with the documents.  
During my early analysis of the documents I identified three specific categories that 
shaped the research question and overall structure of this thesis. The categories of 
participation, integration of non-environmental considerations, and the representation of 
the environment itself were revealed during the initial analysis as intersecting and mutually 
supportive. These were used as the key foci for the substantial analytical chapters because 
they enabled me to engage with different elements within the environmental documents 
while also examining the ways in which the securitisation of the environment may have 
altered international environmental law.  
Second, I read the documents through the different lenses of the ecofeminist framework. 
During this reading, I critiqued the tone, content, omissions, and language against the goals 
included within the ecofeminist ethic. I would look below the text to consider the underlying 
beliefs, values and attitudes that were contained in the text and considered these against the 
context in which the document was made and the purpose for which the document was 
created.   
When undertaking this reading, I would ‘measure’ the provisions against those 
previously analysed and against the goals of an ecofeminist ethic. In doing so, I was able to 
‘categorise’ the texts into those that reflected greater elements of an ecofeminist ethic and 
those that reflected fewer elements of such an ethic. Throughout this process I would refer 
back to the discussion of ecofeminism undertaken in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis, 
and to the writings of the ecofeminists such as Karen Warren, Val Plumwood, and Mary 
Mellor.82 This way I engaged in reflexive analysis of the documents both through the 
analytical framework, and also in the way that I read the documents, informed by my 
understanding of ecofeminism. In doing so, I hoped to be able to reveal the extent to which 
the documents contained provisions that suggested that the securitisation of the 
environment had altered the perception of the environment, when read through an 
ecofeminist framework. 
                                                          
82 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature; Mellor, Feminism & Ecology; Warren, Ecofeminist 
Philosophy; Mellor, 'Feminism and Environmental Ethics'; Plumwood, Environmental Culture; Mary Mellor, 
‘Ecofeminist Political Economy and the Politics of Money’ in Ariel Salleh (ed), Eco-Sufficiency and Global Justice 
(Pluto Press 2009).  
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This section has explained the way in which I used the analytical framework during the 
content analysis of the environmental documents. I suggested that there were a number of 
benefits of using this research method and approach. First, this approach to analysis takes 
into account the interconnections between the different values and features of ecofeminist 
theory. Second, it is an iterative and reflexive method, which allows categorisations to 
emerge from the analysis itself. Third, it allows interconnections between issue areas, 
regimes, and areas to be revealed during the process of analysis. These three benefits indicate 
that the process of analysis outlined below offers an original approach towards the 
examination of IEL. I will reflect on this in the conclusion of my thesis and evaluate the 
successes and limitations of this approach and the implications for my findings. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has addressed the methodological approach and method used in this 
research project. This research was designed to undertake qualitative, feminist content 
analysis, through an ecofeminist analytical framework, of preparatory documents and 
adopted outcome texts from eight international environmental regimes. The role of theory 
in this research was informed by feminism in general, and by ecofeminism specifically, both 
of which argue that theory is central to the research. Therefore, I adopted an iterative 
approach in this research by mediating my analysis of the data through an ecofeminist lens.  
While Chapters 1-2 focused on literature that I read prior to conducting my content 
analysis of the documents, I referred to Chapter 3 throughout the analysis of the documents 
and in my discussion of the findings in Chapters 5-7. These chapters centre on the data 
generated through my analysis of the documents. I have structured the analysis and 
discussion along three distinct categorisations that were revealed during the analytical 
process: Participation (Chapter 5); integration (Chapter 6); and representation (Chapter 7). 
As noted in the introduction (Chapter 1), each of these chapters have distinct questions that 
are asked as a way to guide the analysis undertaken.83 These questions were developed 
during the initial reading of the documents, and helped shape discussion of the findings 
from the content analysis.  
The first analytical chapter (Chapter 5) draws on findings relating to the participation by 
NSAs in the creation and subsequent implementation of the obligations contained in the 
outcome texts. In this chapter, I suggest that the emerging tension – as revealed through the 
analysis – between increased participation as a procedural element and the growing 
securitisation of environmental issues, suggests that the type of justifications for which states 
seek to protect the environment have altered. 
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In Chapter 6, I discuss the findings that relate to the justifications for which the 
international community protects the environment. Chapter 7 turns to reflect on the 
different perceptions of the environment itself, as revealed in the texts of the agreement. I 
decided to order these chapters in this way because who participates in the development of 
international law informs the types of issues and concerns that is included in the legal text. 
The types of issues included in the text can, in turn, inform the perceptions of the 
environment that are included in the document. Further, the hierarchy in which other 
international issues are included in these legal texts can also reveal the different perceptions 
of the environment included in these texts.  
Finally, Chapter 8 provides some reflections on, and implications of, the research and 
focuses on the strengths, drawbacks and limitations of the use of an ecofeminist analytical 
framework to undertake feminist content analysis. The thesis concludes by considering the 
extent to which my analysis has revealed a growing trend in IEL away from focusing on the 
environment as a collective responsibility and concern, towards the protection and 
regulation of the commons based on current and future economic development. 
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5. The Participation by States and NSAs in the Development 
of IEL  
This chapter uses the analytical framework developed in the previous chapter to examine 
the participation by states and NSAs in the creation and content of IEL. It examines who 
participates in the development of IEL and where the participation by NSAs is supported or 
excluded. It identifies the types of issues, topics, and areas where such participation is 
encouraged, and the justifications for the chosen approach. This examination reveals three 
aspects of the law making. It can reveal who participates in the creation of IEL. Second, it 
can examine the assumptions, beliefs, and values that inform state responses to 
environmental problems. Third, it can reveal the basis on which the participants seek to 
protect the environment. This chapter concludes that there is an emerging tension between 
the broadening and deepening of participation in the paradigm of sustainable development, 
and the exclusion of such participation in areas and topics that are closely aligned to state 
interests. 
Support for the increased participation by NSAs, especially non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) re-emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s. This support is closely associated with globalisation and is facilitated by increasing 
interdependence through systems of communication and transportation.1 The rationale 
informing the support for increased participation may be drawn from different sources: 
Those on the ideological right support the role CSOs play in scaling back the role of the 
state, whereas those on the ideological left stress the potential for solidarity and 
emancipation that is inherent in civil society.2 Philip Allot argues that NSA participation in 
the international sphere was a manifestation of the whole human race and of a society of all 
societies and thus incorporated the social element into the international sphere.3 More 
pragmatically, Richard Falk suggests that the emerging system of international governance 
requires the creation of international civil society to ensure that the development of policy is 
shaped on behalf of human interests.4   
The participation by NSAs has broadened the interpretative community involved in the 
creation of law and its implementation.5 This process reflects the pluralisation of the actors 
                                                          
1 Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society (Oxford 
University Press 2007), 99.  
2 Ibid, 99. 
3 Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford University Press 1990), chapter 13. 
4 Richard A. Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics (Polity 1995), 35, 101.  
5 Hurrell, On Global Order, 111. 
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in the international system and in law-making processes at the international level.6 While 
international law regulates states, it is said to be no longer dependent on them for its 
content, existence or implementation.7 Both states and NSAs play a role in the international 
governance structure and in the creation and enforcement of international law and norms.8 
While states retain the final word, NSAs have an increasing influence in the creation and 
enforcement of international law and norms.9 Understanding who participates in the 
creation and implementation of law and norms relating to the environment, and particularly 
what type of NSAs are involved, is pertinent to examining the extent to which 
environment/security linkages may have altered the basis on which the international 
community seeks to protect the environment.  
Furthermore, as alluded to in earlier chapters, sustainable development, and to some 
extent, an ecofeminist ethic, envisages an inclusive, multilevel participatory approach 
towards the creation of norms and law. The concept of sustainable development introduced 
by the Brundtland Report refers to the importance of participation by NGOs and the 
scientific community.10 This was consolidated by the 1992 Rio Declaration which 
established public participation as a ‘cornerstone of sustainable development and good 
governance.’11 International institutions consider these principles of participation as 
interrelated and mutually supportive. They assume public participation in the institutions 
and processes of international law is a prerequisite for the successful design and 
implementation of environmental and socio-economic objectives.12  
For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s characteristics of 
good governance include, inter alia, participation, equity, the rule of law, and 
                                                          
6 Jean D'Aspremont, ‘Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating between Concepts and Dynamics’ in 
Jean D'Aspremont (ed), Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors 
in International Law (Routledge 2013), 4. 
7 Hurrell, On Global Order, 111. 
8 Jean d'Aspremont, ‘International Law-Making by Non-State Actors: Changing the Model or Putting the 
Phenomenon into Perspective?’ in Cedric Professor Ryngaert and Math Dr Noortmann (eds), Non-State Actor 
Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Ashgate Publishing Ltd 2013), 178. For 
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Establishing the World Trade Organisation (Marrakesh) (15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 
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9 d'Aspremont, ‘International Law-Making by Non-State Actors', 175 - 178; see further discussion in Steve 
Charnovitz, ‘Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance’ (1997) [University of 
Michigan Law School] 18(2) Mich J Int'l L 183; Alan E. Boyle and Christine M Chinkin, The Making of 
International Law (Oxford University Press 2007).  
10 WCED, Our Common Future, 326-327. 
11 International Law Association, International Law on Sustainable Development  (2012), 22; Rio Declaration 
1992, Principle 10. 
12 Cordonier Segger and Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law, 164. 
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transparency.13 The UNDP states that these characteristics are interrelated and mutually 
reinforcing and should apply equally to the international and national levels.14 It suggests 
that broad participation contributes to the exchange of information required for legitimate 
decision-making and, in turn, legitimacy enables effective implementation and further 
participation. These arguments have been expressly associated with achieving peaceful, 
resilient, and stable societies,15 and that failures in ‘governance’, broadly defined, have been 
seen as the source of insecurity and threats to the security of western states.16  
Following from this, NSAs (especially NGOs and CSOs) also perform important 
functions at the international level. The public quality of NGOs and CSOs enables them to 
transcend the ‘inside-outside character of traditional politics and to fashion and provide 
space for new forms of political community, solidarity, and identity.’17 They can perform a 
significant role in ‘democratising’ global politics by increasing the transparency and 
accountability of states, and other international institutions. Finally, and equally as 
important for ecofeminism, they are able to create links between the local and global in 
terms of needs and actors.18  
These arguments emphasise that the activities and actions by CSOs support the practice 
of good governance while also holding states and international institutions to account for 
their actions. CSOs can provide a ‘check on exaggeration, obfuscation, and poor logic and 
                                                          
13 UNDP, ‘Governance for Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Policy Document’ (1997)  
<http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/undp/governance/undppolicydoc97-e.pdf> accessed 6 May 2016. 
14 UNDP, Human Development Report: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (Oxford University Press 
2002), 112-122. 
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Post-2015 Development Framework' (Discussion Paper United Nations Development Programme) 
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Open-Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, 'Conflict Prevention, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and 
the Promotion of Durable Peace, Rule of Law and Governance' (TST Issue Brief  21 November 2014) 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2639Issues%20Brief%20on%20Peace%20etc_FINA
L_21_Nov.pdf> accessed 21 January 2016; Naomi Larsson, ‘Good governance: the Pandora's box of the 
sustainable development goals’ The Guardian (London, 25 September 2015) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2015/sep/25/good-governance-sustainable-development-
goals-united-nations> accessed 21 January 2016.  
17 Hurrell, On Global Order, 103; Catriona Sandilands, ‘Wild Democracy: Ecofeminism, Politics, and the Desire 
Beyond’ (1997) 18S(2) Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 135; Sandilands, 'Raising Your Hand'.  
18 See in general, Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local 
and the Global (Routledge 1994). 
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data’19 because of their diverse range of expertise. They can act as a conduit for ideas and 
political pressure and provide expertise and information concerning policy options.20 They 
perform accountability functions by monitoring states through monitoring delegations,21 
providing independent assessments of state compliance and implementation,22 and 
publishing detailed bulletins of environmental negotiations.23 For ecofeminist activists, one 
of the most important functions that NSAs perform is to provide representation to 
marginalised communities and those groups who directly experience the impact of 
globalisation and environmental degradation.24  
CSOs, NGOs and other NSAs can act as a conduit between the local and global by 
enabling an open, transparent, and inclusive environment for the negotiations of 
international legal agreements.25 In this way, they can articulate values that are ‘contextually 
construed by reference to the needs, actual circumstances, and cultural outlook’ of the 
participants involved.26   
As a result, NSAs can contribute to a state-based order through the provision of 
legitimacy and consent. Hurrell suggests that they can act as a ‘relatively autonomous self-
organised public sphere’ wherein ‘genuine deliberation between competing positions can 
take place and through which some notion of international public reason can be 
developed.’27 In each of these views, it is clear that the participation by CSOs represents a 
‘plural and open arena’ in which norms can be developed based upon ‘genuine and unforced 
consent.’28 For these reasons, the extent to which NSAs, such as NGOs and CSOs, are able to 
perform these functions can help identify those topics and environmental areas in which 
states are reluctant to open up to civil society. Examining the justifications used to restrict 
NSA participation, as well as identifying the topics of interest, can point to the broader 
international concerns that states take into consideration during the creation and 
implementation of IEL. Identifying these non-environmental considerations will help reveal 
                                                          
19 Kal Raustiala, ‘States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions’ (1997) 41(4) Int Stud Quart 719, 
727; Kal Raustiala, ‘The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmental Law’ (1997) 21 Harv Envtl L 
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20 Raustiala, 'States, NGOs', 728. 
21 Raustiala, 'The "Participatory Revolution"', 562. 
22 Ibid, 560-561. 
23 Ibid, 564; see e.g. the Earth Negotiations Bulletin and ECO.  
24 Hurrell, On Global Order, 103-4; see also Holly Cullen and Karen Morrow, ‘International Civil Society in 
International Law: The Growth of NGO Participation’ (2001) 1(1) Non-State Actors and International Law 7.  
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26 Cullen and Morrow, 'International Civil Society in International Law', 9; Falk, On Humane Governance, 113. 
27 Hurrell, On Global Order, 104. 
28 Ibid, 104. 
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the extent to which the securitisation of the environment may have altered the basis on 
which the international community seeks to protect the environment.  Further, the 
justifications for supporting or excluding participation by NSAs can reveal underlying 
assumptions about the topics where participation is supported or excluded. Therefore, the 
analysis undertaken in this chapter can identify the non-environmental considerations 
which have been incorporated by states and NSAs into IEL that can guide the analysis in the 
next chapter. Finally, it may help reveal the tensions in the appropriation of the sustainable 
development paradigm by security discourses.   
Building on the discussion above, knowing who shaped the content of IEL and the types 
of issues where such participation is supported is the first step to examining the extent to 
which the securitisation of the environment may have altered the basis on which the 
international community seeks to protect the environment. Second, the types of issues 
where participation is prioritised or excluded and the justification for this approach can 
reveal and contextualise the basis on which the international community protects the 
environment. Third, identifying who shapes the content of the law reveals the assumptions, 
values, and beliefs that are contained in the justifications for the environment’s protection. 
Finally, examining the participation by NSAs will reveal the tension between the principle of 
participation contained in sustainable development (which encourages a broadening and 
deepening of NSA participation in environmental concerns), and the exclusionary practices 
in some areas that are closely linked to the environment and national interests. This final 
point helps inform the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7.   
1. FINDINGS  
In Chapter 4, I outlined the methodological approach used in this thesis. To recap, I 
undertook a form of feminist content analysis and examined the environmental documents 
through four ecofeminist lenses. This was an iterative and reflexive process where I first 
identified different characteristics of participation that resonate with the values that form 
the interconnecting lenses (inclusivity, structural pluralism, contextualism, and openness) 
through which I analysed the documents. These characteristics were contained in references, 
phrases, and provisions relating to participation by states or NSAs. They reflect the 
overarching goals of an ecofeminist ethic and therefore, the extent to which they are 
included in the documents may indicate a broadening and deepening of the participation by 
NSAs in the creation and implementation of IEL. Where these characteristics were less 
evident, it was understood as pointing to forums, issues or areas in which states were 
reluctant to engage in public, ‘democratic’ discussion. These considerations are explored in 
more depth in Section 2 of this chapter. 
My analysis identified characteristics that reflect the different goals of ecofeminism. 
Those documents that exhibit the value of inclusivity include multiple voices and 
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experiences, particularly those of groups that disproportionately experience the destruction 
of nonhuman nature.29 They support the participation by NSAs in the creation, and future 
development of the legal regime and respectfully acknowledge the differences between 
societal groups. Documents that reflect structural pluralism acknowledge the complexity of 
interconnections between the international and local.30 They include references supporting 
the participation and contribution by actors from multiple communities at international, 
national, and local levels. Documents that incorporate contextualism recognise the diversity 
of voices that are located in differing historical and social circumstances. They recognise and 
respect different values, knowledge, interests, and experiences in different cultures and 
sectors of society, and active engagement with various actors.31 Documents that include the 
openness value contain references that support the transparent or open participatory 
practices which enabled the environment to be ‘opened up’ to public, democratic 
discussion.32 
In the following discussion, I group my findings according to the themes and variables 
that emerged during the analysis, and the extent to which they reflect a broadening and 
deepening of the participation by NSAs. These variables include the environmental area, 
age, and forum of the document. I do not expect to find that all voices are represented in the 
documents. There are many reasons for this to be the case.33 First, states may not support 
the participation by some or all NSAs, as discussed above. Second, the technical nature of 
the topic may exclude some epistemic communities from participating. Third, lack of 
funding or monetary support may prevent some communities from attending. Nevertheless, 
the way in which the documents refer to NSA participation can signify those issues and 
areas where states support or oppose the participation by NSAs. Where such participation is 
absent or less explicit, it may indicate issues, areas and topics that states consider closely 
aligned to their interests, and to security. Furthermore, the justifications used to support or 
exclude participation by NSAs may also reveal underlying beliefs, values and attitudes 
towards the environment and the reasons why states seek to protect it. In addition, while I 
do not expect to identify all the different ‘voices’ contained in the documents, examining the 
justifications used to support or exclude participation by NSAs may also reveal underlying 
beliefs, values and attitudes towards the environment and the reasons why states seek to 
protect it. This process of analysis raised important considerations that were subject to re-
examination and will be discussed with reference to the literature discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3 in the second part of this chapter. In the following paragraphs, I outline the different 
variables that affected the participation by NSAs and give an overview of my findings.  
                                                          
29 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 99. 
30 Warren, 'Power and Promise', 142 ; Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, 80-82.  
31 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 99. 
32 Charnovitz, 'Nongovernmental Organizations', 366; Raustiala, 'States, NGOs', 725. 
33 For a discussion of the participation by NSAs in environmental governance, see Joyeeta Gupta, ‘The Role of 
Non-State Actors in International Environmental Law’ (2003) 63 ZaoRV 459;  
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1.1 High-Level Integration 
My analysis indicates that there is a link between the area of IEL, whether it is climate 
change or sustainable development, for instance, and the provisions made in the documents 
for the participation of NSAs. There is a particular correspondence found in some areas of 
IEL and provisions for those who have traditionally been excluded or marginalised from the 
international sphere. 
1.1.1 Sustainable Development  
The documents outlining sustainable development contain the most significant 
references that support the participation by NSAs in the creation and implementation of 
IEL. The documents published by the Preparatory Committee for the 1992 Rio Conference 
(hereinafter 1992 Rio Preparatory Committee) include a significant number of references to 
the participation by marginalised communities. These references often reflect the inclusive, 
structurally plural, and open ecofeminist goals.  
Both the Rio Preparatory Committee Reports and accompanying decisions support the 
participation by communities such as indigenous peoples, women, and youth. These are 
groups that ecofeminists argue are traditionally excluded or marginalised from discussions 
surrounding the environment.34 The principles included in the Rio Declaration support the 
participation by women and indigenous communities, among others, in environmental 
decision-making. It also includes a broader public participation provision supporting the 
inclusive participation by other NSAs at different levels of decision-making. Similarly, the 
1992 Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development (Agenda 21) includes 
specific chapters that support broader and deeper participation by NSAs in environmental 
and developmental matters. Agenda 21 also includes references to the inclusive, structurally 
plural and contextual participation by excluded communities in chapters addressing specific 
environmental and development problems. These two documents set out the concept of 
sustainable development and include significant references that reflect elements of inclusive, 
structural pluralism, contextualism, and openness values, when analysed through the 
ecofeminist framework.  
The post-2001 sustainable development documents reveal a consolidation of this 
approach in this area of environmental law. The preparations for the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Summit) and the 2012 UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20 Conference) both used the internet and other forms of 
communication to encourage the participation by civil society, and particularly those who 
have traditionally been excluded. The references to the participation by such groups reflect 
the ecofeminist goals and continue to articulate and refine the role for NSAs as entities that 
can support the accountability and transparency of sustainable development objectives. This 
                                                          
34 Sturgeon, Ecofeminist Natures, Chapter 5.  
132 
 
is reaffirmed in the adopted outcome documents from these conferences, such as the 2002 
Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 
Plan of Implementation) and the later 2012 Rio+20 Outcome text, the Future We Want 
(Rio+20 Outcome Document). These documents affirm the importance of multilevel, 
inclusive participation that consolidates the broadening and deepening of civil society 
participation in the area of sustainable development. In doing so, they contain many 
references that reflect ecofeminist goals, when analysed through the ecofeminist lenses.  
However, as will be discussed in Section 2 and in Chapter 6, the justifications for the 
broadening and deepening of civil society participation have altered with the emerging 
connections between security, development, and sustainable development that became 
increasingly explicit over the time period in question. Furthermore, the language used in 
support of increasing participation changes, in line with the emerging connection between 
environment and security in the post-2001 period.  
1.1.2 Desertification 
The desertification regime shows great commitment to the participation by NSAs 
amongst the regimes examined in this thesis. This is particularly the case for the 
participation by marginalised communities or who directly experience the effect of 
environmental degradation. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Elaborate a 
Convention to Combat Desertification (INCD) explicitly endorses the participation by local, 
national, and international civil society, thus reflecting structurally plural participatory 
practices. The INCD supports the contributions by those who experience desertification and 
commits to the principles of sustainable development. The 1994 Desertification Convention, 
itself integrates inclusive, structurally plural, contextual and open participatory provisions 
into its central objectives. The significant references to participation, and sustainable 
development indicate a broadening and deepening of participatory practices in the creation, 
content and implementation of environmental agreements in the post-Rio period.  
The later CRIC preparatory reports similarly support the participation by local 
communities and marginalised groups. However, following the pattern noted in the 
sustainable development regime, the language and justifications used to support their 
participation is different to that used in the INCD. Similarly, the adopted outcome texts 
from this review process utilise different language and arguments to support the 
participation of certain types of NSAs than that used in the earlier INCD documents. The 
underlying assumptions informing this change in language referring to NSAs will be 
examined in the second part of the chapter.  
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1.2 Mid-Level Integration 
1.2.1 Natural Resources  
While the 1992 Biodiversity Convention does not explicitly refer to the paradigm of 
sustainable development in its content, I found that many of the provisions affirm and 
support the participation by marginalised communities. This is interesting for two reasons. 
First, the preparatory process for the Biodiversity Convention contains few provisions that 
reflect inclusive, structurally plural, or open participation. Second, the biodiversity regime 
can be seen as an exception to the general approach towards participation by NSAs, and 
particularly civil society, in the environmental area of natural resources. For example, the 
later Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing (AWG-ABS) 
contains more provisions that indicate a broadening and deepening participatory approach. 
The reports refer to supporting the contribution by marginalised communities and those 
who directly rely on their local environment for their well-being. This inclusive, structurally 
plural and open approach is further reflected in the adopted 2010 Nagoya Protocol.  
However, the Open-Ended ad hoc Working Group on Biosafety (BSWG) and the 
Cartagena Protocol generally included fewer such references. This may reflect the technical 
nature of the issue at hand, or it may indicate that states are less comfortable with certain 
types of NSAs participating in negotiations concerning environmental issues that are closely 
aligned to economic, trade, and commercial interests. These tensions will be examined later 
in this chapter and in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Two other natural resources agreements include more restricted references to 
participation by NSAs (particularly CSOs and NGOs). The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
and the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention each include references to certain types of 
NSAs, such as experts or intergovernmental organisations. This approach acknowledges the 
expertise of some NSAs, but reflects very few of characteristics of ecofeminist participation.  
Similarly, the adopted outcome texts relating to natural resources such as fisheries, 
timber, and freshwater resources include few direct references to participation by 
marginalised communities and social groups. The 1983, 1994, and 2006 ITTA include 
significantly fewer references that reflect inclusive, structurally plural, contextual or open 
goals for participation, even in those agreements adopted after the introduction of 
sustainable development. As these areas are traditionally linked to economic interests and 
national security in realist paradigms, it may indicate that states are less receptive to NSA 
participation in these areas. These considerations, and the justifications relating to the 
participation by NSAs in natural resource agreements will be examined in more detail in 
Section 2, below.  
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1.3 Low-level Integration 
1.3.1 Climate Change 
The documents from the climate change regime are a notable exception to the general 
trend towards supporting the broadening and deepening participation by marginalised 
communities and those directly experiencing environmental degradation in the Rio and 
post-Rio periods. While the 1992 UNFCCC takes into account sustainable development, the 
content of the provisions make little reference to the inclusion of marginalised communities 
or social groups. Further, its provisions do not take into account the different lived 
experiences, knowledge, or uses of the environment, characteristics that ecofeminism views 
as integral for open and inclusive participatory practices.  
This more restrictive approach towards the participation by some NSAs is consolidated 
in later ad hoc Working Groups. The documents produced by the Ad Hoc Group on the 
Berlin Mandate (AGBM) include few references to the participation by NSAs. Those 
references identified generally reflect limited characteristics of structural pluralism, 
contextualism and openness values. Similarly, the documents produced by the ad hoc 
Working Groups established after 2001 include few references detailing the participation by 
civil society NSAs and marginalised communities. However, they do include more 
references to the importance of accountability, transparency, and openness, which reflect 
some elements of sustainable development and the arguments for participation by NSAs.  
The soft-law outcome texts adopted after 2001 similarly include few provisions that 
reflect inclusive participation by those communities who directly experience the effects of 
climate change or have traditionally been excluded from the negotiation process. This is 
exemplified in the 2010 Decision 1/CP.16 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(Cancún Agreements (2010)), and the 2012 Decision 1/CP.18 Agreed Outcome Pursuant to 
the Bali Action Plan (Agreed Outcome Pursuant to the Bali Action Plan (2012))35. While 
referring to participation in their texts, these provisions do not reflect the ecofeminist values 
to a significant degree. 
In the case of the adopted outcome texts from the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), this may be 
because of the technical nature of the topic at hand. However, in a similar vein to the 
content of the Cartagena Protocol, and the participatory processes for the AGBM, it may 
                                                          
35 Decision 1/CP.18 Agreed Outcome Pursuant to the Bali Action Plan (8 December 2012). (Decision 1/CP.18 
Agreed Outcome Pursuant to the Bali Action Plan); See also Decision 1/CMP.8 'Amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 9' in Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Eight Session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012, 
Adendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol on its Eight Session (28 February 2013) FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (8 December 2012).  
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also suggest that certain topics that are closely related to the economic, trade, development, 
and commercial interests of states correspond with fewer inclusive participatory provisions.  
1.3.2 Age of Document  
Another trend that emerged through my initial analysis was that the age of the document 
has a direct relation to the extent to which it includes references that support the 
participation by non-traditional NSAs. Many of the documents from the ozone layer regime 
include significantly few references that reflect the inclusive, structurally plural, and 
contextual characteristics of participation. Once again, this may be partly because of the 
technical nature of the negotiations that occurred in the two working groups that developed 
the 1985 Ozone Layer Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol. Such negotiations may 
not be the correct forum for facilitating contextual or structurally plural participation. 
However, the extent to which these documents reflect inclusive or open participatory 
practices may still help identify those issues where states are reluctant to include the 
participation by NSAs.  
This may be in part because the paradigm of sustainable development, that supports the 
broadening and deepening of participation by NSAs, was not generally incorporated into 
IEL until after the Rio Conference. For example, the preparatory process and adopted 
outcome texts from the 1972 Stockholm Conference, supported the participation by newly-
independent developing countries, but contained very few references that supported the 
participation by marginalised communities and those directly experiencing environmental 
degradation. This is reaffirmed by the adopted soft-law texts from the conference. The 1972 
Stockholm Declaration and the 1972 Stockholm Action Plan of the Human Environment 
(Stockholm Action Plan) include some general references encouraging states to undertake 
consultation with local communities. While the documents do acknowledge the value of 
consulting with local communities, such an approach is top-down and only includes some 
limited characteristics of inclusive, structurally plural, contextual, and open participation. 
1.3.3 Forum in which the document is created 
The forum in which the document has been negotiated and adopted also has a bearing on 
the extent to which it includes references that support the participation by NSAs. Most 
notably, the two sustainable development resolutions adopted in the UNGA contain very 
few provisions that reflect the characteristics of inclusive, structurally plural, and contextual 
participation. The 2000 Millennium Declaration and UNGA Resolution 60/1 2005 World 
Summit Outcome (2005 World Summit Outcome) both contain general references to the 
principles of good governance and refer to participatory governance in this context. In this 
way, they reflect some characteristics of open and inclusive participation, albeit in very 
generalised and soft language. Once again, these documents’ content and language indicate 
an emerging connection between sustainable development and security, part of which is 
support for participatory governance.  
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My findings suggest that the integration of the paradigm of sustainable development into 
IEL corresponds with a significant increase in references to the participation by NSAs in the 
creation, content, and implementation of IEL. However, the extent to which these provisions 
reflect ecofeminist characteristics of inclusive, structurally plural, contextual, and open 
participation depends on the environmental area, connection with other areas or state 
interests (trade, economic, science, commercial), age, and forum in which the document 
under consideration is negotiated and adopted. The following discussion will discuss these 
findings relying on the analytical framework developed in Chapter 4, with reference to the 
literature discussed in Chapter 2.   
Drawing on these findings, I am particularly interested in where NSAs were invited to 
participate. This is because highlighting where NSAs were allowed to participate and where 
they were excluded, and the reasons given for their exclusion can give insight into the 
environmental topics and related issues that states were supportive of NSA participation in 
the creation, content, and implementation of environmental obligations.  The justifications 
given by states for NSAs’ participation or exclusion can also reveal any connections between 
the environment, development, and security and the role of NSAs in this context. Where 
possible, I endeavour to identify the types of voices and NSAs invited to participate. These 
findings can only be valid for those voices or NSAs discerned or identified in the documents. 
Nevertheless I believe the more generalised justifications given by states for NSA 
participation or exclusion can also reveal any connections between the environment, 
development and security and the role of NSAs in this context. Not only will this analysis 
inform the discussion in Chapter 6, it also can help unpack the emerging tension between 
the broadening and deepening of participation inherent in the sustainable development 
paradigm and the emerging appropriation of sustainable development by the broader 
security discourse. The conclusions from these discussions will help contextualise the extent 
to which the connections between environment/security may have altered the basis on 
which the international community seeks to protect the environment.  
2. ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
My findings indicated that the extent to which the content and language of the 
environmental documents reflected an ecofeminist understanding of participation increased 
in the post-Rio period. However, my findings also identified significant variation in the 
different references to participation depending on a number of variables, including the 
environmental area, age of the document, and the forum in which the document was made. 
In the following discussion, I analyse the language and content of the environment 
documents and focus on each ecofeminist variable separately. In this analysis I bring in the 
critique and commentary of the environment/security links introduced in Chapters 2 and 3.  
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2.1 Inclusivity 
Section 1 noted that references to the participation by NSAs in the creation, content, and 
implementation of environmental outcome texts has increased with the introduction of 
sustainable development after the Brundtland Report. As noted above, the preparatory 
process for the Stockholm Conference generally included fewer provisions that reflected the 
ecofeminist value of inclusivity. Those references relating to the participation by NSAs in the 
preparation process were generally directed to expert organisations and individuals, or 
international institutions and organisations.36 UNGA Resolution 2581(XXIV) (1969), 
convening the Conference and the preparatory process itself, contains limited references 
that reflect the inclusivity value. Resolution 2581 (1969) requests the Secretary-General to 
‘pursue’ consultations and to ‘draw on contributions’ from ‘appropriate’ intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organisations.37 This open language leaves the discretion of 
determining ‘appropriate’ to the Secretary-General, who may or may not decide to interpret 
this participatory provision widely.  
Analysis of the preparatory reports indicates that the Secretary-General of the 
Conference supported the participation by NSAs on the basis of their expertise. He argued 
that NGOs had an important role in the preparations for the conference and justified this by 
referring to the ‘variety of talent they could give to the conference.’38 Some state delegates 
supported the Secretary-General and favoured the broadening of participation by NSAs 
because they considered environmental problems were of universal character and therefore 
required universal participation to resolve.39 These statements reflect some elements of the 
inclusivity value as they seek to broaden the participation by NSAs on the basis of their 
expertise and in recognition of different experiences, knowledge and values that such broad 
participation could give to the issue of environmental degradation. In this way, the 
documents indicate that NSA participation was seen as drawing on a broader range of 
expertise in relation to development and environmental matters. 
                                                          
36 UNGA Resolution 2398 (XXIII) (3 December 1968) UN Doc A/RES/2398(XXIII), ¶3; United Nations, Report 
of the Secretary-General  (9 December 1970) UN Doc A/CONF.48/PC.8, ¶70; United Nations, 'Report of the 
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment ' (New York, 10-20 
March 1970) (6 April 1970) UN Doc A/CONF.48/PC/6, Annex II; United Nations, 'Report of the Preparatory 
Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment on the Work of its Second Session' 
(Geneva, 8-19 February 1971) (26 February 1971) UN Doc A/CONF.48/PC/9, Annex II; United Nations, 'Report 
of the Preparatory Committee on its Third Session' (New York, 13-24 September 1971)  UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/PC/13, Annex II. NSAs attending the preparatory conferences included the IUCN, Commission of 
the Churches on International Affairs, International Alliance of Women, International Council of Scientific 
Unions, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Commonwealth Human Ecology Council, 
amongst others. 
37 UNGA Resolution 2581(XXIV) (15 December 1969) UN Doc A/RES/2581(XXIV) ¶7-8; ¶10. 
38 Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UNCHE. 2nd Session (1971), ¶107; see also ¶106.  
39 Ibid, ¶109, ¶111. 
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Similarly, analysis of the preparatory documents published by the Working Groups for 
the Ozone Layer Convention and Montreal Protocol suggests that NSA participation was 
restricted to expert organisations and individuals, or international institutions and 
organisations.40 The participation by experts is particularly notable in the Ad Hoc Working 
Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Protocol on the Control of 
Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
(AWG-CFCs). The Working Group reports record that NSAs such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce, The Federation of European Aerosol Associations, Environmental 
Defense Fund, and the World Resources Institute participated, among others.41 These 
participant NSAs indicate a focus of expertise in law, science, and technology and also the 
participation by groups with a business and commercial interest in the environmental issue 
under negotiation. This narrow participatory approach may reflect the technical nature of 
this issue, unlike the broader and interrelated concerns of environmental degradation and 
underdevelopment addressed by the Stockholm Declaration. Therefore, while the overall 
participation by NSAs in the pre-Rio period does not reflect many of the characteristics of 
the inclusivity value, the references to the NSAs indicates growing support by some states in 
NSA participation in the creation of IEL. As the Ozone Layer Convention and the Montreal 
Protocol were negotiated during the time when the Brundtland Report was being written 
and published, the participation by experts, the private sector, and industry may be seen to 
support the arguments for developing more inclusive participation for NSAs included in the 
report.42 
However, the tensions between those countries that sought to broaden the participation 
by NSAs and those that sought to limit their participation which were present during the 
Stockholm Conference were also present in the preparations for the Rio Conference. This 
tension correlates with those countries which sought to emphasise environmental problems 
and those that sought to focus on problems of underdevelopment in the preparations for the 
Rio Conference. Developing countries expressed resistance to the participation by NGOs in 
the preparatory processes and at the conference itself.43 They were concerned that the 
                                                          
40 E.g. UNEP Governing Council, Report of the Governing Council on the Work of its Ninth Session (New York, 
13-26 May 1981) (1981) UN Doc A/36/25, ¶353; UNEP Governing Council, Decision 13/18 I 'Protection of the 
Ozone Layer' in Report of the Governing Council on the Work of its Thirtheen Session (UN GAOR 40th Session, 
Supplement No 25) (1995) UN Doc A/40/25 (24 May 1985); UNEP, Draft Report of the ad hoc Working Group of 
Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Protocol on the Control of Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on the work of its First Session (Geneva, 1-5 December 1986) 
(1986) UN Doc UNEP/WG.151/L.4; DeSombre, 'The Experience of the Montreal Protocol', 57.  
41 UNEP, Report on the Second Part of the Workshop on the Control of Chlorofluorocarbons (Leesburg, USA 8-12 
September 1986) (13 October 1986) UNEP/WG.148/3, ¶7; UNEP, Draft Report of the the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the work of its First Session, UN Doc UNEP/WG.151/L.4 (1986), ¶3.  
42 WCED, Our Common Future, 20, 326-329.  
43 Peter Willetts, ‘From Stockholm to Rio and Beyond: The Impact of the Environmental Movement on the 
United Nations Consultative Arrangements for NGOs’ (1996) 22(1) Rev Int Stud 57, 71; Mickelson, 'South, 
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participation by environmental NGOs may undermine and draw attention away from their 
development concerns.44 This tension reveals the paradox between environment and 
development considerations that the Rio Conference sought to address.45 It also indicates 
that concerns over development were an issue of significant importance for developing 
countries during preparations of the Rio Conference, something that will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter 6.  
To address the concerns by developing countries, the Preparatory Committee adopted 
Decision 1/1 that encouraged an ‘equitable representation of NGOs from developed and 
developing countries and from all regions.’46 It encouraged the committee to ensure ‘a fair 
balance between NGOs with an environment focus and those with a development focus.’47 It 
also took into account the differences between developed and developing countries and 
supported the use of the voluntary fund to facilitate the participation by institutions, NGOs, 
and experts from developing countries during the preparatory stage and at the Rio 
Conference.48 These references to NSAs reflect many of the characteristics of the inclusivity 
value because they take into account the different interests, experiences, and needs of 
communities from different regions in relation to the environment. They recognise that for 
developing countries, the development needs of their citizens were of central importance to 
the negotiations concerning the use of the environment and environmental conservation. 
The inclusion of NGOs with a developmental interest enabled the participation by 
communities whose interests have not traditionally been recognised at the international 
level.  
Furthermore, the Rio Preparatory Committee explicitly invited traditionally marginalised 
communities and social groups, such as indigenous peoples and youth, to participate in the 
creation, content, and implementation of sustainable development. Decision 2/7, Decision 
                                                                                                                                                                   
North, and International Environmental Law'; see also, Marc Williams, ‘Re-Articulating the Third World 
Coalition: The Role of the Environmental Agenda’ (1993) 14(1) Third World Quarterly 7. 
44 Willetts, 'Stockholm to Rio and Beyond', 72. 
45 See Redclift, 'Oxymoron Comes of Age'.  
46 UNCED, Decision 1/1 'Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Preparatory Process for the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development' in Report of the Preparatory Committee For the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UN GAOR 45th Session, Supplement No 46) (1991) 
A/45/46 Annex I (14 August 1990), ¶3. 
47 Ibid, ¶3. 
48 Ibid, ¶5; see also INCD, Decision 2/1 'Mandates for the Working Group' in Report of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Desertification in those 
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa on its Second Session (15 
October 1993) A/48/226/Add.1 (Annex) Appendix II which outlines the procedure to determine ‘competence 
and relevance’ of non-governmental organisations to the work of the Preparatory Committee; UNGA Resolution 
45/211 (21 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/211; see also, UNGA Resolution 46/168 (19 December 1991) UN 
Doc A/RES/46/168; United Nations, ‘Reference Document on the Participation of Civil Society in the United 
Nations Conference and Special Session of General Assembly during the 1990s ’ (Office of the President of the 
Millennium Assembly, 55th session of the United Nations General Assembly (Version 1 August 2001), 2001)  
<http://www.un.org/ga/president/55/speech/civilsociety1.htm#earth> accessed 14 May 2014. 
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3/7, and Decision 3/6 recognise the important contribution made by indigenous people and 
local community organisations to the preparatory process and sought to promote ‘effective’ 
participation by these social groups in the areas of environment and development.49 These 
decisions invited NGOs, particularly those representing indigenous people and local 
communities, to contribute to this process.50 By including these voices in the preparatory 
process, the Rio Preparatory Committee engages in inclusive participatory practices and 
identifies that participation by these groups is supported in areas relating to environmental 
management and development.  
However, some marginalised social groups were initially omitted from the inclusive 
participatory approach adopted during the initial Rio Preparatory Conferences. Women 
were only explicitly acknowledged as a ‘major group’ alongside indigenous peoples, youth, 
and NGOs during the third session of the committee. This was after concerted effort by 
women-focused NGOs, civil society, and support by other NSAs to encourage states to 
incorporate a gender dimension into international responses to environment and 
development problems. 51 Decision 3/5 acknowledged these criticisms and stated that 
women’s contributions to sustainable development should be addressed at the Rio 
Conference as a ‘distinct cross-cutting issue.’52 Decision 3/5 also recognised that women 
should be mainstreamed in all ‘substantive work and documentation,’53 including the 
adopted outcome texts. The committee requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration 
with states and NSAs, to promote women’s participation in conference activities.54 In doing 
so, this decision recognised that women experienced environmental degradation and 
development differently and supports the contribution of their experiences to the 
development of international responses for sustainable development. 
The content of the these decisions indicate that states acknowledged there were 
connections between gender, development, and the environment that should be taken into 
consideration in the creation, content and implementation of soft-law objectives relating to 
sustainable development. Like Decision 2/7 and Decision 3/7 above, Decision 3/5 suggests 
                                                          
49 Decision 3/7 'Indigenous People and Local Communities' in Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (Volume II) (UN GAOR 46th Session, Supplement No 48) 
(1992) UN Doc A/46/48 (vol II) Annex I (4 September 1991), preamble; UNCED, Decisions 3/6 'Youth in 
Environment and Development' in Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (Volume II) (UN GAOR 46th Session, Supplement No 48) (1992) UN Doc 
A/46/48(Vol.II) Annex I (4 September 1991), ¶(b).  
50 UNCED, Decision 2/7 'Indigenous People and Local Communities' in Preparatory Committee for the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UN GAOR 46th Session, Supplement No 48) (1991) 
A/46/48 Annex I (5 April 1991), ¶2. 
51 Braidotti and others, Women, the Environment, 91. 
52 UNCED, Decision 3/5 'Women in Environment and Development,' in Report of the Preparatory Committee 
for the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Volume II) (UN GAOR 46th Session, Supplement 
No 48) (1992) UN Doc A/46/48(Vol II) Annex I (4 September 1991), ¶(a). 
53 Ibid, preamble. 
54 Ibid, preamble, ¶(c). 
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that the participation by women-related NSAs is supported in a broad range of topics 
connected to the environment and sustainable development. However, the connection 
between women’s participation and sustainable development is very different from those 
proposed in the two decisions relating to indigenous peoples. In Decision 3/5, the text refers 
to women’s ‘critical economic, social and environmental contributions to sustainable 
development.’55 This suggests that the reason for women’s participation is what they can 
give to sustainable development whereas the references to economic growth and 
development in the decisions relating to indigenous peoples justify their participation as a 
way to strengthen growth and development.56 This difference identifies not only the types of 
issues with which these social groups are associated, but also the purpose for their 
participation in the creation, content, and implementation of soft-law sustainable 
development objectives. Here, women are seen as the producers, whose worth is measured 
by their contribution to sustainable development, while indigenous peoples and local 
communities are presented as partners whose knowledge and expertise generates economic 
growth and the drive for development.  
Overall, the decisions by the preparatory committee indicate that states recognised the 
interrelated ways in which certain groups of society may disproportionately experience 
environmental degradation and exclusion from development.  In particular, they indicate 
that states supported NSA participation in areas such as sustainable development, social and 
economic development, and environmental management. This recognition supports the call 
for the increased participation by CSOs and NGOs put forward by the Brundtland Report 
on the basis that NSAs, such as CSOs and NGOs, hold important expertise, experience, and 
knowledge that can help sustainable development to succeed.57 The references to women, 
indigenous peoples, and local communities support the participation by organisations 
representing their interests during the Rio Conference process, and also in the subsequent 
implementation of international, national and local responses to the interrelated concerns of 
development and environment through the paradigm of sustainable development.  
The support for participation by marginalised groups continues in the adopted outcome 
texts of the Rio Conference. Agenda 21, contains discrete chapters to the participation and 
involvement of NSAs in the creation and implementation of sustainable development at the 
local, national, and international levels.58 It also emphasises the importance of adopting 
inclusive participatory mechanisms in the implementation of development and environment 
                                                          
55 Ibid ¶(a). Emphasis added. 
56 See criticisms by, Mies and Shiva, Ecofeminism, 25. 
57 WCED, Our Common Future, 21, 38.  
58 Agenda 21 1992, Chapter 24 (Women), Chapter 25 (Children and Youth), Chapter 26 (Indigenous Peoples), 
Chapter 27 (NGOs), Chapter 29 (Workers and Trade Unions), Chapter 30 (Business and Industry), Chapter 31 
(Scientific and Technological Community). 
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objectives.59 This approach is included in other chapters relating to specific environmental, 
developmental, or institutional aspects of sustainable development. In these chapters, states 
support facilitating the decision-making by ‘concerned individuals, groups and 
organisations… at all levels.’60 These general references to the participation by CSOs are 
complemented by detailed references to the inclusion by marginalised groups in the creation 
of environment and development policies.61 Taken together, these references reflect the 
inclusivity value by supporting the participation by those communities and groups who are 
directly affected by environmental degradation as well as including more general 
participatory provisions. 
The Rio Declaration also supports the participation by NSAs in sustainable development 
and environmental decision-making. Principle 20 and Principle 23 of the Rio Declaration 
state that the full participation of women, indigenous peoples, and local communities is 
‘essential to achieve sustainable development’62 and that ‘states should recognise and duly 
support their identity, culture, and interests and enable their effective participation in the 
achievement of sustainable development.’63 Principle 10 states that ‘environmental issues are 
best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.’64 By 
including these principles, the Rio Declaration has incorporated significant characteristics of 
the inclusivity value, when analysed through the inclusivity lens.. This is because Principle 
10 recognises that different members of society experience environmental degradation 
differently and should therefore be involved in order to address these issues.  
The analysis of the principles of participation contained in Rio Declaration and in the 
content of Agenda 21 reveal three important considerations. First, the analysis suggests that 
states increasingly recognised the value, expertise, and experience that different social 
groups may contribute in the creation and implementation of sustainable development. 
Second, NSA participation was linked to issues relating to development, environment, and 
economic growth in quite different ways. Whereas women’s activities are seen as part of the 
contribution to sustainable development, indigenous peoples’ activities are included because 
of their knowledge and expertise, which may be used to attain economic growth and 
development objectives. This distinction will be examined in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7 
                                                          
59 Ibid, Chapter 8 ¶3, ¶4(r), ¶5(g). 
60 Ibid, Chapter 8 ¶3(c); see also Chapter 10 ¶5(d), Chapter 11, ¶11; Chapter 12, ¶3, ¶4(f), Chapter 13 ¶16(d); 
Chapter 15 ¶3, ¶5(k); Chapter 16 ¶30.  
61 E.g. Ibid, Chapter 10 ¶10; Chapter 11 ¶1,  ¶3(b), ¶13; Chapter 12 ¶17(a), ¶56(d), Chapter 13 ¶16(h).  
62 Rio Declaration 1992, Principle 20. 
63 Ibid, Principle 23. 
64 Ibid, Principle 10. ‘Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the 
relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the 
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in 
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial 
and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.’ 
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as it suggests that each of these groups have a different value in the overall objective of 
sustainable development. Analysing these differences may reveal the underlying beliefs, 
values, and attitudes that inform the inclusion of issues such as development, economic 
interests and trade issues into IEL. Third, the inclusion of NSAs reflects significant 
characteristics of the ecofeminist value of inclusivity. These conclusions suggest states 
viewed NSA participation as integral to achieving sustainable development at the local, 
national, and international levels. 
The support for NSAs’ participation in environment and sustainable development 
matters was a central focus for the INCD preparatory process and the adopted 
Desertification Convention itself. This process enabled those who disproportionately 
experience environmental destruction to have a voice at the international level. The most 
significant example in the immediate post-Rio period is contained in the documents 
produced by the INCD. Under Resolution 47/188 (1992), the UNGA invited the attendance 
of observers, the contribution of intergovernmental organisations, and the participation of 
NGOs to contribute ‘constructively to the success of the negotiating process.’65 It further 
stated the first week of the first INCD session shall be ‘devoted to the sharing of technical 
information and assessments, with the involvement of experts, on drought and 
desertification.’66 These statements indicate that states supported the participation by NSAs 
in discussions concerning issues surrounding drought and desertification. They suggest that 
states recognised the expertise that such participants may have, and that the experiences of 
those who are directly affected by drought and desertification were relevant in the creation, 
content, and implementation of international responses to drought and desertification. In 
doing so, these statements reveal elements of the inclusivity value and suggest that in the 
post-Rio period, states were supportive of NSA participation on the basis that it enabled the 
different experiences, needs and experiences of local communities.67 
This approach may be seen as a manifestation of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
because it encouraged the participation by those directly affected by desertification and 
drought to be involved in the negotiations of international responses to these issues. Over 
the course of the negotiations, NSAs could meet with delegations formally and informally 
and they were successful in convincing governments to propose their ideas.68 For example, 
                                                          
65 UNGA Resolution 47/188 ( 22 December 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/188, ¶8; also ¶16, ¶19. 
66 Ibid, ¶5. 
67 Elisabeth Corell, ‘Non-State Actor Influence in the Negotiations of the Convention to Combat Desertification’ 
(1999) 4(2) International Negotiation 197, 208. 
68 United Nations, 'Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Elaboration of an 
International Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, particularly in Africa on its Second Session' (Geneva, 13-24 September 1993) (15 October 1993) 
UN Doc A/48/226/Add.1 Annex, Appendix III, Report of Working Group I, ¶15 and Appendix III, Report of 
Working Group II, ¶15; Michele Merrill Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, ‘NGO Influence in International 
Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for Analysis’ (2001) 1(4) Global Environ Polit 65, 93-94.  
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NGOs argued that national action plans should establish a participatory approach at the 
international level, and they should be allowed to attend conferences of the parties as 
observers, or any other decision-making body created.69 Both states and NSAs supported the 
full local participation in decision-making and incorporating an integrated, ‘bottom-up 
approach’ to combating desertification.70 This widespread support for inclusive 
participation, both at the local and international level, reflects an increasingly pluralised 
international sphere, where states and other actors were involved in the creation, content, 
and implementation of environmental objectives. 
The content of the Desertification Convention incorporates local community 
participation as a central feature of international responses to combating drought and 
desertification.71 This incorporation indicates that states considered locally-driven 
participation as central to responding to desertification and its underlying social, economic, 
and developmental drivers.72 Local participation was included in the National Action Plans 
– one of the main features of the convention. Articles 9 and 10 emphasise the importance of 
incorporating bottom-up participatory approaches and specifically refer to women, resource 
uses, and local communities.73 Similarly, the regional annexes to the convention adopt this 
approach, although to a varying degree.74 For example, the Regional Annex for Africa makes 
direct reference to the role played by women and the importance of their participation, 
whereas the Regional Annex for Asia is not explicit in their references to the participation by 
marginalised communities.75 These provisions point to states supporting NSA participation 
in areas that relate to sustainable development and environmental degradation.  
                                                          
69 ‘Summary of the Second Session of the INC for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat 
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70 INCD Secretariat, 'Compilation of Government Views, Statement and Drafting Proposals. Note by the 
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71 Desertification Convention 1994, preamble, art 3(a), art 5(d), art 10(2)(f).  
72 Ibid, art 9.  
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L Rev 163, 177; see generally, Chasek, 'The Convention to Combat Desertification'. 
74 Desertification Convention 1994, Annex I Regional Implementation Annex for Africa, art 4(b); art 6(2); art 
8(2)(c); art 11(g); Annex II Regional Implementation Annex for Asia, art 4(d); Annex III Regional 
Implementation Annex for Latin America and the Caribbean, art 4(l); Annex IV Regional Implementation 
Annex for the Northern Mediterranean, art 3(2), art 5(d).  
75 Compare ibid Annex I Regional Implementation Annex for Africa, art 8(2)(c); and ibid Annex III Regional 
Implementation Annex for Latin America and the Caribbean, art 3(2); Annex IV Regional Implementation 
Annex for the Northern Mediterranean, art 4(2) with ibid Annex II Regional Implementation Annex for Asia, art 
4(1)(b) and art 4(1)(d); Annex III Regional Implementation Annex for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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In the post-2001 period, the documents relating to sustainable development continued to 
consolidate inclusive participation by marginalised communities. The preparatory 
documents from the Johannesburg Summit and Rio+20 Conference affirmed the link 
between participation and effective implementation of sustainable development.76 UNGA 
Resolution 64/236 (2000) called for the ‘active’ participation of all major groups ‘at all stages 
of the preparatory process.’77 It further stated that the Committee should provide for the ‘full 
and effective’ participation of all States, specialised agencies and to encourage the 
participation of relevant NSAs.78 The report of the organisational meeting for the Rio+20 
Preparatory Committee notes that representatives of major groups were able to address the 
plenary after statements by state delegates (time allowing), organise informal side events and 
briefings with governments, and participate in multi-stakeholder dialogues.79  
The reports by the Johannesburg Summit Preparatory Committee also contain details of 
the participation by states and NSAs, such as major groups, private sector, and 
intergovernmental organisations in multi-stakeholder dialogues on sustainable 
development.80 However, they also record the criticisms by some non-state participants who 
argued that their involvement should be institutionalised in decision-making for sustainable 
development.81 Similarly, NSAs participating in the preparations for the Rio+20 Conference 
reiterated that their participation was necessary to ensure that sustainable development 
programmes reflected the needs and the context in which they would be placed.82 These 
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Development Acting as the Preparatory Committee for the World Summit on Sustainable Development' (New 
York, 27 May - 7 June 2002) (2002) UN Doc A/CONF.199/4, Annex II ¶17; WEDO, 'Multistakeholder Dialogue 
Segment, Note by the Secretariat. Addendum: Dialogue Paper by Women' (23 April 2002) 
A/CONF.199/PC/18/Add.1, ¶10; Indigenous Peoples Caucus of the Commission on Sustainable Development, 
2002 #3107}, ¶8; Third World Network, Environmental Liaison Centre International and Danish 92 Group, 
'Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Segment. Note by the Secretary-General. Addendum: Dialogue Paper by Non-
Governmental Organisations' (10 May 2002) A/CONF.199/PC/18/Add.4, ¶12(e) 
82 Report of the Preparatory Committee for the WSSD. 2nd Session (2002), Annex I, ¶3-5, ¶16-17 and Annex II 
¶18; WEDO, Dialogue Paper by Women (23 April 2002), ¶6; Indigenous Peoples Caucus of the Commission on 
Sustainable Development, 'Note by the Secretary General. Addendum: Dialogue Paper by Indigenous Peoples' 
(23 April 2002) A/CONF.199/PC/18/Add.3, ¶6-¶7. 
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examples indicated that, in the context of sustainable development, NSAs were actively 
encouraged to participate during the preparatory process, and were offered opportunities to 
do so.  
Once again, the content of the adopted outcome texts from these two conferences reveal 
that principles of participation by NSAs articulated in the Rio Declaration have been 
incorporated in the later soft law sustainable development documents. However, unlike 
earlier iterations of participation by NSAs, these documents emphasise the role of NSA 
participation as part of the solution to poverty and underdevelopment. For example, the 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation reaffirms the participation of women in decision-
making as part of the solution to poverty.83 Similarly, the Plan of Implementation and the 
Rio+20 Outcome Document associate the participation by women and other marginalised 
groups with the development of renewable energy, and natural resource management, food 
security, and energy security, among others.84  
The connections between participation by marginalised communities within these 
documents may indicate a shift in the topics in which states support the participation by 
NSAs. Whereas previous topics related to environment management and development, the 
documents from these two conferences indicate a shift towards supporting the participation 
by marginalised communities as a response to the drivers of underdevelopment and poverty.  
However, the practices of negotiations in the climate change regime indicate 
exclusionary participation for both states and NSAs. The more frequent references to 
‘informal’ working groups in the reports suggest that their use has become more common, 
particularly where the topic under negotiation concerns highly sensitive issues, such as 
economic or trade interests.85 The use of the ‘informal’ working groups means that the Chair 
of the group retains the right to close the group to observers at any time, a practice that 
occurs most often in the final stages of negotiations.86 This practice is not limited to the 
UNFCCC, and received criticism during the final negotiations at the Rio Conference.87  
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During the negotiations of the UNFCCC, some states remarked on their exclusion from 
the negotiations. The representative from Malaysia stated that the process had not been 
representative a ‘true spirit of cooperation’ and noted that ‘important and substantive 
elements of the convention had been drafted with selected delegates, without any plenary 
discussion.’88 These issues related to the principles, objectives, and financial mechanisms of 
the convention and may suggest that some states were reluctant to include other states 
whose needs and interests may constrain their own. The marginalisation of some state 
participants may further suggest that these topics were viewed as closely linked to the 
economic and security interests of historically powerful States that were unwilling to include 
smaller states that may challenge the way in which the adopted texts addressed the linkage 
between climate change and other areas of international law. These issues will be examined 
in more detail in Chapter 6 because the justifications for their inclusion may give insight 
into the extent to which basis on which states seek to protect the environment has changed.  
In the post-2001 climate change negotiations, the use of consensus decision-making 
indicates that some states can be marginalised or excluded because of unequal bargaining 
positions.89 This marginalisation is noted in the reports produced by the AWG-LCA and the 
AWG-KP. For example, Decision 1/CMP.1 was adopted despite ‘loud verbal dissent from 
Russia’ with support from Belarus and Ukraine.90 This also occurred in a later meeting 
where Bolivia argued that no consensus had been achieved over the draft ‘Cancun 
Agreements’ because they were not in agreement with the text.91 The agreements were 
pushed through by the presiding officers despite Bolivia’s express disagreement.92 The 
meeting report notes that Bolivia objected to the text because most of the agreements had 
been discussed behind closed doors in ministerial negotiations and there had been no 
opportunity given for discussion or negotiation of the text prior to the decision to adopt it.93  
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This practice is also found in the earlier negotiations of the Berlin Mandate, where it was 
adopted by consensus against the reservations by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, and 
the disagreement by Saudi Arabia.94 These references to the use of consensus and its 
interpretation as ‘consensus minus one’95 can function to marginalise states from the process 
of decision-making. In combination with the references to the exclusion of some states from 
the informal negotiations during the final stages of negotiation, this does not reflect 
characteristics of the inclusivity value. It reveals tensions in the negotiation of 
environmental documents whose content and purpose has a significant effect on the 
economic and security interests of states.96  
NSAs connected with the environment and development issues have also remarked on 
their exclusion from observing the negotiations of the climate change regime in the post-
2001 period.97 They have protested over their exclusion during the final negotiations of 
important documents.98 The few references to the participation by NSAs in the two ad hoc 
Working Groups suggest that where the environmental topic under negotiation is 
particularly sensitive and relates to state interests, the participation by NSAs is less secure.99  
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This insecurity remains a central concern in recent climate change negotiations, where 
NSAs have been excluded or marginalised during discussions concerning economic, 
commercial, and trade implications of proposed measures.100 The analysis indicates that 
states continue to view certain topics, such as the economy, trade, and development as 
closely related to their national interests and security. The connections between the 
environmental area and wider issues of international concern have a profound effect on the 
level of participation enjoyed by NSAs. This indicates that there may be an emerging tension 
between the principles of participation as deployed within sustainable development, 
contrasted with the participation within those environmental areas that have a direct impact 
on the economic and national well-being of states.  
This analysis focused on four environmental regimes whose documents contain 
references to the participation by NSAs. Investigating the extent to which these regimes 
contain references to the participation by NSAs that reflect the inclusivity value has revealed 
two important insights which will inform the subsequent examination of these 
environmental regimes. The analysis suggests that, in general, the participation by NSAs has 
broadened and deepened with the introduction of sustainable development into 
international environmental agreements. Many of the documents relating to sustainable 
development and desertification attempt to ensure the inclusive participation of all citizens 
and particularly by communities traditionally excluded from environmental decision-
making. This approach exemplifies many characteristics of the inclusivity value because 
these documents include explicit references to excluded communities in the preparatory 
process and outcome texts. Therefore, those who have experienced environmental 
degradation may participate in the creation of international, national and local responses to 
these concerns. 
However, the analysis also revealed an emerging tension within some environmental 
regimes between supporting and encouraging the participation by NSAs, and excluding 
them from negotiations concerning topics that have connections to states’ economic and 
security interests. This is particularly notable in the documents from the climate change 
regime, an environmental problem that has a potentially destabilising effect on national 
interests, including international trade, national security, and economic security. These 
documents reveal that states and NSAs may be excluded, particularly where negotiations 
have reached a critical juncture. Such practices suggest that where certain environmental 
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topics directly concern the interests of state, such as economic and development interests, 
some states are less willing to proceed in a way that supports the inclusive participation by 
all sectors of the international community.  
2.2 Structural Pluralism 
My initial findings suggested that the content of documents developed and adopted 
during the Rio Conference and post-Rio period contained more characteristics of structural 
pluralism. This is because the introduction of sustainable development as the dominant 
paradigm shaping IEL emphasises the importance of locally-driven and community-led 
responses to environmental and developmental problems. As noted in section 1, the 
documents from the sustainable development and desertification regimes incorporated 
many characteristics of structural pluralism and the participation by NSAs in the creation, 
content, and implementation of environmental objectives.  
The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 emphasise the participation by NSAs at different 
levels of environmental governance in the creation and implementation of sustainable 
development objectives.101 The chapters concerning specific major groups and 
environmental concerns stress the importance of participation by local populations, 
including marginalised communities, in decision-making at local and national levels.102 
These references encourage states and other international institutions to support the 
participation by communities directly affected by environmental and developmental 
objectives. In doing so, they reflect the arguments put forth by the Brundtland Report that 
the participation by all sectors of society is necessary to achieve sustainable development.103 
In particular, the INCD described participation by NSAs as the ‘fourth objective of 
sustainable development.’104 Building on the inclusivity characteristics contained in the 
documents of the sustainable development and desertification regime, these documents 
support the participation by NSAs at different levels of the preparatory process, including 
local, national, and international negotiations. For example, the reports by the Rio 
Preparatory Committee and the INCD each include references to the participation by local 
NGOs in developing national reports prior to the Rio Conference, and the participation by 
grassroots NSAs as part of the fact-finding and knowledge sharing segment of the INCD.105 
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The content of reports from these two regimes indicate that states increasingly supported 
‘bottom-up’ approaches to participation by NSAs, such as local communities, in the creation 
of international environmental objectives.  
The inclusion of locally-driven and bottom up participatory approaches in the Rio and 
post-Rio documents points to a consolidation of bottom-up and multilevel participatory 
structures articulated through the paradigm of sustainable development.106 The report from 
the first session of the INCD notes the strong consensus for an innovative ‘bottoms-up [sic] 
approach where commitments at national, regional and international levels reinforced local 
action.’107 During the negotiations, state delegates continually referred to grassroots 
organisations, peoples living in marginal lands, and argued that the convention should be 
designed to improve their living conditions.108 This approach built on the principles of 
participation articulated in the earlier Rio Declaration and recognised the importance of 
engaging local communities in developing responses to environmental problems, such as 
desertification, where they also have an impact on their economic development, livelihoods, 
and well-being. This structurally plural approach suggests that states supported the 
participation by NSAs at all levels in developing responses to the interconnected areas of 
desertification and sustainable development. Such an approach recognises that concerns 
surrounding desertification may be experienced by different sectors of society in different 
ways and will have an effect on other areas of their lives, such as economic and development 
opportunities. 
The incorporation of this structurally plural approach reveals that in the post-Rio period, 
states sought to include the interrelated principles of public participation and good 
governance in IEL as a way to support the implementation of these practices at the national 
and local level. By emphasising this approach, lawmakers recognise that poor governance 
and lack of participation may impede the effectiveness of any international response to 
desertification. As noted in the introduction, good governance and participation have been 
expressly associated with attaining stable, peaceful, and resilient societies, as failures in 
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governance have been considered as sources of insecurity.109 Therefore, the presence of such 
references in the Desertification Convention may suggest that states viewed structurally 
plural participatory approaches as part of a wider strategy to strengthen good governance 
and ensure peace. 
The content of the Desertification Convention reinforces the structurally plural approach 
articulated by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. The Preamble to the Convention stresses 
the ‘importance of ensuring the full participation of both men and women at all levels’ to 
combat desertification and mitigate drought.110 As noted earlier, local level participation is 
the central feature of the National Action Programmes.111 These programmes include 
specific references to support the participation by marginalised communities in the creation 
and implementation of national action programmes, and their participation in regional and 
international responses to desertification and drought.112 This structurally plural approach 
reinforces the participation principles contained in the Rio Declaration and may suggest that 
states increasingly viewed public participation at the local, national, and international levels, 
as a cornerstone of good governance and sustainable development.113  
In the post-2001 period, the documents from the sustainable development regime 
reinforce this conclusion as they consistently emphasise the importance of deepening 
participation by NSAs at the local and national levels with the objective of attaining 
sustainable development. During the preparations for the Johannesburg Summit and the 
Rio+20 Conference, the reports notes the active participation by NSAs at the local, national, 
and international levels.114 In this context, the reports refer to the importance of such 
participation for attaining sustainable development, and its related goals of addressing the 
drivers of underdevelopment, such as poverty, poor governance, environmental 
degradation, and poor economic growth.115 
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This connection between local level participation, sustainable development, and drivers 
of insecurity is also found in the outcome texts from the Johannesburg Summit and Rio+20 
Conference. The Johannesburg Declaration, Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, and the 
Rio+20 Outcome Document include many provisions that affirm the need to enhance the 
participation by NSAs, such as NGOs, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders 
in subnational, national, regional and international sustainable development efforts.116 The 
Plan of Implementation calls for governments to promote ‘multi-stakeholder participation 
and encourage partnerships to support the implementation of Agenda 21 at the regional and 
sub-regional levels.’117 It requests states and NSAs to support developing countries to 
improve the ‘capacity of civil society, including youth, to participate, as appropriate, in 
designing, implementing and reviewing sustainable development policies and strategies at 
all levels.’118 The Rio+20 Outcome Document similarly refers to the ‘meaningful 
involvement and active participation of … all major groups… as well as other stakeholders, 
including local communities, volunteer groups and foundations’119 in achieving sustainable 
development. These references indicate an emerging connection between the principles of 
good governance and participation. The Rio+20 Outcome Document recognises the various 
interconnections between the local and the global in an increasingly globalised society.120 
Further, the Outcome Document may also be seen as part of international efforts to address 
concerns over the marginalisation and radicalisation of communities in the global south 
which present a threat to national and international stability.121 
The post-2001 climate change decisions similarly emphasise local participatory 
approaches to developing national adaptation strategies. The Cancún Agreements (2010) 
affirms that adaptation strategies should follow a ‘country-driven, participatory… approach, 
taking into consideration vulnerable groups.’122 This decision also directs countries to 
undertake national strategies and action plans to ensure the ‘full and effective participation 
of relevant stakeholders.’123 It recognises the need to ‘engage a broad range of stakeholders at 
the global, regional, national and local levels.’124 It explicitly identifies the importance of 
supporting capacity building in developing countries by ‘strengthening integrated 
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approaches and the participation of various stakeholders in relevant social, economic and 
environmental policies and actions.’125 Decision 2/CP.17 Outcome of the Work of the 
AWG-LCA (2011) includes more general references the participation by NSAs in the 
development of enhanced action on adaptation and in relation to capacity building.126 These 
statements incorporate key elements of the participatory and governance principles 
articulated in the paradigm of sustainable development. The emphasis of such an approach 
in the climate change regime suggests that states recognise the benefit of good governance 
and local participation to identify, plan, and respond to climate change and its security 
risks.127 
As noted earlier in this chapter, most of the natural resource agreements include very few 
obligations on states to encourage participation by local communities in their texts. This 
lack may suggest that in environmental regimes relating to natural resources that are closely 
associated with economic development and trade, states are more reluctant to incorporate 
the principles of participation and governance articulated in sustainable development and 
supported by an ecofeminist ethic. For example, the 1994 ITTA includes a general reference 
for members to give ‘due regard for the interests of local communities.’128 The later 2006 
ITTA includes more focused references to the importance of collaboration between states 
and other stakeholders in promoting sustainable forest management.129 These two 
generalised references to participation suggest a more ‘top-down’ and state-led approach to 
local community participation. The inclusion of this approach towards participation in the 
timber agreements may suggest that where the environmental topic in question is a 
significant contribution to the economic well-being of states, the latter have been loath to 
include references to the participation by NSAs at any level.  
This analysis suggests that documents from the climate change, desertification, and 
sustainable development regimes incorporate structurally plural participatory practices in 
the creation, content, and implementation of their objectives. The support for the 
participation by different communities thus suggests that for the most part, states and other 
international actors acknowledge the value of the contributions by the multiple 
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communities that make up the local, national and international spheres. By encouraging 
structurally plural participation in the creation, development, and implementation of 
international responses to environmental degradation, these documents suggest that the 
international community recognised the diverse experiences, cultures and historical contexts 
in which common environmental concerns may have significantly different impacts. 
Analysing the extent to which these regimes include references that support locally 
driven and bottom up participatory practices has revealed two important insights that will 
help shape the analysis of these environmental regimes in the two following chapters. First, 
the support for such participatory practices in the climate change regime is notably different 
from the analysis of the same documents through the inclusivity lens. This suggests that 
there has been a consolidation of the sustainable development paradigm in post-Rio and 
post-2001 periods. 
Further, the arguments for supporting such approaches reveal an emerging connection 
between engaging marginalised communities, addressing the drivers of underdevelopment, 
and responding to environmental concerns at the local level. The justifications for ensuring 
local participation indicate that other international concerns are increasingly included in the 
content and objectives of IEL. As discussed in the literature review and earlier in this 
chapter, these connections may suggest that such participation has been encouraged in order 
to respond to potential national and international security risks caused by the 
marginalisation of communities.   
Second, the environmental topic and its connection to the economic interests of a state 
have an impact on the extent to which the content of the documents contain references to 
the structurally plural participation by NSAs. As identified in the timber agreements, these 
documents mainly include top-down participatory provisions and very generalised 
references to the participation by relevant stakeholders. Once again, this suggests that where 
the environmental topic has connections to interests that impact on a state’s well-being, the 
content of these provisions generally includes fewer provisions that reflect ecofeminist 
values of participation. 
2.3 Contextualism 
My findings suggested that many of the pre-2001 documents included references that 
reflected characteristics of contextualism in relation to the participation by marginalised 
communities. As noted in Chapter 4, this value gives significance to the voices from humans 
located in different historical circumstances. In the context of participation, it examines the 
different types of knowledge, experience, and understandings of the environment that 
marginalised communities may contribute to the creation, content and implementation of 
international environmental objectives. This value builds on arguments by ecofeminists who 
state that valuing traditional knowledge and experiences can contribute towards developing 
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responses to environmental problems in a way that takes into account the historical context 
of human/nonhuman interactions. The documents developed after the introduction of 
sustainable development into IEL contain many examples of contextual participation in 
their references to marginalised communities.  
The biodiversity regime contains significant examples of contextualism in their 
references to the participation of indigenous peoples and local communities. During the 
negotiation of the Biodiversity Convention, the reports by the AWG-Biodiversity refer to the 
value of indigenous peoples’ environmental experience and knowledge to biodiversity 
conservation. These reports indicate that states supported the participation by indigenous 
peoples in the implementation of the convention because their unique environmental 
knowledge had value for the sustainable utilisation of biological resources.130 The discussion 
contained in the reports suggests that the support for some types of NSAs, such as 
indigenous peoples and local communities, may be based on the potential value that their 
knowledge can contribute to ensure the sustainable exploitation and management of states’ 
biological resources. This argument, while acknowledging the contribution of different 
knowledge, experiences, and context, indicates that such support is on the basis that it has 
potential economic value.  
However, the negotiations of the Biodiversity Convention also indicate that states and 
state experts understood that conservation efforts would fail without the participation by 
local communities and indigenous people. This recognition suggests that States were 
increasingly aware that the experiences and expertise of local communities is specific to the 
location in which they are placed and as a result, local communities may be the best source 
of knowledge and information about biological conservation. The AWG-Biodiversity 
supported the introduction of participatory approaches for indigenous peoples as the 
experiences, knowledge and traditional uses by indigenous peoples are often ‘consistent with 
conservation goals.’131 The Guatemalan expert argued that in-situ biodiversity conservation 
would be unsuccessful without participation by local communities and the contribution of 
their local knowledge.132 Similarly, the Chilean expert stated that the convention should 
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‘ensure the systematic participation of populations living next to areas of interest.’133 The 
content of the AWG-Biodiversity reports suggest that states were aware of the value of local 
knowledge and participation for successful conservation efforts. In doing so, they reflect 
characteristics of the contextualism value because they recognise the differences between 
locations, communities, and knowledge that is context specific.  
The content of the Biodiversity Convention itself contains characteristics of contextual 
participation in its references to indigenous peoples and local communities. Following from 
the argument outlined by the Guatemalan expert, the convention includes state obligations 
towards ensuring local communities and indigenous peoples’ participation in connection to 
in-situ conservation, sustainable use of biodiversity components, and in the exchange of 
information.134 This approach acknowledges the expertise, knowledge, and experience of the 
environment which such communities hold. For example, Article 8(j) recognises the benefit 
of indigenous and local communities’ participation in in-situ conservation. It requests 
parties to ‘respect, preserve, and maintain’ traditional knowledge, practices and 
innovations.135 This provision incorporates characteristics of contextualism because it 
recognises the traditional knowledge and innovation that is context specific. Similarly, 
Article 10 requests states to protect and ‘encourage customary use of biological resources in 
accordance with traditional cultural practices.’136 These two articles indicate that in some 
natural resource conventions, states supported the participation by NSAs because of their 
local expertise, knowledge and innovations. In doing so, they reflect contextualism and 
incorporate principles of sustainable development by taking into account these interests 
which form the basis of accountability and participation.  
However, the Biodiversity Convention also recognises the value of local knowledge, 
experience and tradition in the successful implementation of sustainable development, and 
the sustainable exploitation of natural resources. This is similar to the content of reports by 
the CRIC who observed that the participation by local communities and indigenous 
populations was ‘critical’ to enable joint planning and information sharing for natural 
resource management processes.137 Not only does this suggest that states took into account 
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the diversity of cultures, ecosystems and structures amongst communities,138 but they also 
recognised such knowledge can make a significant contribution to the development of local 
technology, and to the economic well-being of communities and States.  
The emphasis on the value of local communities’ knowledge and innovation is included 
in the speeches made on behalf of states during the UNGA High-Level Summits. The 
contents of the speeches suggests that states in the post-2001 period increasingly link NSA 
participation as a way to achieve objectives relating to the foremost interests of the 
international community, such as sustainable development, poverty reduction, and 
economic development. For example, the speeches refer to the general importance of NSA 
participation as a way to achieve economic development,139 as a strategy for poverty 
reduction,140 and as a way to counter the ‘ideologues of division of civilisation.’141 These 
statements reflect the dominant considerations of the international community and suggest 
that state support the participation by NSAs to the extent that it will contribute to the 
achievement of these objectives.   
The connections between sustainable development, NSA participation, and poverty 
reduction in these speeches signify the continued belief by the international community that 
liberal values of participation, good governance, and free trade enable the peaceful secure 
coexistence of local communities and states. In doing so, the content of these speeches 
incorporate the emancipatory potential of human security. This is because they connect 
sustainable development, good governance, participation, economic development, and the 
technological potential of communities in order to reduce the the insecurity of peoples and 
of states.142 The emphasis on the value of participation in addressing the drivers of 
underdevelopment (poverty, economic stagnation, poor governance) through the paradigm 
of sustainable development suggests that in the post-2001 period, the justifications such 
participation have been incorporated within wider discussions concerning the role of 
sustainable development in attaining peace and security for individuals and states. 
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 Therefore, the extent to which the content of these documents reflect the contextual 
value is less clear. There are many references that indicate states and international 
institutions supported the participation by NSAs because of their unique knowledge and 
that such knowledge is context specific. In this way, these documents connect the expertise 
of some marginalised communities, notably indigenous peoples and local communities, with 
successful conservation and sustainable management of natural resources. This association 
is particularly evident in the biodiversity regime. However, the content of the speeches made 
on behalf of states at the two UNGA High-Level Summits contain strong similarities to the 
arguments that associate sustainable development, peace and security discussed in the 
literature review. This difference suggests that in some contexts, states supported the 
participation by NSAs to enable their experiences, voices, and knowledge to contribute to 
the creation of international responses to environment and development. However, the 
underlying assumptions and arguments supporting this participation may be increasingly 
informed by liberal assumptions concerning solutions to insecurity based upon the 
principles of good governance, participation, and responding to the drivers of 
underdevelopment through sustainable development objectives.  
2.4 Openness  
Both an ecofeminist ethic and the paradigm of sustainable development emphasise the 
importance of accountability and transparency in the way in which states and other 
international institutions seek to respond to environmental problems. In Chapter 2, I noted 
that the Brundtland Report emphasised the importance of openness and accountability as a 
key procedural element of environmental decision-making. Both the Brundtland Report and 
the later report by the Commission on Global Governance emphasised the valuable 
contribution of NSAs in facilitating accountability and openness by governments, the 
private sector, and other actors involved in sustainable development.143 Earlier in this 
chapter, I suggested that NSAs perform a valuable function in the international sphere by 
supporting good governance, including holding states and institutions to account, and 
enabling an open, transparent, and inclusive environment in which to negotiate 
environmental agreements. Therefore, the negotiations in the different environmental 
regimes may suggest that states have recognised the importance of such practices. Further, 
environmental issues such as sustainable development and desertification may not be 
viewed as a potential security risk, thereby legitimising exceptionalism and exclusion of 
states and NSAs from deliberations.  
The content of the documents relating to environmental areas such as desertification, 
natural resources, and sustainable development reflect a more open participatory approach. 
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This openness is particularly evident in negotiations that occur after the adoption of the Rio 
Declaration and Agenda 21. For example, the content of the reports produced by the INCD 
and the UN Fish Stocks Conference both include references that reflect an open 
participatory approach in which NGOs were able to actively take part in discussions 
concerning the negotiating text and contribute their knowledge and expertise.144 During the 
INCD, NGOs took part in discussions concerning their prospective role in the decision-
making body of the Desertification Convention. This open approach towards NSA 
participation enabled them to perform functions such as accountability, information 
dissemination and monitoring of state delegations – all of which characterise open 
participation.145 This analysis suggests that in the post-Rio period, states supported the 
participation by NSAs and their function in opening up the negotiations to wider civil 
society in some natural resource regimes, as well as in the desertification and sustainable 
development regime.  
The post-2001 period consolidates state support for openness in the area of sustainable 
development. Building on the procedural elements of the participation principle in 
sustainable development, the 2001 Secretary-General’s Report on Major Groups recognised 
the importance of establishing accountable and transparent participatory mechanisms at the 
international level.146 It acknowledged that some initiatives building on Agenda 21 and 
engaging with the private sector were criticised by some NSAs for their lack of 
accountability and transparency. It also recognised the criticisms facing some 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
concerning lack of transparency and engagement with CSOs, had begun to be addressed, 
indicating that these institutions had started to open up consultations with NSAs.147 This 
commentary indicates that the procedural principles of participation in sustainable 
development have been consolidated in the post-2001 period. In particular, the report 
suggests that international institutions such as the United Nations value the role of NSAs to 
hold states and institutions accountable and ensure transparency in their activities.  
The sentiments expressed in this report are reflected in the content of the Johannesburg 
and Rio+20 Conference Preparatory Committee reports. They both record the delegates’ 
support for ‘transparent and inclusive preparatory process that fully engaged civil society 
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and all major groups.’148 The reports note the support by members of the international 
community, such as intergovernmental organisations, international institutions, and some 
UN programmes, for the participation by NSAs and the transparency and accountability 
such participation would offer.149 This support suggests that in the context of attaining 
sustainable development, states encouraged the participation by NSAs and the openness that 
such participation enabled. 
This support for the open and transparent participation by NSAs is reiterated in the 
outcome texts adopted in the fisheries, desertification, and sustainable development regimes. 
Article 36 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement enabled the Secretary-General to invite 
intergovernmental organisations and NGOs to participate as observers in a review 
conference to assess the effectiveness of the Agreement.150 The 10-Year Strategic Plan and 
Framework to Enhance the Implementation of the Desertification Convention emphasised 
the importance of open, transparent and objective institutions to ensure the successful 
implementation of the strategic plan.151 The content of the Rio+20 Conference Outcome 
Document affirmed that the institutional framework for sustainable development should be 
‘inclusive, transparent, and effective’152 and that it should ‘promote transparency and broad 
public participation.’153 The content of the Fish Stock Agreement and soft law documents 
suggest that in specific environmental regimes that relate to the environmental areas of 
natural resources, sustainable development and desertification, states support the 
participation by NSAs to ensure transparency and accountability of implementation of states 
and some NSAs’ objectives. As these documents similarly emphasise the importance of 
sustainable development in their texts, this analysis suggests that there has been a 
consolidation of the principles of participation articulated in those environmental areas.   
However, the preparations and outcome texts developed under the climate change 
regime continue to provide exceptions to the general trend identified in the discussion 
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above. As noted in section 2.1, the climate change regime has undertaken practices that 
exclude NSAs from observing the negotiations, as well as impairing the ability of some 
developing countries to participate.154 This practice has continued in recent negotiations 
where civil society participation has been impaired because of space limitations of the 
conference centre and for security reasons.155 For example, during COP-15, many of the 
meetings occurred behind closed doors and excluded both NSAs and some state 
delegations.156 Space considerations were also used to justify the exclusion of CSOs during 
the negotiations and deliberations of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP.157 One environmental 
activist noted that the chair of these meetings has significant discretion over who could 
attend the negotiating meetings.158 These exclusionary practices serve to marginalise many 
NSAs and impair the accountability and transparency functions that they may provide in the 
international sphere.  
The marginalisation and exclusion of NSAs supports the analysis above that 
environmental areas that are related to the economic productivity, security and well-being of 
states generally include fewer references to support the participation by NSAs in their 
preparatory process and adopted outcome texts. This suggests that in negotiations 
concerning environmental issues that have close ties and significant impact on issues of 
national security, such as economic security, development, trade interests, and development, 
states are more likely to undertake difficult bargaining and negotiation sessions away from 
public scrutiny. This lack of openness and transparency in the area of climate change 
suggests that a tension is emerging between the broader objectives of sustainable 
development, in which the participation by NSAs and the principles of good governance are 
championed as central to achieving individual and state well-being, and the resistance to 
such openness in the negotiations of environmental issues that have a significant impact on 
the national interests and security of states.  
The marginalisation of NSAs in the climate change regime reaffirms what some have 
referred to as the perceived democratic gap in the international sphere, where citizens are 
often unable to bridge the gap between the public (international) sphere and the private 
                                                          
154 Lars H Gulbrandsen and Steinar Andresen, ‘NGO Influence in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: 
Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks’ (2004) 4(4) Global Environ Polit 54, 29. 
155 ‘Doors Wide Shut’ ECO: NGO Newsletter (11 August 2009) 
<http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/Eco2_Bonn-III.pdf> accessed 18 June 2014, 2; Fisher, 'COP-15 in 
Copenhagen', 11; van den Bossche, ‘The Copenhagen Accord - The Way Forward’; ‘The Dream and the Reality 
in Cancun’, 2. ‘This is Our Home Too!’; Visionontv, 'Getting surreally stupid at cop15 as the NGOs are...' (16 
December 2009) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ce3a9crrN88> accessed 19 June 2015, cited in Fisher, 
'COP-15 in Copenhagen', 17.  
156 Mark Lynas, ‘How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the Room’ The Guardian 
(London, 22 December 2009) <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-
change-mark-lynas> accessed 28 July 2014; Radoslav S Dimitrov, ‘Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The 
Copenhagen Conference’ (2010) 27(6) Rev Policy Res 795.  
157 ‘Doors Wide Shut’, 2.  
158 Ibid, 2. 
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(national) sphere.159 For many citizens, meaningful participation in the international sphere 
is beyond their ability without NGOs, especially, who are able to put forward the arguments 
of those who are unable to be represented.160 NGOs, in particular have been described as 
‘effective guardians of the public interest in environmental protection’ vis-à-vis the 
perception of states as ‘preoccupied by national self-interest.’161 Therefore, the exclusion of, 
or limited opportunities for, NSAs to engage in public, democratic discussion concerning 
environmental issues in certain environmental regimes may suggest that some 
environmental regimes are unwilling to address this criticism.  
The analysis undertaken in this section reveals that the extent to which states support 
open participatory practices depends upon the subject matter under discussion, and the 
forum in which the discussion occurs. Environmental subjects, such as desertification, 
fisheries, and those documents concerning sustainable development, integrate both open 
participatory practices in the preparation processes and notable references to transparency, 
openness, and inclusive participatory practices in their adopted texts. This analysis suggests 
that in some contexts, states continue to consolidate the participation by NSAs as integral to 
sustainable development at the different levels of policy development and implementation. 
However, the analysis of the documents from the climate change regime suggests that 
there is tension between the increasingly open participatory practices in those regimes which 
integrate the paradigm of sustainable development, and those participatory practices that 
serve to marginalise and exclude states and NSAs during the climate change negotiations. 
The implications of such exclusion suggest that where negotiations touch on interests 
relating to trade, the economy, development and security, states are less willing to engage in 
participatory practices in which NSAs may seek to hold them accountable, or engage in 
transparent practices. As will be discussed in the following chapter, this creates an 
interesting paradox where states, and some NSAs, support the inclusion of other issues into 
IEL, but this may also mean that those issues are prioritised in the resulting outcome 
documents. 
                                                          
159 Roger A. Coate, Chadwick F. Alger and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ‘The United Nations and Civil Society: Creative 
Partnerships for Sustainable Development’ (1996) 21(1) Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 93, 94; Diane Otto, 
‘Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil 
Society’ (1996) 18 Hum Rts Q 107, 110; Raustiala, 'The "Participatory Revolution"', 539-540; Lang, NGOs, Civil 
Society, and the Public Sphere, 3; see also Charlesworth, 'The Public/Private Distinction'.  
160 Morrow, ‘Perspectives on Environmental Law ', 129. 
161 Jacqueline Peel, ‘Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues for 
Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization’ 
(2001) 12(1) Colo J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y 47, 48; WCED, Our Common Future, Chapter 1 ¶14; Christopher D 
Stone, ‘Defending the Global Commons’ in Philippe Sands (ed), Greening International Law (The New Press 
1994), 39-41.  
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3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the participation by states and NSAs in the creation, content, and 
implementation of IEL. I started by examining who participates as this can reveal the types 
of areas and topics where states support NSA participation and those areas and topics where 
states and NSAs have been marginalised. This process of documentary analysis revealed the 
issues and topics of concern for those who are able to participate. This analysis is the first 
step in understanding the extent to which the securitisation of the environment has altered 
the basis on which states seek to protect the environment. It forms a stepping stone to, and 
informs, the analysis undertaken in the next chapter.  
This chapter found that the integration of the paradigm of sustainable development into 
IEL corresponds with a significant increase in references to the participation by NSAs in the 
creation, content, and implementation of IEL. The extent to which these participatory 
provisions reflect ecofeminist values of inclusivity, structural pluralism, contextualism, and 
openness in their references to participation depends on the environmental area, its 
connection with other issues or state interests, the age of the document, and the forum in 
which the documents were negotiated and adopted. By analysing the preparatory documents 
and adopted outcome texts, it is possible to draw two broad conclusions from these 
variables.  
First, there is a tension emerging between those environmental areas that have built their 
regime on the concept of sustainable development and those environmental areas which are 
closely aligned to the economic and developmental well-being of states. The documents 
from the sustainable development regime, desertification regime and, to a lesser extent, the 
fisheries and biodiversity regimes include references that facilitate the participation by 
NSAs, and especially those from traditionally marginalised communities. The language used 
to refer to the participation by NSAs indicates a widening and deepening of their 
participation as articulated by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. As the biodiversity, 
sustainable development, desertification, and fisheries regimes were consolidated after the 
Rio Conference, the content of these outcome documents emphasises the importance of 
involving local populations and marginalised communities in environmental decision-
making, supporting ‘bottom-up’ participatory mechanisms, and encouraging the 
participation of indigenous peoples and local communities because of their knowledge, 
experience, and expertise of their local environment. These documents also highlight the 
areas in which such participation is encouraged, and these generally relate to issues such as 
poverty reduction, local development, environmental management, and technological 
innovation. These participatory approaches reflect many of the values of the ecofeminist 
ethic and further suggest that states acknowledge the value of such participation in the 
creation, content and implementation of IEL.  
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However, the analysis suggests that where responding to environmental concerns may 
have a detrimental effect on economic, commercial and trade interests, states are less 
supportive of inclusive participatory practices. The use of ‘informal’ working groups, 
‘consensus minus one’ and other negotiating practices meant that some states were 
marginalised or excluded during the negotiations of the UNFCCC and the Cancún 
Agreements. Further, these exclusionary practices serve to marginalise NSAs who have 
criticised their exclusion during the final stages of negotiations of the soft-law COP 
decisions. The analysis suggests that more exclusionary participatory practices occur where 
the discussions concerning climate change relate to economic, commercial, and trade 
implications of the proposed measures. Therefore, the extent to which these documents 
support the participation by NSAs correlates with the degree to which any such measures 
may have an impact on state economic well-being and, in a broad sense, state security.  
Second, the analysis suggests that the justifications for the participation by NSAs in the 
creation, content, and implementation of IEL have altered over the time-period. Whereas 
the documents that incorporated the concept of sustainable development in the Rio and 
post-Rio period supported the participation by NSAs on the basis that it would improve the 
economic and social development of states, the language included in later documents 
suggests that such participation is encouraged as part of the process of preventing conflict 
and insecurity. As discussed above, the later sustainable development documents, and the 
speeches made on behalf of states during the high-level summits, associate NSA 
participation with achieving other goals such as poverty reduction, economic development 
and countering threatening ideologies. Each of these non-environmental considerations 
issues has been identified as a driver of underdevelopment and linked with destabilising 
communities and exacerbating the security risks of states and the international community. 
Thus, the inclusion of such topics and their connection with sustainable development and 
environmental topics may suggest that the international community considers IEL as a tool 
in the fight against underdevelopment and other drivers of insecurity.  
Where negotiations affect economic, development or security interests, some states are 
less willing to engage in inclusive, participatory practices. As sustainable development is an 
integrationist principle, it seeks to balance the different norms, principles and interests 
between different areas of international law. At a more practical level, the concept of 
sustainable development seeks to take into account often-competing interests between 
states, and between states and NSAs in different spheres of international concern. With the 
greater inclusion of other international considerations, such as development, the economy, 
science and technology, and security, it may be that these considerations are so closely 
linked to individual state interests that their integration into IEL has altered the ways in 
which states view the environment, and also their reasons for seeking to protect it. The 
implications of this difference will be examined in the following chapter where I will focus 
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on the non-environmental considerations identified during the examination of the 
participation by NSAs, and the justifications put forward by states and NSAs for their 
inclusion in IEL. 
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6. The Integration of Development, Economic, Scientific, 
Security and Technological Considerations into International 
Environmental Law  
In the last chapter, I examined the participation by NSAs in the creation, content, and 
implementation of IEL. I found that where IEL adopted sustainable development as the 
dominant paradigm, the documents showed significant support for the participation of 
NSAs. I drew two conclusions from this examination of the documents. First, support for 
the participation by NSAs changed when this participation was considered to have an 
impact on state interests, economic well-being, and in a broad sense, its security. Second, the 
justifications used to support the participation by NSAs altered over the time-period. From 
these conclusions, I suggested that the inclusion of non-environmental considerations such 
as development, the economy, trade, and science and technology into IEL affected the way 
in which NSAs were encouraged to participate. Following from this, I suggested non-
environmental considerations have been incorporated into IEL because they can help solve 
the interrelated drivers of poverty, underdevelopment, and environmental degradation 
which have been associated with insecurity and conflict. 
This chapter focuses more on the integration of non-environmental considerations, such 
as the economy, development, science and technology in IEL and the justifications used to 
support their inclusion. This chapter examines the integration of these non-environmental 
considerations because it may identify any shared values, beliefs, and assumptions between 
the arguments supporting environment/security connections in international discourse, and 
those used in arguments supporting the protection of the environment. As these non-
environmental considerations are considered key factors that lead to sustainable 
development, members of the international community believe that promoting sustainable 
development and growth will solve the drivers of insecurity and provide the means to 
address environmental degradation. I suggest that the introduction of sustainable 
development as the dominant paradigm in IEL, with its integration of socio-economic 
development, economic, scientific and technological considerations may have altered the 
basis on which states protect the environment because it prioritises economic growth and 
development. Furthermore, the inclusion of these considerations into IEL may also have 
important implications for the overall perception of the environment by the international 
community, but this is examined in a later chapter.  
Underdevelopment and environment degradation have increasingly been coupled 
together by the international community because they are seen as affecting the security of 
states and the international community as a whole. This interconnected approach was 
consolidated with the introduction of sustainable development by the 1987 Brundtland 
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Report. The report argued that sustainable development could be a solution to national, 
regional and international insecurity. This is because it could respond to the drivers of 
insecurity by supporting the socio-economic development of underdeveloped countries 
through the sustainable exploitation of natural resources.1 This response was explicitly 
integrative. It sought to address environment, social, and development problems in an 
interconnected and mutually supportive way and thus recognised the interconnections 
between different areas of international law, as well as international interests.2  
The concept of sustainable development, introduced by the Brundtland Report, 
recognised that transboundary problems would have to be addressed in a way that took into 
account the different interests of states, and levels of development.3 Therefore, the concept 
of sustainable development, articulated in the 1992 Rio Declaration, incorporates principles 
of differentiation in recognition of the historical differences in the contributions by 
developed and developing countries to global environmental problems.4 In doing so, the 
concept recognises and addresses the respective differences between the economic and 
technical capacity of States to address environmental problems.5 
However, critics of sustainable development argue that certain elements of the concept 
have been prioritised.6 Previously, I suggested that the concept of sustainable development 
contained in the Brundtland Report embodied the outlook of post-Cold War liberal 
internationalism.7 Sustainable development was seen as a solution to the drivers of state and 
human insecurity by supporting economic liberalism, democracy and democratic 
governance, and the sustainable exploitation of natural resources for socio-economic 
development.8 Each of these elements of sustainable development relate to the values and 
practices needed to prevent conflict and maintain peace and security. The assumptions that 
inform this argument have been criticised because it subjects environmental resources to 
‘economisation’ and measures their value against economic and development rationales 
                                                          
1 WCED, Our Common Future, chapter 11.  
2 World Charter for Nature (1982), ¶7; Commission on Sustainable Development, ‘Principles of International 
Law’, ¶13, ¶16-¶18; International Law Association, ILA Declaration of Principles Relating to Sustainable 
Development (New Delhi, 6 April 2002), principle 7; also, McGoldrick, 'Sustainable Development and Human 
Rights'; Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, 140; United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, ¶53 
3 Redclift, 'Oxymoron Comes of Age'; McGoldrick, 'Sustainable Development and Human Rights'; Atapattu, 
'Myth or Reality'. 
4 Rio Declaration 1992, Principle 7; Cordonier Segger and Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law, 133.  
5 Cordonier Segger and Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law, 133. 
6 E.g. Redclift, 'Oxymoron Comes of Age'; McGoldrick, 'Sustainable Development and Human Rights'; Atapattu, 
'Myth or Reality'. 
7 Chapter 2, 49-50. 
8 Begby and Burgess, 'Human Security and Liberal Peace', 92; Leonardsson and Rudd, 'The ‘Local Turn’ in 
Peacebuilding', 827-834. 
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rather than other values.9 Some argue that this prioritisation alters the balance between the 
three components of sustainable development.10 
With these tensions in mind, this chapter turns to examine the content of the 
environmental documents and the extent to which the consolidation of sustainable 
development as the dominant paradigm in IEL, its integration of non-environmental 
considerations, and the justifications for their integration has altered the basis on which the 
international community protects the environment. By identifying which areas have been 
prioritised, and the justifications for such prioritisation through an ecofeminist analytical 
framework, it is possible to reveal the underlying beliefs, values, and assumptions that have 
informed the prioritisation of non-environmental considerations in IEL. In doing so, I can 
examine the extent to which (if at all), the securitisation of the environment (as identified in 
Chapter 2), has altered the basis for protecting the environment.  
1. FINDINGS 
In this chapter, I first identified the different types of non-environmental considerations 
that states proposed should be included in any responses to environmental problems. To do 
this, I drew on the findings from Chapter 5 in which I identified the environmental areas 
and non-environmental considerations where states and NSAs were either included or 
excluded from participating. Once I identified the non-environmental considerations that 
were included in IEL, I examined the assumptions that informed the arguments supporting 
their inclusion into the documents. During this process, I noted similarities between the 
arguments justifying the inclusion of these non-environmental considerations and the 
values that form the interconnecting lenses (inclusivity, structural pluralism, contextualism, 
and openness) through which I analysed the documents. Where the arguments for the 
inclusion of these non-environmental considerations supported an integrated, balanced and 
context dependent inclusion of other international interests, this may suggest that the 
international community recognised that the environment was of equal importance in IEL.11 
I initially read the documents and identified arguments and references to the integration 
of non-environmental considerations and the characteristics within these references that 
reflected ecofeminist values. For example, those documents that reflected the value of 
                                                          
9 ‘Economisation’ implies that ‘economy is an achievement rather than a starting point or a pre-existing reality 
that can simply be revealed and acted upon.’ Koray Çalışkan and Michel Callon, ‘Economization, Part 1: Shifting 
Attention from the Economy Towards Processes of Economization’ (2009) 38(3) Economy and Society 369, 370; 
Valérie Boisvert, ‘Conservation Banking Mechanisms and the Economization of Nature: An Institutional 
Analysis’ (2015) 15 Ecosystem Services 134, 136; Yahya M. Madra and Fikret Adaman, ‘Neoliberal Reason and 
Its Forms: De-Politicisation Through Economisation’ (2014) 46(3) Antipode 691; Michael Rühle, ‘The 
Economization of Security: A Challenge to Transatlantic Cohesion’ (2013) 35(1) American Foreign Policy 
Interests 15; and WCED, Our Common Future, chapter 6 para 1. 
10 McCloskey, 'The Emperor Has No Clothes', 154. 
11 Chapter 2, section 3.3; Agarwal, 'Gender and Environment Debate', 127. 
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inclusivity supported the integration of non-environmental considerations in a way that 
acknowledged the interdependency between issue areas in a non-privileged manner, and 
recognised that human society is interrelated with and integrated into the Earth’s 
ecosystems.12 Those documents that reflected the value of structural pluralism supported 
arguments that took into account that environmental degradation and non-environmental 
considerations affected communities differently and is dependent on cultural and historical 
difference. Arguments that reflected the value of contextualism took into account that 
communities and peoples experience economic, social, environment and security interests 
in socially constructed ways that depended on culture and location. In this way they 
demonstrated a contextual understanding of the interconnections between people, place and 
cultures. Arguments that reflect openness supported the integration of environmental and 
non-environmental considerations in a transparent and open manner that enabled the 
creation and development of principles and values that take into account all experiences. 
My initial findings revealed that the environmental area, age, and forum in which the 
document was created affected the extent to which the justifications for integrating non-
environmental considerations reflected a balanced, contextual, and integrated approach. I 
will outline my findings in the discussion below.  
1.1 High-level integration 
The justifications in the documents for the integration of non-environmental 
considerations did not reflect many of the ecofeminist characteristics. In general, this was 
consistent across the environmental area, age of the document, and forum in which the 
document was adopted. In the discussion below, I identify the regimes in which the 
justifications take into account the differences between states as a reason for integrating 
non-environmental considerations, particularly those relating to economic, development, 
and trade differences.  
1.1.1 Sustainable Development 
Many of the preparatory documents and adopted outcome texts from the sustainable 
development regime reflected the value of structural pluralism in the way that they 
integrated other non-environmental considerations into their texts. The preparatory 
documents and adopted outcome texts from the 1972 Stockholm Conference reflected this 
value as they took into account economic interests and the perceived need for developing 
countries to pursue economic growth and development as a precursor for achieving 
environmental goals. This differentiation was contained in the text of the 1972 Stockholm 
                                                          
12 Lorraine Code, ‘Flourishing’ (1999) 4(1) Ethics and the Environment 63, 63-64; Serenella Iovino, ‘Ecocriticism 
and a Non-Anthropocentric Humanism: Reflections on Local Natures and Global Responsibilities’ in Laurenz 
Volkmann (ed), Local Natures, Global Responsibilities: Ecocritical Perspectives on the new English Literatures 
(Rodopi 2009), 35-37. 
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Declaration and in the 1972 Stockholm Action Plan which differentiated the objectives for 
developed and developing countries depending on the economic level of the country.  
Documents from the 1992 Rio Conference similarly integrated non-environmental 
considerations to account for the differences between developing and developed countries 
and the respective capabilities of each to respond to environmental problems. Unlike the 
earlier Stockholm Conference, the documents from the Rio Conference included more 
references that took into account social considerations, as well as the different user groups in 
relation to the development, social, and economic objectives of sustainable development. 
The Rio Preparatory Committee Reports included provisions that explicitly recognised the 
interconnections between socio-economic considerations, development and the 
environment. This recognition has an effect on the well-being of different social groups and 
on developed and developing countries. In recognition of these differences between social 
groups, and between countries, the documents included references that acknowledged that 
the response of developing countries to environmental problems required greater support 
for social as well as economic development.  
The adopted outcome texts from the Rio Conference reflected the value of structural 
pluralism by taking into account the differences between developed and developing country 
parties and the additional support that developing countries require to respond to 
environmental problems. In this, they followed the Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan 
before them.  
Similarly, the later documents in the sustainable development regime, such as those 
produced during the preparations for the 2002 Johannesburg Summit and the 2012 Rio+20 
Conference take into account the differences between developed and developing countries 
in their justification for the inclusion of non-environmental considerations into the adopted 
outcome texts. These documents, like those from the Rio Conference, specify social, cultural 
and other differences between communities, individuals and states as justifications for the 
inclusion of non-environmental considerations. Hence, it could be argued that the 
sustainable development regime reflects inclusiveness, contextualism, and structural 
pluralism in the arguments supporting the inclusion of non-environmental considerations.  
In spite of examples like those referred to above, my findings in this chapter suggest that 
the justifications for the integration of non-environmental considerations prioritise 
economic growth and trade-related considerations to support development in developing 
countries. The prioritisation of economic considerations has been criticised by ecofeminism 
because it supports a process of ‘maldevelopment’ that is based upon the exploitation of 
natural resources and the dominance of non-western cultures in this process. This is very 
different to my findings in Chapter 5, where the post-2001 sustainable development 
documents included significant references that reflected inclusive, contextual, and open 
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participatory practices. In the present chapter, very few of the sustainable development 
documents published after 2001 contain references that reflect inclusiveness in the 
arguments supporting the inclusion of non-environmental considerations. This is because 
these arguments focus on attaining economic growth, economic development and 
international trade considerations in order to achieve sustainable development objectives. 
This finding will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.  
1.1.2 Desertification  
The preparatory reports from the INCD take into account the socio-economic 
differences between developed and developing countries in the arguments for including 
technological, scientific, and financial support for developing countries. Where the 
documents include additional support for developing countries, this is also based on socio-
economic differences. Furthermore, the provisions included in the 1994 Desertification 
Convention adopted an integrated and interconnected approach towards addressing the 
problems of desertification and drought. The arguments supporting the integration of 
financial, technological, and scientific considerations in the convention were made on the 
basis that without such support developing countries may not be able to implement their 
obligations under the convention.  
These arguments reflect structural pluralism because it recognises the differences 
between states. The INCD documents support the inclusion of non-environmental 
considerations to support developing countries in fulfilling their obligations under the 
desertification regime and to achieve sustainable development. They include proposals to 
adopt a convention framework that takes into account the inequalities between developed 
and developing countries. These proposals argue that including non-environmental 
considerations into the Desertification Convention will help developing countries redress 
these inequalities, with the support of developed countries and other international 
institutions. These arguments take into account the ways in which differences between 
developed and developing countries manifest themselves and affect their ability to respond 
to environmental problems.  
In addition, the documents from the INCD, the CRIC, and the adopted outcome texts 
take a more holistic approach towards including non-environmental considerations. This 
approach reflects elements of inclusiveness because they do not appear to prioritise one type 
of interest over another. I found that the INCD and CRIC reports integrated economic, 
development, technological, and livelihood considerations in a way that acknowledged and 
incorporated a holistic approach. Similarly, the Desertification Convention and the later 
soft-law decisions took into account that environmental and non-environmental issues were 
interconnected and should be addressed in a non-privileged and holistic manner. This 
finding is very different from many of the other environmental regimes which privileged 
economic and development considerations.  
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1.1.3 Climate Change  
The documents of the climate change regime contained one of the most comprehensive 
discussions of differentiation and the importance of integrating such an approach into IEL. 
Therefore, the documents reflected elements of structural pluralism in the arguments 
supporting the inclusion of non-environmental considerations and in their recognition of 
historical, geographical, and other forms of difference between the state parties. For 
example, the documents referred to the historic differences which affected the capabilities 
for some state parties to implement their obligations under the convention. Furthermore, 
the content of the documents produced by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee 
for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC/FCCC), the Ad Hoc Group on the 
Berlin Mandate (AGBM), and the post-2001 Ad Hoc Working Groups included notable 
references to non-environmental considerations, such as development, economic, financial 
and technology differences between developed and developing states, that should be taken 
into account when considering the ways in which states responded to climate change. This 
approach suggested that these non-environmental considerations were included in the 
adopted outcome texts to support developing country parties. By including these broader 
concerns, the documents suggest that states recognised that socio-economic, technological, 
financial, and geographical differences impaired national and international responses to 
climate change.  
The content of the outcome texts from the climate change regime similarly contain 
significant references that take into account difference. As will be discussed below, Article 3 
of the UNFCCC establishes the principle of common, but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities (CBDRRC) as a ‘guiding principle’ of the climate change regime.13 
This principle is further incorporated in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol14 and in some of the later 
COP decisions, such as the 2007 Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan (Bali Action Plan 
(2007))15 and the Cancún Agreements (2010). Notably, these documents also contain 
provisions that emphasise the importance of capacity building and supporting the needs of 
developing country parties in the context of science and technology, access to international 
markets, and in their mitigation activities relating to climate change. I found many of these 
arguments used to support the inclusion of these areas were made with reference to the 
economic and development inequalities and imbalances between developing and developed 
country parties.  
These findings suggest that many of the arguments supporting the inclusion of non-
environmental considerations reflect elements of structural pluralism because they took into 
                                                          
13 UNFCCC 1992, art 3(1). 
14 Kyoto Protocol 1997, art 10. 
15 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.13 'Bali Action Plan' in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth 
session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its thirteenth session (14 March 2008) FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1* (14-15 December 2007). 
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account the cultural, historical, social, economic, technical, and geographical differences 
between states. This recognition is particularly evident in the provisions relating to 
CBDRRC in the climate change and sustainable development regimes, and the arguments 
supporting the provision of financial, technical, and other assistance in order to support 
developing country countries’ implementation of environmental and sustainable 
development objectives. However, as will be examined in Section 2, a significant proportion 
of these provisions emphasise the importance of economic, commercial, and development 
considerations in a way that may suggest these interests have been prioritised in the 
documents.  
1.2 Mid-Level Integration 
My findings revealed that only a few of the environmental areas took into account the 
social, geographical and cultural contexts of states in their arguments to support the 
integration of economic, social development, commercial, technological, scientific, and 
security considerations. Where such awareness was present, I found that the arguments for 
such a contextual approach were made on the basis that traditional and local knowledge can 
be a development opportunity. As will be discussed below, the assumptions that informed 
these arguments share underlying values and beliefs with the security discourse and their 
support for sustainable development as a solution to the drivers of insecurity.  
1.2.1 Sustainable Development 
Documents from the 1992 Rio Conference, 2002 Johannesburg Summit and the 2012 
Rio+20 Conference contain provisions that acknowledge the cultural and traditional uses of 
the environment by different social groups. The documents take into account that these 
kinds of traditional uses of the environment dependent upon location and cultural context. 
The documents also recognise that there are different forms of knowledge, experience, and 
culture in the discussion of interests such as development, and science and technology.  
I found that these references and the arguments for including non-environmental 
considerations emphasised the potential economic, development, and security gains that 
could be made through the exploitation of such knowledge. The documents made the 
connection between the use of traditional knowledge for the sustainable management of 
natural resources, gaining alternative energy sources for energy security, and attaining food 
security. These arguments and connections between traditional knowledge, development 
and security were prevalent in the 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the 2012 
Rio+20 Outcome Document. Each document includes provisions that refer to the 
dissemination of traditional technology, knowledge, and experience. I will examine the 
implications of these justifications in Section 2.  
175 
 
1.2.2 Natural Resources: Biodiversity, Fisheries, Tropical Timber and Freshwater 
Resources 
While the sustainable development and climate change regimes demonstrated high-level 
integration of the structurally plural value, many of the natural resources regimes reflect 
mid-level integration of this value. This is particularly notable in the fisheries regime where 
the preparatory documents and adopted outcome texts recognised the economic and social 
differences between developed and developing countries, and took them into account in the 
obligations contained in the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The agreement refers to 
financial, technological and scientific differences between developed and developing 
countries, and that these will affect the ability for developing countries to undertake their 
obligations under the agreement. Like the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, the agreement 
takes into account the differences between countries and their ability to implement their 
objectives. This differentiation incorporates elements of structural pluralism, albeit to a 
lesser degree than found in the climate change, sustainable development, and desertification 
regime.  
The documents from the AWG-Biodiversity, the Ad Hoc AWG-ABS, the Biodiversity 
Convention, and the 2010 Nagoya Protocol, supported the protection of traditional 
knowledge and use of natural resources by local and indigenous peoples. Once again, the 
arguments supporting this protection were made on the basis that such knowledge could be 
used for the conservation of natural resources and for sustainable development. While these 
provisions reflect elements of contextualism because they take into account that different 
communities and peoples experience environmental degradation in ways that are dependent 
on culture and location, these documents also connect the protection of this knowledge 
because it could be used for economic development. This tension between the protection 
and utilisation of traditional knowledge, and the assumptions that inform these arguments, 
will be examined below and in Chapter 7 as they can give insight into the way in which the 
international community perceives the environment itself.  
1.3 Low-Level Integration 
My analysis of the documents found that there has been a prioritisation of economic, 
development, and trade considerations in these environmental regimes. I found that this 
prioritisation occurred in three interrelated ways. First, the arguments for such prioritisation 
were made on the basis that they were needed to achieve the objectives of the environmental 
regime; second, that these considerations were the precursor to environmental conservation; 
and third, that these areas could be used as a way to incentivise states to protect the 
environment. Where the documents prioritised these considerations, references were made 
to reducing security risks to individuals, communities, and states. This prioritisation 
occurred in most environmental regimes, with the exception of the desertification regime, 
and is most explicit in the documents developed in the UNGA,  
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1.3.1 Ozone Layer 
While the ozone layer regime took into account the differences between the developed 
and developing country parties’ capabilities to reduce emissions of ozone depleting 
substances, the content of the documents indicate that economic and industrial 
considerations have been prioritised. Like the outcome texts from the climate change, 
desertification, and guiding principles of IEL discussed above, the objectives and obligations 
to be undertaken by developing country parties under the 1987 Montreal Protocol are 
qualified by non-environmental considerations, such as economic, technological, and 
scientific support by developed countries. Once again, these references reflect characteristics 
of structural pluralism because they take into account the historical contributions to ozone 
layer degradation, the relative capabilities of states and that different geographic locations 
will be more adversely affected.  
However, I found that the content of the documents produced by the Ad Hoc Working 
Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the Elaboration of a Global Framework 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (AWG-Ozone) and the AWG-CFCs 
focused primarily on economic and trade related considerations and the interrelationship 
between these two areas and the environment. The reports reveal that participants justified 
the integration of these considerations because they believed that economic and industrial 
issues had a bearing on the success of the regime. The documents contain very few 
references that reflect inclusiveness because the content of the reports suggest that economic 
development, and related trade and industry considerations, were prioritised during the 
negotiations.  
Therefore, while the ozone documents suggest a prioritisation of certain non-
environmental considerations, they do recognise the differences between the parties to the 
1985 Ozone Layer Convention and the Montreal Protocol. As will be examined in the 
second part of this chapter, my initial findings indicate that these differences are predicated 
on economic, technological, and trade considerations, and these considerations seem to be 
prioritised in the creation, content, and implementation of IEL.  
1.3.2 Climate Change  
My analysis found that the justifications for integrating non-environmental 
considerations prioritised economic, trade, development, security, and social consideration. 
This does not reflect the inclusiveness value because it maintains separation between human 
(economic activities) and the nonhuman environment, while also prioritising certain forms 
of human activities over others. I found that the early documents in the regime prioritised 
economic and trade considerations and justified this prioritisation in two ways. First, that 
the prioritisation was necessary to achieve the objective of the convention. Second, that the 
prioritisation was necessary so as not to impede the development of developing countries. I 
found that the earlier documents in the climate change regime integrated economic, 
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sustainable development, and trade considerations. This integration is particularly 
noticeable in the preparatory documents from the INC/FCCC and in the negotiations 
undertaken by the AGBM. I found that the justifications for their integration prioritised the 
economic and commercial interests of developing countries, and the potential implications 
that emission reduction activities would have on the sustainable development of developing 
country parties.  
The content of the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol similarly integrated non-
environmental considerations in a way that prioritised those interests. As will be discussed 
below, the UNFCCC’s guiding principles focus overtly on the economic implications of 
emission reductions and maintain that economic growth is the best solution to climate 
change.16 In the Kyoto Protocol, I found two interrelated approaches that reflect the 
prioritisation of economic and development considerations. First, state participants argued 
that states and private actors could be incentivised through economic and commercial 
means to reduce emissions. Related to this, the protocol incorporated market mechanisms as 
a way that enabled parties to commodify the nonhuman environment.17 The content of 
these outcome texts suggests that non-environmental considerations have been prioritised, 
and as will be examined in later in the chapter, the justifications for this prioritisation may 
suggest that the basis for which states protect the environment has altered. 
This prioritisation of non-environmental considerations continued in the post-2001 
climate change documents, where economic and social development, technological, 
scientific, and trade considerations featured prominently in the content of the Ad Hoc 
Working Groups, and in the texts of the COP decisions themselves. Unlike the earlier 
documents, the content of these documents associated development, security, and economic 
considerations more prominently. I found more references to the importance of 
technological innovation for energy and food security, and the importance of sustained 
economic growth in developing countries to ensure that they continue to develop. I will 
examine the implications of these justifications in more detail below.  
1.3.3 Sustainable Development 
While the content of the preparatory documents and outcome texts from the sustainable 
development regime reflected many characteristics of structural pluralism, the documents 
also indicated a prioritisation of economic, scientific, technological, and development 
considerations. As in the climate change regime, the arguments supporting the prioritisation 
of socio-economic considerations are based on two underlying assumptions, first that 
economic growth is necessary to achieve sustainable development, and that its prioritisation 
is necessary so as not to impede the development of developing countries. The latter 
                                                          
16 UNFCCC 1992, art 3.  
17 Kyoto Protocol 1997, art 6, art 12, art 17; see also Yamin and Depledge, The International Climate Change 
Regime, 136-139. 
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argument is reflected prominently in the early sustainable developments, such as the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration and the 1972 Stockholm Action Plan. These documents included 
many references that prioritised economic and development considerations and justified 
such prioritisation on the importance of economic growth for developing countries. As will 
be discussed below, these arguments emphasised the importance of economic growth and 
development for developing countries.  
The more recent documents, such as the preparatory reports for the Johannesburg 
Summit and the Rio+20 Conference similarly integrate economic, trade, sustainable 
development, and technological considerations into their text. However, unlike the earlier 
documents, the justification for the inclusion of these considerations suggest that they are 
being prioritised as solution to the drivers of underdevelopment. The content of the adopted 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the Rio+20 Outcome Document included many 
references for the need for economic and social development, technological development for 
energy security, and scientific innovation for food security. These references to security 
suggest that concerns over human security and the security of states have fed into the 
discussions surrounding environmental degradation and sustainable development. This may 
indicate that the reasons for protecting the environment may have altered over time.  
My findings suggest that the forum in which the document is created has an effect on the 
type of non-environmental considerations that are incorporated into the texts. Like Chapter 
5, I found that documents developed by the UNGA contained fewer references that reflected 
the ecofeminist values of openness, structural pluralism, contextualism, and inclusivity. The 
2000 Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit Outcome both prioritised the 
importance of achieving economic growth and development. Unlike other documents, these 
two resolutions explicitly link achieving sustainable development with security.18 I found 
that the speeches made during the high-level summits of the UNGA emphasised the 
connection between achieving sustainable development and maintaining international peace 
and security.  
This indicates that non-environmental considerations have been included in the 
environmental documents since the start of the time period under examination in this 
thesis. My initial reading has identified that economic, trade, commercial, development, 
financial, scientific, and technological considerations have been common topics of 
discussion during the creation of IEL, and many of these issues have also been incorporated 
into the adopted outcome texts themselves. However, the extent to which the inclusion of 
these considerations and the arguments supporting their inclusion reflect ecofeminist 
characteristics of inclusiveness, structural pluralism, contextualism, and openness depends 
on the environmental area, age of the document, forum in which the document was made, 
                                                          
18 E.g. Millennium Declaration (2000), ¶6; World Summit Outcome (2005), ¶9. 
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and the connection between the issue and state interests. These initial findings share 
similarities with those found in Chapter 5. However, unlike in Chapter 5, where the 
inclusion of the paradigm of sustainable development corresponded with an increase in 
references supporting the participation by NSAs, in this chapter, it appears that the 
introduction of sustainable development has meant a prioritisation of those areas closely 
aligned to state or international interests. Therefore, the following discussion will unpack 
these findings and discuss them with reference to the literature introduced in Chapter 2.  
Building on these findings, the remainder of this chapter analyses the arguments 
supporting the introduction of sustainable development as the dominant paradigm in IEL, 
and the prioritisation of the development and economic aspects of this concept in the 
resulting environmental agreements. This is because examining the justifications and 
arguments given by states for the prioritisation of economic and development 
considerations in environmental agreements can reveal any underlying connections between 
the environment, development, and security which may be present in the documents. 
Analysing these arguments through the ecofeminist lenses, can reveal the underlying 
assumptions, values, and beliefs that have informed the reasons for which states seek to 
protect the environment and therefore the extent to which the environment/security 
connections may have altered the basis on which the international community seeks to 
protect the environment.  
2. ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS USING AN ECOFEMINIST LENS  
My findings and the literature discussion in Chapter 2, suggest that states and NSAs have 
accepted that there are interconnections between the environment, development, economic, 
and social considerations, and this has been succinctly incorporated into the concept of 
sustainable development.19 However the analysis indicates that very few of the arguments 
used to support the incorporation of non-environmental considerations have engaged with 
the underlying beliefs, assumptions, and values informing them. This uncritical approach 
may indicate that dominant concerns, such as the economy, peace, and security, and their 
growing connections with the environment and development, has altered the reasons for 
which states protect the environment. This in turn may affect the ways in which states 
perceive the environment. It may further suggest that the association between environment, 
development, and security that has emerged in the post-Cold War period has altered basis 
on which the environment is protected. The following discussion will examine this further. 
2.1 Inclusivity  
Reading the environmental documents through the ecofeminist analytical framework 
revealed that very few of them contained provisions that exhibited non-privileged, non-
                                                          
19 Chapter 2, 50. 
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hierarchical, integration of non-environmental considerations.20 As noted in Section 1, a 
theme that surfaced from my analysis is the emerging prioritisation of specific non-
environmental considerations, such as those relating to economic, trade, and developing 
concerns. The justifications for the prioritisation of these interests reveal underlying beliefs, 
values and assumptions, which inform reasoning as to why these interests have been 
integrated into environmental documents. Identifying these assumptions may reveal 
changes in the ways in which states perceive the environment and will guide the analysis in 
Chapter 7. 
The reports by the Rio Preparatory Committee suggest that states explicitly recognised 
the interconnections between environmental problems, economic, social, and scientific 
interests. UNGA Resolution 44/228 (1990) convening the Rio Conference states the 
objectives of the Conference were to identify ways in which environmental concerns could 
be incorporated in the ‘economic and social development process’21 while taking into 
account the specific needs of developing countries. These links were stated in Decision 1/25 
by the Preparatory Committee which identified the connection between environmental 
problems, poor economic growth, poverty, trade, and social conditions.22  
This recognition of the need to address these considerations in an interrelated and 
integrated manner reflects the principle of integration and forms one of the substantive 
elements of sustainable development.23 Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration embodies this 
approach and states that ‘in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental 
protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it.’24 This principle constitutes one of the core elements of 
sustainable development and informed the development of later environmental 
agreements.25 The content of this principle initially suggests that the international 
community took into account the need to respond to environmental and developmental 
problems in a holistic manner. 
                                                          
20 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 100. 
21 UNGA Resolution 44/228 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (22 December 1989) 
UN Doc A/RES/44/228, ¶15(c); further, ¶15(h), ¶15(f), ¶15(j) and ¶14.  
22 UNCED, Decision 1/25 'Environment and Development' in Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UN GAOR 45th Session, Supplement No 46) 
(1991) UN Doc A/45/46 Annex I (31 August 1990), ¶a(i), ¶a(iii), ¶1a(vi) and ¶1a(viii.)  
23 WCED, Our Common Future, 5; Sumudu A. Atapattu, Emerging Principles of International Environmental Law 
(Transnational Publishers 2006), 129; above, Chapter 5, 133-137, and Chapter 2, 50. 
24 Rio Declaration 1992, Principle 4; see also Stockholm Declaration 1972, Principle 13.  
25 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, ¶140; In the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway 
(Belgium v Netherlands)  (Aribtral Award) (2005) XXVII RIAA 35 , ¶58-¶59; Atapattu, Emerging Principles, 129; 
Marie-Claire Segger Cordonier, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law’ in Hans Christian Bugge and 
Christina Voigt (eds), Sustainable Development in National and International Law: What did the Brundtland 
Report do to Legal Thinking and Legal Development, and Where can We go from Here? (Europa Law Pub. 2008), 
174-175. 
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This integrated and holistic approach can be found in the reports produced by the INCD. 
These reports recognised that problems relating to desertification were interrelated with 
socio-economic considerations. As noted previously, this approach suggests that the 
participants in the INCD took into account the interrelated nature of environment and 
socio-economic considerations in a way that did not privilege or prioritise one such 
consideration. This inclusive and integrationist approach is similar to that found in Chapter 
5, where state participants supported the contributions and participation by NSAs in the 
creation, content, and implementation of the convention. For example, participants 
attending the INCD proposed that programmes responding to desertification should ‘adopt 
an integrated approach encompassing all the measures to combat desertification including 
socio-economic aspects.’26 They also referred to the different ways in which the integration 
of non-environmental considerations may affect local communities.27 The recognition of the 
interrelationship between humanity and non-human nature reflects a more holistic and 
integrationist approach towards responding to the issue of desertification. It indicates that 
the participants during these conferences recognised the interrelationship between the 
environment and wider international interests in the context of desertification.  
This integrationist approach is reaffirmed in the Desertification Convention. Article 10 
takes into account the connection between desertification, drought, development, and socio-
economic considerations and requires affected states to integrate national policies for 
sustainable development with long-term strategies to combat desertification.28 This is a 
more holistic response to environmental problems and is further supported by other 
provisions in the convention that requests parties to take into account the way in which any 
such measures affect local communities and marginalised social groups.29 These references 
to the integration of non-environmental considerations suggest that the international 
community recognised that the inclusion of development, scientific, and technological 
considerations into measures to respond to desertification and drought may 
disproportionately affect some social groups. Such a holistic approach is very different from 
the other environmental regimes developed during the same period and later.  
While the Rio Declaration supported an integrationist approach towards environment 
and development in the paradigm of sustainable development, my findings suggest that the 
Rio Conference outcome texts also prioritise economic and development considerations. 
This prioritisation suggests that the assumptions informing international responses to 
                                                          
26 Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Desertification Convention. 2nd Session 
(1993), (Appendix III) Pt 1 (Attachment), 27; Decision 2/1 (1993) Mandates for the Working Group, preamble 
¶1. 
27 E.g. Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the Desertification Convention. 2nd Session 
(1993), 24-25. 
28 Desertification Convention 1994, art 10(2)(a); see also art 4-6 which outline the different obligations for 
developed and developing countries, as well as general obligations.  
29 Ibid, preamble, art 3(a); and art 5(c) - (d). 
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insecurity during the post-Cold War period were increasingly influential in the creation, 
content, and implementation of IEL. Chapter 2 noted there was widespread support for 
economic liberalisation and socio-economic development as pathways to support the peace 
and security of the international community.30 In this context, they promoted the view that 
economic development was a precursor to environmental conservation, and that natural 
resource exploitation could be used as a source of economic development, in turn increasing 
the prosperity of communities and thereby decreasing incidences of conflict.31 Elements of 
these views are contained in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, which incorporate 
damaging assumptions concerning the relationship between environmental problems and 
the economy. Principle 12 affirms that states should ‘cooperate to promote a supportive and 
open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable 
development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental 
degradation.’32 Not only does the association between economic growth and environmental 
protection reveal a set of beliefs and assumptions that prioritise institutions and structures 
that subordinate and exploit the natural world, they also suggest that some of the 
assumptions informing the securitisation of the environment are present in the basic 
documents of sustainable development.33 
These assumptions are also present in Agenda 21. Chapter 2 of Agenda 21 incorporates 
the argument that economic growth and development is a precursor to environmental 
conservation.34 This argument reflects assumptions that economic liberalisation, open trade, 
and the integration of developing countries into the international economic system is 
integral to achieving security as it addresses the drivers of underdevelopment and insecurity 
in developing countries. For example, Chapter 2 of Agenda 21 sets out the relationship 
between trade, the economy, and environmental protection. It states that ‘environment and 
trade policies should be mutually supportive,’35 and calls for improved market access for 
developing countries' exports that would have a ‘positive environmental impact.’36 These 
justifications are made on the basis that trade liberalisation and other economic measures 
make possible a ‘more efficient allocation and use of resources and thereby contributes to an 
                                                          
30 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 227; UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding  (2009) 8. 
31 WCED, Our Common Future, 14-10, 37-41, 57-60, 157-158; there significant research surrounding the 
relationship between natural resource exploitation and development. See the following for different perspectives. 
Report of the Secretary General, The Causes of Conflict (1998) (1998); Humphreys, 'Natural Resources, Conflict'; 
Lujala, 'Spoils of Nature'; De Koning, 'Controlling Conflict Resources'; Global Witness, Lessons UNlearned; 
UNEP, Sierra Leone  (2010); UNEP, ‘Good Governance’; Atta-Asamoah, 'Besides Greed and Grievance'; Bavinck, 
Pellegrini and Mostert, Conflicts over Natural Resources. 
32 Rio Declaration 1992, Principle 12; see also Principle 6 and Principle 3.  
33 E.g. Stephanie Lahar, ‘Roots: Rejoining Natural and Social History’ in Greta Claire Gaard (ed), Ecofeminism: 
Women, Animals, Nature (Temple University Press 1993), 99; Mellor, Feminism & Ecology, 26-29, 173. 
34 Agenda 21 1992, Chapter 2.  
35 Ibid, Chapter 2 ¶19.  
36 Ibid, Chapter 2 ¶5. 
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increase in production and incomes and to lessening demands on the environment.’37 These 
statements reveal a belief that attaining sustained economic growth will address 
underdevelopment and enable developing countries to achieve environmental conservation. 
In doing so, it maintains the dominant social paradigm in which the environment is seen as 
an object and utility for economic well-being,38 rather than recognising the interrelated 
nature of human/nonhuman nature as part of a fragile ecological relationship.39 The 
justifications reflected in these references reflect the similar assumptions that informed the 
securitisation of the environment, namely that the environment is a commodity that can be 
used for economic development and thereby support the maintenance of peace and 
security.40   
The content of the post-2001 sustainable development outcome documents also contains 
explicit references that prioritise economic and development considerations. In doing so, 
they maintain the view of the environment as subordinate to economic and development 
considerations. The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development 
(Johannesburg Declaration),41 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the 2005 
World Summit Outcome refer to the environment as the ‘natural resource base’ for 
development.42 This language is repeated in the Rio+20 Outcome Document, which states 
that ‘managing the natural resource base of economic and social development are the 
overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for, sustainable development.’43 While 
these documents reaffirm the integration of environment and development considerations, 
they frame the environment as a subordinate consideration by referring to it as the ‘base’ for 
economic and sustainable development. These more explicit references to the environment 
as a ‘resource’ indicate that states viewed the environment as a commodity or utility in the 
process of economic and social development.  
This prioritisation of economic and social development similarly reflects the assumptions 
put forward in the security discourse that support the use of natural resources for social and 
economic development and in conflict prevention strategies.44 This explicit prioritisation in 
the post-2001 sustainable development outcome texts may indicate a consolidation of more 
implicit assumptions surrounding the connection between sustainable development and 
international peace and security. As discussed in Chapter 2, states have increasingly referred 
                                                          
37 Ibid, Chapter 2 ¶19; see also Chapter 8, ¶27 and ¶34. 
38 Devall, 'The Deep Ecology Movement', 126; see also Braidotti and others, Women, the Environment, 133; Annie 
Rochette, ‘Transcending the Conquest of Nature and Women: A Feminist Perspective on International 
Environmental Law’ in Doris Buss and Ambreena S Manji (eds), International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches 
(Hart 2005), 228.  
39 See the criticisms in Chapter 3, 91-97; see also Chapter 4, 112-114.  
40 See above, Chapter 2, 61-75. 
41 Johannesburg Declaration (2002). 
42 Ibid, ¶11; Plan of Implementation 2002, ¶2; World Summit Outcome (2005) ¶48. 
43 Rio+20 Outcome Document (2012) ¶4.  
44 See Chapter 2, 62-66. 
184 
 
to natural resources as a resource of peace and security by supporting the sustainable 
development of post-conflict states.45 This connection was explicitly made in the UNSC in 
resolutions concerning the use of natural resources in supporting post-conflict 
reconstruction and the maintenance of peace in unstable regions.46 Therefore, the 
prioritisation of socio-economic development and the references to natural resources as the 
‘base’ for this development contained in the post-2001 sustainable development documents 
may suggest that assumptions which inform the environment/security connections have 
been increasingly incorporated within IEL documents. 
Another way in which the documents indicate that economic and development 
considerations have been prioritised is by arguing that economic growth and development is 
a precursor to the conservation of the environment. This argument is found in the climate 
change regime where states affirmed that economic growth, as well as social and economic 
development, remains the overriding priorities of developing countries. The Berlin Mandate 
(1995), stated that that the process for negotiating emission reductions by Annex I Parties 
should be guided by the ‘legitimate needs of the developing countries for the achievement of 
sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty, recognising also that all parties 
have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development.’47 These references to 
economic and development considerations indicate that the states continued to prioritise 
such considerations as a precursor to responding to environmental problems. This is 
reaffirmed by the Berlin Mandate which stated that the share of global emissions originating 
in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.48 Once again, 
the content of the climate change documents reaffirms the dominant social paradigm which 
assumes that economic growth is the measure of progress and the first and foremost 
requirement for responding to environmental degradation.  
                                                          
45 See Chapter 2, 63 fn 181.Government of Sweden, 'Preventing violent conflict - A Swedish Action Plan', 16, 24; 
Solana, 'European Security Strategy', 2; European External Action Service, 'Providing Security in a Changing 
World', 5; Government of Canada, 'Canada First Defence Strategy', ‘unequal access to resources and uneven 
economic distribution are proving to be increasing sources of regional tension even as existing low-intensity or 
frozen conflicts in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans remain largely unresolved.’; Government 
of Sweden, 'Aid Policy Framework', 37; Council of the European Union, 'Main aspects and basic choices of the 
CFSP', 159-160. 
46 E.g. UNSC Res 1509 (2003), ¶3(r); UNSC Resolution 1625 Conflict Prevention in Africa (14 September 2005) 
UN Doc S/RES/1625 (2005), ¶6;  Presidential Statement 22 (25 June 2007); UNSC Res 1925 (2010), ¶12(r); UNSC 
Resolution 2021 (2011); United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Somali Natural 
Resources and Waters (25 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/661; UNSC Presidential Statement 4 (15 April 2013); 
UNSC Res 2128 (2013), preamble (5)-(6), ¶12; UNSC Verbatim Record (19 June 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6982 
(Resumption 1), 3, and 5; ‘Letter dated 6 June 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ (6 June 2013) 
UN Doc S/2013/334, Annex; UNSC Res 2198 (2015), preamble (14) – (15), ¶20-26, ¶29. 
47 Decision 1/CP.1 The Berlin Mandate (7 April 1995), ¶1(c); see also ¶2(a).  
48 Ibid, ¶1(d). 
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Similarly, the post-2001 COP decisions supported the liberalisation of the international 
economic system on the basis that this would lead to economic growth and development of 
all parties to the UNFCCC.49 Not only does this reflect one of the cornerstones of the post-
Cold War liberal international order, but it also reveals a continued assumption that 
economic growth is a precursor for responding to environmental problems that has 
informed the development of IEL since the Rio Conference and the introduction of 
sustainable development.50  
An extension of this argument can be found in the increasing economisation of the 
environment in the sustainable development, climate change, and in some natural resources 
regimes. Economisation implies that the ‘economy is an achievement rather than a starting 
point or a pre-existing reality that can simply be revealed and acted upon.’51 This approach 
is revealed in the introduction of the green economy concept in the aftermath of the 2007 
global economic crises.52 The concept proposes to maintain sustained economic growth by 
creating an economy that supports sustainable economic growth, environmental protection, 
and social equity through the marketisation and commoditisation of nonhuman nature 
while simultaneously reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.53 These areas 
suggest that the international community continued to view economic and social 
development as a precursor to attaining environmental protection.  
One way in which the green economy seeks to maintain economic growth is through the 
commodification of the environment. For example, the reports by the Rio+20 Preparatory 
Committee propose that a ‘green economy’ can create new opportunities for through 
promoting efficiency in natural resource usage.54 Reports by the CRIC suggest that it could 
create necessary revenue to achieve sustainable development goals and environmental 
protection.55 Both regimes propose that the revenues from the sale of ‘ecosystem services’ 
could be a source of income for sustainable development and conservation within the green 
                                                          
49 Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan (14-15 December 2007), preamble ¶2; Cancún Agreements (2010) (10-11 
December 2010), Pt II(E), preamble ¶3, ¶90. 
50 Cancún Agreements (2010) (10-11 December 2010), Pt III(E) preamble ¶3 and preamble ¶6, ¶6, ¶90. 
51 Çalışkan and Callon, 'Economization', 370. 
52 Morrow, 'Re-orienting Sustainable Development', 283; Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality, 1. 
53 UNEP Economic and Trade Branch, Green Economy (2010)  (2010), 5; Report of the Preparatory Committee 
for the UNCSD. 1st Session (2010), Annex ¶6; Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UNCSD. 2nd 
Session (2011), ¶38, ¶40; Rio+20 Outcome Document (2012) ¶3, ¶11; and OECD, Towards Green Growth: 
Monitoring Progress: OECD indicators (OECD Publishing 2011); The World Bank Group, Inclusive Green 
Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development (Washington DC: World Bank, 2012); OECD, A Toolkit of 
Policy Options to Support Inclusive Green Growth (Revised version (July 2013) of the original submission to the 
G20 Development Working Group by the AfDB, the OECD, the UN and the World Bank, 2013). 
54 Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UNCSD. 1st Session (2010), ¶54; Rio+20 Outcome Document 
(2012) ¶56, ¶58(d), ¶60, ¶62. 
55 UNCCD CRIC, 'Report of the Committee for the Review of the Implementation of the Convention on its Fifth 
Session' (Buenos Aires 12-21 March 2007) (24 April 2007) ICCD/CRIC(5)/11*, Annex I ¶60.  
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economy.56 The commodification of the environment will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter 7, as the assumptions, beliefs and values that inform the arguments for such an 
approach can give significant insight into the perception of the environment contained in 
these documents.  
The above discussion suggests that the post-2001 climate change and sustainable 
development documents have consistently prioritised the economic and social elements of 
sustainable development. They have justified such prioritisation on the basis that socio-
economic development is a precursor for environmental protection. In doing so, they reveal 
a continued affirmation of the dominant social paradigm whereby economic growth is seen 
as the primary measure of well-being. However, the analysis also reveals implicit 
assumptions and linkages with broader discourses in which sustainable development is a 
precursor to, and solution for, international peace and security. This is evident in the 
references to the importance of economic growth, social development, and the sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources in order to reduce poverty, land degradation, and other 
drivers of underdevelopment. As noted in Chapter 2, such problems are seen to be the 
causes of conflict and regional instability.57 Therefore, the integration and prioritisation of 
economic and development considerations and the references to the environment as the 
‘resource base’ for such development suggests that the environment/security connections 
have altered the basis for which states seek to protect the environment.  
Furthermore, my analysis of the climate change documents suggests that the approaches 
used to protect the environment prioritise the economic and commercial benefits of such 
conservation. The analysis of these documents suggest that the participants assumed that the 
only way to incentivise states and relevant NSAs to reduce carbon emissions was through 
economic means. I found that the justifications used to incorporate market and trade 
measures as mechanisms to reduce carbon emissions prioritised the economic and 
commercial co-benefits of such approaches for both developed and developing countries 
parties. This approach towards implementing environmental objectives has been 
consolidated in IEL from the Rio period onwards,58 and suggests that the neoliberal ideology 
                                                          
56 Ibid, Annex I ¶34. 
57 Chapter 2, 63, 72.  
58 E.g. Tropical Timber Agreement 1994, art 1(f), art 27(1); Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (28 July 1994) UN Doc 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
187 
 
that has shaped the evolution of the sustainable development concept, and the 
environment/security connections has also informed international responses to 
environmental degradation. It is revealed in the arguments which emphasise the potential of 
commoditising the environment as a mechanism to protect the environment.59  
In the climate change and sustainable development regimes, this approach has been 
supported by dominant states, such as the United States, and indicates a growing 
commoditisation of the environment. The justifications for the commoditising the processes 
by which states protect the environment may suggest that the basis for which they seek to 
protect the environment have altered in line with the emerging environment/security 
connections and the underlying assumption that economic development and the 
commodification of natural resources can respond to the drivers of insecurity. 
For example, the justifications for integrating commercial and economic considerations 
in the climate change regime highlight the potential of economic mechanisms to encourage 
parties to reduce emissions.60 Submissions to the AGBM emphasise the role of the market to 
‘incentivise’ Annex I Parties to reduce their emissions through trading greenhouse gases.61 
The arguments for including a ‘tradable CO2 entitlement programme’62 were made on the 
basis that it would provide a ‘least cost solution’63 to global warming and become ‘effective 
mechanisms for transferring resources to developing countries.’64 These arguments reflect 
an ideological shift towards privatising, deregulating, and replacing state-led emission 
reduction programmes with those which are market-oriented and support sustained 
economic growth.65 Not only do they prioritise the continued economic growth predicated 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks' (New York, 24-28 May 2010) (27 July 2010) UN Doc 
A/CONF.210/2010/7, ¶107. 
59 See above, Chapter 2, 58-60, and generally, Harry Cleaver, ‘Nature, Neoliberalism and Sustainable 
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Communities’ (2005) 37(2) Antipode 324; Emmanuel Kumi, Albert A. Arhin and Thomas Yeboah, ‘Can Post-
2015 Sustainable Development Goals Survive Neoliberalism? A Critical Examination of the Sustainable 
Development-Neoliberalism Nexus in Developing Countries’ (2014) 16(3) Environment, Development and 
Sustainability 539. 
60 UNFCCC AGBM, 'Report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate on the Work of its Fourth Session, 
Geneva 11-16 July 1996'  (7 October 1996) FCCC/ABGM/1996/8, Annex I(I), ¶3. 
61 UNFCCC AGBM, 'Framework Compilation of Proposals from Parties for the Elements of a Protocol or 
another Legal Instrument, Addendum, Note by the Chairman' (27 February 1997) FCCC/AGBM/1997/2/Add.1, 
¶28.1 (New Zealand). 
62 UNFCCC AGBM, 'Annotated Compilation of Information Relevant to the Berlin Mandate Process. Note by 
the Secretariat' (26 October 1995) FCCC/AGBM/1995/5, ¶10; see also UNFCCC AGBM, 'Review of Relevant 
Conventions and other Legal Instruments. Note by the Secretariat' (21 May 1996) FCCC/AGBM/1996/6, ¶24. 
63 UNFCCC AGBM, Annotated Compilation of Information (26 October 1995) FCCC/AGBM/1995/5 (26 
October 1995), ¶10. 
64 Ibid, ¶14. 
65 M Shamsul Haque, ‘The Fate of Sustainable Development Under Neo-Liberal Regimes in Developing 
Countries’ (1999) 20(2) Int Polit Sci Rev 197, 199-200 
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on industrialisation and consumption, they frame the global commons as a commodity – 
something that will be examined in more detail in Chapter 7.66 
These assumptions are also included in the Kyoto Protocol and in the introduction of 
emission trading schemes. The protocol established a system where parties’ excess ‘assigned 
amount units’ of carbon may be sold to countries who are over their targets on a ‘carbon 
market’.67 It also includes other market mechanisms whereby ‘removal units’68 (referring to 
land use, land-use change and forestry), ‘emission reduction units’69 (created by joint 
implementation projects) and ‘certified emission reduction’70 (created from clean 
development mechanism projects) may be transferred in the ‘carbon market’.71 These 
articles reflect a realignment of environmental protection as a potential market and 
economic opportunity, particularly for developed country parties. Therefore, it economises 
the protection of the environment and in doing so prioritises the potential economic gains 
that could be made from such activities.  
This approach has been consolidated in the post-2001 period. The reports by the AWG-
LCA and AWG-KP, and their associated outcome texts indicate a continued support for the 
use of market measures to promote emissions reduction and climate adaptation.72 For 
example, the content of the Cancún Agreements (2010) highlights continued support for the 
use of market measures to promote emissions reduction and climate adaptation. The 
decision asks parties to consider establishing of ‘one or more market-based mechanisms to 
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72 UNFCCC AWG-KP, 'Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, held at Bonn from 17-25 May 2006'  (18 July 2006) 
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Submissions from Parties' (3 March 2008) FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1, 8 (Bangladesh); UNFCCC AWG-KP, 
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enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation activities.’73 The 2011 Decision 
2/CP.17 Outcome of the Work of the AWG-LCA further affirms that ‘appropriate market-
based approaches’ could be used to support ‘the results-based actions by developing country 
parties’74 in the context of achieving emission reductions through reforestation [REDD].75 
These justifications for the integration of economic and development considerations 
contained in these documents prioritise the economic co-benefits resulting from the 
commodification of the environment. These arguments indicated that the economic 
considerations of any activities have been the focus of much of the discussion and centre in 
most arguments concerning emission reductions.76 In doing so, these documents suggest 
that participants, who were predominately state actors,77 believed that such an exploitative 
approach is the best. This prioritisation is interesting, as NSAs were generally excluded from 
participating in the negotiations for these Agreements. Building on the conclusions set out 
in Chapter 5, this analysis suggests that where the environmental regime is closely associated 
to states’ economic interests, those interests are prioritised. 
However, in some regimes, the prioritisation of trade, economic, and commercial 
considerations have been challenged by states and NSA participants. In the biodiversity 
regime, states and NSAs have criticised the way in which trade, commercial interests, and 
intellectual property considerations were integrated into the Cartagena Protocol.78 They 
argued that the way in which these interests have been included into the biodiversity regime 
functions to exclude, and marginalise the interests of less powerful states, and groups within 
society and they particularly criticised the draft Cartagena Protocol as being more ‘slanted 
towards trade than towards biosafety.’79 These criticisms were reiterated after the subsequent 
adoption of the Cartagena Protocol where one representative suggested that the ‘philosophy 
of the protocol was to protect international trade.’80 Similar criticisms were included in the 
reports by the AWG-ABS where states questioned the relationship between private property 
regime established by the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
                                                          
73 Cancún Agreements (2010) (10-11 December 2010), ¶80; Decision 1/CP.13 Bali Action Plan (14-15 December 
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77 See above, Chapter 5, 142-143. 
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Rights (TRIPs)81 and its potential to undermine the access and benefit-sharing provisions of 
the Biodiversity Convention.82 Others challenged the relationship between the WTO, TRIPs 
and the Biodiversity Convention, arguing that it was increasingly recognised that intellectual 
property rights ran counter to the interests of biodiversity.83 These criticisms highlight the 
impact of the emerging connections between different areas of international law and suggest 
that trade and other commercial interests have been prioritised. These criticisms suggest 
that some states have queried the way in which dominant interests have been included in 
international responses to environmental problems.  
The above discussion focused on the integration and prioritisation of predominately 
economic and commercial considerations into the content of IEL. I suggested that the 
arguments for their integration highlighted implicit connections between the environment 
and security. This is because the arguments that were used to support the inclusion and 
prioritisation of these considerations shared the same assumptions that informed the 
arguments supporting sustainable development as a solution for insecurity. These 
assumptions included the belief that economic growth, socio-economic development, and 
the sustainable exploitation of natural resources were the precursor for solving 
environmental problems. These assumptions have been criticised because they are based 
upon industrialisation, consumerism, and overexploitation.84 In this context, they reaffirm 
the dominant social paradigm in which ‘wellbeing’ and ‘security’ are predominately viewed 
in economic terms. As noted in Chapter 2, many of the solutions to the perceived causes of 
insecurity were predicated on responding to the drivers of underdevelopment, such as 
sluggish growth, and poor social and economic development.85 These documents indicate 
that similar assumptions have been incorporated into the justifications for including these 
non-environmental considerations into the content of IEL. Therefore, the prioritisation of 
such economic and development considerations may suggest that the basis for which the 
international community seeks to protect the environment has altered.  
Furthermore, where the documents explicitly integrate security considerations, they 
prioritise the importance of using IEL to attain sustainable development and ensure the 
well-being of individuals. Once again, these references are contained in documents 
produced in forums where the participation by NSAs is significantly lower. For example, 
both developed and developing states made the connection between achieving sustainable 
development and international peace and security during the two high-level Summits of the 
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UNGA.86 They included references that built on the assumption that economic and social 
security, based in sustainable development ‘are the basic building blocks of peace and 
security for all peoples … [because they] allow us to address all the great issues – poverty, 
climate, environment and political stability as parts to a whole.’87 During the summits, the 
representative of Kiribati stated that ‘development, in particular sustainable development, is 
fundamental to the achievement of international peace and security.’88 Similarly, the 
presidents of both Rwanda and of Tajikistan identified a ‘clear and positive reaffirmation of 
the link between security and development.’89 The King of Spain stated that sustainable 
development, peace and security, and respect for human rights represented ‘three 
interdependent, indivisible and fundamental pillars.’90 These associations were made by 
other states during the summits.91  
These references to the incorporation of sustainable development into considerations of 
peace and security, reflect the growing conceptual linkage between underdevelopment and 
insecurity92 The content of these speeches indicates that during these plenary meetings of 
the UNGA, states exhibited a broader understanding of security in which addressing the 
drivers of underdevelopment and achieving sustainable development, is central for all 
countries, and particularly developing countries.  
Furthermore, the speeches made on behalf of states during these summits suggest that 
states justified protecting the environment in order to protect the resource base for future 
development. The speeches contain references to ‘our’ environment and the importance of 
preserving the ‘planet’s riches’ for future development.93 Others note the destabilising effect 
that environmental degradation may have on the ability of states to develop because of the 
negative effects on human health, natural resource productivity and economic 
development.94 These justifications are reiterated in the content of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome which states that the protection and management of the ‘the natural resource base 
of economic and social development are overarching objectives of and essential 
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requirements for sustainable development.’95 The justifications for environmental protection 
contained in this UNGA resolution reaffirm that the economic benefits derived from natural 
resources are one of the important considerations for the protection of the environment. As 
the document explicitly includes sustainable development in peace and security concerns, 
and refers to the environment in this context, this reflects an assumption of the environment 
as a utility or commodity.  
Similar assumptions underlie the references to energy security in the climate change and 
sustainable development documents. The negotiations in the AWG-LCA associate energy 
security with supporting sustained economic growth and achieving sustainable 
development. The work program for the AWG-LCA stated that the Working Group must 
take into account energy security to support ‘pro-poor economic growth and production 
targets’ for Least Developed Countries (LDCs).96 Submissions by state parties similarly 
emphasised the necessity of ensuring energy security as a means to meet sustainable 
development objectives for SIDs and LDCs.97 These references to energy security in the 
sustainable development and climate change documents may indicate a continued and over-
riding prioritisation of sustained economic growth and development as the main priority for 
developed and developing countries alike.98  
The justifications for integrating food security considerations into the post-2001 
documents also indicate a continued prioritisation of socio-economic development in the 
climate change, biodiversity, and sustainable development regimes. The content of these 
documents emphasise the importance of increasing the productivity of the land and 
reducing land degradation and desertification which threaten food security and sustainable 
development.99 These will also be examined in Chapter 7 because they prioritise utility of 
natural resources for human consumption and suggests that the underlying values, beliefs 
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and assumptions that inform the content of the IEL documents have been informed by 
anthropocentric perceptions of the environment.100  
In addition, the focus on productivity and food security may also reveal the influence 
that liberalism has had on the development of sustainable development and its connection 
with international peace and security. In Chapters 2 and 3, I suggested that critics of 
sustainable development challenged the assumption that it was possible to increase 
consumption and production sustainably while also privatising and commoditising public 
goods, such as water, pasture land, and other sources of food.101 They argued that it 
contained an inherent paradox because it supported market liberalisation, free trade, and 
capitalism as mechanisms to increase the economic development of developing countries – 
each of which is reliant on exploitation, production, and consumption, which critics argue 
makes the concept inherently unsustainable.102  
In the IEL documents analysed in this chapter, I found that the justifications for 
integrating food security considerations into the documents reflected ‘neo-Malthusian’ 
assumptions that emphasised production and role of scientific and technological 
developments to support such production as the solution for feeding nine billion people by 
2050.103 These justifications indicate an emerging privatisation of food production, as well as 
a continued commitment to technological responses to environmental problems. These 
issues will be examined in more detail in Chapter 7. For the meantime, it is possible to 
suggest that these references to food security and the justifications for integrating these 
considerations into IEL documents indicate that the basis for which states seek to protect the 
environment are closely interconnected with concerns surrounding conflict over food, 
poverty, and hunger that the international community argue can be resolved through 
remedies such as trade liberalisation, increased production, and privatisation.104 
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The above analysis indicates that many of the IEL regimes examined in this thesis have 
integrated non-environmental considerations into the content of their documents. It found 
that the justifications for this integration and the results of the integration have consistently 
prioritised economic, trade, and development considerations over environmental ones, with 
the exception of the desertification regime. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the 
assumptions that informed the connections between sustainable development, the 
environment and international peace and security have also informed the arguments 
supporting the prioritisation of these considerations in the environmental documents.  
These assumptions were particularly evident in the content of the climate change and 
sustainable development documents which referred to economic and trade considerations in 
three interrelated ways. First and second, these documents prioritised economic, trade, and 
development considerations on the basis that economic growth and well-being needed to 
achieve the objectives of the environmental regime and were a precursor for responding to 
environmental problems. Third, they argued that using market forces, such as trading 
schemes and in effect, commoditising the global commons would both incentivise states to 
protect the environment while also contributing to the economic development of such 
countries. These three arguments indicate that the assumptions informing the 
environment/security discourse which portray the environment as a commodity or utility is 
reflected in the arguments supporting the integration and prioritisation of economic, 
development and trade considerations in IEL.105  
2.2 Structural Pluralism 
The arguments supporting the inclusion of non-environmental considerations also take 
into account the differences in capabilities between states. This recognition and the support 
for including such considerations to assist developing country parties to undertake their 
obligations reflects structural pluralism. In particular, the concept of sustainable 
development incorporates this recognition within the principle of CBDRRC. This principle 
was introduced in the Rio Declaration and reaffirmed in the climate change regime.106 It has 
subsequently made differentiation one of the central features of the international 
communities’ response to environmental degradation and has guided the inclusion of other 
non-environmental considerations so as to support developing countries. In the following 
discussion, I will examine the justifications for including these areas to facilitate and support 
the mitigation and adaptation activities of developing states in the IEL documents.  
In Section 1, I found that states justified the integration of non-environmental 
considerations into IEL documents on the basis of the differentiated capabilities and specific 
circumstances of members of the international community. The pre-Rio documents 
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included provisions that recognised the differences and the need to include technological, 
financial, and scientific support in order for developing states to participate. For example, 
the preparatory reports for the Stockholm Conference acknowledged the differences 
between States due to national structures, stages of development and socio-cultural systems 
that may affect and alter the ability of states to address environmental degradation and 
conservation.107 The Stockholm Declaration noted that in the context of environmental 
protection, the international community should consider the ‘systems of values prevailing in 
each country, and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for the most 
advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the 
developing countries.’108 These statements indicate that some states recognised that 
responses to environmental degradation required a differentiated approach that took into 
account the differences in social and economic development.  
Similarly, the documents from the ozone layer regime indicated that states took into 
account the special situation of developing countries. For example, participants attending a 
meeting of the AWG-Ozone agreed that that account should be taken of the special situation 
of developing countries and their obligations under the convention should be undertaken in 
accordance with their capabilities.109 The participants attending the AWG-CFC noted that 
there was general consensus among states as to a requirement to give special consideration 
to the needs of developing counties.110 These reports suggest that the participants in these 
two working groups recognised the social and economic disparities between states which 
may affect their ability to implement the objectives of the regime.  
This recognition is explicitly stated in the content of the Montreal Protocol. The 
preamble acknowledges that ‘special provision is required to meet the needs of developing 
countries for these substances.’111 This special consideration is reflected in the different 
treatment of developing states in the protocol itself. Article 5 of the protocol delays 
compliance for developing states, while Article 10 includes additional provisions for 
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technology transfer and financial assistance to developing states.112 These reference tie 
developing country obligations to the provision of technology transfer, financial support, 
and capacity–building. These non-environmental considerations were integrated into the 
Montreal Protocol because the international community increasingly recognised that social, 
political, and economic disparities between its members should be taken into account in 
responses to the problems of the shared environment.  
This practice continues after the Rio Conference. The content of the Rio documents 
supports the inclusion of technological, financial and other considerations in order to take 
into account the special needs of developing countries and to support them in fulfilling their 
obligations. Both the Biodiversity Convention and the Rio Declaration refer to the ‘special 
situation and needs of developing countries.’113 This phrase was repeated in later 
environmental agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and Desertification Convention.  
In each of these documents, developing state obligations were tied to the provision of 
technology transfer and financial assistance by developed states.114 This repeats the approach 
undertaken in the ozone layer regime, which encouraged parties to ‘facilitate access to 
environmentally safe alternative substances and technology’ by making funds available for 
developing countries to gain access to these technologies.115 Further, the parties amended 
the protocol and established a multilateral fund to support developing countries to meet 
their obligations.116 These provisions have been seen as a turning point in international 
environmental law and policy.117 However, during the negotiations of this multilateral fund, 
parties, such as the United States emphasised that the fund decision was ‘without prejudice 
to any future arrangements that may be developed with respect to other environmental 
issues.’118 This resistance suggests that some powerful parties viewed CBDRRC as an 
opportunity for developing countries to ‘extract the maximum possible transfer of wealth, 
without regard to the economics of the situation, as a precondition for accepting a share of 
responsibility in protecting the global environment.’119 This resistance highlights the 
different perceptions of the notion of ‘differentiation’ and the role of technological and 
financial transfer mechanisms.  
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There is widespread recognition of the disparities and differences between states because 
of socio-economic inequalities.120 However, the technology transfer and funding 
mechanisms in the environmental regimes remain controversial with very little being put 
into them.121 This disparity the recognition of difference between states, and the need to 
support developing countries in order for them to participate in environmental regimes and 
fulfil their obligations indicates that CBDRRC remains contentious.122 This is because 
developed and developing countries hold very different understandings of the principle. 
Developing countries view it as a ‘burden-sharing provision anchored in the historic, moral, 
and legal “responsibility to pay”…’123 whereas developed countries see it as a ‘pragmatic 
problem-solving formula based on a relative “ability to pay.”’124 Therefore, the integration 
socio-economic considerations reflect characteristics of structural pluralism by 
acknowledging the need to support those members in attaining environmental objectives. 
Nevertheless, the contentious nature of the attendant financial and technology transfer 
reveals the continuing tensions inherent in the principle because of the different perceptions 
and understandings of the CBDR principle itself.125   
As noted in Chapter 2, the principle of CBDRRC sought to integrate the principle of 
equity in states’ collective responses to environmental problems.126 This principle may be 
seen as the manifestation of structural pluralism because it recognises the diverse starting 
points of states, while also acknowledging shared concerns over the common environment. 
Environmental agreements adopted during the Rio Conference and afterwards include the 
principle of CBDRRC as a central feature because it introduces conditionality for developing 
countries obligations. The inclusion of conditionality recognises that the extent to which 
developing country parties will be able to implement their commitments, depends on the 
effective implementation by developed country parties of their commitments relating to 
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financial resources and the transfer of technology.127 Not only does this principle recognise 
the interconnections between different areas of international concern, it also recognises that 
these interconnections affect states differently. 
For example, the UNFCCC requires developed country parties to provide new and 
additional financial resources, including the transfer of technology required by developing 
country parties to meet the costs of implementing their commitments.128 The Biodiversity 
Convention states that the extent to which developing country parties will be able to 
implement their commitments is dependent on the ‘effective implementation by developed 
country Parties of their commitments under this convention related to financial resources 
and transfer of technology.’129 Therefore, it requests parties to provide or facilitate access to 
and transfer of technology to developing countries, and promote technical and scientific 
cooperation.130 Each of these link non-environmental issues to the ability of states to 
undertake their obligations.  
The post-Rio documents continue to integrate CBDRRC in their guiding principles and 
link developing states’ obligations with provisions of support by developed states. In the 
context of technology transfer and capacity-building, provisions from the desertification 
regime include a novel response which reflects structural pluralism. Once again, this regime 
is the exception to the norm and it is worthwhile to note that it was also the regime that 
supported the inclusive participation by NSAs in the creation of the convention 
document.131 The INCD reports contain references to the development of technology and 
emphasise that such development should occur through joint efforts between developed and 
developing countries.132 They justify this approach as a way to support locally driven 
responses that take into account differentiations between States and the needs of local 
communities.133 These arguments reflect the approach towards participation that was 
discussed in Chapter 5 and indicates that the participants in the creation of the 
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Desertification Convention took into account the importance of locally driven, bottom up, 
responses to environmental problems.  
Other post-Rio documents justified the integration of non-environmental considerations 
on the basis of difference between states. The documents produced during the UN 
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks recognised that scientific, technological, and financial 
considerations would have to be integrated into the adopted agreement in order for 
developing states successfully to implement the objectives.134 In the adopted Fish Stocks 
Agreement, Article 25 takes into account differences between developed and developing 
states by providing a general obligation to take into account the special requirements of 
developing countries.135 It therefore requires states to extend technical and financial 
assistance to developing states to allow them to participate in the exploitation, conservation 
and management of fisheries.136  
The Kyoto Protocol similarly integrates technological and financial considerations to 
support the needs of developing countries in responding to climate change. Article 10 calls 
for Annex I Parties to cooperate with developing countries for the ‘effective transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies.’137 Article 11 requests developed country parties to 
provide new and additional financial resources to meet the costs incurred by developing 
country parties.138 These references indicate that states recognised that international 
responses to global environmental problems required taking into account of differentiations 
between states through the inclusion of other international interests in IEL so that they may 
achieve the objectives of the environmental agreement.139  
Furthermore, the climate change includes some limited recognition of the historic 
responsibilities for climate change.140 During the negotiations of the UNFCCC, UNGA 
Resolution 44/202 (1989) recognised the historic differences between states’ contributions to 
climate change. It noted that the largest part of current emissions originates in developed 
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countries and therefore they have the main responsibility for combating such pollution.141 
As in the negotiations for Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, developing countries wanted 
developed states to take legal responsibility for historic carbon emissions.142 This was 
contested by developed countries, and Article 3(1) makes no reference to the historic 
contributions to climate change.143 Instead, Article 3(1) incorporates the principle of equity 
and requires the parties to ‘take in account all relevant considerations in the setting of 
responsibilities, in particular the needs and circumstances of developing countries.’144 It 
states that parties ‘should protect the climate system … on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.’145 It also informs the differences between commitments made by state 
parties.146 This approach to differentiation means that there are more defined commitments 
for developed country parties and ties developing country parties’ obligations to the 
provision of financial and technical assistance.147 These provisions indicate that states 
integrated non-environmental considerations because they recognised the historic, 
economic, technological, and scientific differences between states, which would make it 
difficult for developing country parties to implement their obligations under the convention.  
This recognition is further expressed in the Berlin Mandate (1995), which stated that the 
process for reviewing the adequacy of the commitments contained in the UNFCCC should 
be guided by CBDRRC.148 The reports of the AGBM – tasked to implement the Berlin 
Mandate – note that state delegations shared a ‘general consensus’ on the need to achieve 
equitable burden-sharing to tackle climate change through the principle of CBDRRC.149 
Similarly, proposals submitted by parties to the AGBM emphasised that any future 
implementation of the UNFCCC commitments should occur based on CBDRRC.150 
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However, there was significant debate over how to differentiate between parties in order to 
ensure equity and take into account the varying national circumstances, developmental 
stages, and economic context between Annex I Parties, and non-Annex I Parties.151 These 
discussions suggest that the principle of CBDRRC in the context of the climate change 
remained a contested feature, particularly with the economic growth undertaken by some 
developing states.  
However, the principle of CBDRRC has been increasingly challenged in the post-2001 
period. The submissions by state parties to the AWG-KP emphasised the need for 
developing countries to become more engaged in mitigating climate change activities.152 
Canada noted that the ‘new realities’ concerning developing countries’ emissions could not 
be ignored.153 Similarly, the European Union stated that consideration ‘should also be given 
to ways of effectively involving major energy-consuming countries, including those among 
the emerging and developing countries.’154 Other state parties emphasised the historic 
responsibility for climate change by developed states.155 In their submissions, they sought to 
ensure that the historical responsibility and ecological debt of developed country parties was 
taken into account to ensure the ‘fair allocation of the global atmospheric space to all 
parties.’156 These submissions indicate that the debates concerning how CBDRRC should be 
integrated into the climate change regime contained in the post-2001 period, and highlight 
the tension in the debate as they concern areas closely related to national interests. 
These debates also occurred in the AWG-LCA and suggest that there is growing distance 
between those parties who consider that climate change mitigation activities should be based 
upon CBDRRC and historical responsibility, and those who argue that the principle does 
not take into account the current realities. The submissions by China and Bolivia argued 
that the principles for contribution by different groups of countries to long-term cooperative 
action should take into account the historical responsibility of developed countries.157 Other 
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parties proposed that differentiation requires reconsideration based upon the changing 
social and economic situation in the world.158 These differences were evidenced in relation 
to the contribution by different country groups to the achievement of long-term goals.159 
They also express broader criticisms of CBDRRC held by some states. The United States, a 
long-standing critic of CBDRRC, sought to bracket references to it in other forums, 
including the Johannesburg Summit.160 This analysis suggests that while the negotiations 
reflected a commitment to the principle of CBDRRC as a base for long-term cooperative 
action in climate change mitigation, in the AWG-LCA work stream there remains tension 
between members of the international community over CBDRRC as currently 
conceptualised. Once again, these tensions relate to those areas which are closely associated 
with national security and national interests, and signify developed county parties’ 
reluctance to cede their powerful position in the international community. 
This tension is reflected in the few references to the principle in the later climate change 
decisions. The Outcome of the Work of the AWG-LCA (2011) contains a single reference to 
the CBDRRC principle in the context of integrating market mechanisms to promote 
mitigation activities.161 The Cancún Agreements (2010) refer to CBDRRC in relation to the 
shared vision for long-term cooperative action.162 These decisions consistently stress the 
support for developing states in relation to technology transfer, access to assistance and to 
finance.163 However, the criticism over the historical responsibility as a differentiator for 
commitments and the omission of this approach in the Advancing the Durban Platform 
Stream, indicates that the climate change regime is evolving and that the principle of 
CBDRRC may be increasingly contested.164 
Furthermore, the introduction of ‘nationally appropriate mitigation activities’ in the Bali 
Action Plan (2007) demonstrates a shift in the way that differentiation is conceptualised in 
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the climate change regime.165 It introduced the possibility that developing countries may 
undertake mitigation activities. This signifies a move towards a more nuanced 
understanding of differentiation.166 This is significant because the Bali Action Plan called for 
action on climate change by all UNFCCC parties, and indicated a move away from the 
Annex I/non-Annex I party dichotomy incorporated in the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol.167 Instead, it referred to ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries in the context of 
CBDR and called for mitigation commitments by the former and mitigation actions by the 
latter.168 The plan also qualified such actions by developing countries by stating that these 
must be ‘in the context of sustainable development’ as well as ‘supported and enabled by 
technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable 
manner.’169 Therefore, the evolution of the concept requires both developed and developing 
states to undertake mitigation activities, while also acknowledging the continuing barriers 
for developing countries in achieving mitigation activities and the overriding priorities of 
poverty eradication and socio-economic development for developing countries.170  
These arguments indicate that discussions surrounding CBDRRC have increasingly 
focused on the economic implications of differentiation. The arguments surrounding the 
concept suggest that developed states are unwilling to cede their energy and economic 
security by supporting those developing countries who they view as economically capable of 
mitigating their carbon emissions. Once again, the focus of the debate centred on non-
environmental considerations, and suggests that in these environmental documents, 
economic considerations remain a priority, for both rapidly developing country parties and 
developed country parties. This prioritisation may suggest that the increasing concern that 
climate change may affect the economic and energy security of states. Therefore, the 
tensions in these documents may suggest that the basis for which, and how states protect the 
environment has altered. 
The above discussion has mainly concentrated on the integration of the CBDRRC 
principle into the climate change regime and the related arguments used to include non-
environmental considerations in order to support developing countries implement their 
obligations. In Section 1, I found that many of the references to CBDRRC and 
differentiation reflected structural pluralism because it suggested that states have recognised 
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that differences in ability, circumstances and needs affect the extent to which members may 
be able to pursue the common goal of environmental protection. The analysis undertaken in 
this section suggests that historical, socio-economic, geographical and (to some extent) 
political differences between states have been taken into account when identifying their 
capabilities to implement their environmental obligations under IEL. I found that the 
arguments supporting the integration of technological, scientific, and financial 
considerations into these documents expressly linked state obligations with the provision of 
additional support from developed countries. The Desertification Convention is notable for 
this conditionality because it also takes into account the local conditions where such 
technology may be used and emphasises the cooperative nature of technology transfer, and 
scientific capacity building between developed and developing countries. Therefore, these 
documents indicate that the integration of such non-environmental considerations has been 
made in order to support the capabilities of some states to achieve the common goal of 
environmental protection.  
However, the analysis also suggests that the principle of CBDRRC is becoming 
increasingly contested and the rapid economic development of some developing state parties 
has caused other parties to challenge the relevance of the concept in the post-2001 period. 
The content of the post-2001 climate change documents indicates that much of the focus 
during the negotiations of the COP decisions centred on the economic implications of the 
concept and that some developed country parties resented the imposition of tighter controls 
while other developing countries were free to emit more. The analysis of the post-2001 
climate change documents suggests that later negotiations surrounding the CBDRRC 
principle overwhelmingly focused on economic differentiation and the relative economic 
strengths of developing and developed country parties. The focus of the negotiations on 
these issues suggests that while the parties recognised the value of differentiation, it has 
increasingly been qualified in terms of economic capabilities. These tensions, and the 
reluctance to include the principle in the adopted outcome texts, may suggest that other 
interests, such as economic, trade and development, are affecting the extent to which states 
respond to environmental concerns in a differentiated way.171 The analysis of the documents 
indicates that these interests are at the forefront of any discussion concerning differentiation 
in commitments. This suggests that economic, development and financial considerations 
have been prioritised during the negotiations of state responses in relation to shared 
environmental concerns, such as climate change.    
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2.3 Contextualism 
In Section 1, I suggested that documents from the post-Rio period onwards indicate that 
the preference for trade and economic liberalisation has universalised a model of 
development that does not necessarily take into account the different contexts in which 
communities interact with the environment. From my findings, I propose that there are two 
important critiques of the ways in which the inclusion of non-environmental considerations 
take into account the different contexts in which local communities and other marginalised 
social groups interact with the environment. First, the arguments that support the inclusion 
of these other areas into environmental agreements are based on a universalising model of 
development that presents environmental protection as an opportunity for development 
through technological, scientific and commercial innovation.172 Second, the arguments 
supporting the protection of traditional knowledge, technology, and know-how justify this 
protection on the basis that it can support the economic development and environmental 
protection of the local environment. This justification appears to appropriate indigenous 
peoples and local communities’ knowledge for the purpose of economic development. These 
arguments share similar assumptions with the arguments supporting sustainable 
development as a solution to insecurity and conflict by facilitating the economic and social 
development of local communities in conflict-prone regions.  
Ecofeminists argue that the dominant development approach taken by states, the United 
Nations, international financial institutions, and other members of the international 
community was influenced by the description of a new ‘development age’ put forward by 
President Truman in his 1949 inaugural address. This conceptualisation of development 
sought to support those peoples who are victims of disease and starvation, lead a primitive 
economic life, and whose poverty is a ‘handicap and threat both to them and to more 
prosperous areas.’173 Therefore, development should ‘help free the peoples of the world, 
through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for 
housing.’174 In doing so, development could attain ‘peace, plenty, and freedom’175 through 
international cooperation with other states to increase the industrial and economic activity 
of poor and underdeveloped states.  
Development ecofeminists criticised this conceptualisation of development because it 
incorporates a dualism whereby those who are underdeveloped are poor, sick, non-
consumers, and a security risk, whereas those who are ‘developed’ are rich, healthy, 
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consumers, and peaceful.176 Critics of this conceptualisation argue that development has 
become synonymous with political, economic and social change in the countries of Africa, 
Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the South Pacific.177 In this context, 
‘underdevelopment’ emerges as the antithesis of development and denotes those societies 
who were made to look beyond their own culture to achieve salvation as they lack the 
autonomous capacity to mobilise or control socio-economic formation for economic 
growth. Therefore, ‘underdevelopment’ can refer to the insufficient or inadequate levels of 
development resulting from the under-utilisation or exploitation of countries’ human and 
material resources. As understood, underdevelopment frames societies who have not been 
integrated into the capitalist world economy in terms of their economic and technological 
backwardness.  
Elements of these assumptions are inherent in the arguments that support including 
non-environmental considerations into the environmental regimes because they reflect a 
universalising model of development predicated on economic growth and the sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources. These assumptions are found in the preparatory 
documents for the Rio Conference. UNGA Resolution 42/186 (1987), UNGA Resolution 
44/228 (1989), and the Rio Preparatory Committee Decision 1/25 (1990) associate the 
continued improvement of the world's environmental situation with sustained economic 
growth, technological development, and the improvement of social and economic 
conditions.178 Similarly, the Rio Preparatory Committee reports note that participants 
supported the role of technology and economic growth in responses to environmental 
degradation.179 The prominence of these references reveals a singular understanding of 
‘development’ that is defined by economic growth and environmental sustainability is 
predicated on technological innovation and economic development.180 
Critics of development state that ‘working in development inevitably positions us within 
a ‘development discourse’, where the north’s superiority over the south is taken for granted, 
and western-style development is the norm.’181 Development ecofeminists critique the 
interconnected concepts of ‘maldevelopment’ and ‘underdevelopment’ and argue that 
inherent in this approach is an assumption that western ways of life are superior to the 
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‘backward’ and subsistence ways of non-western societies.182 They criticise the associations 
between development, technology, and economic growth inherent in the concept of 
sustainable development. They argue that the continued support for technoscientific 
solutions to shared global problems retains part of the conceptual framework informing 
ideologies and economies of domination that rest on the exploitation of nonhuman nature 
through rationalist science and the continued commodification of the environment.183 These 
criticisms will be taken up in Chapter 7 because they also point to the universalisation of a 
western perception of the environment as a commodity or utility for economic benefit, 
rather than recognising that different communities and cultures view and experience their 
environment differently. 
The content of the documents from the biodiversity regime similarly contain references 
that universalise a development model based on the exploitation of natural resources. The 
documents produced by the AWG-Biodiversity consistently promote the importance of 
biodiversity as an economic good for developing countries’ development.184 The working 
group stated that any new instrument must protect the interests of the states in which 
biological resources are located, and provide incentives for the conservation, without 
inhibiting economic growth or sustainable development.185 These references exhibit a 
universalisation of a dominant, western, model of development in which nonhuman nature 
is viewed as a commodity or utility.186 The proposals suggest that such debates were 
informed by the assumption that the primary value of biodiversity is its economic potential, 
which communities need to be incentivised to protect rather than exploit.187  
The prominence of these arguments and the way in which they include non-
environmental considerations in protecting the environment reflect similar assumptions 
that link environment/security in post-Cold War liberal peace discourse. This is because 
they suggest that the participants in these working groups assumed that the primary value of 
natural resources is its economic value, and that if communities were not incentivised 
economically, they would not conserve it. These assumptions are similar to those that were 
presented by scholars examining environment/security connections who argued that the 
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economic value of natural resources is a source of conflict.188 As noted in Chapter 2, these 
arguments had significant influence on states in the post-Cold War period.189 Therefore, the 
prominence of these references in the documents by these working groups signifies a 
universalisation of the assumptions that have informed the dominant development model 
which views the environment as a commodity and therefore states and communities require 
monetary ‘incentives’ to protect. 
The documents also revealed a second approach towards including non-environmental 
considerations that recognised the cultural and traditional uses of natural resources by 
women, indigenous people, and local communities.190 These groups were identified in 
Chapter 5, as the sustainable development and biodiversity regimes supported their 
participation in the creation of environmental objectives and the implementation of the 
objectives surrounding sustainable development and biodiversity.191 In this context, the 
documents suggest that states recognised that the objectives may have an impact on the 
traditional and cultural practices of these groups. The AWG-Biodiversity noted that 
indigenous peoples and local communities were ‘users and custodians of biological richness’ 
and therefore, their knowledge and rights should be respected.192 Decisions in the later Rio 
Preparatory Committee noted that programmes promoting sustainable livelihoods of 
indigenous peoples should ‘address the dimensions of cultural identity preservation’193 and 
take into account indigenous peoples and local communities’ interaction with the 
environment.194 These references recognise that communities have different lived 
experiences which affect the way in which they interact and utilise the local environment. 
These references requested states to take into account these differences in the way in which 
they integrate non-environmental and environmental considerations in national policies 
concerning biodiversity and sustainable development. 
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The later INCD reports include similar references that recognise the ways in which local 
communities utilise the environment. They indicate that participants in the INCD also 
identified local communities as ‘users and custodians’195 of nonhuman nature and that their 
knowledge and rights should be respected. They proposed that the development, 
implementation and follow-up concerning the Desertification Convention should involve all 
the actors concerned, including local communities, women, non-governmental 
organizations, youth, and the private and public sectors. They further supported the 
protection of cultural and traditional uses of natural resources where it contributed to the 
sustainable use of such resources or environmental conservation.196 These references 
identify the different ways in which traditionally marginalised groups interact and utilise 
their environment, and the integration of non-environmental considerations is explicitly 
connected to the needs and values of the local community. Therefore, they indicate that 
states seek to take into account the different social, cultural, and geographical context in 
which environment and development responses would take place.  
However, the arguments used to protect these traditional practices justify the protection 
on the basis that they can contribute to sustainable development. These arguments frame 
such knowledge as a potential commodity and relate it to sustainable development 
objectives for developing countries. The AWG-Biodiversity reports refer to the need to 
protect indigenous peoples and local communities’ rights, interests, and ownership of 
traditional knowledge and technology, and to reward indigenous peoples for their ‘informal 
innovation.’197 They identified local communities, women, and indigenous peoples as 
holders of knowledge and technology that could enable the sustainable use of natural 
resources and therefore contribute to economic and sustainable development.198 Once again, 
these references suggest that the extent to which states support the contextual integration of 
non-environmental considerations is balanced against the potential economic value of such 
consideration. In this context, the value of protecting and supporting the use of traditional 
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knowledge and technology is measured against the potential for undertaking a process of 
development based upon a universalised western notion of development that focuses on the 
economic context of human/environment interconnections.199 
The analysis of the outcome texts from the biodiversity and sustainable development 
regime similarly justify the protection of traditional and cultural practices on the basis that 
they contribute to sustainable development. In doing so, these documents indicate a 
prioritisation of the western notion of development. Both recognise the close relationship 
between indigenous peoples and local communities ‘embodying traditional lifestyles’200 with 
nonhuman nature. They both refer to women as having a ‘vital role’ in environmental 
management, conservation and development of the environment.201 However, they frame 
the contribution of these groups as a potential economic contribution to sustainable 
development through the sustainable utilisation of natural resources.202 Principle 22 of the 
Rio Declaration affirms that indigenous people and local communities ‘have a vital role in 
environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional 
practices.’203 These references indicate that states valued the traditional knowledge and 
experiences of women, local communities and indigenous peoples for their contribution to 
sustainable development.204 
Once again the arguments supporting these contextual considerations contain 
assumptions that seek to assimilate other cultures, traditions and practices into the 
dominant discourse of development, in which the economic value of such practices is 
privileged over other values. These arguments suggest that the basis for which states seek to 
protect the environment has altered, particularly after the introduction of sustainable 
development. These references suggest that while states recognised that local communities 
utilised their resources differently, they supported the protection of these practices because 
they could contribute to sustainable development. These arguments indicate that the 
introduction of sustainable development has framed such protection in terms of the 
potential economic and development benefits.  
However, some of the documents also include references that indicate states recognised 
other values, not just the economic value of the environment. The preamble to the 
Biodiversity Convention recognises the intrinsic value of biodiversity, including its cultural, 
ecological, social, and aesthetic value.205 Principles 20 and 22 of the Rio Declaration call for 
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states to support the identity, culture, and interests of indigenous communities,206 while 
Agenda 21 calls for states to respect the ‘cultural integrity and the rights of indigenous 
people and their communities.’207 These references suggest that in certain contexts, states 
acknowledged the different culture, location, social, and historical contexts in which 
community members alter the way in which they interact with nonhuman nature have been 
taken into account with the integration of sustainable development. 
Once again, the content of the Desertification Convention and its annexes are a notable 
exception to the trend identified in the above analysis. The preamble to the convention 
identifies the cause of desertification as ‘complex interactions among physical, biological, 
political, social and economic factors,’208 which recognises that different communities may 
experience desertification and drought differently, depending on the specific context in 
which they inhabit. Similarly, Annex I requests parties to undertake medium and long-term 
studies of socio-economic and cultural trends in affected areas in their national action 
programmes.209 Article 2 of Annex III requests states to take into consideration particular 
conditions of the region, including the diverse values of the region and the negative social, 
cultural, economic, and environmental effects caused by desertification.210 It further requests 
states to take into account the ‘frequent use of unsustainable development practices in 
affected areas as a result of complex interactions among physical, biological, political, social, 
cultural and economic factors, including international economic factors.’211 The content of 
these articles from the regional annexes recognises that communities experience 
desertification differently because of their specific cultural, historical, and social contexts, 
which alters both the way in which they interact with nonhuman nature and their 
experiences of development. Like the preamble to the Biodiversity Convention above, these 
references integrate both environmental and non-environmental considerations into the 
text of the documents in a way that recognises the complexity of human and environment 
interactions, which occur because of cultural, traditional and geographical differences 
between communities. 
In the post-2001 period, documents from the sustainable development regime attempt to 
balance the cultural diversity between groups and the need to integrate such groups into 
sustainable development. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the Rio+20 
Outcome Document recognise the ‘cultural diversity of the world’ and the value of this 
diversity for sustainable development.212 Both recognise that vulnerable and marginalised 
social groups, such as the poor, especially depend on nonhuman nature for their ‘economic, 
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social, and physical well-being, and their cultural heritage.’213 These statements take into 
account the geographical, social, and historical context in which different groups are 
situated.  
This difference may reflect the emerging contribution by NSAs in the creation, content, 
and implementation of sustainable development objectives in the post-2001 period.214 The 
submissions by NSAs to the preparatory process for the post-2001 sustainable development 
conferences included more direct references to the different ways in which communities 
may experience sustainable development because they view non-human nature in other 
ways, and not solely as a commodity. They stressed the need to take into account differences 
in location and between communities in international responses to environmental 
problems.215 In the preparations themselves, they stressed the importance of cultural and 
spiritual aspects of sustainable development and that respect for cultural diversity was 
essential for supporting sustainable development.216 These examples suggest that at least 
during the preparatory stage, there was broad recognition of the cultural differences between 
communities that affect their experience of sustainable development.  
This is different from the submissions by states who referred to the value of cultural 
diversity,217 but made little connection between diversity and the different ways in which 
communities experience and utilise their local environment. At the fourth session of the 
Johannesburg Preparatory Committee, ministers noted that the ‘world must work towards 
creating a culture of sustainable development, including ethical values that took into 
account cultural and traditional difference.’218 This analysis suggests that states have 
recognised other values, such as cultural, traditional, and ethical values in the context of 
sustainable development and integrated them into IEL. Nevertheless, unlike the submissions 
by NSAs, they have not yet recognised that such values mean communities and social groups 
experience and interact with their environment differently.  
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However, I found that the documents relating to natural resources contained few 
references that recognised the differences between communities and that these differences 
affected the way in which they related to the environment. Article 5 of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement and Article 25 of the 2006 ITTA both require states to take into account the 
social effects or interests of account the interests of subsistence or artisanal users of the 
natural resource.219 Article 6 of the UN Watercourses Convention includes similarly broad 
distinction.220 These broad references do not directly acknowledge the social, historical, and 
cultural differences between locations and group and are in contrast with the 1992 Non-
Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus of the 
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests (Statement 
of Forest Principles). This non-legally binding documented calls for states to consider ‘the 
multiple functions and uses of forests, including traditional uses, and the likely economic 
and social stress when these uses are constrained or restricted.’221 The binding nature of the 
above agreements may suggest that states are less willing to take into account the ‘social, 
social, economic, ecological, cultural, and spiritual needs of present and future 
generations’222 in connection with potentially profitable natural resources.  
The analysis in this section indicates that the environmental regimes and areas that 
contained more inclusive participatory approaches general contain references that reveal 
greater contextual awareness in the integration of non-environmental considerations. They 
recognise that communities use and experience their local environment in very different 
ways, and therefore the inclusion of non-environmental considerations should take these 
contexts into account. This contextual approach is particularly represented in the 
Desertification Convention which supported the integration of technological, scientific, and 
other considerations so long as they recognised local communities, women and other social 
groups as users and custodians of traditional technology relevant to preventing 
desertification. Further, the convention and its annexes also recognised that local 
communities and their environments were intimately interrelated and that desertification 
affected the cultural, social and traditional practices of local communities. These references 
indicate that the arguments for the integration of non-environmental considerations take 
into account the local context in which they will be implemented.  
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However, many of the documents do not adopt such an approach, and the arguments 
supporting the integration of non-environmental considerations refer to the potential 
economic outcomes of protecting traditional knowledge and cultural practices. This is 
particularly the case in the documents relating to biodiversity and sustainable development 
where the documents contain many arguments supporting the protection of cultural and 
traditional technology and innovation on the basis that such technology could facilitate the 
sustainable exploitation of natural resources for economic development. This appropriation 
of local and traditional knowledge, and what it might reveal about the way in which the 
international community perceives the environment will be examined in Chapter 7.  
These arguments indicate that there has been a universalisation of the dominant 
development model in which elements of different cultures, knowledge and experience may 
be considered a tool to achieve economic development and sustainability goals, rather than 
recognised for other, intrinsic and unmeasurable values. The justifications for States to take 
due account of these communities in the economic, social, and development considerations 
are often directly associated with economic gain and development, rather than a more 
contextual focus on the different principles, values and experiences of these communities. 
Supporters of sustainable development argue that it offers a way to respect local traditions 
and values as part of the development model, while also supporting the assimilation of these 
communities into the capitalist productive system, through development projects. However, 
critics argue that a core argument for the connection between sustainable development and 
insecurity is that economic growth and development is a precursor to both peace and 
environmental conservation. Therefore, the analysis undertaken in this section may suggest 
that the security/environment connections have altered the basis for which States protect the 
environment. 
2.4 Open  
In Chapter 2, I noted that sustainable development emphasised transparency and 
openness as part of the principle of good governance that has been incorporated into the 
concept.223 Proponents of these principles argue that they institutionalise a collective 
response to environmental concerns by enabling governments to be held to account over 
their activities.224 Similarly, an ecofeminist ethic emphasises the importance of transparency 
and openness in the way in which states connect non-environmental considerations and the 
environment in IEL. Ecofeminists argue that opening up the arguments and discussions 
surrounding the inclusion of non-environmental connections enables such justifications to 
be interrogated and the proponents for them to be challenged. Such activities reflect the 
activist heritage of ecofeminism and also recognises that those who are in privileged and 
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dominant positions have historically determined the way in which areas were connected and 
which considerations were prioritised.225 My analysis suggests that while the parties to some 
environmental regimes support including transparency and accountability provisions, these 
are limited to specific regimes, and omit any transparency in the way in which non-
environmental considerations, such as intellectual property, trade, and economic 
considerations affect the decisions and approaches undertaken under the regimes.  
One outcome text that does support stronger accountability and transparency 
mechanisms in its implementation is the Cartagena Protocol.226 The BSWG preparatory 
reports and protocol suggest that states recognised the importance of transparency in some 
collective responses to environmental concerns, particularly in connection to environmental 
safety. During the negotiations of the protocol, state participants affirmed the necessity of 
ensuring transparency in the systems surrounding the safe transfer of living modified 
organisms (LMOs). Australia noted that the exchange of information on LMOs ‘will be 
essential to the effective operation in all countries of a transparent, scientifically based 
system for regulating the transboundary movement of LMOs.’227 The reports further 
affirmed the importance of transparency in relation to other issues directly related to an 
effective biosafety protocol, such as risk assessments.228 The Cartagena Protocol requires 
information concerning LMOs to be publically accessible.229 The reports also refer to the 
importance of ensuring transparency in different international systems, including 
international trade in the implementation of the objectives of the protocol.230 The reports 
include statements that emphasise the need for assurances that any procedures developed 
under the protocol are themselves transparent.231 This support to transparency and 
openness relates to environmental safety and allows some non-environmental 
considerations, such as transportation, and related scientific and technical considerations to 
be subject to the scrutiny of the public. These more procedural elements of LMOs indicate 
that in some contexts, transparency has occurred.  
Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol includes provisions that support open and transparent 
information between parties, and in some instances, between parties and civil society. These 
provisions relate to both the content of the protocols and also more general provisions 
concerning information transfer. Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol identifies information 
                                                          
225 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 99; Darling, 'A Weight for Water', 19. 
226 CBD BSWG, 'Report of the Third Meeting of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group On Biosafety' 
(Montreal, 13-17 October 1997) (17 October 1997) UNEP/CBD/BSWG/3/6, ¶68 and ¶81. 
227 CBD BSWG, 'Compilation of the Views of Governments on the Contents of the Future Protocol' (18 March 
1997) UNEP/CBD/BSWG/2/2 , 28 (Australia).  
228 CBD BSWG, 'Compilation of Government Submissions of Draft Text on Selected Items' (15 August 1997) 
UNEP/CBD/BSWG/3/3, 25 (Australia), 35 (Brazil). Report of the BSWG. 6th Session (1999), ¶7. 
229 Cartagena Protocol 2000, art 20.  
230 CBD BSWG, 'Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group on Biosafety' (Montreal, 12-
16 May 1997) (11 June 1997) UNEP/CBD/BSWG/2/6, ¶17. 
231 Ibid, ¶ 24. 
216 
 
exchange as a way to contribute to the effectiveness of the parties’ actions.232 Various 
provisions included in the 2001 Marrakesh Accords and in the 2005 Decision 27/CMP.1 
‘Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’ support the 
dissemination of information to the public.  
Further, the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanisms supports the provision of 
information during the compliance process, which enables more accountability between 
states and the public. Therefore, it allows the public dissemination of information and for 
enforcement hearings to be held in public.233 Later decisions support the publication of 
‘non-confidential’ information and the provision of a ‘provide a publicly accessible user 
interface.’234 These provisions suggest that some environmental agreements have 
incorporated provisions supporting transparency of information, information 
dissemination, and some accountability measures to be undertaken in public. These 
references indicate that in some contexts, transparency has occurred in relation to 
information surrounding the objectives of the agreement.  
In this way, these provisions may suggest that these agreements have incorporated 
procedural accountability and transparency in their content. However, they do not indicate 
that the way in which states prioritise and decide which non-environmental considerations 
are important, or the arguments surrounding these discussions, are undertaken in a 
transparent and open manner. Further, the analysis of the post-2001 documents suggest that 
any references concerning the relationship between environment, trade, economic and 
commercial considerations and transparency and accountability provisions are extremely 
broad. This generalisation suggests that in relation to certain considerations that go to the 
heart of some state interests, and to the well-being of industry, business and other private 
actors, states are reluctant to open those decisions to the public.  
Therefore, the post-2001 sustainable development outcome documents only include 
general references to the importance of open and transparent international economic 
                                                          
232 Kyoto Protocol 1997, art 2(1)(b), and art 3. 
233 Ibid, art 8; UNFCCC, Decision 27/CMP.1 'Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the 
Kyoto Protocol' in Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its First Session, held at Montreal from 28 November to 10 December 2005, Addendum, Part Two: 
Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its 
First Session (30 March 2006) FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (9-10 December 2005), Annex Part VII ¶6; Annex 
Part VIII ¶6-¶7; Annex Part IX, ¶2, ¶6 and ¶10; UNFCCC, Decision 22/CMP.1 'Guidelines for Review under 
Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol' in Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, held at Montreal from 28 November to 10 December 2005, Addendum, 
Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its First Session (30 March 2006) FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (30 November 2005), Annex 
¶115(a), ¶139. 
234 Decision 13/CMP.1 Modalities for the Accounting of Assigned Amounts under the Kyoto Protocol (30 
November 2005), Annex ¶43(b), ¶44-¶48. 
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systems for sustainable development.235 The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation includes 
broad references calling for international financial and trade institutions to ‘ensure that 
decision-making processes and institutional structures are open and transparent.’236 The 
plan further identified a need for reform of the international financial architecture to ‘foster 
a transparent, equitable and inclusive system.’237 The omission of any reference to 
accountability, or public dissemination may suggest that the provisions are responding to 
developing states’ criticism of the international financial and economic systems, but have 
not yet engaged in opening up those systems for public, democratic discussion.  
Similarly, the move towards openness and accountability has been inhibited by economic 
and trade considerations in the biodiversity regime. During the negotiations of the 
Cartagena Protocol, the parties also emphasised the need to take into account issues of 
confidentiality and intellectual property rights in relation to the advanced informed 
procedure and risk assessments.238 The tensions between the need to balance transparency 
and commercial interests suggests that in some circumstances, some states are less willing to 
enable open and transparent information sharing, particularly where it may affect private, 
economic, or commercial interests. This tension indicates that the increasing 
interrelationship between areas of international law, such as commercial, intellectual 
property, economic and environmental, environmental concerns have been subordinated.  
Two conclusions may be drawn from this analysis. First, the preparations and outcome 
texts implementing legally binding obligations and objectives for states have engaged with, 
and accepted the need to integrate open and transparent systems for information-sharing as 
part of their institutional framework. The Cartagena Protocol, Kyoto Protocol, and 
Montreal Protocol include such references and the later decisions by the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol clarify the position concerning information dissemination to 
the protocol.239 Therefore, there are some references that reflect the openness value in 
connection to the access of information. However, the generalised nature of the content and 
the use of ‘soft’ language in the post-2001 sustainable development documents suggests that 
some members of the international community may be resistant to such openness and 
transparency occurring. Similarly, the reluctance to open up the decisions surrounding 
economic, intellectual property and commercial interactions within the environmental 
                                                          
235 E.g. World Summit Outcome (2005). ¶25(e); Rio+20 Outcome Document (2012) ¶10.  
236 Plan of Implementation 2002, ¶47(b). 
237 Ibid, ¶86(a). 
238 Report of the BSWG. 2nd Session (1997), ¶156.  
239 Montreal Protocol 1987, art 7, art 9; Kyoto Protocol 1997, art 10(e); Cartagena Protocol 2000, art 20 and art 
21; see also UNFCCC, Decision 11/CP.8 'New Delhi Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention' in Report 
of the Conference of the Parties on Eighth Session, held at New Delhi from 23 October To 1 November 2002. 
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Eighth Session (28 March 2003) 
FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1 (1 November 2002), Annex Section B and Section C;   
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documents suggest that these interests remain prioritised and subject to very limited 
accountability.  
Therefore, my analysis suggests that while the parties to some environmental regimes 
support including transparency and accountability provisions, these are limited to specific 
regimes, and omit any transparency in the way in which non-environmental considerations, 
such as intellectual property, trade, and economic considerations affect the decisions and 
approaches undertaken under the regimes. The extent to which these documents reflect such 
an approach is determined by other interests, particularly those relating to economic, 
intellectual property, and commercial interests. This prioritisation of non-environmental 
considerations over supporting accountability and openness in environmental agreements 
mirrors the conclusions outlined in Section 2.1 and 2.2, that economic and commercial 
interests have been prioritised in the context of IEL. 
3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the integration of development, economic, technological, 
scientific, commercial, trade, and security considerations into IEL and the justifications put 
forward in the documents for their inclusion. I started this examination by identifying the 
broader areas of international concern that have been included in the content of IEL, and 
the justifications for their inclusion. I undertook this analysis because it identified any 
shared values, beliefs, and assumptions between the arguments supporting 
environment/security connections in international discourse, and those used in arguments 
supporting the protection of the environment. Therefore, it could potentially reveal the 
extent to which the inclusion of these interests has altered the for which states seek to 
protect the environment, and instead, the environment’s utility for securing sustainable 
development and wider interests is considered more important. 
My findings revealed three important themes affecting the extent to which an 
environmental regime reflected ecofeminist values. First, I found that the documents which 
took into account differences between countries, communities and locations generally 
included more references that reflected the ecofeminist values of structural pluralism, 
openness, and contextualism. As discussed above, the desertification regime and the 
sustainable development regime both incorporated differentiation into the content and 
implementation of their outcome texts. Interestingly, these two regimes were the ones that 
supported the increased participation by NSAs during the creation, content, and 
implementation of their objectives.  
Second, I found that a consistent argument for the integration of non-environmental 
areas was made on the basis that the international community should take into account the 
differences between developed and developing countries. This argument occurred 
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throughout the time-period under analysis and was present in the documents from the 
Stockholm Conference, as well as in later documents, such as the reports by the AWG-LCA. 
However, the documents developed during the Rio period and afterwards explicitly 
integrate differentiation into the implementations of objectives and states’ obligations 
through the principle of CBDRRC. This principle has been subject to significant criticism in 
the climate change agreement after 2001 and the tension revealed in the criticisms suggested 
that the differentiation as a central feature of IEL may increasingly be challenged. 
Third, I found that the documents from the Rio Conference onward incorporated more 
provisions that supported the protection and respect for these forms of knowledge and 
experience, particularly in the sustainable development, biodiversity, and climate change 
regime. With the exception of the climate change documents, I found that these documents 
generally supported the participation by NSAs from local communities and marginalised 
groups in the creation, content and implementation of the adopted objectives. However, I 
also found that the justifications for such protection were made on the basis that such 
knowledge could be utilised for the purpose of economic development and scientific and 
technological innovation. These findings support the conclusions made in Chapter 5, where 
I suggested that one of the justifications for the participation by these groups was their 
potential utility in attaining economic and social development.  
Finally, these findings indicate continued prioritisation of economic and trade 
considerations in the documents, particularly after the introduction of sustainable 
development. This prioritisation is found across the documents from the different regimes, 
and does not appear to be affected by the age of the document, the forum in which it has 
been made or the regime in which it is created. This prioritisation has significant 
implications concerning the arguments that states use to justify the protection of the 
environment and also the way in which the international community perceives the 
environment itself. 
It is possible to draw three interrelated conclusions from the analysis undertaken in this 
chapter. First, this chapter concludes that economic and development considerations appear 
to be the overriding priority of states in the negotiations and discussion surrounding 
environmental problems. This prioritisation is reflected in the arguments supporting the 
conservation of the environment, and also in those supporting the integration of 
technological, scientific, and financial considerations. While earlier environmental 
documents, such as the Stockholm Declaration, Stockholm Action Plan, and the Montreal 
Protocol contain references that reflect this prioritisation, it has been consolidated in the 
paradigm of sustainable development and particularly in those documents relating to 
climate change and developed during the post-2001 period. This prioritisation does not 
reflect many of the values of the ecofeminist ethic and suggests that states consider the value 
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of the environment in terms of its potential use for economic and development gain, 
something that is the focus of the next chapter.  
Building on the above, it is possible to conclude that the assumptions, values, and beliefs 
that inform the support for sustainable development as a solution to conflict and insecurity 
are present in arguments used to prioritise economic and development considerations. The 
belief that economic growth and socio-economic development is a precursor to 
environmental conservation is a central feature of the post-Cold War environmental 
documents, such as the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, and the UNFCCC and forms the basis 
of the paradigm of sustainable development. Similar beliefs inform the arguments 
supporting sustainable development as a solution for conflict and insecurity which propose 
that responding to the drivers of underdevelopment through poverty eradication, good 
governance and the management of natural resources will ensure economic prosperity and 
reduce incidences of conflict. These associations were explicitly identified in the speeches 
made on behalf of states during the UNGA High Level Summits, and made more implicitly 
in the later sustainable development documents, particularly during the Johannesburg 
Summit and the Rio+20 Conference. The prioritisation of such considerations suggests that 
the international community considers the environment, and environmental management, 
as a tool in the fight against the drivers of insecurity.  
Finally, inherent in these assumptions is the belief that the environment is a resource for 
a form of development that universalises western, rationalist development, predicated on the 
commodification, commercialisation, and exploitation of nonhuman nature for economic 
betterment. This belief reveals that the dominant model of development, in which economic 
growth, supported by technological assistance and expertise from developed countries, is 
seen as the primary measure of ‘development.’ Ecofeminists argue that such a model is 
predicated on the subordination and exploitation of nonhuman nature and maintains the 
separation between humanity and the material world in which we inhabit.  These 
assumptions and what they may reveal about the perception of the environment by the 
states will be examined in more detail in the following chapter. For the meantime, these 
conclusions indicate that the reasons for state responses to environmental problems are 
informed by a development model in which the environment is a utility for achieving 
economic development as part of the wider goals of eradicating underdevelopment and 
attaining international peace and security 
The above conclusions suggest that justifications used to support the integration of non-
environmental considerations into IEL have underlying conceptual connections with those 
used to connect security, sustainable development, and environmental degradation. This 
indicates that the justifications for environmental protection, particularly after the 
introduction of sustainable development have evolved in line with the integration of liberal 
politics for peace and security in which economic growth and socio-economic development 
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are considered as the most important part of the solution. These conclusions have 
implications for the way in which the environment is represented, and in turn, perceived by 
the international community. They suggest that the environment is viewed as a commodity 
and utility for strategies of development that are predicated on consumption, production, 
and exploitation – something which ecofeminists have strongly criticised. Drawing on the 
conclusions found in this chapter, the following chapter will examine the extent to which the 
perception of the environment itself has altered in line with the changing priorities and 
focus of IEL. 
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7. Examining the Representation of the Environment in IEL 
The previous chapters concluded that the introduction of the paradigm of sustainable 
development into IEL has altered the basis on which the international community seeks to 
protect the environment. This is because environment conservation, development, and 
economic growth have increasingly been viewed as solutions to the drivers of insecurity and 
conflict, such as the problems of underdevelopment and environmental degradation. In 
addition, the arguments supporting the increased participation by NSAs in the creation, 
content, and implementation of IEL are increasingly based on economic arguments, and an 
implicit linkage to security, through the paradigm of sustainable development. Furthermore, 
the arguments for protecting the environment prioritise economic, development, and trade 
non-environmental considerations, particularly through the paradigm of sustainable 
development.  
This chapter turns to examine the second part of the research question. It analyses the 
ways in which the environment is represented in the environmental documents, and the 
extent to which the prioritisation of economic and development non-environmental 
considerations may have altered the perception of the environment itself by the 
international community. I intend to examine both how the perceptions of the environment 
may have altered over time and the degree to which states perceive the environment in 
terms of its intrinsic value for both humanity and nonhuman nature.1  
When introducing ecofeminist theory, I noted that ecofeminists criticise the 
anthropocentric nature of the dominant social paradigm and its prioritisation of economic 
and productive measures of well-being.2 Critics of this paradigm argue that it expresses the 
values and beliefs of the ruling elites.3 Further, they argue that they are informed by a series 
of oppressive conceptual frameworks that underpin the dominant and rational discourses in 
western society.4 They contend that these frameworks, and the logical structures included 
within them, continue to exclude, devalue, and subordinate human ‘others’ and the 
environment. This is because they are based upon conceptual dualisms naturalising the 
oppression and subordination of gender, nature, and human ‘others’.5 They argue that these 
dualisms are part of logical structures that institutionalise power and normalise it by 
attaching it to existing types of difference.6 Therefore, these critical frameworks and logical 
                                                          
1 Hughes, 'Fishwives and Other Tails', 504; Mellor, 'Feminism and Environmental Ethics', 112-113. 
2 Above, Chapter 3, 77, 95-96.  
3 Fotopoulos, ‘Dominant Social Paradigm’.  
4 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 46; see in general, Warren, ‘Taking Empirical Data Seriously'; Plumwood, 
Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. Plumwood, Environmental Culture. 
5 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 43. 
6 Ibid, 42. 
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structures function to maintain institutions, such as the global economy and security which 
institutionalise oppression and domination.  
The environment/security literature incorporates these oppressive conceptual 
frameworks and their logical structures,7 and hence reflect the dominant social paradigm. 
This is in the research identifying the sources of security risks and in the proposed solutions 
to these risks. For example, scholars identified security risks because of natural resource 
scarcities,8 the overabundance of natural resources,9 the degradation of the environment,10 
overpopulation,11 and underdevelopment,12 among others.13 These environmental sources of 
insecurity incorporate a worldview in which the environment is separate, subordinate, and a 
‘threat’ to the well-being and security of humans.  
These documents indicate support for sustainable development as a solution to these 
environmental threats. This is because proponents of the paradigm argue that it can reduce 
poverty, improve well-being, and generate hope, all of which can help reduce the ‘alienation 
of individuals and thus lessen the risk of social tension and conflict.’14 Inherent in this 
paradigm are the interrelated assumptions that supporting economic liberalism, 
technological innovation, and improving governance will establish the foundations of peace 
and prosperity, and therefore reduce insecurity. Building on these assumptions, security 
scholars, international institutions, states, and NSAs proposed that insecure states should 
achieve sustainable development through the ‘managed’ exploitation of natural resources in 
order to support socio-economic development, economic liberalism, and technological 
innovation.15 
This reflects an anthropocentric perspective of the environment which seeks to reduce 
conflict through preventative development based on the liberal values of ‘life, liberty and 
property’16 predicated on the assumption that the environment is to be used for human 
interests. However, the prioritisation of economic and development considerations within 
the sustainable development paradigm incorporate damaging conceptual frameworks that 
                                                          
7 Above, Chapter 2, Section 3.3 
8 Percival and Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcity', 280. 
9 Mark J. Lacy, Security and Climate Change: International Relations and the Limits of Realism (Routledge 2005), 
41; UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding  (2009), 8; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 'Natural Resources and Violent 
Conflict' 651; see also Chapter 2, 63, fn 194.  
10 Barnett, 'Security and Climate Change', 9; IPCC, Climate Change 2014. Summary for Policy Makers, 16.  
11 Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: How we can Make it Happen in our Lifetime (Penguin 2005), 65-66. 
12 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 3-4; also, Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security 
64-65; Abrahamsen, 'Blair's Africa', 61, 70; Duffield, The New Wars, chapter 2. 
13 Fletcher, Breitling and Puleo, 'Barbarian Hordes', 1200. 
14 Duffield, 'The Liberal Way of Development', 57. 
15 UNSC Res 2128 (2013), ¶12; see also UNSC Res 1903 (2009), ¶9(d); UNSC Resolution 2021 (2011), preamble; 
UNSC Res 2198 (2015), preamble; Begby and Burgess, 'Human Security and Liberal Peace', 92. 
16 United Nations Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now 4; Bosold and Werthes, 'Human 
Security in Practice', 95. 
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exclude, devalue, and subordinate humans others and the environment.17 These criticisms 
are important because the central thesis of ecofeminism is that there are shared conceptual 
roots for the domination of women, animals, and nature that function in real life to 
maintain institutions and practices of oppression and domination. Where the IEL 
documents represent the environment solely in terms of its value as a commodity or 
resource for human needs, well-being, and to achieve ‘security’, this suggests that these 
conceptual roots are present in international responses to environmental degradation. This 
may suggest that the perception of the environment contained in these documents is one of 
a commodity or resource for attaining security and securing human interests. 
Therefore, this chapter turns to examine the representations of the environment 
contained in the environmental documents. It analyses the extent to which the prioritisation 
of economic, development, and trade considerations within the paradigm of sustainable 
development has altered the perception of the environment itself. By examining the ways in 
which the environment is represented and portrayed in the environmental documents, it is 
possible to identify the underlying beliefs, values and assumptions that have shaped the ways 
in which the international community perceives the environment. In doing so, this chapter 
reveals whether there are any shared assumptions, values, and beliefs between the 
representations of the environment in environment/security literature and those contained 
in the IEL documents. Where there are similarities, it may suggest that the prioritisation of 
sustainable development in the environment/security discourse and in IEL has altered the 
perception of the environment itself in the environmental documents.  
1. FINDINGS  
Given that ecofeminist approaches to nature represent a counter-hegemonic approach, it 
is expected that some of the documents may not reflect very many of their values. This is the 
case for those documents developed and adopted before the start of the environmental and 
feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s, such as the documents from the Stockholm 
Conference. As a result of the age of the documents, it may not be surprising that these 
documents represent the patriarchal status quo. 
Nevertheless, I argue that reading the documents from the Stockholm Conference 
onward still offers an opportunity to examine the extent to which the status quo has been 
consolidated, subverted, or altered, in a way that reflects ecofeminist goals. This is because 
the language contained in these documents helped shape the future direction of IEL and the 
ways in which the international community balanced environmental, development, and 
economic considerations. Analysing the representations of the environment in these 
documents can build on earlier conclusions in this thesis. It can examine the extent to which 
                                                          
17 Above, Chapter 3, 95-96.  
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the broadening and deepening of the participation by NSAs, as well as the recognition of 
socio-cultural and environmental/social interrelationships in some of the environmental 
regimes, may have subverted the dominant representations of the environment. Therefore, 
undertaking a critique of these pre-ecofeminist documents is still highly relevant to the 
overall objective of this thesis.  
With this caveat in mind, I initially read the documents and identified different 
representations of the environment that reflected characteristics of the different ecofeminist 
values of inclusivity, structural pluralism, contextualism, and openness. Drawing on the 
analysis undertaken previously, I identified the different ways in which the environment was 
represented in documents, and the assumptions, values and beliefs that may have informed 
the way in which the environment was represented in the documents. During this process, I 
highlighted the different ways in which the environment was represented that shared 
similarities with the values forming the interconnecting ecofeminist lenses. 
Representations of the environment that reflected the ecofeminist value of inclusivity 
recognise that humans are ecological and embodied in nature.18 These representations take a 
relationship-oriented approach that acknowledges differences in a non-reductive, non-
centrist and non-anthropocentric way. Representations of the environment that reflect the 
structurally plural value take into account the connections between communities 
(nonhuman and human), and the different relationship between nonhuman and humanity 
depending on location, context and culture.19 References to the environment reflect 
characteristics of contextualism occur where the documents question the dominance of 
certain views and contextual locations that privilege dominant western cultural, social, 
economic, scientific, and historical constructions of the environment and associated others. 
Representations of the environment that contain characteristics of the openness value occur 
where the documents disseminate different knowledge, values, and experiences of the 
environment into the public sphere. 
Following this, I re-examined the documents and categorised them depending on the 
extent to which they reflected an ecofeminist understanding of the environment as 
interdependent and interconnected living systems which recognises that humans are 
materially embedded in ecological systems.20 Where the documents appeared to include 
representations of the environment that subverted the dominant representation of the 
environment, I categorised it as a document that had ‘high-level’ integration of the 
ecofeminist values. Where they appeared to consolidate or reinforce the status quo, and 
represented the environment primarily as a commodity or resource for economic growth 
and development, I categorised the document as reflecting ‘low-level’ integration of the 
                                                          
18 Mellor, Feminism & Ecology, 68; Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 100; Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 19. 
19 Warren, 'Power and Promise', 142. 
20 Mellor, Feminism & Ecology, 184-189. 
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ecofeminist values. Given the conclusions of Chapters 5 and 6, I was interested to discover 
where, if at all, subversion of the dominant representation occurred, and if the 
representation of the environment altered where there is greater inclusion of non-
environmental considerations, or where there was greater participation by NSAs in the 
creation of the environmental document.  
Building on Chapters 5 and 6, my initial findings revealed that the environmental area, 
age of the document, and forum in which the document created affected the extent to which 
the representations of the environment reflected a high-level integration of the ecofeminist 
values. These findings are similar to those discussed in the previous chapter concerning the 
arguments used to support the integration of non-environmental considerations into IEL. 
These initial findings suggest that the extent to which the documents include 
representations of the environment reflecting ecofeminist characteristics alters depending 
on the extent to which the documents reflect inclusive participatory approaches, and the 
types of non-environmental considerations that they prioritised within the texts. I will 
outline my findings in the discussion below.  
1.1 High-Level Integration 
Very few of the documents’ references to the environment display higher-level 
integration of ecofeminist characteristics. The documents including high-level integration of 
these characteristics are generally found in the environmental regimes developed during the 
Rio Conference and afterwards. This is because these documents exhibit contextualism and 
a contextual understanding of the environment by recognising that social groups may 
experience and utilise their environment differently.  
1.1.1 Sustainable Development  
References to the environment that reflect high-level integration of contextualism were 
found in the preparatory documents of the sustainable development conferences. These 
conferences generally supported more inclusive participation by NSAs, especially in the 
post-Cold War period. As this inclusive participation generally occurred after the end of the 
Cold War, such references are generally included in the documents produced during the Rio 
and post-Rio periods.  
The documents produced by the 1992 Rio Preparatory Committee incorporate references 
that recognise the experiences and uses of the environment may differ depending on social 
group. Decision 3/7 takes into account that these social groups are holders of traditional 
knowledge that may be useful for the conservation and protection of the local 
environment.21 Decision 3/7 also states that the cultural and traditional practices, and 
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knowledge of local communities and indigenous peoples should be respected.22 Decision 
2/18 referred to the ‘need to recognise the special relationship of indigenous peoples, and the 
importance of traditional knowledge, with the conservation and utilisation … of … living 
marine resources’23 These references reflect a more contextual understanding of 
human/environment interrelationships, which is one aspect of the contextualism value. 
They suggest that the participants acknowledge that differences in location, geography, 
cultures, and communities affect the ways in which people may interact and view their 
environment. In doing so, these references suggest that the preparatory committee 
recognised that representations of the environment are located in different, interconnected, 
and intersecting contexts, which include social, historical, and cultural contexts.24  
However, the Rio Conference documents and those produced afterwards include very 
few references that reflect the ecofeminist values of inclusiveness, structural pluralism and 
openness in their references to the environment. As will be discussed below, outcome 
documents, such as the 1992 Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 generally reaffirm or 
consolidate the dominant perception of the environment-as-commodity. Therefore, these 
initial findings suggest that in the context of sustainable development, even where the forum 
supports the participation by NSAs, the dominant representation of the environment 
generally prevails.  
1.2 Mid-Level Integration 
Once again, the age, forum, and type of document affect the extent to which the 
references to the environment incorporated the ecofeminist values. I found that documents 
from the biodiversity, sustainable development, and desertification regime include 
provisions recognising the interrelationships between humanity and the environment in a 
non-hierarchical, integrated, and inclusive language. These regimes also support the 
protection of traditional knowledge and cultural practices. These findings suggest that that 
the participants in these regimes increasingly recognise the contextualism value in relation 
to the environment. In doing so, this analysis may indicate that the international community 
recognises that communities and social groups have different perceptions and views of 
human/environment interrelationships, and of the environment itself.   
                                                          
22 Ibid, ¶1(a).  
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1.2.1 Sustainable Development 
The post-2001 preparatory documents contain references to the environment that 
recognise the interrelationship between humanity and the environment. These references to 
the environment are included in the submissions by some NSAs and states during the 
preparatory process for the 2012 Rio+20 Conference. They suggest that some participants 
have begun to adopt a more inclusive perception of the environment and view humanity as 
part of ecological systems, rather than separate and distinct entities. 
The Rio+20 Preparatory Reports include similar references. However, these reports use 
more qualified language and there are fewer provisions that recognise the interrelationship 
between humanity and the environment. These examples suggest that documents created 
with more inclusive participatory practices, such as those made by large multilateral 
conferences, contain references to the environment that may subvert the dominant 
perception of the environment-as-commodity.  
The preparatory documents produced prior to the 2002 Johannesburg Summit include 
references to the environment that adopt a more contextual understanding of the 
environment. They recognise recognise the cultural and spiritual values of different 
communities which may affect the way in which communities experience and view their 
local environment. Building on the earlier sustainable development documents, the 
Johannesburg preparatory documents also contain provisions taking into account cultural 
practices, traditional knowledge, and practices which may have a bearing on the ways in 
which local communities utilise and experience their environment. The inclusion of these 
references in the preparatory documents suggests that the international community 
recognises the contexts in which people interact with their local environment, and that these 
contexts have a bearing on the way in which they view and interact with it. In doing so, it 
may suggest that states and NSAs increasingly adopted a more contextual understanding of 
human/environment interrelationships and the environment itself.  
Therefore, the post-2001 adopted texts include some references that reflect a contextual 
understanding of the environment. This contextual understanding is included in the 2002 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the later 2012 Rio+20 Outcome Document. Both 
of these documents emphasise the value of cultural differences, traditional practices, and 
traditional knowledge for sustainable development. Further, the Rio+20 Outcome 
Document makes limited reference to humanity as ecological beings embodied in nature. 
Nonetheless, the overall tone from these post-2001 sustainable development documents 
suggests that the view of environment-as-commodity, epitomised in the dominant social 
paradigm, remains dominant.  
1.2.2 Desertification 
The type of document affects the extent to which it moves beyond the dominant, 
environment-as-commodity perception of the environment. The documents in the 
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desertification regime challenged the overall trend in which softer law documents generally 
included more references that subverted dominant perception of the environment. The 
reports by the INCD suggest that the participants during the negotiations of the convention 
recognised that humans were interrelated and integrated into an ecological community. The 
references to the environment in these reports indicate that participants recognise that 
economic, trade, and development considerations were interconnected to the way in which 
different communities viewed and interacted with their local environment. These references 
reflect a more inclusive understanding of humanity’s relationship with the environment and 
suggest that the desertification regime may have subverted the dominant perception of the 
environment, to a greater degree. 
In addition, the INCD documents also took into account differences between 
communities in their interactions with their local environment. The documents referred to 
the environment in ways that took into account the geographic location, the ways in which 
different communities use and experience their local environment, and that such 
experiences may be affected by their class, race, gender, ethnicity, and social or cultural 
contexts. Extending this structurally plural approach towards the environment, the 
documents supported the protection and conservation of traditional knowledge, and 
cultural practices. This differentiated approach may have occurred because the INCD 
supported the participation by NSAs, and specifically grassroots organisations, whose 
participants directly experience the impact of desertification and drought in their daily lives.  
The adopted 1994 Desertification Convention similarly included references that reflect 
inclusive and structurally plural characteristics in relation to the environment. The preamble 
to the convention recognises that humans are interrelated and integrated into an ecological 
community. The preamble recognises that development, economic, cultural and other 
considerations were interconnected and affected the way in which local communities 
experience the environment. Furthermore, Articles 10, 17-19 of the convention also support 
the protection and conservation of traditional knowledge, cultural practices and ‘know-
how.’25 Building on the preparatory documents, this differentiated approach may suggest 
that the participants in the creation of the convention recognised that the way in which 
communities use and experience their environment is different depending on location, 
culture and tradition.  
These findings suggest that in the post-Rio period, some regimes include provisions 
relating to the environment that subverted the dominant perception of the environment-as-
commodity. Once again, the analysis of the desertification regime suggests that participatory 
approaches and ways in which the participants sought to balance environmental and non-
environmental interests affected the way in which the environment was represented in the 
                                                          
25 Desertification Convention 1994, arts 10, 17-19.  
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documents. As my findings in the previous two chapters reveal, the desertification regime 
incorporated inclusive participatory provisions, and adopted a more balanced and 
differentiated approach towards including non-environmental considerations. These 
findings may alter the extent to which the desertification documents include representations 
of the environment that subvert the dominant perception of the environment.  
However, the documents produced by the CRIC indicate a consolidation of the 
dominant perception of the environment. This is different to the earlier documents, where 
the references to the environment reflected inclusiveness, structural pluralism, and a 
contextual understanding of human/environment interrelationships. Instead, the 
documents produced by the CRIC approach human/environment interrelationships from a 
primarily anthropocentric perspective and refer to the environment as a resource for 
sustainable development. As noted above, the documents do acknowledge that communities 
interact and experience their environment differently, depending on the context in which 
they are situated. Nevertheless, the content of the CRIC documents indicates a consolidation 
of the dominant perception of the environment as commodity by promoting the use of 
cultural practices to increase the productivity, security and well-being of local communities.  
1.2.3 Natural Resources: Biodiversity 
Some of the documents developed in the biodiversity regime exhibit mid-level 
integration of contextuality in their references to the environment. This is an anomaly 
because many of the documents were developed in working groups, with had less inclusive 
participatory practices. Therefore, while the biodiversity documents include fewer references 
to the environment that reflect ecofeminist values, those present are notable because they are 
incorporated into documents developed in a very different forum.  
The documents produced by the AWG-Biodiversity and the AWG-LTB included some 
references that took into account differences between communities that may alter the way in 
which these communities experience their environment. This is a consistent theme across 
many of the environmental regimes and suggests that states may have increasingly 
acknowledged the diversity of cultures, locations, politics, and other differences that will 
alter the way in which social groups view and interact with the environment. Similarly, the 
1992 Biodiversity Convention adopts a contextual understanding of the environment. Its 
preamble and Article 8 support the protection of local communities’ traditional practices, 
knowledge, and cultures in relation to the conservation of biological resources.26 Similarly, 
Article 12 of the Nagoya Protocol takes into consideration customary laws, protocols, and 
procedures and the qualified prohibition of restricting customary uses and exchanges of 
genetic resources among communities.27 These rather limited references indicate that, in 
                                                          
26 Biodiversity Convention 1992, preamble, ¶12, art 8(j). 
27 Nagoya Protocol 2010, art 12. 
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some circumstances, states take into account other views of the environment, and not just as 
a commodity or resource.  
1.3 Low-Level Integration 
The majority of the documents include references and provisions relating to the 
environment that maintain the dominant perception of the environment-as-commodity. I 
found that the documents developed and adopted prior to the Rio Conference generally 
include low-level integration of the ecofeminist values of inclusiveness, structural pluralism, 
contextualism and openness in relation to the environment. As noted above, this may be 
because the documents were developed prior to the birth of ecofeminist theory and other 
ecological and feminist critiques of international responses to environmental degradation 
and development concerns. Nevertheless, the language used in the documents can be used to 
identify the ‘benchmark’ for what the dominant representation of the environment looks 
like. Furthermore, the documents developed and created in the Rio and post-Rio period 
suggest that the dominant perception of the environment-as-commodity has generally been 
consolidated.  
1.3.1 Sustainable Development 
The documents developed during the 1972 Stockholm Conference adopt an 
anthropocentric perspective of the environment. The content of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration does not recognise the interrelated and integrated relationship between 
humanity and ecological systems. The declaration and the Stockholm Action Plan maintain 
a view of humanity as disembedded and disembodied from the environment. This may 
occur because these documents were created and adopted at the cusp of the environmental 
movement. However, the Stockholm Declaration and Stockholm Action Plan are considered 
as some of the foundational documents for the international community’s response to 
environmental and development problems.28 Therefore, this anthropocentric perspective 
may have had significant influence on subsequent approaches to environmental problems.  
The Stockholm Declaration and the Stockholm Plan of Action maintain the dominant 
perception of the environment. Unlike the later sustainable development documents, these 
outcome documents include few references that took into account differences between 
communities which may affect the way in which they experience the environment and 
environmental degradation. Further, they did not include provisions supporting the 
protection of cultural practices or traditional knowledge. This suggests that states did not 
recognise that human/environment interactions are context specific and may generate 
different knowledge frameworks depending on location, culture, geography, and other 
contexts. Nor do these documents take into account to any great degree, support for 
                                                          
28 Brunnée, ‘The Stockholm Declaration', 2. 
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different knowledge, values, and experiences of the environment to be disseminated into the 
public sphere.  
The post-2001 documents also display low-level integration of the ecofeminist values. 
Many of the references to the environment in the adopted outcome documents maintain 
separation between humanity and the environment. This was noticeable in the content of 
the 2000 Millennium Declaration and in the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Both of these 
documents were created and adopted by the UNGA and demonstrate lower level 
participation by NSAs. The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation and the later Rio+20 Outcome Document similarly maintained a separation 
between humanity and the environment in their references to the environment.  
However, unlike the later adopted outcome documents in the sustainable development 
regime, the Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit Outcome include few 
references that support the dissemination of cultural diversity, values, and experiences of the 
environment in the public sphere. Furthermore, they include few provisions that recognise 
the differences between communities in their references to the environment. These findings 
suggest that the later sustainable development outcome documents may increasingly 
consolidate the dominant perception of the environment as a commodity or resource for 
economic development.  
1.3.2 Climate Change 
The documents produced by the INC/FCCC refer to the environment in separating, 
dissociative language. This may indicate that the participants in the negotiation process took 
an anthropocentric perspective of the human/environment interrelationship. The 
continuing development of the climate change regime further exemplifies this trend. The 
documents produced by the BSWG, AWG-KP, and the AWG-LCA contain few references 
to the environment at all. The references present in the documents refer to the environment 
in anthropocentric terms and indicated little consideration that other cultures and traditions 
may view and experience their environment differently.  
1.3.3 Natural Resources: Tropical Timber, Fisheries, UN Watercourses & Biodiversity 
The other natural resource regimes analysed in the thesis similarly reveal a consolidation 
of the dominant perception of the environment as a commodity. The preparatory 
documents by the Fish Stocks Conference, and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement itself 
contained few references to the environment. Those present did not reflect inclusiveness 
because they positioned the environment as separate and subordinate to the well-being of 
human beings. The references to traditional knowledge support the protection of traditional 
and local practices to the extent that they could be used for the sustainable conservation and 
exploitation of this natural resource. This indicates a domination of other cultures by 
western, Eurocentric culture instead of a more contextual and plural understanding. 
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Furthermore, the documents do not include any provisions that support the open 
dissemination and endorsement of alternative forms of knowing in which the environment 
may not be seen as a, subordinate or distinct entity.  
Other natural resources regimes echo the above finding. The reports by the International 
Law Commission during the creation of the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention contains 
significant discussions concerning the biophysical, hydrological, and geological aspects of 
watercourses. The language used to discuss these considerations reaffirms and maintains 
separation between humanity and the environment. In the documents, the central interests 
were those of states and their sovereignty, rather than recognising the complex 
interrelationships between humans and the environment. The UN Watercourse Convention 
maintains this perspective and includes very few provisions that challenge the dominant 
framework of human/environment interrelationships. Unlike the Biodiversity Convention 
and the Nagoya Protocol, I found that the content of the UN Watercourses Convention 
included very little recognition of different types of knowledge, experience, and 
understanding of the environment. This low-level integration was similarly contained in the 
content of the 1983, 1994, and 2006 ITTAs.  
Therefore, my findings suggest that the representation of the environment continues to 
be as a resource or commodity to be utilised for human interests. Very few of the documents 
analysed included references to the environment that subverted this dominant view of the 
environment. Where such references were found, they were contained in the preparatory 
documents produced in forums with more inclusive participatory practices, such as the 
preparatory reports for the different sustainable development conferences, and in the INCD. 
However, the above analysis reveals that the later documents have consolidated the 
dominant perspective of the environment. This is notable in the climate change, natural 
resources, and later sustainable development documents. These initial findings share 
similarities with those found in Chapter 5, as my findings indicate that the extent to which 
the regime supported the inclusive participation by NSAs has some bearing on the way in 
which the documents refer to the environment.  
In addition, the documents consistently maintained an anthropocentric perception of the 
environment. These findings suggest that the dominant perspective been consolidated in 
later documents with the commoditisation of the environment being included as a 
mechanism for its protection. This is further consolidated in the references to traditional 
knowledge. Many of the documents supported the utilisation of traditional and cultural 
practices for the purpose of economic and sustainable development. These findings suggest 
that the prioritisation of the economic and development considerations has altered the way 
in which the international community views the environment. I will unpack these findings 
in the following discussion and examine the underlying assumptions, values, and beliefs that 
inform the representations of the environment included in the documents. In doing so, I 
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hope to reveal any assumptions and values that are shared between the content of the IEL 
documents and the environment/security discourse. This can identify the extent to which 
these shared values, if any are found, may have altered not only the basis for which states 
seek to protect the environment but the perception of the environment itself within IEL.  
2. ANALYSIS 
In the introduction to this chapter, I gave a brief overview of the critiques of the 
dominant social paradigm and the way in which western culture subordinates and devalues 
the environment. I suggested that many of the assumptions, values and beliefs that 
ecofeminists, and other critical approaches, identify as exploitative and destructive are 
reflected in the arguments linking security and the environment together.29 In the following 
discussion, I will draw on these criticisms and examine the representation of the 
environment in the documents.  
2.1 Inclusivity  
Both anthropocentrism and androcentricsm are central to the documents’ approaches 
towards the environment. This is because these documents place humans at the centre of 
international considerations surrounding the environment. These constructions also 
maintain that humans belong to a superior, rational sphere that is made up of exclusively 
‘human ethics, technology, and culture dissociated from nature and ecology.’30 This 
perspective has been criticised because rationalist constructions of anthropocentrism and 
their associated exclusions have supported western culture. They also maintain the 
economic rationality of capitalism to achieve the dominant position ‘by maximising the class 
of other beings that are available as ‘resources’ for exploitation without support.’31 As I will 
discuss below, the documents from the sustainable development, desertification, and climate 
change regimes reveal these underlying structures in their references to the environment 
and the associated arguments for the commoditisation and exploitation of the environment 
for sustainable development. These assumptions share striking similarities with those that 
inform the securitisation of the environment discussed in Chapter 2.  
Very few of the documents contained references that recognised human beings as 
integrated and part of an ecological system. Instead, they incorporated an anthropocentric 
worldview and placed human beings and their interests as the central consideration when 
addressing environmental concerns. The use of such anthropocentric and androcentric 
language suggests that exploitative and gendered conceptual frameworks that underpin the 
dominant and rational discourses in western society have been integrated into the content of 
                                                          
29 Above, Chapter 7, 231-233; Chapter 3, 89-95; Chapter 2, 73-75.   
30 Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 99. 
31 Ibid, 100. 
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these IEL documents.32 As these conceptual frameworks function as a ‘socially constructed 
lens through which one perceives reality,’33 it could suggest that the creators of 
environmental law continue to exclude, devalue and subordinate human others and the 
environment. 
Val Plumwood argues that, historically, anthropocentrism and androcentricsm have been 
‘intimately connected’ within the western philosophical tradition.34 Plumwood argues that 
anthropocentrism has taken the form of androcentricsm in many contexts.35 
Androcentricsm refers to ‘male-centred thinking that assumes the superiority of men over 
women,’36 that ‘naturalises and justifies a certain sort of self-centredness, self-imposition, 
and dispossession, [and] provides… a very distorted framework for perception of the 
other.’37 This anthropocentric framework is built on logical structures which create a ‘false 
universalism in culture in which the experiences of the dominant ‘centre’ are represented as 
universal, and the experiences of those subordinated in the structure are rendered as 
secondary, or irrational.’38 Therefore, alternatives to these structures are rendered invisible 
once the master standpoint has become part of the framework of thought. Both 
anthropocentric and androcentric frameworks may be seen in the environmental 
documents.  
For example, the founding documents of the contemporary responses to transboundary 
environmental problems contain androcentric and anthropocentric language. This is seen in 
UNGA Resolution 2581 (1969), convening the Stockholm Conference, which refers to the 
‘human environment.’39 The Stockholm Conference Preparatory Committee reports include 
provisions that refer to the ‘human environment,’40 ‘man's environment’41 and to ‘man and 
his environment.’42 These references indicate both a possessive perception of the 
environment, and a gendered perception of the environment where women are silenced as 
well.43  
                                                          
32 Above, Chapter 2, section 3.2.  
33 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 46. 
34 Ibid, 24. 
35 Plumwood, 'Nature, Self and Gender', 22. 
36 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 24. 
37 Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 118. 
38 Ibid, 99. 
39 UNGA Res 2581 (XXIV) (1969), preamble, ¶6.  
40 ECOSOC, Problems of the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary-General (New York) (26 May 1969) 
UN Doc E/4667, ¶71; see also UNGA Res 2581 (XXIV) (1969), ¶2. 
41 UNGA, 'Agenda Item 21: Problems of the Human Environment. Report of the Secretary-General' (15 
December 1969) UN Doc A/PV.1834, ¶77; see also UNGA Res 2398 (XXIII) (1968), preamble ¶5. 
42 UNGA Res 2398 (XXIII) (1968), preamble, ¶4; see also Report of the Preparatory Committee for the UNCHE. 
1st Session (1970), ¶19. 
43 Charlesworth, 'Feminist Methods in International Law', 382; Mallory, ‘Ecofeminist Environmental 
Jurisprudence’, 13; Gaard, 'Women, Water, Energy', 159  
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Similarly, the Preamble to the Stockholm Declaration states that ‘man is both creature 
and moulder of his environment, which gives him physical sustenance and affords him the 
opportunity for intellectual, moral, social, and spiritual growth.’44 Principle 1 affirms that 
‘man has the fundamental right to … adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a 
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to 
protect and improve the environment.’45 The Stockholm Action Plan suggests that particular 
attention should be paid to those species of wildlife that may serve as indicators for future 
wide environmental disturbances, and an ultimate impact upon human populations.’46 
These references place ‘man’ central in the international communities' environmental 
response. This marginalises women, and positions the environment as subordinate to the 
androcentric interests of ‘man.’ The content of these reports and the adopted outcome 
documents from the Stockholm Conference indicate that the early foundations of the 
sustainable development concept and international responses to environmental degradation 
that incorporated an androcentric model. This meant that male-oriented values, beliefs, and 
assumptions were considered the standard, and the environment was defined and perceived 
in relation to these standards.47  
The above analysis indicates that the earliest sustainable development documents 
incorporated anthropocentric and androcentric references to the environment. These 
references suggest that the participants, and those who drafted the documents, sought to 
conserve the environment as a resource to be used to pursue economic and development 
goals in order to attain human well-being and security. In doing so, the documents 
incorporated value dualisms that legitimised the exploitation of the environment for the 
benefit of dominant groups of humans. 
This anthropocentric approach is explicitly incorporated in the Principle 1 of the Rio 
Declaration as the basis for any response to the interrelated concerns of underdevelopment 
and environmental degradation.48 As will be discussed below, other principles contained in 
the Rio Declaration instrumentalise the usefulness of women, indigenous peoples, and local 
communities and their value for the purpose of attaining sustainable development and 
addressing the drivers of underdevelopment.49 This has similarities with the conclusions 
from the previous chapter which indicated that the prioritisation of economic and 
development considerations were made on the basis that such activities can be used to 
achieve environmental objectives. This instrumentalises the environment and maintains an 
anthropocentric perspective of human/environment relationships.  
                                                          
44 Stockholm Declaration 1972, preamble ¶1. 
45 Ibid, Principle 1; see also Principle 4. 
46 Stockholm Action Plan 1972, Recommendation 29; see also Recommendations 76, 79, 89, and 108. 
47 Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 20, and 22-23. 
48 Rio Declaration 1992, Principle 1.  
49 E.g. Ibid, Principle 20 and 22. Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 108-109. 
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The later sustainable development and climate change documents display an extension of 
the human-centric model in which ‘economic rationalism’ is mapped onto androcentric 
structures and the radical separation of male-coded reason from female-coded spheres of 
emotions and the body.50 The UNGA resolutions convening the Johannesburg Summit and 
the Rio+20 Conference refer to the environment as the ‘natural resource base for economic 
and social development.’51 This perspective is reaffirmed in the preparatory reports which 
state that a ‘people-centred approach should be taken to sustainable development.’52 
Similarly, the objectives for the Rio+20 Conference state that that ‘managing the natural 
resource base of economic and social development are the overarching objectives of and 
essential requirements for sustainable development.’53 The content of UNGA Resolution 
64/236 (2010), which convened the Rio+20 Conference, similarly prioritises the role of the 
environment as a producer and resource base for economic and social development.54 This 
perception in turn informs the justifications for the environment’s protection.  
These statements reaffirm the priority of economic development and defines the value of 
the environment solely in terms of its economic and social value. The inclusion of non-
environmental considerations such as economic development into the sustainable 
development paradigm consolidates the positioning of humanity as disembodied and 
disembedded from the ecological systems which sustain both humanity and other 
nonhuman species.55 In doing so, these documents indicate that the androcentric 
perspective revealed in the Stockholm Declaration and Stockholm Action Plan has been 
refined and consolidated in the later documents. This suggests that the current sustainable 
development documents have incorporated economic rationalism into the sustainable 
development paradigm. This extends the underlying structures of androcentricsm and 
therefore maintains and reinforces the logical structures that subordinate, instrumentalise 
and backgrounds the environment and human others, while prioritising the interests and 
needs of the economic elite.56   
This perspective of the environment legitimises its exploitation for the benefit of 
humanity, and discussed previously, informs the arguments used to support its protection. 
Many of the arguments supporting the protection of the environment were framed in 
economic rationalism, in which the free market could be used to incentivise environmental 
                                                          
50 Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 20-22. 
51 Rio+20 Outcome Document (2012), ¶3; Johannesburg Declaration (2002), ¶11; Plan of Implementation 2002, 
¶2; Report of the Preparatory Committee of the WSSD. 4th Session (2002), Annex I ¶3; World Summit Outcome 
(2005), ¶22(g). 
52 Report of the Preparatory Committee of the WSSD. 4th Session (2002), Annex ¶3. 
53 UNGA Res 64/236 (2009), preamble ¶12; see also UNGA Res 65/152 (2010), preamble ¶9; Report of the 
Preparatory Committee for the UNCSD. 1st Session (2010), Annex I ¶57. 
54 UNGA Res 64/236 (2009), preamble ¶12. 
55 Mellor, 'Ecofeminist Political Economy', 143; Mellor, 'Women, Nature', 138.  
56 Plumwood, Environmental Culture, 83. 
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conservation, and also support the economic development of developing countries. Similar 
arguments were used to promote sustainable development as the solution to conflict and 
insecurity by supporting the economic growth and development of conflict prone 
countries.57 This analysis indicates that the dominant perception of the environment 
informs the arguments supporting the inclusion of non-environmental considerations into 
IEL. It may also signal that the environment/security connections may simply be a 
manifestation of the dominant social paradigm which views the environment as a resource 
or commodity.  
Furthermore, many of the documents referred to the environment as a commodity and 
privileged this view of the environment in their text. Ecofeminists argue that 
anthropocentrism legitimises the exploitation of the environment and thus reinforces the 
perception of the environment either as a resource or commodity.58 For example, the Rio 
Preparatory Committee reports contain references that reduce the environment to 
individual components to be utilised for sustainable development. Decision 1/20 (1990) and 
Decision 1/14 (1990) both emphasise the value of specific natural resources for sustainable 
development. Decision 1/20 refers to developing measures for the ‘conservation, rational 
use, and sustainable development of living resources of the high seas.’59 Decision 1/14 
includes similar references viewing non-living natural resources in terms of their potential 
to support (economic) development through rational usage and sustainable management.60 
These references to the environment reduce complex ecological systems into discrete 
components that can be commoditised and utilised for the purpose of economic growth and 
social development.61 This is indicative of an anthropocentric perception of the 
environment, and the resulting commoditisation of the environment itself.  
                                                          
57 Above, Chapter 2, 59-73. 
58 Above, Chapter 3, 95-98; see also, Chapter 4, 113-114. 
59Decision 1/20 'Protection of the Oceans and all kinds of Seas, including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, and 
Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of their Living Resources' in Report of the 
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UN GAOR 45th 
Session, Supplement No 46) (1991) UN Doc A/45/46 Annex I (31 August 1990), ¶1(p); see also Decision 1/14 
'Combating Deforestation' in Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nation Conference on 
Environment and Development (UN GAOR 45th Session, Supplement No 46) (1991) UN Doc A/45/46 Annex I 
(30 August 1990), ¶2(d), ¶2(e), ¶2(h); Decision 1/11 'Climate Change' in Report of the Preparatory Committee 
for the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, General Assembly Supplement No. 46 (31 August 
1990) UN Doc A/45/46 (Annex I) (30 August 1990), ¶(b); Decision 1/16 'Conservation of Biological Diversity' in 
Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nation Conference on Environment and Development (UN 
GAOR 45th Session, Supplement No 46) (1991) UN Doc A/45/46 Annex I (30 August 1990), ¶(a) 
60 Decision 1/14 (1990) Combating Deforestation (30 August 1990), ¶2(d), ¶2(e), ¶2(h); Decision 1/11 (1990) 
Climate Change (30 August 1990) ¶(b); Decision 1/16 (1991) Conservation of Biological Diversity (30 August 
1990) ¶(a). 
61 INC/FCCC, 'Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on 
Climate Change on the work of its First Session, held at Washington, DC from 4 to 14 February 1991' (8 March 
1991) UN Doc A/AC.237/6, ¶26 and ¶46; Report of the INC/FCCC. 2nd Session (1991), ¶51; above, Chapter 5, 
section 2.1. 
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The extension of the androcentric, rationalist model is evident in the content of the 
climate change documents where the documents privilege market mechanisms and 
processes as dominant response in reducing carbon emissions. This approach transforms 
nature into profit through processes that erode and pollute it.62 This is seen in the 1992 
UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.63 During the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, 
state participants supported the use of market measures to promote emissions reductions 
and support sustainable development. The participants argued that the use of such measures 
would support efficiency in emissions reductions, while also supporting the economic 
development in developing countries. This analysis suggests that the participants in the 
AGBM viewed the environment in terms of what it could provide for economic gains.64 
These references indicate a commoditisation of the environment, in order for it to be traded 
on newly-established markets.65  
The Kyoto Protocol operationalises the overall objective of the UNFCCC for Annex I 
Parties in a way that reflects the commoditisation of the environment. This is because it 
transforms components of the global atmosphere into economic goods. The flexibility 
mechanisms introduced in the protocol structures emissions reductions in economic terms 
by placing cost-effectiveness and flexibility at the centre of greenhouse gas mitigation 
strategies.66 While Article 3 establishes the core obligations in the protocol, parties to the 
protocol may individually choose the mechanisms or policies necessary to implement their 
obligations.67 Article 17 introduces the option of ‘trading’ unused ‘emission’ quotas to 
another participating party.68 Other mechanisms are included in the protocol that allow 
Annex I Parties to contribute to projects in developing states to achieve sustainable 
development, contribute to the objectives of the UNFCCC, and assist parties in meeting 
their targets.69 These two approach emissions reductions as a commercial venture that 
enables the environment to be privatised as part of the response to environmental 
problems.70 
Chapter 6 identified an expansion of the use of market mechanisms and the 
incorporation of the free-market environmental protection during the post-2001 period. 
                                                          
62 Mellor, Feminism & Ecology, 62. 
63 UNFCCC 1992, art 2 and art 3(1). 
64 Braidotti and others, Women, the Environment, 149-150. 
65 UNFCCC AGBM, 'Report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate on its First Session, held at Geneva 
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This chapter suggests that the use of market mechanisms commoditises the environment 
and maintains the disembeddedness of the market from any ‘social responsibility or any 
recognition of our embedment in a constraining ecological order.’71 This commoditisation is 
seen in the transformation of ecological functions to ecological ‘services’ that can then be 
traded or sold on international markets to ‘incentivise’ conservation and the sustainable 
management of the environment.72 The concept of ‘ecosystem services’ itself has been 
criticised as an ‘exploitative and androcentric construction of the living order which 
continues to perpetuate a hierarchical way of thinking that separates humans from nature 
and renders nature subordinate.’73 Therefore, redefining ecological functions as ‘services’ in 
international responses to environmental problems may recast the environment as 
providing a ‘service’ to humanity without examining the exploitative ideology that is implicit 
in the language.74 
The desertification and sustainable development regimes promote the use of ecosystem 
services as a solution to protect degrading ecosystems while maintaining economic growth 
and achieving sustainable development objectives. The CRIC note that payment for 
ecosystem services could offer potential for sustainable livelihoods and provide additional 
incentives to ensure resource conservations.75 Their reports suggest that the concept of ‘the 
ecosystem services approach’ can provide a renewed focus on the socio-economic 
significance of these services in the drylands.76 However, some participants challenged the 
assumptions informing the concept and argued that its effectiveness was not yet 
established.77 These discussions suggests that there is a growing focus on commercialising 
nonhuman nature as part of its protection and a perception of the environment in terms of 
profitable products and services.78  
Similarly, the High-Level Ministerial Segment during the preparatory process for the 
Johannesburg Summit include proposals to swap debt for ecological services to support 
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LDCs.79 The Johannesburg Summit Report states that ecosystems ‘generate a wide range of 
goods and services on which the world economy depends.’80 The notion of ‘payment for 
ecosystem services’ and the use of ecological services to support economic growth and 
sustainability is further contained in the Rio+20 Preparatory Committee reports, and in the 
submissions by state and NSA participants. The preparatory committee report notes that 
several delegations proposed an evaluation of the costing of ecosystem services and 
internalising of environmental externalities as key elements of a green economy, as well as 
green accounting,’81 Submissions by states and NSAs to the ‘zero draft’ compilation 
document proposed that ecosystem services should be an integral part of an ecosystem that 
promotes sustainable growth and human well-being.82 These examples indicate the support 
for the approach in both the sustainable development and desertification regimes. 
The incorporation of reducing carbon emissions by reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries (REDD) in the climate change regime may be seen as 
the most comprehensive example of commoditising the environment.83 The AWG-LCA and 
AWG-KP reports include references to REDD activities as a way to incentivise the ‘the 
protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance 
other social and environmental benefits.’84 The AWG-KP reports consolidated this 
perception of natural forests as ‘ecosystem services’ by referring to them as ‘stocks’ which 
have a monetary ‘external global benefit’ to the climate system and have ‘socially optimal 
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area[s] of forest retention.’85 Similar views of the environment are contained in the parties’ 
submissions to the AWG-LCA. Some parties suggest that REDD may be ‘one of the most 
cost-effective means to reduce emissions in the short term,’86 and that a ‘well designed 
market-linked approach can contribute to long-term action.’87 These statements suggest that 
economic and development considerations have been privileged in recent discussions. They 
indicate that economic rationalism has informed these arguments as they seek to monetise 
the environment and trade it on global markets.  
Therefore, ecosystem services may be seen as a manifestation of economic rationalism 
because it seeks to translate the protection of the environment itself into an economic 
process, thereby disembedding ecosystems themselves. The above references reveal that the 
conceptual frameworks and logical structures informing these arguments continue to view 
the environment as separate and subordinate, therefore legitimising its exploitation and 
reinforcing its value as a commodity or resource for economic gain. This use of distancing, 
rationalist, and economic language in the documents enclose nonhuman nature and 
privatise natural environments.88 In doing so, the language maintains the hierarchical 
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dualisms of western culture in which the abstract, autonomous, individual is universalised.89 
This reinforces the subordination of nonhuman nature and individuals who are unable to 
achieve the power to function independently, economically, socially, or politically.90  
The commoditisation of the environment continues to maintain dominant assumptions 
and conceptual frameworks that position hu(man)ity as external to, and transcending the 
living and natural world.91 The use of commoditising language reflects a desire to subject 
environmental conservation to the whims of the global economy and is suggestive that the 
value of the environment relates to the products and services, which are profitable. Thus the 
inclusion of sustainable development and international economic and trade interests in IEL 
has consolidated the perception of the environment in terms of its economic value as a 
commodity, service, and producer, and does not take into account the other ways in which 
human/environment connections may be manifested. 
Turning to the environment/security literature, and the references to ‘security’ contained 
in the IEL documents, I suggest that the emerging connections between the environment 
and security are a manifestation of the perception of the environment as a commodity or 
resource that needs to be secured for potential economic gain. Should this be the case, this 
analysis supports the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter that the connections 
between environment and security in international discourse has altered the basis for which 
states seek to protect the environment. This is because they emphasise the importance of 
economic growth and sustainable development as the dominant approach to responding to 
the interrelated problems of underdevelopment, insecurity, and environmental degradation.  
In the literature review, I identified that many of the concerns relating to environmental 
degradation, conflict, and insecurity referred to the environment as a resource for 
sustainable development and as a commodity for economic growth. I suggested that the 
research connecting natural resources and conflict framed the environment as a resource or 
commodity that individuals, communities, and states competed over.92 This perception of 
the environment is evident in publications by UNEP, the UNDP and by states who 
promoted sustainable development activities as a solution to address the drivers of 
underdevelopment and insecurity.93 These examples highlight the similarities in the way in 
which the documents refer to the environment and support commoditisation and 
exploitation of it for benefit of individuals.  
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The preceding analysis suggests that the representation of the environment in the IEL 
documents and security documents is informed by the same androcentric conceptual model. 
This similarity in the logical structures and conceptual frameworks that shape the way in 
which the international community views the environment in IEL and in security discourses 
suggests that concerns over environmental degradation exacerbating insecurity stem from a 
shared view of the environment as separate, subordinate, and as a resource. Thus, while the 
environment/security connections may increasingly be prioritising sustainable development 
and economic growth as the solutions to the shared problems of environmental degradation, 
underdevelopment, and insecurity, the assumptions and beliefs that inform this 
prioritisation stem from shared conceptual frameworks and logical structures that are 
reflected in the content of both types of documents. 
The emerging references to ‘security’ in the IEL documents reflect these shared 
perceptions of the environment. The post-Cold War sustainable development documents 
include some provisions that make explicit connections between environment degradation, 
increasing productivity, and attaining security. UNGA Resolution 42/186 (1987) encourages 
farmers to adopt practices that are ‘ecologically sustainable in their own areas and promote 
national food security.’94 In the post-2001 sustainable development documents, references to 
food security made the connection between increasing the productive capacity of the 
environment and attaining broader goals of sustainable development more explicit. The 
references reveal the influence of economic rationalism and the reliance on economic 
growth to support development and attain security. The contribution by UNEP and UNDP 
to the ‘Zero Draft’ Outcome Document of the Rio+20 Conference both state that ‘growth 
must lead to strengthened resilience – of households, ecosystems, and economies, and 
improved water, food, and nutrition security.’95 Similarly, the Nature Conservancy and the 
World Bank Group both connect the use of the private sector and the commodification of 
ecosystem services for food security and poverty alleviation.96 These references associate the 
productive capacity of the environment with attaining security. This reinforces the 
anthropocentric perspective of the environment, which my analysis indicates is the 
foundation of the paradigm of sustainable development, and in the economic rationalism 
that also informs international responses to insecurity and environmental degradation.  
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and Rio+20 Outcome Document also include 
references that connect the productiveness of the environment with attaining development 
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goals, economic growth and achieving human security. The Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation calls for action to enhance the productivity and efficiency of land and water 
resources.97 It refers to the need to develop public-private partnerships aimed at ‘increasing 
agricultural production and food security.’98 It identifies marine resources as ‘critical for 
global food security and for sustaining economic prosperity.’ 99 Similarly, the Rio+20 
Outcome Document refers to the role of farmers in contributing to sustainable development 
‘through production activities that … enhance food security … and invigorate production 
and … sustained economic growth.’100 Subsequent provisions concerning marine resources, 
biodiversity, and mountain ecosystems also associate the productive capacity of the 
environment with attaining food security, human security, and economic growth.101 These 
references suggest that responses to the perceived insecurity of access to food has been 
subject to economic rationalism which reinforce the anthropocentric perspective of the 
environment. This analysis indicates that the connections between security and the 
environment in the IEL documents reinforce the dominant perception of the environment 
as a commodity or resource for human well-being.  
This perspective of the environment is ingrained within the paradigm of sustainable 
development. Both the Stockholm Declaration and Rio Declaration explicitly place humans 
as the central concern for any international responses to environmental concerns, and this 
anthropocentric approach has been refined in the later environmental documents. The post-
Cold War period consolidated and expanded this anthropocentric perspective by subjecting 
environmental considerations to economic rationalism and thus reinforcing the perception 
of the environment, and some subordinate groups as resources for economic and 
development objectives. Building on this, I suggest that the connections between security 
and the environment in the IEL documents reinforce this perspective of the environment 
and thus indicate that assumptions and beliefs that inform this prioritisation stem from 
shared conceptual frameworks and logical structures that are reflected in the content of both 
types of documents.  
Unlike in the previous chapters, this chapter’s analysis suggests that the forum, age of the 
document, and type of document has little bearing on the way in which the environment in 
represented it its contents. Furthermore, it indicates that even where the regime supports the 
inclusive participation by NSAs, the representation of the environment in the adopted 
outcome document remains informed by the dominant social paradigm in which the 
environment is viewed as a resource or commodity to be shaped and manipulated by 
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humanity for solely human benefit.102 This disconnect is noticeable in the post-2001 
desertification and sustainable development regimes that supported the inclusive 
participation by NSAs, and whose adopted outcome document contained inherent 
anthropocentric perceptions of the environment as subordinate and as a resource to be use 
for human purposes. This perception of the environment is incorporated into dominant 
social paradigm in which other uses of the environment are silenced, and those communities 
who do not perceive the environment in this way are assimilated and dominated. The issue 
of domination will be examined in the next section.  
2.2 Structural Pluralism 
One of the main criticisms of anthropocentrism is that its chief structural features sets up 
one group as the ‘privileged centre’ and defines others as secondary or derivative in relation 
to it.103 In this way, anthropocentrism shares the same conceptual structure with 
ethnocentrism, eurocentrism, sexism, and racism.104 As noted in Chapter 3, these ‘isms of 
domination’ are mutually supportive and confirm one another.105 Logical characteristics of 
radical exclusion, backgrounding, assimilation, and instrumentalism serve to maintain the 
privilege of the central group by maintaining power and subjecting others to either 
assimilate into the dominant cultural concepts and identities, or to remain ‘other’ and 
separate and subordinate.106 This is in contrast with the ecofeminist value of structural 
pluralism which recognises the interconnections between humans and the environment 
while also acknowledging that the different features of communities mean that they 
experience and perceive their local environment differently.107 Therefore, it supports 
individuals and communities to live with ecological integrity by recognising that their 
differences may affect the ‘choices’ each community may make in relation to their 
interconnection and relationship with the environment.108 
In this section, I suggest that the references to the environment reveal that the IEL 
documents assimilate different communities’ experiences and views of their local 
environment into the dominant conceptual model that views the environment as a 
commodity or resource for economic gain. In doing so, few of the documents recognise the 
differences between communities and that their experiences may mean they view 
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human/environment relationships differently.109 Instead, these documents indicate that the 
international community view difference in terms of ‘deficiency’, measured in economic and 
developmental terms.110 I suggest that these references reflect similar assumptions that 
inform the securitisation of non-traditional threats discussed in the literature review and 
indicate that environment/security connections may be a manifestation of a broader 
conceptual structure that informs both IEL and security.  
Once again, the documents that incorporate some references to the environment 
recognising and supporting difference were developed in environmental regimes that 
encouraged inclusive participation by NSAs. The documents from the sustainable 
development regimes recognise the different ways in which specific communities, such as 
indigenous peoples and local communities, utilise and experience their local environment. 
The Rio Conference’s preparatory documents recognise the special relationship that 
indigenous peoples and local communities have with their environment.111 This suggests 
that the participants at the Rio Conference recognised that natural resources and ecosystems 
‘continues to be essential to the cultural, social, economic and physical well-being of 
indigenous people and local communities.’112 Similar provisions are also contained in 
Agenda 21. Chapter 10 takes into account the ‘weaknesses in the policies, methods and 
mechanisms adopted to support and develop the multiple ecological, economic, social and 
cultural roles of trees, forests, and forest lands.’113 It recognises the different roles that local 
resources, such as forests, may play in different communities. These statements suggest that 
states presuppose and maintain difference between communities because they acknowledge 
that such communities utilise and experience the environment differently. 
Similar statements are included in the Johannesburg Summit and Rio+20 Conference 
outcome documents. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and Rio+20 Outcome 
Document both take into account the vital role of biodiversity as a critical foundation for 
sustainable development and human well-being. They both acknowledge the role of 
biodiversity in the cultural, social, and economic lives of the poor and indigenous 
communities. For example, the Plan of Implementation calls for action to develop policies 
that recognise that ‘traditional and direct dependence on renewable resources and 
ecosystems … continues to be essential to [the] cultural … and physical well-being of 
indigenous people and their communities.’114 The Rio+20 Outcome Document similarly 
recognises that ‘many people, especially the poor, depend directly on ecosystems for their 
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livelihoods … and their cultural heritage.115These provisions recognise that the relationship 
between indigenous communities and their environment can be affected by social, 
economic, and cultural factors. In doing so, they indicate that in some contexts, the 
international community recognised that the different situations, cultures, and experiences 
of communities alter the way in which they view and experience nonhuman nature.  
However, the analysis undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6 suggests that these differences are 
supported only to the extent that they may contribute to sustainable development and 
economic growth. The references to the environment in these provisions indicates that they 
have integrated the dominant perception of the environment. In this way, they suggest that 
the international community recognises and celebrates ‘difference’ insofar as it can be 
assimilated into the dominant social paradigm, in which the environment is viewed as a 
commodity or resource for human interests. For example, Agenda 21 proposes that that 
state governments should ‘maintain and increase the ecological, biological, climatic, socio-
cultural and economic contributions of forest resources.’116 Once again, the language in this 
statement starts from the position that humanity is separate and distinct from nonhuman 
nature – a statement that does not recognise the differences between communities and the 
way in which they may position themselves differently in relation to the environment. 
Furthermore, analysis of the documents suggests that the international community 
acknowledged that ecological and geographic differences may affect the ability of some 
communities and states to achieve sustainable development. The recognition of such 
objective and measurable factors may take into account the differences between 
communities and that such differences may alter the way in which individuals interact with 
their communities. These differences were identified by the participants in the drafting of 
the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, who recognised that the 
international management of water will likely call for different solutions, depending on the 
geographic situation.117 A similar focus on the management of shared resources is contained 
in the reports by the BSWG, which noted that action would need to take into account the 
different behaviour of living modified organisms in ecosystems and geographical regions.118 
The Johannesburg Summit preparatory reports focused on the transboundary challenges 
facing the ‘management and equitable use of natural resources.’119 Each of these forums 
emphasised the importance of action at the regional or sub-regional level in order to ensure 
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natural resource management.120 These references recognise that objective factors such as 
geographic location and ecological specificities may alter the attainment of sustainable 
development. However, the underlying assumption in these references is that such 
communities may use and interact with their environment in ways that are informed by the 
human/environment dichotomy which legitimises the exploitation of such ecological 
resources.  
This process of assimilation is repeated in the natural resource agreements. As noted 
previously, the ITTAs include few references supporting the inclusive participation by local 
communities and prioritises the economic and development opportunities from tropical 
timber exploitation. The few references that refer to the environment frame tropical forests 
in terms of the services that it provides to local communities and states. For example, the 
1994 ITTA mentions in passing the need to consider the interests of local communities, 
while emphasising the importance of tropical timber in sustainable development.121 
Similarly, the 2006 ITTA refers to the ‘multiple economic, environmental and social benefits 
provided by forests… and the contribution of sustainable forest management to sustainable 
development.’122 These documents universalise one view of the environment and, in doing 
so, assimilate indigenous communities into it. In this way, these provisions reflect the 
dominant assumption that sustainable development is predicated on the exploitation of 
natural resources and do not take into account differences in cultural, social, political, and 
geographical factors that may alter the way in which individuals and communities interact 
with their environment. 
This assimilation of differences into the dominant paradigm shares similarities with the 
proposed solutions to conflicts over natural resources. Previously, I identified that much of 
the research concerning the relationship between security and the environment view natural 
resources solely in terms of its economic value to local communities and developing 
countries.123 This approach demonstrates many of the chief structural features of 
anthropocentrism by assimilating and instrumentalising the environment for the benefit of 
the ‘privileged centre’. This is particularly notable in the UNSC resolutions concerning the 
use of natural resources in the post-conflict reconstruction phase in Liberia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.124 Similarly, UN agencies and programmes, such as UNEP 
and UNDP, also demonstrate characteristics of assimilation and instrumentalising of local 
communities and indigenous peoples in their discussion of natural resources, post-conflict 
reconstruction, and human security. Both UNEP and UNDP emphasise the importance of 
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supporting the participation by marginalised communities and other vulnerable user groups 
in the creation of post-conflict natural resource management programmes.125 However, the 
assumptions informing these approaches seek to assimilate these social groups into the 
dominant social paradigm by undertaking programmes of sustainable development based 
on the exploitation of natural resources and commodification of traditional knowledge. 
These programmes may not take into account the differences between communities and 
their interaction with the local environment. This analysis suggests that the 
environment/security connection is a manifestation of the underlying perceptions of the 
environment.  
The analysis undertaken thus far supports the conclusions made earlier in this thesis. 
Chapter 5 concluded that support for the participation by different communities suggests 
that the international community recognised the diverse experiences and contexts in which 
common environmental concerns may have significantly different impacts. It proposed that 
participation has been encouraged to respond to potential national and international 
security risks caused by the marginalisation of communities. Similarly, Chapter 6 concluded 
that differentiation has been hotly contested in the context of the climate change. It 
identified that economic considerations were prioritised when taking into account 
differences between states. In both of these contexts, the references to the environment 
reflect a process of assimilation where other values, experiences, and understandings of the 
environment are backgrounded and the view of the environment taken by the privileged 
centre is imposed on the way in which the international community seeks to respond to the 
environment and associated concerns – such as economic development and security.  
This assimilation of difference is also evident in the references to the environment that 
deny agency on the behalf of local and indigenous communities. When discussing my 
analytical framework, I suggested that structural pluralism takes into account that the way in 
which communities experience their local environment may be affected by their location, 
class, race, gender, ethnicity, and social or cultural contexts.126 The analysis of the references 
to the environment suggests that very few of the environmental documents recognise that 
the specificity of location means that individuals and their communities interact with their 
environment differently, and that this will inform their choices concerning ecological 
integrity. Instead, the provisions indicate that the participants developing these 
environmental documents focus on the attainment of other international considerations, 
such as economic, development and security considerations. This suggests that once again, 
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the documents, while celebrating the ‘diversity’ of communities across the globe, 
universalise the dominant social paradigm in which the environment is viewed in terms of 
its productive capacity for economic and social development.  
The references to shared natural resources and their management reflect this 
universalism of the dominant social paradigm and its view of the environment. During the 
Cold War period and immediately afterward, the reports prepared by the AWG-LTB127 refer 
to the conservation and management of biodiversity as a contribution to the well-being of 
societies’ and their economies.128 The state-appointed experts comprising the working group 
refer to the potential for biotechnology to enhance the conservation and promote the 
rational use of biodiversity.129 These sentiments are repeated in the obligations and 
provisions in the adopted biodiversity convention.130 The underlying assumption of these 
statements reveals a universalisation of the perception of the environment as inert and 
therefore may be used to support local communities’ integration into the productive and 
capitalist markets.131 The proposed solution to this perceived ‘underdevelopment’ is through 
assimilating seemingly ‘backward’ communities into the productive economy through the 
use of technology, modern agrarian practices, and chemicals.132 The underlying assumption 
in these references indicates that states viewed economic development as the primary 
solution to causes of underdevelopment and poverty, without considering other cultural 
systems, land uses, or experiences of nature that may not view it purely as a resource.   
Similar assumptions are contained in the references concerning the importance of 
natural resource management for sustainable development in the post-Cold War sustainable 
development documents. Decision 2/13 (1991) refers to the need to quantify the ‘respective 
economic values’ of forest.133 References to the economic and development value of natural 
resources are also affirmed in the adopted outcome such Agenda 21 and the 1992 Statement 
of Forest Principles. The Forest Principles state that ‘forests are essential to economic 
development’134 and that ‘decisions taken on the management, conservation, and sustainable 
development of forest resources should benefit… from a comprehensive assessment of 
                                                          
127 Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Biological Diversity  
128 Decision 2/13 Combating Deforestation 'Combating Deforestation ' in Report of the Preparatory Committee 
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economic … values of forest goods’135 Chapter 11 of Agenda 21 identifies the ‘vast potential 
of forests and forest lands as a major resource for development’ that has not yet been fully 
realised.136 These references to forests and their economic values indicate that the dominant 
perception of the environment has been universalised within the foundational documents of 
sustainable development.  
Later sustainable development documents reaffirm this view. Chapter 6 discussed the 
introduction of the green economy and the commodification of the environment.137 The 
introduction of the green economy in the Rio+20 Outcome Document reveals a 
universalisation of the dominant social paradigm in which the environment is seen as 
separate, and subordinate. Therefore, while the Rio+20 Outcome Document acknowledges 
the cultural and social diversity of different indigenous peoples and local communities, 138 it 
emphasises the productivity of the environment, which is to be used for human purposes 
and human well-being.139 The emphasis on productivity of natural resources, agriculture 
and other uses of the environment is reaffirmed in other post-2001 environmental 
documents.140 These references reveal the underlying perception of the environment in the 
environmental documents. They suggest that the recognition of cultural and social diversity 
in these documents does not extend to recognise multiple perceptions of the environment. 
This universalisation rests on the assumption that development relies on the exploitation of 
natural resources for economic gain found in the environment/security literature.141 
The significance of this analysis is that these documents contain only passing references 
to the interconnections between humans and the environment which may be affected by the 
different factors that affect the way in which individuals and communities may interact and 
experience their environment. Where the documents recognise differences in culture, 
societies, location, and other factors, the references to the environment are still informed 
conceptual frameworks that are supported by damaging logical dualisms. Therefore, the 
overriding thrust of the provisions aim to incorporate such communities into the dominant 
paradigm in which humans and environment are viewed as separate and distinct. This does 
not reflect the ecofeminist value of structural pluralism because it does not acknowledge the 
plurality of ways in which communities may experience difference outside of one 
constructed in a dichotomy. Instead, the way in which different experiences have been taken 
                                                          
135 Ibid, ¶5(c); see also, ¶4, ¶7, ¶13. 
136 Agenda 21 1992, Chapter 11 ¶20.  
137 Above, Chapter 6, 195-196. 
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140 ECOSOC, 'Agriculture, Land and Desertification: Report of the Secretary General' (29 March 2001) 
E/CN.17/2001/PC/13, ¶13-¶16; Report of the Preparatory Committee for the WSSD. 2nd Session (2002), Annex I 
¶53, ¶63-¶71. 
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into consideration presents a universalisation of the dominant paradigm of the environment 
as separate, and as a commodity.  
These conclusions support my previous analysis where I suggested that differences 
between members of the international community have been recognised to the extent that 
they support sustainable development and provide solutions to security concerns. Where 
such differences do not reflect the dominant paradigm or are viewed as ‘other’, ‘backward’ 
or inferior, those differences are themselves backgrounded and instrumentalised. This 
means that indigenous peoples, local communities, and other social groups’ views, 
experiences, and traditions in relation to the environment are instrumentalised to the extent 
that they support the interrelated goals of responding to environmental degradation, 
addressing poverty alleviation, and underdevelopment. This instrumentalisation reflects the 
universalisation of the dominant social paradigm. It further suggests that the later IEL 
documents share underlying similarities in the conceptual frameworks and logical dualisms 
that inform their perception of the environment.  
2.3 Contextualism 
The previous section concluded that non-western views, experiences, and traditions in 
relation to the environment have been instrumentalised or backgrounded depending on the 
extent to which they can support development and economic growth. In doing so, the 
dominant perception of the environment has been universalised in the IEL documents. 
Another manifestation of the imposition of dominant norms is the privileging of western, 
rationalist science to repair and alleviate environmental degradation, and to exploit 
nonhuman nature for future human well-being.142 Plumwood uses the term ‘technoscience’ 
to reveal the ‘relationship between science and capitalism.’143 I adopt this phrase in this 
research to connote an approach towards the use of science and technology, which 
ecofeminists argue reaffirms the powerful subject/object, human/nature dualisms that 
inform the epistemic foundations of modern science.144 Ecofeminists criticise the 
incorporation of these conceptual frameworks into science because they maintain the 
perception of nonhuman nature as a ‘machine – dead, inert, and insensitive to human 
action.’145 
In the following discussion, I argue that the documents incorporate ‘technoscience’ 
approaches to environmental problems in two ways. First, they incorporate ‘technoscience’ 
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as a solution to environmental problems. Second, they suggest that it can be used as a way to 
benefit local communities through economic growth and sustainable development. In each 
of these approaches, the references to the environment do not reflect contextualism because 
they devalue or exclude more relational and experiential knowledge of the environment 
unless it can be utilised for the benefit of economic growth and development.146  
Many of the documents contain provisions that refer to nonhuman nature in the context 
of science and technology. These provisions are further demarcated between those that refer 
to the use of ‘technoscience’147 to repair and alleviate environmental degradation and those 
that refer to the potential discoveries by science in untapped nature. The analysis of the 
documents suggests that the potential of technoscience to alleviate environmental 
degradation while also maintaining economic growth has been a consistent assumption 
from the pre-Rio Conference period onwards. 
The documents produced during the preparations for the Stockholm Conference indicate 
that the participants viewed technoscience as the solution to redress environmental 
degradation while maintaining necessary economic growth and development. The 
Stockholm Conference preparatory reports demonstrate a confidence in science and 
technology to solve environmental problems. The reports note the importance of 
international action to support the exchange of technology and experience on the planning 
and management of basic natural resources.148 In this context, the reports refer to the 
potential technological solutions to ensure ‘optimum environmental quality.’149 UNGA 
Resolution 2849 (1971) further noted that the focus on science and technology would 
facilitate an equilibrium between development needs and the preservation and 
‘enhancement’ of the environment.150 The resolution stated that the development ‘of 
adequate technologies … represents … the best possible solution for most of the 
environmental problems in developing countries.’151 These references to the use of 
technoscience show that states viewed new and emerging technology as a central part of the 
solutions to environmental problems and to support the necessary economic development 
for developing countries. Therefore, technology, environment, and the economy were 
viewed as mutually supportive elements of development.  
Both the IEL documents and the environmental security literature share similar 
assumptions concerning the role of technology and science to ‘solve’ environmental 
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problems. For example, the references to energy and food security in the sustainable 
development, biodiversity, and climate change documents refer to the importance of 
scientific and technological solutions to ‘future proof’ access to energy and food for future 
generations.152 One solution for achieving food security is from the development of 
traditional and modern biotechnology to improve the productivity of degraded lands, and in 
the development of new ‘improved’ varietals for improved agriculture. Agenda 21 stated that 
the major focus of food security is to ‘bring about a significant increase in agricultural 
production in a sustainable way.’153 Another solution to achieve increased productivity is by 
using traditional and modern biotechnologies to ‘improve productivity, nutritional quality 
and shelf-life of food’ and to increase the yields of food sources.154 The later BSWG and 
AWG-ABS reports similarly affirm the potential for biotechnology and genetic resources to 
improve productivity and ensure food security.155 The AWG-ABS connected food security 
and poverty eradication as the overriding objective in ‘developing effective international 
policies for agricultural genetic resources.’156 In this context, the solution to food security is 
addressed through ensuring increased production through technoscientific solutions.   
This response to food security has been criticised by ecofeminists. Shiva argues that the 
focus on attaining food security through biotechnology and linear monoculture excludes 
and marginalises the contribution of women farmers.157 She argues that the privilege 
conferred to western, rationalist science to linear monoculture and its associated use of 
pesticides has marginalised and devalued the shared knowledge and productivity by rural 
women.158 In particular, women farmers contribute to food security in ways that work in 
‘partnership with other species.’159 This approach is centred in sharing knowledge, viewing 
other species and plants as kin, and regeneration of biodiversity.160 She argues that in this 
context, knowledge is shared and productivity occurs through varietal planting and the 
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regeneration of soil, water, and biodiversity.161 This response to food security does not draw 
on technoscientific solutions to agricultural and environmental productivity, instead, it 
recognises the different interconnections between humanity and nonhuman nature in which 
food security could be assured. 
The documents also contain references to the environment that emphasise the need to 
protect the energy security of states and local communities. The climate change and 
sustainable development documents refer to need to disseminate renewable energy 
technology to local communities and to develop new energy technologies to support the 
economic development of developing countries.162 During the negotiations in the AWG-
LCA, participants at a workshop on the economic and social consequences of response 
measures noted that technological innovation could have a positive impact on development 
and on energy security.163 Similarly, the post-2001 sustainable development documents 
coupled technoscience with energy security and environmental conservation. The 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation refers to energy security and energy sector 
development in the context of developing environmentally-sound energy services and 
supporting technology transfer.164 These provisions indicate a continued perception of 
environmental problems as primarily scientific in nature, and that achieving a 
technoscientific solution to the externalities of the economic market can ensure both energy 
security, environmental protection, and economic growth. They also highlight the growing 
anxieties states have about their ability to access adequate energy supplies in line with 
climate change.165 As such, the links between security and the environment in these 
documents may be indicative of another manifestation of western dualist thinking in which 
security is viewed predominantly in terms of economic well-being. 
These provisions complement the arguments contained in the environmental security 
literature which suggest that science and technology could reduce the factors that cause 
states to use coercive power to secure access to natural resources in order to ensure energy 
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security.166 Similar assumptions are incorporated in reports arguing that technological 
improvements could reduce incidences of conflict over energy sources in conflict prone 
regions, such as the central African region.167 In the context of food security, NGOs propose 
that conflict can be reduced by using technology to improve agricultural production and 
attaining food security.168 In both the environmental security literature and in the IEL 
documents, technoscientific solutions are viewed as part of the strategy for achieving energy 
and food security, and in turn, part of the international responses to the drivers of 
insecurity. Furthermore, both arguments reveal assumptions that technoscience can alleviate 
the drivers of insecurity through improving the environment or maximising environmental 
resources for human benefit.169 These references suggest that the IEL documents continue to 
integrate a perception of the environment as a tool or resource that can be altered and 
improved through technology for human interests.  
This perception is reaffirmed in the climate change documents. The focus on technology, 
as well as sustainable and economic development, is contained in the submissions to the 
INC/FCCC by participating states. Austria and Switzerland proposed that the commitments 
in the UNFCCC should promote the ‘development and transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies, and technical as well as financial assistance.’170 Other parties also supported 
the inclusion of cooperation by ‘means of systematic and sustained research … in order to 
better understand the causes and impacts of climate change and the response strategies 
required to deal with such change.’171 These submissions suggest that states saw technical 
and scientific solutions to climate change as a central feature in the future climate change 
regime and this suggests that many participants viewed climate change as primarily 
scientific and technical in nature and resolvable by science and technology.172 These 
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assumptions support the ‘techno-optimism’173 of some security scholars who suggest that the 
technological improvements emerging from capitalist societies and liberal democracies will 
solve the problems of environmental degradation and the related security concerns 
emerging from this degradation.174 The shared belief in technoscience solutions reflected in 
the IEL documents and the environmental security literature reveals a view of the 
environment as a resource that can be ‘improved’ through technological manipulation.  
The adopted outcome documents from the climate change regime also associate the 
promotion of economic and technological solutions to climate change with attaining 
sustainable development through economic development. The Kyoto Protocol and 
UNFCCC both affirm that responses to climate change will be more effective if they ‘are 
based on relevant scientific, technical, and economic considerations.’175 They both link the 
promotion of sustainable development with the development and transfer of new 
technologies to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change while also ensuring the 
sustainable and economic development of party states.176 The texts of the post-2001 COP 
decisions concerning long-term cooperative action, introduce new financial and trade 
mechanisms to support technical development for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation.177 These references associate such responses with the ‘legitimate needs of 
developing country parties for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the 
eradication of poverty, so as to be able to deal with climate change.’178 These examples 
indicate that both the adopted outcome documents and the preparatory documents contain 
provisions that promote technoscientific and economic solutions while enabling economic 
growth.  
The analysis thus far reveals that the content of the IEL documents continue to promote 
technoscience solutions to the drivers of environmental degradation. This approach 
privileges western, rationalist science and indicates a continued belief in human innovation 
to repair environmental degradation and solve future problems caused by human activities. 
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This belief shares similarities with the arguments set forth in the environmental security 
literature and their support for technological and scientific solutions to the problems of 
insecurity, such as poverty, underdevelopment, and environmental degradation. In each of 
these discourses, the perception of the environment remains informed by the dominant 
social paradigm, in which it is viewed as a resource for human interests. Therefore, this 
analysis suggests that the environment/security connections may be a manifestation of a 
common perception of the environment that informs both IEL and security discourses.  
The second way in which the IEL documents incorporate technoscience is as a way to 
benefit local communities through economic growth and sustainable development. This 
approach is evident in the references to biodiversity resources in the biodiversity regime 
which impose a western, rationalist and scientific perception of the value of these resources 
for scientific and economic benefit. For example, the reports by the negotiating groups for 
the Biodiversity Convention, Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol refer to the 
environment in terms of its scientific and economic value. They note the ‘immense scientific 
value’ of biodiversity as the ‘foundation of biological science and an understanding of 
organic evolution, including the human biological heritage.'179 Not only does this present a 
human-centric justification for biodiversity conservation, but the discussions surrounding 
the role of biotechnology suggest that states viewed the role of technology as a way to unlock 
commercial benefits from biodiversity. The reports refer to the potential for biotechnology 
to support sustainable development by developing ‘win-win’ deals between technology rich 
developed countries and gene-rich developing countries.180 They further link biotechnology 
with the potential for conservation, agriculture, and forestry.181 These statements indicate 
that the participants viewed the potential of biodiversity and genetic resources for future 
economic and scientific development – both for developed countries and developing 
countries.182 In this way, they share a universalising perception of the environment as a 
commodity and resource to be used for development and economic growth. 
The reports by the AWG-ABS and BSWG similarly include references to the potential of 
biodiversity and genetic resources for future economic and scientific advancement.183 These 
provisions suggest that the state and non-state participants attending these working groups 
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viewed biodiversity and genetic resources in terms of their ‘immense strategic, economic 
and social value’184 that offers development opportunities to all communities. State delegates 
attending the BSWG stressed that any potential biosafety protocol should ‘avoid hindering 
access to and transfer of biotechnology.’185 The documents from the negotiations of the 
Nagoya Protocol similarly emphasise the importance of capacity building and technology 
transfer so developing countries can use their genetic resources for sustainable and 
economic development.186 The AWG-ABS listed the shared benefits envisaged through 
access and benefit schemes to include benefits from research and technology linked to 
conservation and sustainable use,187 research funding,188 and participation in product 
development.189 The technoscientific focus of these benefits suggests that the participant’s 
view of nonhuman nature is informed by western rationalist ideology in which the primary 
benefits of ‘nature’s cornucopia’190 are defined in terms of their potential scientific and 
economic contributions to human well-being.191 
The references to technology transfer and scientific cooperation in the Biodiversity 
Convention and Nagoya Protocol are similarly couched in language that frames the 
protection of the environment in order to protect future economic value. Article 15 of the 
Biodiversity Convention refers to the potential ‘benefits’ emanating from the ‘commercial 
and other utilisation of genetic resources’ arising from scientific research.192 It requests 
contracting parties to provide access to and transfer of technology that makes use of genetic 
resources provided by developing countries.193 These references to biodiversity suggest 
many states viewed biodiversity in terms of its potential economic and scientific value for 
developing countries. This perception is reiterated in the Nagoya Protocol. Article 5 
introduces the fair and equitable benefit sharing procedure for in connection to the 
utilisation of genetic resources and subsequent commercialisation of these resources.194 As 
part of this procedure, the article outlines the type of measures to support the transfer of 
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194 Nagoya Protocol 2010, art 5(1). 
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benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources. These benefits include monetary 
and non-monetary ‘benefits,’195 such as research funding, intellectual property rights, 
cooperation in scientific research and development, and access to scientific information 
relevant to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.196 The emphasis on the 
scientific and economic potential of biodiversity in these provisions indicates the primary 
view of the environment is as a commodity for productive economic value, rather than 
acknowledging the different values, principles and experiences of nonhuman nature by 
other cultures. 
The documents from the climate change, biodiversity, and sustainable development 
regime include references that focus on technoscientific solutions to environmental 
degradation. These proposals indicate that state actors and NSAs believe that such solutions 
can enable continued economic growth, and achieve sustainable development while, at the 
same time, mitigating the effects of these commercial activities on the environment. These 
proposals exemplify underlying ideologies that present humanity as disembodied and 
disembedded from nonhuman nature and thus legitimise the commoditisation of the 
environment through activities such as emissions trading and ‘improving’ nature by geo-
engineering, biotechnology and other technoscience solutions.197 
As already discussed, dominant norms in the IEL documents privilege western rationalist 
science to both repair and alleviate environmental degradation and to support the economic 
development of states through the scientific and technological utilisation of environmental 
resources. However, some references in the sustainable development regime and 
desertification regime acknowledge the differences in values, principles, and experiences of 
the environment that may alter the ways in which ‘other’ communities perceive and use the 
environment. One particular example is the references to the ‘special relationship’ between 
indigenous peoples and local communities and their environment.198 Decision 3/7 (1991) of 
the Rio Preparatory Committee acknowledged the traditional and direct dependence on 
ecosystems by indigenous people and local communities. This decision recognised this 
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relationship to be essential to their ‘cultural, social, economic and physical well-being.’199 
Agenda 21 identified this special relationship and the ‘holistic traditional knowledge’ of 
indigenous peoples and communities in relation to their lands, natural resources, and 
environment.200 These types of references indicate that states and NSAs continue to 
universalise the dominant perception of the environment on other cultures, and thus 
prioritise the economic value of the environment. In doing so, these references share similar 
assumptions with those articulated by the environmental security literature and suggest that 
the dominant perception of the environment is common across the IEL and security 
discourses. 
In the post-2001 period, the CRIC acknowledged the potential cultural and 
socioeconomic implications of desertification and drought strategies.201 The reports 
produced by CRIC include the recognition that initiatives for natural resource management 
should respect cultural specificities, while also ‘promoting the customary land tenures of 
local communities, [and] strengthening and legalizing their traditional institutions.’202 
Similarly, the 2003 Decision 1/COP.6 Further Steps in the Implementation of the 
Convention encouraged parties to take ‘action at a specific spatial scale so as to address the 
local ecological and socio-economic conditions in a more holistic manner.’203 These 
statements indicate that in the context of the desertification regime, some parties recognise 
that desertification and drought strategies may marginalise some communities. By explicitly 
linking management strategies to cultural specificities, these references take into account the 
differences between communities and groups. 
Sustainable development does seek to take into account differences in respect to 
environment and development concerns. General statements to this effect are included in 
the post-2001 sustainable development documents produced during the Johannesburg 
Summit, the Rio+20 Conference and the Millennium Assembly.204 In these forums, the 
references to cultural and value differences include generalised language and relate 
specifically to the issue of sustainable development. For example, the executive director of 
UNEP noted the diverse cultural and spiritual values were a ‘prerequisite for the 
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globalisation agenda,’ when taking part in the preparations for the Johannesburg Summit. 
This point was reaffirmed during the Millennium Assembly and 2005 World Summit, in 
which Qatar stated that cultural, social, and economic rights should be taken into account in 
the context of international responses to globalisation and sustainable development.205  
The outcome documents from these forums similarly affirm the importance of cultural 
diversity to achieve sustainable development.206 The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
notes that ‘respect for cultural diversity… [is] essential for achieving sustainable 
development.’207 The Rio+20 Outcome Document states that in the context of sustainable 
development, green economy policies should enhance the welfare of communities, 
‘recognising and supporting their identity, culture, and interests, and avoid endangering 
their cultural heritage, practices and traditional knowledge.’208 These provisions indicate that 
in some environmental regimes, the post-2001 documents contain provisions that 
acknowledge the diversity of peoples in the context of achieving sustainable development. 
These references suggest that some environmental regimes developed with the 
participation by NSAs include provisions relating to the environment that take into account 
the interrelated contexts that alter the way in which communities experience their local 
environment. The above references demonstrate greater contextual understanding by 
explicitly referring to the customs, traditions, cultures, and social contexts that may affect 
local communities’ experiences and views of their environment. However, these references 
also emphasise the value of culture, traditional knowledge, and practices relating to the 
environment to the extent that they support sustainable development. This analysis is 
similar to the conclusions drawn in Chapter 6 where the prioritisation of economic and 
development considerations framed traditional knowledge, culture, and practices as a 
potential commodity for achieving sustainable development objectives.209 This connection 
between traditional knowledge, the environment, and sustainable development suggests a 
continued universalisation of the dominant paradigm in which other cultural contexts are 
assimilated to the extent that they support the exploitation and commodification of the 
environment. In doing so, these references indicate an imposition of the dominant norms 
contained within western, rationalist thinking on other cultures who may view the 
environment entirely differently. 
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This is notable in the Rio Conference documents onward. These documents include 
significant references to the utilisation of traditional knowledge and technology to achieve 
sustainable economic and social development. The references to traditional knowledge in 
the context of the environment instrumentalises experiential and relational knowledge 
where it can be utilised for the benefit of economic growth, security and development. This 
instrumentalising of traditional knowledge is evident in the reports by the AWG-
Biodiversity and the AWG-LTB. Both working groups emphasise that the rights of 
indigenous peoples must be recognised in order to benefit from ‘their highly practical 
knowledge of organisms and to incorporate their traditional uses of local systems that are 
often consistent with conservation goals.’210 They stressed the importance of traditional 
technologies to achieve food security, and the conservation, development, and sustainable 
utilisation of biodiversity and natural resources.211 
These references to instrumentalising traditional knowledge for sustainable development 
reinforce the assumptions contained in the dominant development paradigm. In this 
paradigm, those societies denoted as ‘underdeveloped’ are made to look beyond their own 
culture to achieve salvation. This is because dominant elites consider them to lack the 
autonomous capacity to mobilise or control socio-economic formations for economic 
growth.212 Therefore, development programmes seek to utilise traditional knowledge and 
practices relating to environmental conservation as an opportunity for development through 
technological, scientific, and commercial innovation. In this way, the references to the 
adaptation of traditional knowledge and practices relating to the environment in the IEL 
documents continue to represent the environment and experiential knowledge of local 
communities and indigenous peoples as serving the ‘interests of western-style 
conservation’213 and as commodities for economic benefit. 
This representation of the environment and traditional knowledge as commodities is 
contained in the Rio Declaration. The declaration recognises the ‘vital role’ that indigenous 
people and local communities have in environmental management and development 
‘because of their knowledge and traditional practices.’214 This statement views the knowledge 
of local and indigenous communities in terms of its usefulness for development and 
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management projects.215 Similar references to traditional knowledge and technology are 
contained in Agenda 21 and the Biodiversity Convention that refer to both as a potential 
economic commodity.216 Viewing knowledge and technology through the lens of sustainable 
development with its emphasis on economic growth does not take into account the ways in 
which ‘local and modern forms of knowledge entail different ways of apprehending the 
world’217 that are informed by different principles, values, and knowledge.218 Therefore, 
these references do not reflect contextual understanding of the different ways in which 
communities and people may experience and understand the environment.  
The references to indigenous knowledge and traditional technology in the post-2001 
documents indicate that the participants in the preparatory processes continue to view the 
interconnection between human/nonhuman nature in terms of a nature/society dichotomy. 
The post-2001 sustainable development documents emphasised that efforts on sustainable 
development required ‘harnessing sound science and traditional knowledge’ as the basis of 
sustainable development policy and implementation.219 The Johannesburg Summit 
preparatory reports noted the importance of preserving traditional knowledge of indigenous 
and local communities whose practices were ‘harmonious with sustainable development 
objectives’220 as such knowledge could enhance food security by increasing agricultural 
productivity.221 The Plan of Implementation called for states to promote the ‘conservation, 
and sustainable use and management of traditional and indigenous’ systems relating to 
agricultural production.222  
The biodiversity regime similarly includes references that identify the interrelationship 
between genetic resources, traditional knowledge and biological conservation. The Nagoya 
Protocol affirms the importance of traditional knowledge for the sustainable use of 
components, and for the sustainable livelihoods of these communities.’223 The parties to the 
Biodiversity Convention recognised that some communities consider biodiversity as a 
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‘relational category that is ecologically and culturally embedded.’224 This is further 
emphasised in the protocol recognising community protocols and customary laws 
surrounding traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. 225 This recognition 
could be evidence that the parties acknowledged that local communities and indigenous 
people may perceive connections between human/environment nature that are distinct from 
the dominant western ideology, which is premised on the separation of human/nonhuman 
nature. 
The protocol establishes an access and benefit regime that requires the prior, informed 
consent or approval and involvement of indigenous and local communities for access to 
genetic resources where they have the established right to grant access to such resources.226 
The prior, informed consent is further repeated for access to the traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources.227 Nevertheless, while protecting the rights of indigenous 
communities and ensuring that the benefits derived from their local environment are shared 
with them, this regime still continues to reinforce the dominant perception of the 
environment as a resource or commodity for commercial, economic gain. This has been 
criticised by ecofeminists who argue that it reflects another form of colonisation.228 They 
argue that utilisation of traditional knowledge for the purpose of biodiversity protection is a 
form of ‘bio-colonialism’ in which transnational companies engage in utilising it for private, 
economic gain.229 They criticise the inclusion of intellectual property rights in the 
biodiversity regime as it opens the way to privatise women’s knowledge while also 
reaffirming the dominant perception of nature as inert until modified.230  
Other environmental regimes similarly reflect this incorporation of indigenous 
knowledge into the dominant western, rationalist sustainable development paradigm.231 The 
discussion concerning indigenous knowledge and traditional knowledge systems in the 
CRIC stated that this knowledge ‘must be more systematically exploited and innovations 
based on such knowledge encouraged and, where appropriate, in combination with modern 
technologies adapted to local conditions.’232 The CRIC further proposes that traditional 
technologies could be introduced under secure market conditions,233 and refers to 
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traditional knowledge as the ‘main wealth’ of communities.234 These provisions do not 
reflect the diversity of values, knowledge, or recognise that other cultures may perceive the 
environment as intrinsically linked into ethical, social, and cultural values, and as a 
continuum between the different spheres of the material and human worlds.235 
This section has analysed the contexts in which the international community refers to the 
nonhuman environment. The analysis reveals that the international community refers to the 
nonhuman environment in the context of its productive capabilities for achieving scientific 
and technological progress, ensuring the security of food and energy services while also 
supporting continued efforts for economic and social development. These contexts reflect a 
perception of the environment in which it is seen as an entity for supporting human well-
being. Such a perception does not reflect an ecofeminist understanding of the environment 
because it continues to portray nonhuman nature in terms of its extrinsic value for the 
benefit of humanity. As such, this analysis suggests that not only has the inclusion of other 
non-environmental considerations (such as the economy, security, science, and 
development) altered the focus of IEL, the perception of the environment in these 
documents is also informed by a world view that considers its value in terms of its extrinsic 
worth for human well-being. 
2.4 Openness 
In Chapter 4, I argued that openness relies on the other boundary conditions of an 
ecofeminist ethic, such as inclusivity and contextuality.236 This means that documents which 
take into account different forms of knowledge, such as relational and experiential 
knowledge may also reflect greater openness. This is because these documents may 
disseminate these alternative forms of knowledge, values and experiences of the 
environment into the public sphere rather than reinforcing western, rationalist informed 
perceptions of the environment. The analysis undertaken in the previous sections suggest 
that the references to the environment in the IEL documents continue to privilege western, 
rationalist thinking. Therefore, the extent to which the documents reflect openness in their 
references to the environment is less apparent because they suggest a continued privileging 
of economic rationalism and a preference for objective, quantifiable data.237 Both of these 
findings indicate that while marginalised communities may be included in discussions 
surrounding the environment, their experiences of the environment have been marginalised 
and backgrounded in the adopted outcome documents. In doing so, the references to the 
environment do not reflect openness as they do not recognise the different ways in which 
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communities across the globe may experience or perceive the environment. Instead, the 
adopted outcome documents maintain a rationalist informed perception of the environment 
in the type of information that they require states to disseminate to the public.   
The previous chapter identified that some environmental regimes supported 
transparency and accountability mechanisms in the implementation of its objectives. The 
climate change regime incorporated transparency in information sharing between parties to 
the protocol, and between parties and civil society. I suggested that these provisions reflected 
openness because they support the dissemination of information into the public sphere. 
However, the type of information disseminated maintains economic rationalism and the 
economisation of environmental conservation. For example, the discussions concerning 
transparency and accountability in the climate change working groups emphasise the need 
to disseminate emissions and market data in order to allocate emission reduction 
obligations.238 They emphasise the need for confidence in data accuracy for accountability.239 
Participants in the AWG-KP further stated that transparency could be ‘supported by 
providing quantitative and qualitative information on a common set of elements.’240 These 
references to the sharing of data focus primarily on the economic and market-related 
mechanisms of the climate change regime. In doing so, they suggest that the androcentric 
perception of the environment reflected in the content of the documents continues when 
parties choose what type of information is relevant to ensure transparency and 
accountability. 
However, the Cartagena Protocol supports stronger accountability and transparency 
mechanisms that refer to the environment in a way that broadens the type of information 
disseminated. In doing so, it recognises that the activities undertaken in this protocol may 
have an adverse effect on the well-being of local communities. For example, the protocol 
requests parties to take into account the socio-economic considerations ‘arising from the 
impact of living modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local 
communities.’241 It encourages parties to ‘cooperate on research and information exchange 
on any socio-economic impacts of living modified organisms, especially on indigenous and 
                                                          
238 UNFCCC AWG-KP, 'Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol on the First Part of its Fifth Session, held in Bangkok from 31 March to 4 April 2008 '  
(15 May 2008) FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/2, ¶15; see also Report of the AWG-KP. Resumed 6th Session (2008), 
Annex I ¶20; UNFCCC AWG-KP, 'Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its Seventh Session, held in Bonn from 29 March to 8 April 2009'  (13 May 
2009) FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/5, Annex I ¶20. 
239 Report of the AWG-KP. 13th Session (2010), Annex I ¶8. 
240 Ibid, Annex I ¶20; see also Decision 2/CP.17 Outcome of the Work of the AWG-LCA (11 December 2011) ¶9. 
This provision acknowledges the ‘need to elaborate rigorous, robust and transparent approaches in a systematic 
manner to measure progress towards the achievement of economy-wide emission reduction targets.’ 
241 Cartagena Protocol 2000, art 26(1). 
270 
 
local communities.’242 Finally, it supports public awareness and education in the issues 
surrounding living modified organisms.243 These references to information dissemination 
and transparency indicate some recognition that the manipulation of genetic resources can 
adversely affect local communities. It suggests that some states recognise the different ways 
in which communities may utilise and experience their environment that may be adversely 
affected by the manipulation of genetic resources. By supporting the dissemination of 
research and information on these impacts, the protocol demonstrates a more open 
response to the different ways in which communities utilise and experience their 
environment.  
Further, the technical nature of the environmental subject matter affects the type of 
knowledge and information shared with the public. Chapter 5 suggested that the narrow 
participatory approach adopted in the working groups that developed the Ozone Layer 
Convention and the Montreal Protocol may reflect the technical nature of this issue under 
negotiation, unlike the broader and interrelated concerns of environmental degradation and 
underdevelopment addressed by other environmental regimes. In these working groups, the 
primary participants were state-appointed legal, scientific, and technical experts, often from 
industrialised countries, as well as some observers from industry and a small number of 
environmental NGOs.244 As the technical nature of the subject matter shapes the regime 
developed in response, it is not surprising that the Ozone Layer Convention empowers the 
COP to ‘seek where appropriate the services of competent international bodies and scientific 
communities.’245 In this context, experiential and relational knowledge may not be 
appropriate in the evolution of international responses to the depletion of the ozone layer. 
This analysis suggests that in some contexts, the overt preference for technological and 
scientific expertise, and the dissemination of such expertise may be appropriate given the 
technical nature of the environmental regime.  
This analysis suggests that the extent to which the documents reflect openness in their 
references to the environment is less apparent because few of the documents included 
references relating to the environment and the dissemination of information. Where such 
references were present, the documents adopted different approaches towards the 
dissemination of information and the type of information that should be included. Some 
environmental documents, particularly those from the climate change regime indicate a 
continued privileging of economic rationalism and a preference for objective, quantifiable 
data. In others, the documents indicate states recognised that other forms of information 
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relating to human/environment interactions should be disseminated. This is particularly 
notable in the biodiversity regime and the recognition that the transport of LMOs may 
adversely impact local communities and indigenous peoples. Others still, adopt a technical 
and scientific approach towards information sharing and the type of experts used in the 
creation of information. The analysis indicated that in some contexts, such an approach may 
be appropriate given the nature of the regime. Overall, this indicates that type of 
information and the extent to which it reflects openness is highly dependent on the extent to 
which the environmental documents include references to the environment that reflect the 
other ecofeminist values such as inclusivity, structural pluralism and contextualism. 
3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the representations of the environment contained in the IEL 
documents to reveal the extent to which the perception of the environment may have altered 
with the increasing convergence between IEL and security. This chapter also examined the 
extent to which the environment/security connection has altered the perception of the 
environment from one that recognises its intrinsic value for both humanity and nonhuman 
nature to one that views it purely in terms of its utility for human interests.  
There were three core factors that meant many of the IEL documents did not include 
references to the environment reflecting ecofeminist values. I found that the documents 
incorporated anthropocentric and androcentric perspective to the environment. This was 
evident in the Rio Declaration and other sustainable development documents that explicitly 
include a human-centric model in which the environment was seen as a resource to achieve 
sustainable development and address the drivers of underdevelopment. Similar references 
were included in the climate change and biological environmental regimes. These 
representations to the environment indicate that the anthropocentric perspective evident in 
the earlier documents has been refined and consolidated. Furthermore, the later climate 
change and sustainable development documents incorporated economic centrism, meaning 
that the references to environment maintain and reinforce the logical structures that 
subordinate, instrumentalise, and background the environment and human ‘others’ while 
also prioritising the needs, interests, and values of the economic elite. Interestingly, the 
sustainable development and biodiversity regimes, both of which include explicitly 
anthropocentric references to the environment, are regimes that supported the increased 
participation by NSAs during the creation, content, and implementation of their objectives. 
Second, I found that the dominant view of the environment is as a commodity or 
resource for development or economic growth. The climate change, sustainable 
development, biodiversity, tropical timber, and other natural resources regimes portrayed 
the environment as a resource base for development. This portrayal is incorporated into the 
foundation of the sustainable development regime and informs the objectives of the 
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biodiversity and climate change regimes. These regimes also depicted the environment as 
potential market for commercialisation and economic gain. The Kyoto Protocol and its 
implementing provisions makes this representation of the environment a central part of the 
international community’s responses to climate change. Similarly, the biodiversity, 
desertification, and sustainable development regimes commodify the environment through 
payment for ecosystem services schemes in order to support the economic and social 
development of developing countries. Therefore, this representation of the environment as a 
potential market reveals a perception of the environment as a commodity and source of 
economic growth. 
Third, some documents include references to the environment that acknowledge 
differences between communities which may affect the way in which they experience and 
perceive their local environment. This recognition is evident in some of the sustainable 
development and biodiversity documents. These documents took into account the 
relationship between indigenous communities and their environment. However, even in 
these provisions, references to the environment and indigenous knowledge emphasise the 
utility of such knowledge for economic growth and development. In doing so, they indicate 
that the dominant perspective of the environment remains one where it is a resource to be 
manipulated, utilised, and adapted for human needs remains. This perception was evident in 
the biodiversity regime and its references to the use of traditional and indigenous knowledge 
through technoscience to attain food and energy security. Once again, this representation of 
the environment reveals a perception of it as inert, and as an object that science and 
technology can improve for human advancement. 
It is possible to draw three interrelated conclusions from these findings. First, while the 
inclusion of non-environmental considerations such as development, economic, security, or 
science and technology has altered the reasons for which states protect the environment, the 
perception of the environment remains informed by western, anthropocentric and 
androcentric assumptions. Second, this androcentric perspective has been universalised 
within the IEL documents. Therefore, these documents are informed by damaging 
conceptual frameworks and dualisms in which the environment is viewed as inert, and solely 
valuable in terms of its productive capacity. Third, alternative or non-western worldviews 
and their perspectives of the environment are supported to the extent that they are 
assimilated into the dominant worldview in which their value is defined in terms of their 
utility for economic growth and development objectives.  
Therefore, the analysis concludes that association between environment and security, as 
included in IEL, remains informed by a Western anthropocentric worldview. The 
manifestation of security in terms of food or energy security can be understood as an 
extension of the underlying ideologies that inform justifications for the inclusion of other 
international interests into environmental law. The associations between environment and 
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security reflect one aspect of this ideology by framing security in terms of using the 
environment for human well-being rather than an examination of why such concerns need 
to be securitised in the first place (something reflected in the literature). In both contexts, 
the environment is perceived as separate and inert, and humanity is disembedded and 
disembodied from it.  
The implications of this conclusion are highly relevant for both the future development 
of IEL and the continuing discussions of environment/security links. These conclusions 
indicate that the dominant perspective of the environment has been consolidated and 
reinforced with the integration of economic rationalism and the economisation of 
environmental objectives. These conclusions further suggest that the environment/security 
connections in international discourses are a manifestation of this dominant perspective of 
the environment. This is because both IEL and security discourses support the sustainable 
exploitation and utilisation of the environment for the purpose of achieving development 
and responding to the drivers of insecurity.  
Therefore, the adoption of sustainable development as the solution to environmental and 
security concerns in both IEL and broader discourses may simply reaffirm the dominant 
perception of the environment as a commodity or resource for human interests. This is 
because they may not engage in an interrogation of the beliefs, values, and assumptions that 
inform this view. Continuing to perceive the environment as a commodity and humanity as 
disembodied and disembedded from the environment means that future responses to 
environmental degradation and insecurity may well perpetuate underlying structural, 
ideological and material inequalities. 
 

275 
 
8. Conclusion 
This thesis set out to examine the extent to which the association between environment 
and security has altered the basis on which the international community protects the 
environment, and in turn, what this suggests about states’ perception of the environment. 
Over the course of the research, I arrived at two broad conclusions concerning the 
perception of the environment held by states and their reasons put forward for protecting it 
in the development of international environmental law IEL. First the environmental topic, 
the forum, and the age of the document had an effect on the ways in which states view the 
environment, and the arguments put forward for its protection. Second, the prioritisation of 
development, economy, security, science, and technology interests through the paradigm of 
sustainable development in IEL has an effect on the perception of the environment itself. 
However, the underlying western, anthropocentric perception of the environment, as 
reflected in these environmental documents has prevailed. This perception has been 
consolidated by the securitisation of the environment in the broader security discourse. 
Therefore, the research showed that, though the justifications for the protection of the 
environment have changed over time, the western, anthropocentric worldview remains the 
same.  
In this chapter I offer the main conclusions and findings of this study. The chapter is 
divided into four sections. First, I give a brief overview of the research. Second I reflect on, 
and evaluate, the methodological approach used in this research. Third, I summarise the key 
findings of this thesis and consider their implications for future responses to environmental 
problems. Fourth, I identify what I consider as some of the most fruitful avenues for future 
research in this area. 
1.  RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
The first part of the thesis introduced the context and background to the research, its 
theoretical foundation, and explained the methodological approach developed to examine 
the research question stated in Chapter 1 (Introduction). To recap, this thesis set out to 
answer the following question:  
To what the extent has the association between environment and security has 
altered the basis on which states and NSAs that make up the international community 
seek to protect the environment, and in turn, what does this suggest about their 
perception of the environment? 
Chapter 2 undertook a review of the evolution of international responses to 
environmental problems and international security. My analysis of the academic literature 
concluded that both IEL and international responses to international peace and security 
have broadened through the introduction of the interrelated concepts of sustainable 
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development and human security. The literature showed that the paradigm of sustainable 
development has received notable support in both international responses to 
underdevelopment, and the associated drivers of insecurity, and in the collective responses 
to environmental vulnerability through the interrelated principles of common concern for 
humankind and common, but differentiated, responsibility and respective capabilities 
(CBDRRC). As the result of this literature review, I came to three conclusions. First, 
sustainable development has had a profound influence on the evolution of international 
responses to IEL. Second, sustainable development has been co-opted by the international 
community as both a goal and solution to insecurity during the post-Cold War period. 
Third, this co-option may be a cause for concern for the subsequent development of IEL 
because liberal responses to insecurity are inherently anthropocentric and focus on 
economic and social development. 
Extending from these conclusions, I suggested that securitisation of the environment has 
occurred, and with the co-option of sustainable development by global security actors, it 
may have implications for the justifications for environmental protection and evolving 
perceptions of the environment by the international community. This review of the  
literature indicated that little of the research focused on the attitudes, values, and beliefs that 
formed states’ perceptions of the environment in the evolution of environmental law and 
international responses to insecurity. Therefore, my research sought to address this gap by 
examining the evolving perception of the environment by states in IEL documents, and the 
reasons for which states protect the environment, in light of the securitisation of the 
environment.  
Chapters 3 and 4 introduced ecofeminism as the theoretical foundation of the thesis and 
the methodological approach used to analyse IEL. In Chapter 3, I argued that ecofeminism is 
able to develop a more complete analysis of the underlying attitudes, beliefs, and values that 
inform the international community’s perception of the environment, and how these may 
have altered with the securitisation of the environment. In  Chapter 4, I drew on ecofeminist 
theory to develop an analytical framework by which to examine the preparatory documents 
and outcome texts of eight different environmental regimes (climate change, biodiversity, 
the ozone layer, tropical timber, desertification, highly migratory and straddling fish stocks, 
sustainable development, and transboundary watercourses) and four time periods (Pre-Rio 
Conference (1980-1987), the Rio-period (1987-1992),  post-Rio  period (1993-2000), and 
post-2000-period (2001-2012)). This breadth of documentation made possible a close 
analysis of the evolution of factors and influences on hard and soft environmental law-
making.  
The second part of the chapter introduced my analytical framework and method used to 
examine the IEL documents. I explained how the different boundary conditions of an 
ecofeminist ethic were used to develop the four analytical lenses (inclusivity, structural 
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pluralism, contextualism, and openness) through which I examined the environmental 
documents. I explained my method of content analysis which enabled me to build a more 
holistic understanding of the different ways in which the international community mediates 
its experiences of the environment and its connections with other non-environmental 
considerations. This more ‘open’ method enabled concepts to emerge from the data and 
allowed me to identify specific categories emerging from the data that formed the key foci 
for the analytical chapters. These categories included participation, the integration of non-
environmental considerations, and the perception of the environment itself. The strengths, 
drawbacks, and limitations of the use of an ecofeminist analytical framework to undertake 
feminist content analysis is discussed below. 
The second part of the thesis examined three interrelated topics in the development of 
international environmental law and the subsequent evolution of environmental regimes. 
These concern the participation by states and NSAs in the creation, development, and 
implementation of international environmental law, the inclusion of other international 
interests in international responses to environmental problems, and the representation of 
the environment itself in preparatory documents and adopted environmental law. The 
degree to which environment/security links may have altered the perceptions of the 
environment and the basis on which members of the international community protect the 
environment were examined through these three topics and they became the focus of the 
three analytical chapters in this research.  
The first analytic chapter examined the participation by states and NSAs in the creation, 
development, and implementation of IEL. I analysed this category first because I wanted to 
reveal who participated, and in what environmental areas they were able to participate. 
Furthermore, analysing the justifications put forward for broader participation in the 
creation, development, and implementation of IEL meant that I could identify any non-
environmental considerations and environmental regimes in which the participation by 
NSAs or states were excluded. This could reveal any tensions between the emerging 
principle of participation in sustainable development and the exclusionary practices that 
occurred in the negotiations of some environmental areas closely connected to the 
environment and national interests. The findings of this chapter established the foundation 
and informed the analysis undertaken in the next chapter. 
I examined the integration of non-environmental considerations into IEL in the second 
analytic chapter. This category meant that I could identify the types of considerations 
included in IEL, such as development, trade, economic, scientific, technological, and 
security, and the justifications used in order to include them into IEL. More specifically, I 
examined the consolidation of sustainable development as the dominant paradigm in IEL, 
and its integration of non-environmental considerations, and how the justifications for their 
consideration has altered the basis on which the international community protects the 
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environment. Undertaking this examination meant that I could identify any assumptions, 
values, and beliefs shared between the arguments supporting the integration of non-
environmental considerations into EIL and those used to securitise non-traditional threats 
(such as the environment or underdevelopment) in the broader security discourse. 
Therefore, I could examine the extent to which the securitisation of the environment has 
altered the basis for protecting the environment. 
I analysed the different representations of the environment in the final analysis chapter 
because I wanted to examine the ways in which the international community perceived that 
the environment had altered over time, in light of the prioritisation of non-environmental 
considerations through the paradigm of sustainable development. I hoped to discern if there 
were shared assumptions, values, and beliefs between the different representations included 
in the IEL documents and those in the environment/security literature. Where similarities in 
the references to the environment arose between the IEL documents and security literature, 
I hypothesised that this may indicate that the co-option of sustainable development by the 
broader security discourse as part of a broader strategy to address the drivers of 
underdevelopment. 
Analysing the documents with reference to these categories enabled me to answer the 
overall research question of this study. Throughout the analysis, a number of themes, 
reflections, and findings emerged and informed the analysis, as intended by my use of 
reflexive and iterative content analysis. Hence, before I discuss the findings of this research 
project, I will evaluate the methodological approach used in this research project as it helped 
shape the findings and conclusions drawn from the environmental documents. Following 
this evaluation, I identify the findings from the three analytical chapters before drawing out 
the key conclusions of the thesis and the implications of these more broadly. 
2. EVALUATION OF METHODOLOGY 
The ecofeminist analytical framework proved to be very successful as a tool for analysing 
the international environmental documents. Drawing on an ecofeminist ethic to form the 
basis of my critical analysis enabled me to examine the interconnecting structures of western 
culture that I argue have informed the assumptions and justifications promulgated by states 
to protect the environment. This framework was informed by the four ecofeminist values of 
inclusivity, structural pluralism, contextualism and openness that describe the boundary 
conditions within which actions, decisions, and ethics may be seen as ecofeminist. Through 
this framework I was able to examine the content of these documents and reveal the beliefs, 
values, and attitudes that underpin the international community’s understanding of the 
environment, inform states’ perception of the environment, and the part that these 
perceptions play in the creation of IEL. This understanding facilitated my examination of 
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the securitisation of the environment, sustainable development, and environmental 
protection as contained in the documents.  
On reflection, the methodology adopted in this research had benefits and drawbacks. I 
purposefully decided to draw on a range of environmental documents from four different 
environmental areas (natural resources, general principles of IEL, atmosphere, and 
desertification) and the eight environmental regimes described above. However, the number 
of documents that I analysed meant that there was a lot of information, themes, differences, 
and other variables which I was unable to integrate or discuss in this research. In hindsight, 
by restricting the documentary analysis to two or three regimes, I could have then analysed 
other documentation submitted by the parties, NSAs and other actors during the 
negotiation process rather than focusing primarily on the preparatory reports. Nevertheless, 
this is something that I can undertake in future research.  
Furthermore, there are limitations of this methodological approach which may have 
implications on the findings. As I stated in Chapter 5, there are many reasons why some 
NSA voices are more represented in the documents than others. By restricting my analysis 
to meeting reports, only certain voices were recorded in the documents. Had I restricted the 
documentary analysis to two or three regimes, I could have then analysed the other 
documentation by NSAs and other actors during the negotiation process. This could have 
enabled me to contextualise the type of voices recorded in the meeting reports themselves.  
Nevertheless, the findings in Chapter 5 are still relevant because states and other 
institutions – who control the participation by NSAs – referred to NSA participation in a 
variety of ways. This signified the issues, areas and topics that states consider closely aligned 
to their interests, and to security. Furthermore, the justifications for NSA participation set 
out by states and other international institutions revealed underlying values, beliefs and 
assumptions concerning the role of environmental protection in addressing other 
international issues, such as peace, development and security. Therefore, while the findings 
specifically related to the voices of NSAs may not be generalisable, the findings relating to 
the ways in which states refer to NSA participation, the justifications put forward for their 
participation or exclusion, and the ways in which NSA participation, environmental and 
non-environmental considerations are connected by states informed and supported the 
subsequent analysis of the documents in Chapters 6 and 7. These findings are significant and 
reveal underlying assumptions, values and beliefs that shape the reasons for supporting the 
participation by NSAs and also the emerging tensions between the principles of 
participation in sustainable development, when deployed in environmental areas that may 
adversely affect the economic or other national interests of states. 
In addition, the strength of the findings and conclusions drawn from the breadth of 
documentation outweighs the potential benefits from undertaking a deeper analysis of fewer 
280 
 
regimes. This is because the scope of the analysis offers diversity in perspectives and, 
therefore, I was able to identify overall themes that emerged across the different regimes and 
environmental areas. Furthermore, as I wanted to analyse the evolution of IEL, some of the 
environmental regimes I drew on were significantly older and therefore did not have the 
same range of preparatory documents. This was particularly the case for the earlier ITTAs 
and the preparations for the 1972 Stockholm Conference. Therefore, I would not have been 
able to undertake a deeper analysis of these regimes, as compared to the more recent 
negotiations in the climate change.  
The use of reflexive content analysis in conjunction with the ecofeminist analytical 
framework enabled me to undertake an iterative analysis of the documents. This helped 
compensate for the breadth of documentation because it meant that I analysed the text of 
the documents more than five times during the process of analysis: One initial reading, a 
reading through each of the four ecofeminist lenses, and then again when I was analysing 
the content of other documents. On reflection, I think that I could streamline this process, 
and develop a more useful database for holding my analysis by using a computer aided 
program, such as HyperRESEARCH.1 Once again, this is something that I develop in future 
research.  
The method itself and the analytical framework is highly transferable to other areas of 
international law. I envisage that it could be used to examine the content of international 
human rights law, and other international legal systems with some tweaking. One of the 
benefits of the analytical framework is that it recognises the inherent complexity and 
‘messiness’ of international law and that different assumptions, values, and beliefs inform 
the content of the documents. It also enables those underlying assumptions, values, and 
beliefs to be rendered visible and discussed with reference to, and informed by, an ethic that 
acknowledges that the relationships and interconnections between issue areas are just as 
important as the content of those documents themselves. Therefore, one of the strengths of 
this method and analytical framework is that it offers a system and framework in order to 
analyse these increasingly complicated and interconnected international legal regimes in a 
way that recognises that the relationships between such areas are informed by context, 
history, and other, less ‘objective’ ethical considerations.  
Finally, the analytical framework is a work in progress. One of its benefits is the flexibility 
in its terms and categorisations. However, there could still be some more clarity between the 
different lenses, especially between inclusivity, structural pluralism, and contextualism. 
Furthermore, the open lens is less developed than the other ones. Upon reflection, I think 
                                                          
1 Researchware Inc, ‘Qualitative Analysis with HyperRESEARCH’ (Researchware Inc. Simply Powerful Tools for 
Qualitative Research, ND)  <http://www.researchware.com/products/hyperresearch.html> accessed 28 April 
2016; see also Patricia Lina Leavy, ‘Feminist Content Analysis and Representative Characters’ (2000)(1-2) The 
Qualitative Report 1. 
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that it could be more developed with reference to Catriona Sandilands’ work on ecological 
citizenship and democratic openness.2 When re-reading her work after completing the 
thesis, I was drawn to her discussion of ‘openness’ and democracy. I believe that these ideas 
could strengthen the open lens and contribute to the overall usefulness of the analytical 
framework for future research.  
Nevertheless, I am pleased with the contribution that the analytical framework made to 
my research. The methodological approach was suited to answering the research question, 
and I consider it one of the original contributions that my thesis has made and something 
that I intend to develop in future research.3 This is because it gave an interesting framework 
through which I was able to examine the different environmental regimes by drawing on 
ecofeminist theory and utilising a holistic and iterative method of content analysis. In doing 
so, this methodology enabled me to look beyond the content of the documents to analyse the 
underlying assumptions, values, and beliefs that informed their content. I could therefore 
examine the extent to which these documents shared similar underlying assumptions, 
values, and beliefs towards the environment as those incorporated in the 
environment/security literature. This meant that I could examine the extent to which the 
securitisation of the environment has altered the basis for which the international 
community protects the environment, and in turn, the perception of the environment itself. 
In the following sections, I discuss the findings of this research project discovered through 
the use of this analytical framework.  
3. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS 
3.1 Summary of Findings 
By using the analytical framework, I was able to reveal that the securitisation of the 
environment has altered the basis on which the international community seeks to protect 
the environment. However, as noted in the introduction, I found that the perception of the 
environment has remained static across the time-periods under analysis. The findings from 
each of the three analysis chapters informed the overall conclusions of this research project. 
In the following section, I outline the key findings from each of the chapters before 
discussing the implications of these findings for the future direction of IEL.  
In general, the post-Rio environmental documents included more provisions that 
reflected inclusive and structurally plural participatory approaches. This reflects the 
principles of participation encapsulated in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration (1992) and 
                                                          
2 Sandilands, The Good-Natured Feminist, 144, referring to Lee Quinby, Anti-Apocalypse: Exercises in 
Genealogical Criticism (University of Minnesota Press 1994), 46. 
3 Kate Wilkinson, ‘A Case for an Ecofeminist Critique of International Environmental Law’ in Douglas A Vakoch 
and Sam Mickey (eds), Ecofeminism in Dialogue (Forthcoming 2017). 
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the emerging discussion of the potential benefits of such participation for poverty 
alleviation, and other international concerns.  
However, some environmental regimes did not reflect inclusive or structurally plural 
participatory approaches. These regimes were generally addressing environmental areas that 
have a significant effect on state interests, particularly economic or commercial interests. 
The climate change regime was the most notable example of exclusionary participatory 
approaches because overall approach was quite exclusionary. Both NSAs, and in some 
contexts, states were often excluded where the negotiations related to non-environmental 
considerations such as commercial or economic interests, both of which have an impact on 
the security and well-being of states.  
Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the justifications used to support structurally 
plural and contextual participation were based on two assumptions. First, the voices and 
experiences of marginalised communities are necessary for the success of environmental 
projects and can add benefit to broader sustainable development goals as well. Second, that 
local-level participation in environmental or sustainable development projects can support 
broader security goals by supporting economic and social development within marginalised 
communities. These two findings indicate that many of the justifications for greater 
participation by NSAs are based on an emerging assumption that increasing the 
participation by NSAs may also have an effect on the security of states by enabling economic 
and social development, increasing democratic governance and therefore enabling peaceful 
and stable societies. These findings indicate that participation by NSAs within IEL may be 
seen as part of a broader solution to addressing the drivers of insecurity through the 
paradigm of sustainable development. 
Therefore, these findings suggest that a tension is emerging between the principles of 
participation within sustainable development, compared with the participation by states and 
NSAs in environmental areas that have a direct impact on the economic and national well-
being of states. Overall, the participation by NSAs in the creation, development, and 
implementation of IEL has grown. However, the extent to which it reflects a contextual 
understanding of participation, and actually engages with traditionally excluded or 
marginalised communities is significantly lower where there is a relationship between the 
environmental area and broader security interests.  
The analysis of the integration of non-environmental considerations revealed that there 
is been a prioritisation of economic, trade, and commercial interests in IEL, especially 
through the paradigm of sustainable development. I found that the justifications for such 
prioritisation were made on the basis that economic growth is viewed as a precursor to 
achieving environmental protection and part of the solution to prevent future problems. The 
justification for the prioritisation of economic considerations signifies a deeply seated 
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assumption held by states, in which economic growth and economic development are seen 
as essential to achieve sustainable development and to respond to the drivers of 
underdevelopment. As noted in Chapter 2, underdevelopment has been increasingly viewed 
as the driver for environmental degradation, insecurity, and low-level conflict within 
broader security discourses. Therefore, the integration of such considerations indicate 
shared assumptions, values, and beliefs between IEL and those in the broader security 
discourse, and that environmental projects or obligations can be used as part of a broader 
response to the drivers of insecurity.  
In addition, my findings revealed that the justifications for integrating some non-
environmental considerations into IEL were based on the recognition of difference between 
developed and developing states. By recognising these differences, the environmental 
documents reflect some elements of structural pluralism and a contextual understanding of 
difference. These references were prevalent in the climate change, ozone layer, and 
sustainable development regimes, which acknowledged the ‘special situation’ of developing 
countries and linked their obligations and commitments with the provision of additional 
support by developed States. The climate change regime not only acknowledged the special 
circumstances of developing states, but also that there were historical differences between 
developed and developing states in relation to their contributions to climate change.    
Furthermore, the documents from the climate change regime indicate that the practice of 
differentiating between states based on historical contributions to environmental 
degradation has been increasingly contested. In particular, the concept of CBDRRC has 
become challenged – particularly in relation to differentiation based upon historical 
contributions – in light of the rapid development of some developing countries. The limited 
references to the concept in the later COP decisions suggested that the inclusion of 
economic, trade, and development interests has affected the way in which states respond to 
shared environmental concerns in a differentiated way.  
The significance of this is twofold. First, it suggests that the prioritisation of economic 
interests, within the context of sustainable development, in the documents has altered the 
extent to which the international community responds to environmental degradation in a 
way that reflects a contextual understanding of difference. Instead, the challenges to 
CBDRRC suggest that some states favour measuring difference on objective measures, such 
as economic considerations. Second, it suggests that future responses to environmental 
problems may not occur in a way that acknowledges historic difference between members of 
the international community, which ecofeminists argue have been perpetuated through the 
colonising logic of western rationalism, culture, and its underlying assumptions.  
Furthermore, I found that the justifications for integrating non-environmental 
considerations were made on the basis that they can support the well-being of local 
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communities and their natural resources. However, the analysis revealed that the 
justifications used to protect indigenous and traditional knowledge were made on the basis 
that such knowledge could be utilised for sustainable development, economic growth, and 
scientific and technological innovation for the purpose of attaining food and energy security, 
as well as the conservation and sustainable management of natural resources. In this way, 
the protection of such knowledge was justified on economic, scientific, and development 
grounds, rather than recognising the cultural and ontological differences between 
communities. These justifications universalise the dominant development model and do not 
reflect a contextual understanding of difference. In addition, they may also maintain the 
subordination of traditionally marginalised communities because the prioritisation of 
economic development means that their knowledge is commodified in a way that may not 
recognise other contextual understandings of the environment and mechanisms for 
knowledge creation.  
In the final analysis chapter, I found that the representation of the environment has not 
changed over time. Through my analysis, I discovered that the documents generally 
included references that represented the environment in three interconnected ways: As a 
natural resource base for economic and social development; an inert objective to marketise 
and commoditise on global markets; and as an object to manipulate into other, more 
‘valuable’ products to sell. These representations of the environment correlated with the 
inclusion of wider international interests and the emergence of environmental/security 
connections in broader security discourses. Their inclusion on the documents revealed an 
anthropocentric perception of the environment which disembodies and disembeds 
humanity from the material reality in which we live.  
These findings indicate that implicit in the references to the environment are 
connections to broader security discourse and colonisation of such discourse by a more 
powerful body of international law and policy. My analysis of the documents revealed that 
the references to ‘security’ in the sustainable development, climate change, desertification, 
and biodiversity regimes indicate that the environment is seen as a commodity, an object for 
attaining human security, a tool for sustainable development, and a precursor for 
international peace and security. These perceptions were present in the post-2001 
sustainable development documents, particularly the speeches given by member states 
during the high-level summits by the United Nations General Assembly. Notably, this 
narrative was further revealed in the work undertaken in the post-2001 desertification 
regime, where human security was explicitly linked with attaining food security and 
economic security through the commoditisation of the local environment. These 
perceptions exemplify a view of the environment as a potential commodity for economic 
and social development, and the assumption that sustainable development, peace, and 
security are mutually supportive. 
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Finally, the analysis of the representations of the environment indicate that the content of 
IEL does not recognise different ontologies or values of the environment. Some 
environmental regimes did recognise that the relationship between local communities and 
the environment may differ depending on the context in which they live. This recognition 
indicates some acknowledgement of different ontologies in relation to the environment that 
may also affect the way in which these communities may perceive and interact with their 
local environment. Such references were present in some of the more recent sustainable 
development and biodiversity documents, such as the Rio+20 Outcome Document (2012) 
and the Nagoya Protocol (2010). Nevertheless, even in these documents, the references to 
traditional knowledge, local communities, and indigenous peoples emphasise the value and 
utility of such knowledge for economic growth and development. In doing so, they indicate 
that the dominant perspective of the environment remains one where it is a resource to be 
manipulated, utilised, and adapted for human needs. This perception was evident in the 
biodiversity regime and its references to the use of traditional and indigenous knowledge 
through technoscience to attain food and energy security. Once again, this representation of 
the environment reveals a perception of it as inert, and as an object that science and 
technology can improve for human advancement. 
Therefore, these findings suggest that the integration of sustainable development as the 
dominant paradigm of IEL, and its co-option by security discourse reveals an inherent 
tension in the concept. These findings reveal a tension because of the integrationist nature of 
the concept, which seeks to balance the different needs and interests of both states and 
individuals. These findings also suggest, however, that this balance has been altered in line 
with the increasing securitisation of non-traditional threats, such as the environment and 
underdevelopment. The prioritisation of economic growth, economic development, and 
social development which emerges in the more recent environmental documents reflects the 
underlying assumptions inherent in the security discourse that insecurity and conflict is 
driven by (primarily) underdevelopment, which in itself is driven by poor economic 
development and social development. Therefore, the prioritisation of these considerations in 
the environmental documents indicates that for some states and international actors, 
international responses to environmental problems are increasingly conflated with 
responding to addressing drivers of underdevelopment in order to reduce global insecurity 
and drivers of conflict.  
Finally, there is a broader tension surrounding the concept of differentiation and the type 
of development which is supported by both IEL and in broader environmental discourses. 
This tension has been particularly notable in the negotiations in the AWG-LCA and the 
discussion surrounding CBDRRC. While the most recent 2015 Paris Climate Agreement 
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does include the principle of CBDRRC in its text,4 the focus of difference has moved from 
one that takes into account historical and other contextual forms of different towards 
focusing much more on the objective, rationalist measures of difference through global 
economic participation and wealth. This tension suggests that conflicts surrounding 
economic, trade, and other measures have pervaded the negotiations surrounding shared 
responses to transboundary environmental conditions.   
Building on the above conclusions, the findings suggest that while the inclusion of non-
environmental considerations has altered the reasons for which states seek to protect the 
environment, the perception of the environment remains informed by western, 
anthropocentric, and androcentric assumptions. This androcentric perspective of the 
environment has been universalised within the IEL documents, and means that they are 
informed by conceptual frameworks and dualisms that view the environment as inert, and 
solely valuable because of its productive capacity. Non-western worldviews and alternative 
perspectives of the environment are supported in these documents to the extent that they 
can be assimilated into the dominant worldview, in which their value is defined in terms of 
their utility for economic growth and development objectives, as part of the global strategy 
to maintain peace and address the drivers of underdevelopment and insecurity.  
3.2 Implications of Findings 
The above findings present a number of implications for the future development of IEL, 
sustainable development, and the treatment of the environmental more generally. First of 
all, there is no doubt that the international responses to global environmental degradation 
have gone some way to protecting the planet from significant harm. In some contexts, these 
responses reflect an ethic of environmental care that responds to the existential nature of 
environmental degradation in a manner that is non-hierarchical and respectful. Some of the 
environmental regimes developed prior to the turn of the 21st century, such as the 
desertification and sustainable development regimes, indicate an inclusive, structurally 
plural, contextual, and open approach in their negotiation process and are included in the 
objectives themselves. While more recent documents acknowledge the greater independency 
between humanity and nonhuman nature, as well as the interdependency between 
communities, states, and other international bodies, the extent that the international 
community’s responses reflect an ecofeminist understanding of environmental conservation 
is less apparent. 
This is because the continuing commoditisation of the environment is presented as a 
solution to environmental and security problems and therefore maintains a worldview in 
which the environment is separate and subordinate of humanity. It maintains the dominant 
                                                          
4 Paris Agreement (Paris) (adopted 12 December 2015, not yet in force) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 Annex (12 
December 2015), preamble ¶3, art 2(2).  
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conceptual framework that will continue to perpetuate this exploitative approach based 
upon logical dualisms and the valorisation of rationalism, over other experiential and 
collective understandings of environment and human interrelationships. To continue to 
maintain such a western, Eurocentric and arguably androcentric perspective of the 
environment in IEL and broader security discourses may in fact undermine the security of 
some marginalised communities because it does not require powerful social groups to re-
evaluate their actions and approaches to the environment. Further, it may also legitimise the 
siphoning off of ‘valuable’ environmental resources to states and NSAs who already hold 
significant power within the international community, dominant international institutions, 
and systems. Therefore, the proposed solutions to environment and security problems may 
perpetuate the insecurity facing already marginalised communities.  
These findings suggest that the securitisation of the environment and the apparent co-
option of sustainable development by the security discourse privileges the dominant 
development model. They indicate that western cultural beliefs, assumptions, and 
understandings of the world inform the development of IEL and the framework for 
collective responses to environmental problems. This model continues to affirm the 
association between economic growth and technoscientific solutions as the solution to 
environmental problems, which they argue degrades the global environment, marginalises 
communities, and excludes other, non-dualised interconnections between human and 
nonhuman nature. An ecofeminist response to the current state of affairs would call for a 
critical reappraisal of the ethical, epistemological, and logical basis for international 
responses which they argue maintain a remote, dispassionate, disembedded, and 
disembodied responses to environmental problems. Ecofeminists would argue that any IEL 
and indirectly, the wider responses to questions of insecurity and conflict prevention, would 
not be effective because they continue to maintain a separation and devaluation of 
humanity’s embodiment in the environment, and by extension those communities, 
activities, and processes that rely on the environment. 
Furthermore, the prioritisation of economic growth and development in the 
environmental documents reveals an underlying assumption that such activities, undertaken 
in the course of sustainable development, are the solution to underdevelopment, and its 
associated security concerns. The inclusion of references to security found in the post-2001 
documents is indicative of the anthropocentric nature of the justifications for protecting the 
environment. The references to food security, livelihood security, and energy security 
presented a narrow notion of security that focused on the individual’s needs in order to 
achieve sustainable development. The inclusion of such references in the sustainable 
development, desertification, and biodiversity regimes revealed a prioritisation of human-
centred development as a response to insecurity by emphasising the security of human 
needs. Therefore, the justifications for the inclusion of economic, development, security, and 
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technology interests in these documents reveal a continued prioritisation of these interests 
as a preliminary step towards responding to the drivers of environmental degradation, 
underdevelopment, and insecurity. 
As we saw in Chapter 6, the significant emphasis on socio-economic development in the 
negotiations and outcome texts developed in the post-Rio period, indicate that the 
sustainable development paradigm is premised on the notion of sustained economic growth 
in a global market economy. This approach, while tempered by the modish notion of a 
‘green economy’, continues to ignore the possibility that continuous economic growth 
exacerbates the existing environmental crisis, and the uneven power relations within the 
international community; between the rich and poor and between men and women. 
Ecofeminism argues that these inequalities are inherent in the global market economy. 
Adopting a more ecological and socially tenable understanding of sustainable development 
could not only enable the international community to respond to global environmental 
degradation in a more collective and equitable way, but it could go a long way in responding 
to the notion of ‘human security’ in a manner that acknowledges differences and the 
inherent power relations between individuals.  
In addition, the findings indicate that the IEL documents primarily take into account 
economic and social differences between communities and states. This reinforces the 
dominant conceptual frameworks that inform economic rationalism and the dominant 
responses to environmental problems. In doing so, current responses to economic 
differentiation maintain the subordination and devaluation of other forms of non-
productive values of human/environment interrelationships. This approach towards 
differentiation reveals a very western conceptualisation of difference which does not take 
into account other differences, such as historical, social, cultural, conceptual, or ontological. 
Should these differences be engaged with, it could enable a more respectful and 
contextualised discussion of international responses to environmental, and potentially, 
security problems. This discussion highlights the importance of developing a more 
contextual understanding of human/environment interrelationships which could inform the 
creation, content and implementation of IEL objectives. This could recognise the plurality of 
communities, perspectives, values, and ontologies in relation to the environment.  
Taking stock of the inherent contradictions as discovered throughout this thesis, the 
conclusions point to the need for the international community to take note and consciously 
acknowledge the assumptions and conceptual framework that underpin their justifications 
for the protection of the environment. The references to environment/security links can be 
understood as a manifestation of this destructive framework, which this thesis argues 
informs the paradigm of sustainable development. Therefore, to develop effective 
international responses to the existential crisis of global environmental destruction, a radical 
re-evaluation of humanity’s role and position in the environment is required.  
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The overall idea of sustainable development does not have to be an oxymoron. Principles 
such as precaution, common but differentiated responsibilities, intra- and inter-generational 
equity, can reflect a collective response to the environmental crisis in a way that recognises 
the integration between the international community and humanity’s position as part of an 
ecological community. These principles can also inform the environment/security discourse 
in other disciplines in such a way that recognises the existential crisis of environmental 
degradation, and the need for a collective response to it. However, without states openly 
acknowledging that their perceptions of the environment inform not only the basis on 
which they protect it, but the ways in which they seek to protect it, the development of IEL 
and the future response to environment/security linkages will continue to reaffirm the 
dominant social paradigm.  
Finally, extrapolating from my findings in Chapter 5, some broader comments can be 
made concerning the participation by all sectors of society in environmental issues. Most of 
the post-Rio documents acknowledge the importance of inclusive participation by all sectors 
of society in environmental decision-making. However, as we saw in Chapter 5, there are 
emerging tensions between the principles of participation, as deployed within sustainable 
development, contrasted with the participation within those environmental areas that have a 
direct impact on the economic and national well-being of states. These tensions maintain an 
androcentric and market-based perspective of human/nonhuman interactions that has 
historically not valued the non-productive contributions by women in its strategies. Recent 
conferences and documents have acknowledged this issue and have called for inclusion of 
unpaid labour to be included in economic indicators.5 However, doing so continues to 
maintain a dominant social paradigm that does not acknowledge the material embeddedness 
of humanity in nonhuman nature. Reimagining sustainable development to acknowledge 
humanity’s true position in an ecological world, together with the meaningful participation 
by all members of the international community in a way that honestly recognises power 
relationships, would go far in developing international responses to environmental 
degradation that support the livelihood and existence of all humanity, and develop effective 
policies to ensure the security of all.  
                                                          
5 E.g. Shirin Rai, Catherine Hoskyns and Dania Thomas, 'Depletion and Social Reproduction' (CSGR Working 
Paper 274/11 Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick) 
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/papers/workingpapers/2011/27411.pdf> 
accessed 10 May 2016; Rio+20 Outcome Document (2012), 153; Gaëlle Ferrant, Luca Maria Pesando and Keiko 
Nowacka, 'Unpaid Care Work: The Missing Link in the Analysis of Gender Gaps in Labour Outcomes' (Issues 
Paper OECD Development Centre, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development December 2014) 
<https://www.oecd.org/dev/development-gender/Unpaid_care_work.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016; UNRISD, 
‘Social Inclusion and the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda’ (United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development, 2014)  <http://www.unrisd.org/unitar-social-inclusion> accessed 10 May 2016; UNDP, 
Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development (United Nations Development Programme 
2015), 12-13, 116-117; Nancy Folbre, 'Valuing Non-Market Work' (Think Piece 2015 UNDP Human 
Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme 2015) 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/folbre_hdr_2015_final_0.pdf> accessed 10 May 2016. 
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4. LOOKING AHEAD AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above conclusions present opportunities for future research. As a result of the 
relatively broad focus of this thesis on the evolution of IEL over the last 40 years, there is 
scope to focus on the international legal framework for a specific environmental topic. One 
opportunity for future research is the development of the climate change regime following 
the adoption of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, and changing understanding of 
‘differentiation’ within its text.6 In addition, the broad scope of this thesis meant that there 
was no opportunity to examine the implementation of these environmental regimes. 
Therefore, future research could analyse specific environmental regimes and the 
implementation approach used in countries facing different anxieties, such as insecurity, 
unequal levels of development and complex environmental degradation.  
The second area takes a very different approach. It became clear through the analysis that 
current approaches to international environmental conservation intend to secure 
participation by the private sector. In the context of the biodiversity and climate change 
regimes, this participation is secured through the commodification of knowledge, genetic 
resources, and other schemes that involve payment for ecosystem services.  A critical 
examination of the interplay between relevant trade related treaties, such as the 1994 TRIPs 
Agreement,7 the ongoing negotiations of an instrument on intellectual property and genetic 
resources, traditional knowledge and folklore by the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation,8 and the 2010 Nagoya Protocol could offer an exciting opportunity for 
employing the ecofeminist analytical framework developed in this research project. In 
particular, employing this framework could examine the differences between the way in 
which knowledge is understood in relation to the environment, economic considerations, 
and the way in which this sector could change communities’ perception of the environment.  
Building on the above, a third area of future work could focus on the intersection 
between the law of international development and human rights in relation to the 
environment.9 I intend to contribute to the body of existing work by examining the tensions 
                                                          
6 Decision 1/CP.17 (2011) Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (11 December 2011), ¶2; Decision 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement (12 December 2015); Paris 
Climate Agreement 2015 
7 TRIPs Agreement 1994; see also International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, as 
Revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991 (Brussels) (adopted 2 December 1961, revised 10 November 1972, 23 October 
1978, and 19 March 1991, entered into force 24 April 1998) [2000] ATS 6 / 33 UST 2703 / 815 UNTS 89; 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome) (adopted 3 November 2001, 
entered into force 29 June 2004) 2400 UNTS 303 (2010). 
8 WIPO, 'Decision on Agenda Item 5: Matters Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore' ; WIPO, ‘Draft Provisions/Articles for the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions, and IP & Genetic Resources’ (World 
Intellectual Property Organization)  <http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/draft_provisions.html> accessed 3 July 2015.  
9 John H. Knox, ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations’ (2009) 33(2) Harv Envtl L 
Rev 477; Linda Hajjar Leib, Human Rights and the Environment: Philosophical, Theoretical and Legal Perspectives 
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between these two areas, drawing on the ethic of care articulated by Karen Warren and 
incorporated within the analytical framework developed in this research. This future 
research offers the opportunity to refine the framework while also exploring whether the 
tensions between development, environment and human rights may be resolved by drawing 
on the ecofeminist ethic of care, takes into account the networks of relationships between 
individuals rather than simply focusing on the rights, duties, and rules that apply.10 
Therefore, it recognises commonalities and differences between human and nonhuman 
nature, as well as between humans. This research could feed into the ongoing work by the 
special rapporteur on human rights and the environment and the United Nations Human 
Rights Council on the relationship between human rights and the environment.11  
A fourth area of work could focus on the principles incorporated within sustainable 
development, such as CBDRRC, and the precautionary principle. Article 2(2) of the recently 
adopted Paris Climate Agreement requires that the objectives of the agreement are 
addressed in light of equity and the CBDRRC.12 I believe that an ecofeminist critique of 
equity and the different understandings of equity could shed further light on the underlying 
assumptions, interests, and beliefs that inform state action in relation to the environment. A 
similar project could be undertaken for the precautionary approach. This project would 
offer the opportunity to undertake a reflexive content analysis of case law and other sources 
of international law. This research would enable me to engage with different types of actors 
from both national and international spheres, who mediate the competing interests between 
states and the international community as a whole.  
Finally, a fifth area of future research could focus on the notion of ‘security’ in the 
context of environmental degradation and livelihood destruction. In this context, the use of 
an ecofeminist analytical framework could interrogate the international responses to 
insecurity and the way in which these take into account gender, the environment and the 
competing interests of different groups.  
As the environmental crisis is only going to deepen in the near future, the international 
response has to be radically different. Current reactions to environmental degradation have 
                                                                                                                                                                   
(Martinus Nijhoff 2011); Lyuba Zarsky, Human Rights and the Environment (Routledge 2012); Gunnar G. 
Schram, ‘Human Rights and the Environment’ (2014) 61(1-4) Nord J Intl L 141.  
10 Warren, Ecofeminist Philosophy, 99. 
11 UN Human Rights Council Resolution 19/10 Human Rights and the Environment (22 March 2012) UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/19/10; UNHRC, Report of the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating 
to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment. John H. Knox  (24 December 2012) 
A/HRC/22/43, esp. ¶60-¶61; UN Human Rights Council Resolution 26/27 Human Rights and Climate Change 
(27 June 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/27; OHCHR, Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment: Focus Report on Human Rights and Climate 
Change (June 2014) , preamble; OHCHR, The Effects of Climate Change on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015). 
12 Paris Climate Agreement 2015, art 2(2). 
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made some progress in the conservation of the environment and local communities’ 
livelihoods. However, the perception of environmental degradation as a concern for national 
and international interests, defined by socio-economic needs and economic well-being, 
means that any responses to the environmental crisis are framed in a way that conflates the 
environment-as-commodity or environment-as-utility for human needs. Ecofeminism 
argues that they will fail because they are premised on assumptions that devalue nature, 
devalue women, and are inherently androcentric in perspective. Therefore, international 
dealings with the environment should properly identify and recognise the common concern 
for all humankind that is the environmental crisis. 
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Appendix 1 
These graphs present the findings from my analysis of the documents undertaken in 
Chapter 5. They are intended to show any changes in the extent to which references in the 
documents reflect inclusivity, structural pluralism, and openness values in relation to the 
participation by state and NSAs in the creation, development, and implementation of IEL.  
As explained in Chapter 4 section 1, I categorise the documents into those which reflect 
higher-level integration and lower-level integration. In these graphs, ‘higher’ integration is 
depicted at above 7, and lower level integration is depicted by those columns below 4. Those 
documents depicted between 4-7 reflect ‘mid’-level integration.  
 
 
This graph shows that references supporting the participation by NSAs that reflect the inclusive value 
have increased after the Rio Conference. It indicates that the documents from the biodiversity, 
desertification, and sustainable development environmental areas include the most references that 
reflect this integration.  
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This graph shows that certain environmental areas, such as desertification and sustainable 
development include more references that reflect structurally plural participation.  
 
 
This graph indicates that more of the biodiversity, desertification, and sustainable development reflect 
contextualism. However, overall, fewer documents include provisions that reflect this value.   
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This graph indicates that most of the documents reflect low-level to mid-level integration of the open 
value. It also suggests that documents in the post-Rio and post-2001 periods include more references 
to transparency and openness across the board. However, while there are some references to open 
participation, the overall analysis suggests that this value is still lower.  
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Appendix 2 
These graphs present the findings from my analysis of the documents undertaken in 
Chapter 6. They are intended to show any changes in the extent to which references in the 
documents reflect inclusivity, structural pluralism, and openness values in relation to the 
inclusion of non-environmental considerations into IEL. Once again, I categorise the 
documents into those which reflect higher-level integration and lower-level integration. In 
these graphs, higher-level integration is depicted at above 7, and lower level integration is 
depicted by those columns below 4. Those documents depicted between 4-7 reflect ‘mid’-
level integration. 
 
This graph indicates that many of the documents produced in the Rio period and after reflect lower-
level integration of inclusivity. It is particularly notable that the sustainable development documents 
in the post-2001 period reflect a lower-level integration. This is unlike the analysis undertaken in the 
previous chapter.  
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The analysis found that many of the documents from the biodiversity, climate change, 
desertification and sustainable development environmental areas reflect structural pluralism. 
However, the ozone layer documents also include greater references to this value as well, as can be 
seen in the 1980-1987 period.  
 
 
This graph shows that after 1993, documents from the biodiversity, desertification and sustainable 
development regime reflect higher-level integration of contextualism. However, most of the 
documents reflect mid-level or low-level integration of this value in relation to the inclusion of 
non-environmental considerations.  
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This graph shows that after the Rio Conference, more of the documents include provisions that 
reflect openness. This is notable in the climate change and natural resources areas, both of which 
include references that reflect mid-level integration of this value.  
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Appendix 3 
These graphs present the findings from my analysis of the documents undertaken in 
Chapter 7. They are intended to show any changes in the extent to which references in the 
documents reflect inclusivity, structural pluralism, and openness values in relation to the 
representation of the environment in IEL. I categorise the documents into those which 
reflect higher-level integration and lower-level integration. In these graphs, higher-level 
integration is is depicted at above 7, and lower level integration is depicted by those columns 
below 4. Those documents depicted between 4-7 reflect ‘mid’-level integration. 
 
This graph indicates that significantly few of the references in the six environmental areas include 
references to the environment that reflect inclusivity. In general, none of the documents include 
many references to this value.  
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This graph shows that few of the documents developed prior to the Rio Conference reflect 
structural pluralism in their references to the environment. The documents produced after 1992, 
indicate that more references to the environment were included. However, those references 
generally demonstrate low-mid level integration of structural pluralism..  
 
 
This graph shows that fewer of the documents reflect contextualism. Once again, the biodiversity, 
desertification and sustainable development documents include more references that reflect this 
value. However, overall the graph depicts that few documents reflect mid or higher level 
integration.  
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This graph shows that most documents in the different environmental regimes reflect lower-level 
integration of openness in their references to the environment.  
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Appendix 4 
List of Documents Analysed in this Research 
Permanent Representative of Sweden, ‘The Question of Convening an International 
Conference on the Problems of Human Environment’. Letter dated 20 May 1968 from the 
Permanent Representative of Sweden addressed to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations' 22 May 1968) UN Doc E/4466/Add.1 
ECOSOC, ‘Question of Convening an International Conference on the Problems of the 
Human Environment: Activities of United Nations Organizations and Programmes 
Relevant to the Human Environment. Report of the Secretary General’ (United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Forty-Fifth session, Agenda item 12 (11 July 1968) ) UN Doc 
E/4553 
UNGA Res 2398(XXIII) 3 December 1968 UN Doc A/RES/2398(XXIII) 
ECOSOC, ‘Problems of the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary-General’ (Forty-
seventh session (New York, 26 May 1969)) UN Doc E/4667E/RES/1448(XLVII) 
ECOSOC Res 1436(XLV) 30 July 1968 UN Doc E/RES/1436(XLV) 
UNGA Agenda Item 21: Problems of the Human Environment. Report of the Secretary-
General 15 December 1969 UN Doc A/PV.1834 
UNGA Res. 2581(XXIV) (15 December 1969) A/RES/2581(XXIV) 
United Nations, ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment’ (New York, 10-20 March 1970) (6 April 1970) UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/PC/6 
ECOSOC, ‘United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Report of the Secretary 
General’ (19 June 1970) UN Doc E/4828 
ECOSOC Res 1536 (XLIX) 27 July 1970 UN Doc E/RES/1536(XLIX) 
ECOSOC Agenda Item 16: United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(E/4828, E/4877, paras 50-54; E/AC.24/L.371, E/L.1352) (27 July 1970) UN Doc E-SR.1719 
UNGA Res. 2657(XXV) (7 December 1970) United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, UN Doc. A/RES/2657(XXV) 
United Nations, ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment on the Work of its Second Session’ (Geneva, 8-19 February 
1971) (26 February 1971) UN Doc A/CONF.48/PC/9 
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United Nations, ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on its Third Session’ (New York, 13-
24 September 1971) UN Doc A/CONF.48/PC/13 
UNGA Res. 2849 (XXVI) (20 December 1971) UN Doc A/RES/2849 (XXVI) 
UNGA Res. 2850(XXVI) (20 December 1971) UN Doc. A/RES/2850(XXVI) 
United Nations, ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on its Fourth Session’ (New York, 6-
10 March 1972) (15 March 1972) UN Doc A/CONF.48/PC/17 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (16 June 1972) 
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972) 
Stockholm Action Plan of the Human Environment U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 
11 I.L.M. 1421 (1972) 
International Tropical Timber Agreement (adopted 18 November 1983, entered into force 1 
April 1985) 1393 UNTS 119 (1985) 
UNEP, Decision 9/13(B) ‘Protection of the Ozone Layer’ in Report of the Governing 
Council on the Work of its Ninth Session (UN GAOR 36th Session, Supplement No 25) 
(New York, 1981) A/36/25 (Annex) (26 May 1981) 
UNEP Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer, ‘An Environmental Assessment of 
Ozone Layer Depletion and its Impact. Paper prepared by the UNEP Co-ordinating 
Committee on the Ozone Layer’ (16 October 1981) UNEP/WG.69/6 
<http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/adhoc/adhoc-gfc-69-6-
an_enviroment_assessment.82-01-20.pdf> 19 June 2015 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on its 
Second Session’ (Geneva, 10-17 December 1983) (5 January 1983) UNEP/WG.78/8 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on 
the Second Part of its Second Session’ (Geneva, 11-15 April 1983) (17 June 1983) 
UNEP/WG.78/13 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on 
the First Part of its Third Session’ (Geneva, 17-21 April 1983) (10 November 1983) 
UNEP/WG.94/5 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on 
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the Second Part of its Third Session’ (Vienna, 16-20 January) (13 February 1984) 
UNEP/WG.94/10 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on 
the First Part of its Fourth Session’ (Geneva, 22-26 October 1984) (9 November 1984) 
UNEP/WG.110/4 
UNEP, ‘Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Global Framework Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer’ 
(Vienna, 18-22 March 1985) (28 January 1985) UNEP/IG-53/4 
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (adopted 22 March 1985, entered 
into force 22 September 1988) 1513 UNTS 323 (1988); 26 ILM 1529 (1987) 
UNEP, ‘Report on the Second Part of the Workshop on the Control of Chlorofluorocarbons’ 
(Leesburg, USA 8-12 September 1986) (15 October 1986) UNEP/WG.151/Background 2 
UNEP, ‘Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Protocol on the Control of Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on the work of its First Session’ (Geneva, 1-5 
December 1986) UNEP/WG.151/L.4 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Protocol on the Control of Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on the Work of its Second Session’ (Vienna, 23-27 
February 1987) (4 March 1987) UNEP/WG.167/2 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the 
Elaboration of a Protocol on the Control of Chlorofluorocarbons to the Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer on its Third Session’ (Geneva, 27-30 April 1987) (8 
May 1987) UNEP/WG.172/2 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (adopted 16 September 
1987, entered into force 1 January 1989) 1522 UNTS 3; 26 ILM 1550 (1987) 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(London, adopted 29 June 1990, entered into force 10 August 1992) 30 ILM 537 (1991); 1598 
UNTS 469 (1991) 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(Copenhagen, 23-25 November 1992), UN Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, Annex III, Decision 
IV/4, 32 ILM 874 (1993), 1785 UNTS 517 (1994) 
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Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(Montreal, 15-17 September 1997), UN Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, Annex IV, Decision IX/4 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Beijing, 
3 December 1999), UN Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.11/10, Annex V, Decision XI/5, 2173 UNTS 
183 (2004) 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity on its First 
Session’ (Geneva, 16-18 November 1988) (9 November 1989) UNEP/Bio.Div.1/3 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity on the 
Work of its Second Session’ (Geneva, 19-23 February 1990) (23 February 1990) 
UNEP/Bio.Div.2/3 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Work of its Third Session in 
Preparation for a Legal Instrument on Biological Diversity of the Planet’ (Geneva, 9-13 July 
1990) (13 August 1990) UNEP/Bio.Div.3/12 
UNEP, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Biological 
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